In plain words
Some thinkers declare that action should be abandoned as inherently faulty; others say that acts of yajña, giving, and tapas should not be abandoned.
Word for word
Some thinkers declare 'karma is to be abandoned, having fault'; and others, 'the karma of yajña, giving and tapas is not to be abandoned'.
त्याज्यं दोषवदित्येके कर्म प्राहुर्मनीषिणःयज्ञदानतपःकर्म न त्याज्यमिति चापरे
Other commentaries
The commentators
▸Bhagavadgītābhāṣyam
त्याज्यं त्यक्तव्यं दोषवत् दोषः अस्य अस्तीति दोषवत् । किं तत् ? कर्म बन्धहेतुत्वात् सर्वमेव । अथवा, दोषः यथा रागादिः त्यज्यते, तथा त्याज्यम् इति एके कर्म प्राहुः मनीषिणः पण्डिताः साङ्ख्यादिदृष्टिम् आश्रिताः, अधिकृतानां कर्मिणामपि इति । तत्रैव यज्ञदानतपःकर्म न त्याज्यम् इति च अपरे ॥
कर्मिणः एव अधिकृताः, तान् अपेक्ष्य एते विकल्पाः, न तु ज्ञाननिष्ठान् व्युत्थायिनः संन्यासिनः अपेक्ष्य । ‘ज्ञानयोगेन साङ्ख्यानां निष्ठा मया पुरा प्रोक्ता’(भ. गी. ३ । ३) इति कर्माधिकारात् अपोद्धृताः ये, न तान् प्रति चिन्ता ॥
ननु ‘कर्मयोगेन योगिनाम्’(भ. गी. ३ । ३) इति अधिकृताः पूर्वं विभक्तनिष्ठाः अपि इह सर्वशास्त्रार्थोपसंहारप्रकरणे यथा विचार्यन्ते, तथा साङ्ख्या अपि ज्ञाननिष्ठाः विचार्यन्ताम् इति । न, तेषां मोहदुःखनिमित्तत्यागानुपपत्तेः । न कायक्लेशनिमित्तं दुःखं साङ्ख्याः आत्मनि पश्यन्ति, इच्छादीनां क्षेत्रधर्मत्वेनैव दर्शितत्वात् । अतः ते न कायक्लेशदुःखभयात् कर्म परित्यजन्ति । नापि ते कर्माणि आत्मनि पश्यन्ति, येन नियतं कर्म मोहात् परित्यजेयुः । गुणानां कर्म ‘नैव किञ्चित्करोमि’(भ. गी. ५ । ८) इति हि ते संन्यस्यन्ति । ‘सर्वकर्माणि मनसा संन्यस्य’(भ. गी. ५ । १३) इत्यादिभिः तत्त्वविदः संन्यासप्रकारः उक्तः । तस्मात् ये अन्ये अधिकृताः कर्मणि अनात्मविदः, येषां च मोहनिमित्तः त्यागः सम्भवति कायक्लेशभयाच्च, ते एव तामसाः त्यागिनः राजसाश्च इति निन्द्यन्ते कर्मिणाम् अनात्मज्ञानां कर्मफलत्यागस्तुत्यर्थम् ; ‘सर्वारम्भपरित्यागी’(भ. गी. १२ । १६) ‘मौनी सन्तुष्टो येन केनचित् । अनिकेतः स्थिरमतिः’(भ. गी. १२ । १९) इति गुणातीतलक्षणे च परमार्थसंन्यासिनः विशेषितत्वात् । वक्ष्यति च ‘निष्ठा ज्ञानस्य या परा’(भ. गी. १८ । ५८) इति । तस्मात् ज्ञाननिष्ठाः संन्यासिनः न इह विवक्षिताः । कर्मफलत्यागः एव सात्त्विकत्वेन गुणेन तामसत्वाद्यपेक्षया संन्यासः उच्यते, न मुख्यः सर्वकर्मसंन्यासः ॥
सर्वकर्मसंन्यासासम्भवे च ‘न हि देहभृता’(भ. गी. १८ । ११) इति हेतुवचनात् मुख्य एव इति चेत् , न ; हेतुवचनस्य स्तुत्यर्थत्वात् । यथा ‘त्यागाच्छान्तिरनन्तरम्’(भ. गी. १२ । १२) इति कर्मफलत्यागस्तुतिरेव यथोक्तानेकपक्षानुष्ठानाशक्तिमन्तम् अर्जुनम् अज्ञं प्रति विधानात् ; तथा इदमपि ‘न हि देहभृता शक्यम्’(भ. गी. १८ । ११) इति कर्मफलत्यागस्तुत्यर्थम् ; न ‘सर्वकर्माणि मनसा संन्यस्य नैव कुर्वन्न कारयन्नास्ते’(भ. गी. ५ । १३) इत्यस्य पक्षस्य अपवादः केनचित् दर्शयितुं शक्यः । तस्मात् कर्मणि अधिकृतान् प्रत्येव एषः संन्यासत्यागविकल्पः । ये तु परमार्थदर्शिनः साङ्ख्याः, तेषां ज्ञाननिष्ठायामेव सर्वकर्मसंन्यासलक्षणायाम् अधिकारः, न अन्यत्र, इति न ते विकल्पार्हाः । तच्च उपपादितम् अस्माभिः ‘वेदाविनाशिनम्’(भ. गी. २ । २१) इत्यस्मिन्प्रदेशे, तृतीयादौ च ॥ ३ ॥
In plain words
'To be given up' means: let go of it. 'Doṣavat' — there is a defect in it, and that is why it is called doṣavat. A defect in what? In action, because action is what binds — all action, no exceptions. Or read it this way: just as a fault like attachment is dropped, so action is to be dropped. That is what some say — the thinkers, the learned, standing on the Sāṅkhya position and others near it — and they say it even of those qualified to perform the rites, even of the working ritualists. And right there, on the same ground, others answer: sacrifice, giving and austerity are not to be given up.
It is those who act who are qualified here; these alternatives are set out with them in view — not with the saṃnyāsins in view, who stand in jñāna and have risen clear of action. Those already lifted out of the sphere of karma by the words 'the steadfastness of the Sāṅkhyas, through the yoga of knowledge, I declared long ago' — in their case there is nothing left to deliberate.
Someone might object: 'Just as those already assigned to karma-yoga — "by the yoga of action, for yogins" (Bhagavad Gītā 3.3) — are being examined in this final summary chapter, shouldn't the Sāṅkhyas, settled in knowledge, be examined here too?' No. Because for the Sāṅkhyas, relinquishment out of delusion or out of fear of suffering simply isn't possible. They never see bodily suffering as touching the Self at all — desire and its kin have already been shown to belong only to the field, the body-mind, never to the Self. So they don't give up action from fear of bodily hardship, and they don't even see action as theirs to begin with, so there's no delusion-driven abandoning for them either. What they renounce is only the guṇas' action — 'I do nothing at all,' as the knower says (Bhagavad Gītā 5.8), and 'having renounced all actions mentally' (Bhagavad Gītā 5.13) — this is the true knower's own kind of renunciation. So it's a different group entirely — those still bound to action, who haven't known the Self, whose giving-up comes from delusion or from fear of hardship — who get called 'tamasic' and 'rajasic' relinquishers, and only so that fruit-relinquishment can be praised by contrast. The true, ultimate renunciate is marked out separately: 'one who has given up every undertaking' (Bhagavad Gītā 12.16), 'silent, content with whatever comes, home in no fixed place, steady of mind' (Bhagavad Gītā 12.19) — this describes one who has gone beyond the three guṇas altogether. And the Lord will say later, 'the supreme discipline of knowledge' (Bhagavad Gītā 18.58). So it isn't the knowledge-established renunciates being discussed here at all. What's being called 'renunciation' in this chapter is simply the giving-up of fruit — sāttvika only by comparison with the tamasic and rajasic kinds — not renunciation in its full, primary sense: giving up all action.
One might press further: since total renunciation of all action is impossible for anyone embodied — the Gītā itself says so, 'the embodied cannot' (Bhagavad Gītā 18.11) — doesn't that prove fruit-relinquishment really is the primary meaning after all? No. That statement exists only to praise fruit-relinquishment, not to redefine the word. Compare: 'peace follows immediately upon relinquishment' (Bhagavad Gītā 12.12) — that too is pure praise, spoken to Arjuna precisely because he, still unlearned, couldn't manage the harder paths already taught. In just the same way, 'the embodied cannot' (Bhagavad Gītā 18.11) exists only to praise fruit-relinquishment — it can't be read as carving out any exception to 'having renounced all actions mentally, neither doing nor causing to be done, one simply remains' (Bhagavad Gītā 5.13). No one can show such an exception. So this whole choice between saṃnyāsa and tyāga applies only to people still bound to action. Those who have actually seen the ultimate truth, the Sāṅkhyas, are qualified for one thing only — the discipline of knowledge marked by total renunciation of action, nowhere else — so the choice doesn't even arise for them. I have already established this, both in the passage on 'one who knows the imperishable' (Bhagavad Gītā 2.21) and at the very opening of the third chapter.
Close to the Sanskrit
'Tyājyam' — to be relinquished. 'Doṣavat' — a defect belongs to it, thus 'doṣavat'. What is that? Action, because of its being the cause of bondage — all of it, without exception. Or else: as a defect, such as attachment and the rest, is abandoned, so it is to be abandoned — thus some declare of action, thoughtful ones, that is, the learned, who have taken their stand on the view of the Sāṅkhyas and schools like them, and this even for those qualified for action, for the performers of rites. And within that very domain, others say that the action consisting of sacrifice, giving and austerity is not to be abandoned.
The doers of action alone are the qualified ones; having regard to them, these alternatives are stated — but not having regard to the renunciants, who are established in knowledge and have risen away from action. Those who have been lifted out of the entitlement to action by 'The steadfastness of the Sāṅkhyas, through the yoga of knowledge, was declared by Me formerly' (Bhagavadgītā 3.3) — with regard to them there is no deliberation.
Now: 'by karma-yoga, for yogins' (Bhagavad Gītā 3|3) — thus those previously qualified, whose disciplines were distinguished, are examined here in this section summarizing the whole teaching's meaning; so too let the Sāṅkhyas, established in knowledge, also be examined — thus [the objector says]. No — because for them a relinquishment caused by delusion or by suffering is impossible. The Sāṅkhyas do not see, in the Self, suffering caused by bodily hardship, because desire and the rest have been shown to be attributes of the field alone. Therefore they do not give up action out of fear of the suffering of bodily hardship. Nor do they see actions in the Self, whereby they might give up an obligatory action out of delusion. It is the guṇas' action that they renounce — for, 'I do nothing at all' (Bhagavad Gītā 5|8) — 'having renounced all actions mentally' (Bhagavad Gītā 5|13) and similar verses state the knower of truth's manner of renunciation. Therefore, those others who remain qualified for action, non-knowers of the Self, for whom a delusion-caused or bodily-hardship-fear-caused relinquishment is possible — these very ones are censured as tamasic and rajasic relinquishers, for the sake of praising fruit-relinquishment among agents who lack Self-knowledge; because the ultimate renunciate is specially distinguished in 'one who has relinquished all undertakings' (Bhagavad Gītā 12|16), 'silent, content with whatever comes, homeless, of steady mind' (Bhagavad Gītā 12|19), the description of one who has transcended the guṇas. And the Lord will say: 'the supreme discipline of knowledge' (Bhagavad Gītā 18|58). Therefore knowledge-established renunciates are not meant here. It is fruit-relinquishment alone that, by virtue of being sāttvika relative to the tamasic grade and so on, is called 'renunciation' — not the primary renunciation of all action.
And in the case of the impossibility of renouncing all action: 'for by the embodied' (Bhagavad Gītā 18|11) — thus, because of this statement of reason, [it] is indeed the primary [sense] — if [one argues] thus: no; because of the statement of reason's having the purpose of praise. Just as 'immediately after relinquishment, peace' (Bhagavad Gītā 12|12) is indeed merely praise of fruit-relinquishment, on account of being prescribed toward Arjuna, ignorant, incapable of performing the many previously-stated alternatives; so too this: 'for it is not possible for the embodied' (Bhagavad Gītā 18|11) is for the sake of praising fruit-relinquishment; it is not that any exception to the thesis of 'having renounced all actions mentally, neither doing nor causing to be done, one remains' (Bhagavad Gītā 5|13) could be shown by anyone. Therefore this alternative between saṃnyāsa and tyāga applies only to those qualified for action. But those who are seers of the ultimate truth, the Sāṅkhyas — their qualification lies only in the discipline of knowledge characterized by the renunciation of all action, not elsewhere; therefore they are not candidates for the alternative. And this has been established by us in the passage 'one who knows the imperishable' (Bhagavad Gītā 2|21), and at the beginning of the third chapter.