, , , । , , , , । ? , ॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥। } , ॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥। } , । , , ॥१॥ , , । ॥ §०§ , । , , , । ---- ॥२॥ । ॥ §१§
In plain words
First, what was said: that there are only acts of knowing, divided into experience, and the rest, and that they have no ground at all; that memory is established from ; and that if knowing is insentient, it is not the of the object, while if it is not insentient, it is not different from the truth of the , since it lacks any contraction by space and time. That, to begin with, has been refuted, because it has been shown at length that experience and the rest, as separate things, cannot be accounted for. And since it has also been said that memory does not come from alone, and also shown that knowing is not insentient at all and is uncontracted in form, but appears contracted owing to the colouring of the knowable that its own makes appear, it is not only the objections against the of knowledge that have been torn apart by this set of reasons: by this very set of reasons the faults charged against the of action have been driven off too. This is what the word “api” conveys. “How can one action, being sequential, hold together when its ground has a single nature?”: that is fair. And what was said, likewise, in the words
“when this or that is there”
and in the words
“because what rests in two has more than one form”
that too is simply refuted, since in a as long as this, its whole life is just this much: how could one thing have many natures? And to this it has been said: where, as in a mirror, a difference of can come about in what has for its nature without harm to its oneness, what contradiction could there be? Therefore, by the force of , that thing itself, though one, takes on differences of nature that oppose one another; and as far as it takes them on, so far do those differences, shining in the form of sequence just because they oppose one another, make it the one ground of action. And so relation and the rest too can be accounted for.
But surely being sequential is the very form of action, and there is no sequence in the Blessed One, who is made of and free of the reckoning of time; so how could action belong to Him? With this doubt in view, he says:
And being sequential holds good for worldly action, through the of time; but it would not hold for the eternal action that is the Sovereign’s, as it would not for the Sovereign Himself.
In “he lifts his hand, he lowers it”, the earlier and later moments have sequence. There, for those for whom those very moments are the action, as for the followers of and others, action shines as sequential by perception itself. But others hold that there is some lodged in the hand, beyond the senses, whose form is the stirring of activity and which is always to be inferred, and that it brings about the difference of forms seen in such a perception; of that only its being earlier and later is inferred. So the sequential nature of worldly action “holds good”, can be accounted for, “through the of time”, a particular of the Supreme Lord whose form is the capacity to display cut apart. But the of action that “belongs to the Sovereign”, not other than Him, “eternal”, untouched by time: that it is sequential cannot even be supposed. Just as being sequential cannot be supposed of the Sovereign, so it cannot of this either. For it has been said:
“If the hand were sequential, the action lodged in it would be so too.”
So it runs.
But surely time, coming to be a qualifier, marks off a thing by its own form; so what is this that is called time? With this doubt in view, he says:
Time is the movement of the sun and the rest, or the birth of this or that flower and the like, or heat and cold; or else it is what these mark; and that, in truth, is sequence itself.