अर्जुन
In plain words
Arjuna said: Janardana, if you consider buddhi superior to action, why then do you urge me into this terrible action, Keshava?
Word for word
If buddhi is considered by you superior to action, O Janārdana, then why do you urge me into terrible action, O Keśava?
ज्यायसी चेत् कर्मणस्ते मता बुद्धिर्जनार्दनतत् किं कर्मणि घोरे मां नियोजयसि केशव
Other commentaries
The commentators
▸Bhagavadgītābhāṣyam
शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविषयभूते द्वे बुद्धी भगवता निर्दिष्टे, साङ्ख्ये बुद्धिः योगे बुद्धिः इति च । तत्र ‘प्रजहाति यदा कामान्’(भ. गी. २ । ५५) इत्यारभ्य आ अध्यायपरिसमाप्तेः साङ्ख्यबुद्ध्याश्रितानां संन्यासं कर्तव्यमुक्त्वा तेषां तन्निष्ठतयैव च कृतार्थता उक्ता — ‘एषा ब्राह्मी स्थितिः’(भ. गी. २ । ७२) इति । अर्जुनाय च ‘कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते . . . मा ते सङ्गोऽस्त्वकर्मणि’(भ. गी. २ । ४७) इति कर्मैव कर्तव्यमुक्तवान् योगबुद्धिमाश्रित्य, न तत एव श्रेयःप्राप्तिम् उक्तवान् । तदेतदालक्ष्य पर्याकुलीकृतबुद्धिः अर्जुनः उवाच । कथं भक्ताय श्रेयोर्थिने यत् साक्षात् श्रेयःप्राप्तिसाधनं साङ्ख्यबुद्धिनिष्ठां श्रावयित्वा मां कर्मणि दृष्टानेकानर्थयुक्ते पारम्पर्येणापि अनैकान्तिकश्रेयःप्राप्तिफले नियुञ्ज्यात् इति युक्तः पर्याकुलीभावः अर्जुनस्य, तदनुरूपश्च प्रश्नः ‘ज्यायसी चेत्’(भ. गी. ३ । १) इत्यादिः, प्रश्नापाकरणवाक्यं च भगवतः युक्तं यथोक्तविभागविषये शास्त्रे ॥
केचित्तु — अर्जुनस्य प्रश्नार्थमन्यथा कल्पयित्वा तत्प्रतिकूलं भगवतः प्रतिवचनं वर्णयन्ति, यथा च आत्मना सम्बन्धग्रन्थे गीतार्थो निरूपितः तत्प्रतिकूलं च इह पुनः प्रश्नप्रतिवचनयोः अर्थं निरूपयन्ति । कथम् ? तत्र सम्बन्धग्रन्थे तावत् — सर्वेषामाश्रमिणां ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयः गीताशास्त्रे निरूपितः अर्थः इत्युक्तम् ; पुनः विशेषितं च यावज्जीवश्रुतिचोदितानि कर्माणि परित्यज्य केवलादेव ज्ञानात् मोक्षः प्राप्यते इत्येतत् एकान्तेनैव प्रतिषिद्धमिति । इह तु आश्रमविकल्पं दर्शयता यावज्जीवश्रुतिचोदितानामेव कर्मणां परित्याग उक्तः । तत् कथम् ईदृशं विरुद्धमर्थम् अर्जुनाय ब्रूयात् भगवान् , श्रोता वा कथं विरुद्धमर्थमवधारयेत् ॥
तत्रैतत् स्यात् — गृहस्थानामेव श्रौतकर्मपरित्यागेन केवलादेव ज्ञानात् मोक्षः प्रतिषिध्यते, न तु आश्रमान्तराणामिति । एतदपि पूर्वोत्तरविरुद्धमेव । कथम् ? सर्वाश्रमिणां ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयो गीताशास्त्रे निश्चितः अर्थः इति प्रतिज्ञाय इह कथं तद्विरुद्धं केवलादेव ज्ञानात् मोक्षं ब्रूयात् आश्रमान्तराणाम् ॥
अथ मतं श्रौतकर्मापेक्षया एतद्वचनम् ‘केवलादेव ज्ञानात् श्रौतकर्मरहितात् गृहस्थानां मोक्षः प्रतिषिध्यते’ इति ; तत्र गृहस्थानां विद्यमानमपि स्मार्तं कर्म अविद्यमानवत् उपेक्ष्य ‘ज्ञानादेव केवलात्’ इत्युच्यते इति । एतदपि विरुद्धम् । कथम् ? गृहस्थस्यैव स्मार्तकर्मणा समुच्चितात् ज्ञानात् मोक्षः प्रतिषिध्यते न तु आश्रमान्तराणामिति कथं विवेकिभिः शक्यमवधारयितुम् । किञ्च — यदि मोक्षसाधनत्वेन स्मार्तानि कर्माणि ऊर्ध्वरेतसां समुच्चीयन्ते तथा गृहस्थस्यापि इष्यतां स्मार्तैरेव समुच्चयो न श्रौतैः ॥
अथ श्रौतैः स्मार्तैश्च गृहस्थस्यैव समुच्चयः मोक्षाय, ऊर्ध्वरेतसां तु स्मार्तकर्ममात्रसमुच्चितात् ज्ञानात् मोक्ष इति । तत्रैवं सति गृहस्थस्य आयासबाहुल्यात् , श्रौतं स्मार्तं च बहुदुःखरूपं कर्म शिरसि आरोपितं स्यात् ॥
अथ गृहस्थस्यैव आयासबाहुल्यकारणात् मोक्षः स्यात् , न आश्रमान्तराणां श्रौतनित्यकर्मरहितत्वात् इति । तदप्यसत् , सर्वोपनिषत्सु इतिहासपुराणयोगशास्त्रेषु च ज्ञानाङ्गत्वेन मुमुक्षोः सर्वकर्मसंन्यासविधानात् , आश्रमविकल्पसमुच्चयविधानाच्च श्रुतिस्मृत्योः ॥
सिद्धस्तर्हि सर्वाश्रमिणां ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयः — न, मुमुक्षोः सर्वकर्मसंन्यासविधानात् । ‘पुत्रैषणाया वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति’(बृ. उ. ३ । ५ । १) ‘तस्मात् न्यासमेषां तपसामतिरिक्तमाहुः’(तै. ना. ७९) ‘न्यास एवात्यरेचयत्’(तै. ना. ७८) इति, ‘न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैके अमृतत्वमानशुः’(तै. ना. १२) इति च । ‘ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत्’(जा. उ. ४) इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः । ‘त्यज धर्ममधर्मं च उभे सत्यानृते त्यज । उभे सत्यानृते त्यक्त्वा येन त्यजसि तत्त्यज । ’(मो. ध. ३२९ । ४०) ‘संसारमेव निःसारं दृष्ट्वा सारदिदृक्षया । प्रव्रजन्त्यकृतोद्वाहाः परं वैराग्यमाश्रिताः’(?) इति बृहस्पतिः । ‘कर्मणा बध्यते जन्तुर्विद्यया च विमुच्यते । तस्मात्कर्म न कुर्वन्ति यतयः पारदर्शिनः’(मो. ध. २४१ । ७) इति शुकानुशासनम् । इहापि च ‘सर्वकर्माणि मनसा संन्यस्य’(भ. गी. ५ । १३) इत्यादि ॥
मोक्षस्य च अकार्यत्वात् मुमुक्षोः कर्मानर्थक्यम् । नित्यानि प्रत्यवायपरिहारार्थानि इति चेत् , न ; असंन्यासिविषयत्वात् प्रत्यवायप्राप्तेः । न हि अग्निकार्याद्यकरणात् संन्यासिनः प्रत्यवायः कल्पयितुं शक्यः, यथा ब्रह्मचारिणामसंन्यासिनामपि कर्मिणाम् । न तावत् नित्यानां कर्मणामभावादेव भावरूपस्य प्रत्यवायस्य उत्पत्तिः कल्पयितुं शक्या, ‘कथमसतः सज्जायेत’(छा. उ. ६ । २ । २) इति असतः सज्जन्मासम्भवश्रुतेः । यदि विहिताकरणात् असम्भाव्यमपि प्रत्यवायं ब्रूयात् वेदः, तदा अनर्थकरः वेदः अप्रमाणमित्युक्तं स्यात् ; विहितस्य करणाकरणयोः दुःखमात्रफलत्वात् । तथा च कारकं शास्त्रं न ज्ञापकम् इत्यनुपपन्नार्थं कल्पितं स्यात् । न चैतदिष्टम् । तस्मात् न संन्यासिनां कर्माणि । अतो ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयानुपपत्तिः ; ‘ज्यायसी चेत् कर्मणस्ते मता बुद्धिः’(भ. गी. ३ । १) इति अर्जुनस्य प्रश्नानुपपत्तेश्च ॥
यदि हि भगवता द्वितीयेऽध्याये ज्ञानं कर्म च समुच्चित्य त्वया अनुष्ठेयम् इत्युक्तं स्यात् , ततः अर्जुनस्य प्रश्नः अनुपपन्नः ‘ज्यायसी चेत्कर्मणस्ते मता बुद्धिः’(भ. गी. ३ । १) इति । अर्जुनाय चेत् बुद्धिकर्मणी त्वया अनुष्ठेये इत्युक्ते, या कर्मणो ज्यायसी बुद्धिः सापि उक्तैव इति ‘तत् किं कर्मणि घोरे मां नियोजयसि केशव’(भ. गी. ३ । १) इति उपालम्भः प्रश्नो वा न कथञ्चन उपपद्यते । न च अर्जुनस्यैव ज्यायसी बुद्धिः न अनुष्ठेया इति भगवता उक्तं पूर्वम् इति कल्पयितुं युक्तम् , येन ‘ज्यायसी चेत्’ इति विवेकतः प्रश्नः स्यात् ॥
यदि पुनः एकस्य पुरुषस्य ज्ञानकर्मणोर्विरोधात् युगपदनुष्ठानं न सम्भवतीति भिन्नपुरुषानुष्ठेयत्वं भगवता पूर्वमुक्तं स्यात् , ततोऽयं प्रश्न उपपन्नः ‘ज्यायसी चेत्’ इत्यादिः । अविवेकतः प्रश्नकल्पनायामपि भिन्नपुरुषानुष्ठेयत्वेन ज्ञानकर्मनिष्ठयोः भगवतः प्रतिवचनं नोपपद्यते । न च अज्ञाननिमित्तं भगवत्प्रतिवचनं कल्पनीयम् । अस्माच्च भिन्नपुरुषानुष्ठेयत्वेन ज्ञानकर्मनिष्ठयोः भगवतः प्रतिवचनदर्शनात् ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयानुपपत्तिः । तस्मात् केवलादेव ज्ञानात् मोक्ष इत्येषोऽर्थो निश्चितो गीतासु सर्वोपनिषत्सु च ॥
ज्ञानकर्मणोः ‘एकं वद निश्चित्य’(भ. गी. ३ । २) इति च एकविषयैव प्रार्थना अनुपपन्ना, उभयोः समुच्चयसम्भवे । ‘कुरु कर्मैव तस्मात्त्वम्’(भ. गी. ४ । १५) इति च ज्ञाननिष्ठासम्भवम् अर्जुनस्य अवधारणेन दर्शयिष्यति ॥
ज्यायसी श्रेयसी चेत् यदि कर्मणः सकाशात् ते तव मता अभिप्रेता बुद्धिर्ज्ञानं हे जनार्दन । यदि बुद्धिकर्मणी समुच्चिते इष्टे तदा एकं श्रेयःसाधनमिति कर्मणो ज्यायसी बुद्धिः इति कर्मणः अतिरिक्तकरणं बुद्धेरनुपपन्नम् अर्जुनेन कृतं स्यात् ; न हि तदेव तस्मात् फलतोऽतिरिक्तं स्यात् । तथा च, कर्मणः श्रेयस्करी भगवतोक्ता बुद्धिः, अश्रेयस्करं च कर्म कुर्विति मां प्रतिपादयति, तत् किं नु कारणमिति भगवत उपालम्भमिव कुर्वन् तत् किं कस्मात् कर्मणि घोरे क्रूरे हिंसालक्षणे मां नियोजयसि केशव इति च यदाह, तच्च नोपपद्यते । अथ स्मार्तेनैव कर्मणा समुच्चयः सर्वेषां भगवता उक्तः अर्जुनेन च अवधारितश्चेत् , ‘तत्किं कर्मणि घोरे मां नियोजयसि’(भ. गी. ३ । १) इत्यादि कथं युक्तं वचनम् ॥ १ ॥
In plain words
The Lord pointed to two kinds of understanding as the subject matter of this teaching: understanding regarding Sāṅkhya, and understanding regarding yoga. From 'he abandons desires, when...' (2.55) all the way to the end of chapter two, Kṛṣṇa taught that those grounded in Sāṅkhya-understanding should renounce action, and that simply by abiding in that understanding they reach fulfillment — that is 'the state belonging to Brahman' (2.72). But to Arjuna specifically, Kṛṣṇa said, 'Your right is to action alone... do not let yourself become attached to inaction' (2.47) — basing this on yoga-understanding, he told Arjuna that action alone should be done, but never actually said that the highest good is reached through action alone. Noticing this, Arjuna, his mind thrown into confusion, spoke up: 'How could you, having just taught me grounding in Sāṅkhya-understanding — the direct means to the highest good — now assign me instead to action, which is bound up with so many visible troubles and whose result, even taken as an indirect path, is at best uncertain?' Arjuna's confusion here is entirely understandable, and so is the question that matches it: 'If you deem knowledge superior...' (3.1) and what follows. And it is fitting that the Lord's answer addresses exactly this question, in terms of the very division he had already laid out in his teaching.
Some other commentators, however, read Arjuna's question quite differently, and describe Kṛṣṇa's reply as running against what Śaṅkara himself established in his own introductory essay to the Gītā — and here, once again, they read the question and Kṛṣṇa's answer in a way that contradicts that. How so? In the introduction, Śaṅkara first says that the Gītā's teaching establishes a combination of knowledge and action for everyone, in every stage of life; and then he goes further and flatly denies the specific claim that liberation comes from knowledge alone, once lifelong scriptural duties have been given up. But here, they claim, by pointing to the option of a particular life-stage, Śaṅkara is really only talking about giving up lifelong scriptural duties specifically. But how could Kṛṣṇa possibly say something to Arjuna that contradicts itself this badly? And how could any reader possibly accept a reading that contradicts itself this way?
Here someone might say: "The denial applies only to householders — that a householder could drop the Vedic rites and reach liberation by knowledge alone. Nothing is being denied about people in the other stages of life." But this too contradicts what he said before and what he says after. How? He has already declared that the joint practice of knowledge and action, for people in every stage of life, is the settled meaning of the Gītā. Having declared that, how could he turn around here and say the opposite — that for those in the other stages of life liberation comes from knowledge alone?
Now, someone might argue: perhaps Śaṅkara's statement, read strictly with reference to Vedic ritual, means only this — 'liberation is denied to householders through knowledge alone, apart from Vedic ritual action.' On this reading, they set aside the householder's ongoing traditional (smṛti) duties as if they simply didn't exist, and take 'knowledge alone' to mean 'apart from Vedic ritual specifically.' But this reading is just as contradictory. Why? Because it would mean liberation is denied only when knowledge is combined with a householder's traditional duties — but not denied for people in other life-stages. How could any thoughtful reader possibly accept that? And there's more: if traditional duties really are combined with knowledge as a means to liberation for lifelong celibates, then, by that very same logic, we'd have to say the same thing for the householder too — that his combination is specifically with traditional duties, not Vedic ones. But that makes no coherent sense either.
Now someone may say: for the householder alone, liberation comes from doing both — the Vedic rites and the smṛti rites together; while for those who keep the life-force turned upward, liberation comes from knowledge joined with the smṛti rites and nothing more. But if that is how it stands, then look at what follows. The householder's life is already crowded with toil, and now the whole mass of Vedic and smṛti karma, which is nothing but hardship from beginning to end, gets loaded onto his head.
Someone may now say: then liberation belongs to the householder alone, since his life is packed with effort — and the other stages of life miss out, having no obligatory Vedic rites of their own. That too does not hold. In all the Upaniṣads, and in the epics, the Purāṇas and the yoga texts, the renunciation of every action is laid down for the one who wants liberation, laid down as a limb of knowledge; and both śruti and smṛti prescribe choosing among the āśramas as well as passing through them in turn.
So then, one might say, a combination of knowledge and action must hold for everyone, in every stage of life. No — because scripture specifically enjoins the renunciation of all action for anyone seeking liberation. Consider: 'Having given up craving for children, craving for wealth, and craving for worlds, they go out and live as wandering mendicants' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.5.1). 'That is why the wise declare renunciation to surpass every one of these austerities' (Taittirīya Nārāyaṇa 79). 'Renunciation alone outdid them all' (Taittirīya Nārāyaṇa 78). 'Not through ritual, not through children, not through wealth, but through renunciation alone did some attain immortality' (Taittirīya Nārāyaṇa 12) — these passages, and others like them. 'One may go forth right from one's student years' (Jābāla Upaniṣad 4) — again, scripture itself. 'Give up merit and demerit. Give up both truth and falsehood. And having given up both truth and falsehood, give up even the very faculty by which you give things up' (Mokṣadharma 329.40). And, as Bṛhaspati says: 'Seeing that worldly life itself has no real substance, and longing to see what does, some go forth even before marrying, having embraced the deepest dispassion.' And in Śuka's own teaching: 'A creature is bound by action and freed by knowledge; that is why ascetics who have already glimpsed the far shore no longer perform action' (Mokṣadharma 241.7). And even here, in the Gītā itself: 'having renounced all actions mentally' (5.13), and so on.
And since liberation is never something produced by action, action is simply futile for anyone seeking it. Someone might object: 'But daily obligatory rites exist precisely to ward off the sin of neglecting them.' No — because that sin only applies to people who haven't renounced. You cannot conceive of a renunciate incurring a sin for skipping the fire-ritual, any more than you could for a celibate student who is still, admittedly, bound to ritual duty. And in any case, you can't really suppose that simply not performing a rite gives rise to some positively existing sin — because scripture itself says something real cannot arise from nothing: 'how could the existent be born from the non-existent?' (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.2). If the Veda claimed that not doing a prescribed rite produces a real sin that couldn't otherwise exist, then the Veda would effectively be admitting it asserts things with no basis — which would make it invalid, because then doing the rite and not doing it would come to the very same thing: mere suffering either way. And scripture would then be nothing but a producer of consequences rather than a revealer of what already is — which is simply an untenable fabrication that no one actually accepts. So, obligatory rites don't apply to renunciates at all. Which means combining knowledge with action cannot be maintained — and this is confirmed by the fact that, otherwise, Arjuna's very question, 'If you deem knowledge superior to action...' (3.1), would make no sense either.
Think it through: if Kṛṣṇa had actually said, back in chapter two, that Arjuna should practice knowledge and action combined, then Arjuna's question here — 'If you deem knowledge superior to action...' (3.1) — simply wouldn't make sense. And if Kṛṣṇa had told Arjuna to practice both, then the knowledge deemed superior to action would already have been mentioned — so his reproach, 'Then why are you assigning me to such dreadful action, Keśava?' (3.1), whether taken as a complaint or a genuine question, wouldn't hold together at all. Nor can we imagine that Kṛṣṇa had earlier said the superior knowledge was not meant for Arjuna specifically — because that too would give no basis for the thoughtful question, 'if you deem it superior...', to ever arise.
Now, suppose instead that Kṛṣṇa had earlier said that knowledge and action, being incompatible in one person, cannot be practiced simultaneously, and therefore belong to different kinds of people. In that case, Arjuna's question, 'if you deem it superior...', would make sense. But even granting this reading without close scrutiny, Kṛṣṇa's actual reply still doesn't fit — because his answer treats knowledge and action as belonging to different people. And we certainly cannot imagine Kṛṣṇa's reply arising from mere confusion. In fact, it is precisely because we see Kṛṣṇa's reply treating knowledge and action this way — as belonging to different people — that combining them cannot be maintained. So this is the settled meaning, running through the Gītā and every Upaniṣad alike: liberation comes from knowledge alone.
And there is the request itself: 'decide it, and tell me the one' (3.2) — one, out of knowledge and action. A request aimed at a single path has no ground to stand on if both could simply be combined. And with 'therefore, you — do the work, and only the work' (4.15), by that very insistence he will show that standing firm in knowledge is not open to Arjuna.
'If' — 'superior,' meaning better, than action — is what 'you,' Kṛṣṇa, 'deem' to be 'knowledge,' Janārdana. Now, if knowledge and action really were held to be one combined means, then Arjuna's very statement — 'knowledge is superior to action' — drawing a distinction between the two, would make no sense for him to say at all, because that same knowledge would then produce no different result than action. And so Arjuna reasons: 'You have told me knowledge is more conducive to the highest good than action, and yet you're instructing me to act, even though action is less conducive — what could possibly be your reason?' And, almost reproaching Kṛṣṇa, he says, 'Then why, Keśava, are you assigning me to such terrible, cruel action, marked by violence?' That too makes no sense on the other reading. Or suppose Kṛṣṇa had told everyone to combine knowledge specifically with traditional duties, and Arjuna had understood him that way — even then, how could Arjuna's protest, 'then why do you assign me to such terrible action?' (3.1), possibly fit?
Close to the Sanskrit
Two understandings, which have become the topics of engagement and disengagement in the treatise, were indicated by the Lord: understanding regarding Sāṅkhya, and understanding regarding yoga. There, beginning with 'he abandons desires, when...' (Gītā 2.55) up to the completion of the chapter, having stated that renunciation is to be done by those grounded in Sāṅkhya-understanding, and their fulfillment through grounding in that alone was stated — 'this is the state pertaining to Brahman' (Gītā 2.72). And to Arjuna, [Kṛṣṇa] said, 'Your entitlement is to action alone... let there be no attachment on your part to inaction' (Gītā 2.47) — that action alone is to be done, basing this on yoga-understanding, [but] did not state that the attainment of the highest good [comes] from that alone. Having observed this, Arjuna, his understanding thrown into confusion, said: 'How could [Kṛṣṇa] appoint me — a devotee seeking the highest good — to action, connected with many observed misfortunes, whose result is only an uncertain attainment of the highest good even indirectly, after having taught me grounding in Sāṅkhya-understanding, the direct means to the attainment of the highest good?' — such is Arjuna's fitting confusion, and the question corresponding to it, 'if you deem [knowledge] superior...' (Gītā 3.1) and so on; and the statement rejecting the question is, on the Lord's part, fitting, in the matter of the division stated [earlier] in the treatise.
Some, however, having construed the point of Arjuna's question differently, describe the Lord's reply as running counter to that; and just as the meaning of the Gītā was set forth by him [Śaṅkara] himself in the introductory essay, they set forth, here again, a meaning of the question and reply that runs counter to that. How so? There, in the introductory essay, to begin with, it is said that a combination of knowledge and action for all in every life-stage is the meaning established in the science of the Gītā; and it is further specified that this — namely, that liberation is attained from knowledge alone, having abandoned actions enjoined by scripture for life — is absolutely denied. Here, however, by [Śaṅkara] showing the option of [a particular] life-stage, [they claim] the abandonment only of actions enjoined by scripture for life is what is stated. How, then, could the Lord tell Arjuna so contradictory a meaning, or how could a listener possibly accept so contradictory a meaning?
At this point this might be said: "It is only for householders that liberation from knowledge alone, through the abandonment of Vedic rites, is denied — but not for those in the other stages of life." This too is simply contradictory to what precedes and what follows. How? Having declared that the joint practice of knowledge and action, for those in all the stages of life, is the settled meaning of the Gītā scripture, how, here, contradicting that, would he say that for those in the other stages of life liberation comes from knowledge alone?
Now, one might hold the view that this statement [in the introductory essay], with reference to Vedic ritual action, [means]: 'liberation is denied to householders from knowledge alone, devoid of Vedic ritual action'; on this reading, disregarding the householder's traditional (smṛti-enjoined) action, though present, as if it were non-existent, it is said 'from knowledge alone, mere [knowledge]' [is denied only with respect to Vedic action]. This too is contradictory. How so? [If the denial is that] liberation is denied only from knowledge combined with the householder's traditional action, but not [denied] for the other life-stages — how could discerning people possibly accept this? Moreover, if traditional actions are combined [with knowledge] as a means to liberation for lifelong celibates, then, by the same logic, it should be accepted for the householder too that the combination is specifically with traditional duties, not with Vedic ones.
Now, (it may be said that) for the householder alone the combination of śrauta and smārta rites is for liberation, whereas for those whose seed is turned upward, liberation is from knowledge combined with smārta rites only — so (runs the view). There, this being so, because of the householder's abundance of toil, śrauta and smārta action, being of the form of much suffering, would be placed upon his head.
Now, liberation would belong to the householder alone, on the ground of the abundance of his exertion, and not to the other āśramas, because of their being devoid of the obligatory Vedic rites — thus [some hold]. That too is untenable, because in all the Upaniṣads, and in the histories, Purāṇas and yoga treatises, the renunciation of all action is enjoined for the seeker of liberation in the capacity of a limb of knowledge; and because śruti and smṛti prescribe both option and cumulative sequence among the āśramas.
Then, [it might be objected,] a combination of knowledge and action would be established for all in every life-stage — no, because of the injunction of the renunciation of all action for one who seeks liberation. 'Having risen up from craving for offspring, craving for wealth, and craving for worlds, they then practice mendicancy' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.5.1); 'therefore they declare renunciation to surpass these austerities' (Taittirīya Nārāyaṇa 79); 'renunciation alone surpassed [them]' (Taittirīya Nārāyaṇa 78); and 'not by action, not by offspring, [not] by wealth, [but] by renunciation alone did some attain immortality' (Taittirīya Nārāyaṇa 12) — such scriptural texts, and others like them. 'One may go forth right from the state of studenthood' (Jābāla Upaniṣad 4) — such scriptural texts. 'Abandon merit and demerit; abandon both truth and falsehood; having abandoned both truth and falsehood, abandon that very [faculty] by which you abandon' (Mokṣadharma 329.40). 'Having seen that transmigratory existence itself is without essence, wishing to see what has essence, those who have not [even yet] married go forth, having resorted to supreme dispassion' — thus Bṛhaspati. 'By action the creature is bound, and by knowledge it is released; therefore ascetics who have seen the far shore do not perform action' (Mokṣadharma 241.7) — thus the teaching of Śuka. And here too, [in the Gītā itself]: 'having renounced all actions with the mind' (Gītā 5.13), and so on.
And, since liberation is not an effect [of action], action is futile for the seeker of liberation. If it be objected: 'daily obligatory rites exist for the purpose of avoiding the sin of neglect' — no; because the incurring of that sin pertains only to non-renunciates. For it is not possible to suppose a sin of neglect for a renunciate from the non-performance of the fire-ritual and the like, [any more than it would be] for celibate students, non-renunciates though they are, [who remain] engaged in action. In the first place, it is not possible to suppose the arising of a positively existent sin of neglect from the mere non-performance of daily obligatory rites, because scripture states the impossibility of the existent arising from the non-existent: 'how could the existent be born from the non-existent?' (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.2). If the Veda were to state a sin of neglect, even one that could not otherwise arise, from the non-performance of what is enjoined, then it would effectively be admitted that the Veda, asserting something groundless, is invalid; because [otherwise] the doing and not-doing of what is enjoined would have mere suffering as their only difference in result. And then scripture would be [merely] a producer of results, not a revealer [of an existing reality] — which would be a fabrication carrying an untenable claim. And this is not accepted [by anyone]. Therefore, obligatory rites do not apply to renunciates. Hence, the combination of knowledge and action is untenable; and also because, otherwise, Arjuna's question — 'if you deem knowledge superior to action...' (Gītā 3.1) — would itself be untenable.
For if it had been stated by the Lord in the second chapter that knowledge and action, combined, were to be practiced by you, then Arjuna's question — 'if you deem knowledge superior to action...' (Gītā 3.1) — would be untenable. If it had been stated to Arjuna that both knowledge and action were to be practiced by him, then, since the knowledge deemed superior to action would already have been stated too, [the reproach] 'then why do you appoint me to such dreadful action, Keśava?' (Gītā 3.1) — as either a reproach or a question — would not be tenable in any way. Nor is it proper to suppose that the Lord had previously stated that the superior knowledge was not to be practiced by Arjuna alone, such that thereby a discerning question, 'if [you deem it] superior...' could arise.
If, however, it had been previously stated by the Lord that, because of the incompatibility of knowledge and action for a single person, their simultaneous practice is not possible, [and] therefore they are to be practiced by different persons, then this question, 'if [you deem it] superior...' and so on, would be tenable. Even if one supposes, without careful discrimination, that the question arose this way, the Lord's reply still does not make sense on the basis that the two groundings, knowledge and action, are to be practiced by different persons. Nor can the Lord's reply be supposed to arise from mere confusion. And because of this very observation — that the Lord's reply treats the two groundings, knowledge and action, as belonging to different persons — the combination of knowledge and action is untenable. Therefore, this meaning — that liberation comes from knowledge alone — is the settled purport throughout the Gītās and all the Upaniṣads.
And of knowledge and action, 'tell me the one, having determined it' (Gītā 3.2) — thus, a request having a single object only would be untenable, were a combination of both possible. And 'therefore you, perform action alone' (Gītā 4.15) — thus, by that emphatic restriction he will show the impossibility, for Arjuna, of standing firm in knowledge.
'If' — 'superior,' better, than action, [that is,] your, your own, 'deemed,' held [to be] 'knowledge' — O Janārdana. If knowledge and action, combined, were held [by you as one means], then, [since] one would be the means to the highest good, the [very] statement 'knowledge is superior to action,' making a distinction of knowledge from action, would be untenable, would have been made by Arjuna [without basis]; for that very knowledge would not, in terms of result, be distinct from action. And accordingly, [Arjuna reasons:] 'you, the Lord, have stated that knowledge is more conducive to the highest good than action, and yet you instruct me, 'do action,' which is less conducive to the highest good — what, then, could possibly be the reason for this?' — voicing, as it were, a reproach to the Lord, and saying, 'then why, for what reason, do you appoint me to such terrible, cruel action, characterized by violence, Keśava?' — that too is untenable. Or, if a combination with specifically traditional (smṛti-enjoined) action, for everyone, had been stated by the Lord and grasped by Arjuna, how could the statement, 'then why do you appoint me to such terrible action' (Gītā 3.1) and so on, be fitting? [End of commentary on verse 1.]