। ॥ §०§ । ॥ §१§ , ॥३॥ , , । । ॥४॥ ---- , , , । ॥ §२§ , , , , , ॥५॥ , , , । । ॥ §३§
In plain words
And with pleasure and the like, and with the things that cause pleasure and the like, even though their appearance is there, the standing is of that kind because they are past.
But when pleasure and the like are vividly drawn up by , the standing would be so, in just that way, since it is clearly marked.
With pleasure, and with its cause, a garland, sandal paste and the like; with pain, and with its cause, a snake, a thorn and the like, when these are past or still to come: although the is the same, still it is mixed with another , “this is past” or “this is to come”, and it is cut off from the “I experience”. So, even while they are present, that does not stand in the way he stood before, as “I am now happy” or “in pain”, or as one who has gathered the full set of their causes.
But when he draws up those things vividly by , there enters the that causes the drawing up and the naming of the pleasure and its cause, marked by being repeated again and again. Because of this, one should expect a standing “so”, that is, as “I am happy” and the like, “in just that way”, the way we have described, which is mixing with another , and in no other. This is fitting, since he then marks the of pleasure as mixed with the of clearness. The mention of the past stands also for what is to come.
But surely, what has been said by this much? That garlands and the like, whose form is outer, are the causes of pleasure and the rest, and that pleasure and the rest, born from what is outer, are the causes of the conceit “I am happy”. And so, where there is no being outside and no being born from it, it could not be said so; and in that case they themselves are nothing at all. So how has it been said that there is no difference anywhere in the being of the appearance of the object, when being itself is absent? With this doubt in view, he says:
Being outside is held to be an adjunct of the appearances of presence and absence, not their self; therefore these, being inner, have being always.
Here, as for the of presence and of absence, such as “I have pleasure” and “I have no pain”, what is called their being outside is not their “self”, their own form. For the own form of “pleasure” does not shine with a body that is “outside”; the own form of pleasure is pleasure alone. Being outside is only another , and when the Lord, by the strength of His alone, makes it shine there, mixed into the of pleasure, then it takes on the role of an “adjunct” to it: of what colours it, of a qualifier. And so, just as nothing at all befalls the of the lotus in its own form when the of blue is absent, or the of the man when the of king is absent, so, even when the of being outside is absent, the of pleasure, of the absence of pain, of the beloved, does not fade at all in its own form. So these, being inner, stand always.
Here, in the , whose self is the mirror of , the appearances of blue and the like have inwardness too, since they come about within the . They also have outwardness in the form of being grasped, since they appear cut off from the ; and there is outwardness that is simply being perceived outside. In both these states they do bring about effective action, at the least a knowing that has them as its content. But as for the inwardness marked by being one with the , why would they not bring about some effective action there too? With this doubt in view, he says:
Because of inwardness, in oneness with the , these have no effective action, rooted as it is in difference. Even in outwardness, effective action comes from the difference of distinct .