॥३॥ । ॥ §०§ , । , । । , । । । । ---- , , । ; , , , । । , , ---- ॥४॥ , ---- । ॥ §१§ , , । , , । ॥५॥ , ? । ॥ §२§ । ॥ §३§
In plain words
that is to say, this point must then of necessity be argued for.
And then he shows how it holds, in this way:
The relation of cause and effect in the world is this: that what turns about within comes to be knowable by both kinds of organ, through the of that One beyond telling.
What is within the potter’s heart, in the field of his , flashes forth there even before by , as one with his own , turning about in its variety in the form of difference and non-difference from the universe. That this is made to appear as knowable by both, the inner organ and the outer organ: this alone is that relation of cause and effect. The mention of “both” is a pointer: that is to say, a thing is complete at the point where its effective action is full. For pleasure and the like, making them knowable by the inner organ alone is itself their making. And this does not rest in the potter as one who is all but , the , , the void or the body, since that too is insentient. So it is alone that makes the universe shine in itself, through the variety of its . “Of that One beyond telling” means: of the one spoken of before, whose greatness can neither be thought nor called to account. Nor should it be said that being knowable by both organs is itself either existent or non-existent. For this is the truth here. In the reflection, within a mirror, of a pot and the like being made by a potter, the greatness of making it shine so belongs to the mirror alone, and so too, in seeing a dream, it belongs to . Even so, by that same greatness the conceit springs up, “by this one this is being made outside, clear in form”. In the same way, when by the greatness of the potter, the stick, the wheel and the rest, and the pot are in place, by that greatness alone the conceit arises: “I made this”, “he made this”, “it flashed in my heart”, “it flashed in his heart”. There the conceit is far removed from the insentient, from clay and the rest; so being the doer is settled in what has as its own nature. But surely, let the bare form of a thing be made to shine in this way: why is being knowable by both organs spoken of here? By it a form is meant that is clear and able to do effective action; so where is the conflict?
And he shows that by this inquiry the nature of action, the matter at hand, is established too:
So this one action, an abiding in sequence within and without, has been shown to hold of a single thing alone that can bear both forms.
“This very” action: the one against which the charge was made that it does not hold, either in its own form or in its ground, has been established by reasoning. For the abiding, which is a making appear, runs from the inner, whose form is , out to the outer, as the field of the senses; for that very reason it holds, to begin with, as being in sequence, since it embraces an object whose nature is to be known. And it is one, because doer and object are one with a single ground. And that one ground, because its form is , bears both, the inner form and the outer, through its clearness and its freedom.
But surely, let it be so for the pot and the like. Where, though, as with seed and sprout and the like, no entering in of a sentient being is seen, how is it that the sprout is not the effect of the seed alone? With this doubt in view, he says:
That which is within with respect to something is, outside, the effect of that very thing; and the twofold abiding, outer and inner, has been spoken of with respect to the .
So the alone is the cause, and he stands as the one alone in the effect’s abiding as two ; so action is declared to belong to the one.