। । । । । । । , , , , , ---- । ॥ §०§ , । ---- , , , , , , , , , , , ॥१॥ , , । ॥ §१§
In plain words
with which the passage ends, the is set out in a group of seven verses. There, in the first verse, which is like a , he shows that action and the rest, which are one and many in form, have a body that must by all means be upheld, even though on the view of those who hold to outer things they cannot be accounted for, because of the fault that contradictory properties would be laid on one thing. The second points to how they can be accounted for there. The third says that, although they are known in an awareness free of , their form is clear only at the time of . The fourth and fifth consider how the scope of being one and of being many in form is divided. The sixth states the form of the relation of action and its factors and the rest, which are taken up under the relation pointed to in the opening . The seventh states their use for effective action. That is the summary.
But surely, on this account, whatever is fashioned in that way by the of fashioning, which has the form of making shine, has as its fashioning nothing but its being made to shine, and nothing else. And that belongs to the double moon and the like, to blue and the like, and also to the action, universal, relation and the rest that rest in blue and the like. So how could the dealings in cases like these, as “unreal”, “real” and “real by convention”, hold together, since there is no difference in their being fashioned? With this doubt in view, saying that the unreality of action and the rest, to begin with, does not hold, and hinting that the double moon and the like, for their part, are unreal in this way too, he says:
The thoughts of action, relation, universal, substance, direction and time, whose ground is one and many, are held to be true because of their stability and their use.
Apart from the truth that is , the thought of action that arises about the doer, the object, the instrument and the rest, as in “ roasts”, “the grains of rice grow soft”, “the firewood burns”: its “ground”, its support, is an object, and the like, which is one and many in form. Consider: there ’s body, divided by this or that place, time and shape, though it has many natures, shines without ever letting go of its single form: “this is that very one”. And that itself is action, one and many in form; and because it appears just so, it is real in the highest sense. But the double moon and the like, though it appears in the same way, is unreal, because afterwards its stability, which is the going on of the work of valid knowing, is uprooted in the form “there is no double moon”. Here, though, a of the kind “ moves” is known as going on, uprooted by nothing. And though the double moon and the like are of use for delight and for alarm, still one who takes there to be a double moon does not suppose there is that much effective action there; rather, the effective action that one moon is to do, driving off the darkness and the like, is just what the other does too. So he does not settle on a doubled effective action there, and the double moon is of no use for that. But in walking, the very reaching of the village one settles on is, in full, what walking is of use for. So, from stability and from use, the thought whose support is the truth of action, one and many in form, is true. The same is to be said of relation and the rest, as far as time; he will make it plain in the verses that follow.
But surely oneness and manyness contradict each other; how could they be in one real thing? And so this is a kind of uprooting of stability, brought about by a that cancels. With this doubt in view, he says:
There, the inner is one; and that same , once it comes to be known by the senses, becomes many, through space, time and own nature.