In plain words
One whose bhāva is not shaped by ‘I’ and whose buddhi is not tainted, even if such a person were to slay these people, does not truly slay and is not bound.
Word for word
He whose notion is not shaped by 'I', whose buddhi is not tainted, even having killed these people, does not kill, nor is he bound.
यस्य नाहंकृतो भावो बुद्धिर्यस्य न लिप्यतेहत्वाऽपि स इमाँल्लोकान्न हन्ति न निबध्यते
Other commentaries
The commentators
▸Bhagavadgītābhāṣyam
कः पुनः सुमतिः यः सम्यक् पश्यतीति, उच्यते —
यस्य शास्त्राचार्योपदेशन्यायसंस्कृतात्मनः न भवति अहङ्कृतः ‘अहं कर्ता’ इत्येवंलक्षणः भावः भावना प्रत्ययः — एते एव पञ्च अधिष्ठानादयः अविद्यया आत्मनि कल्पिताः सर्वकर्मणां कर्तारः, न अहम् , अहं तु तद्व्यापाराणां साक्षिभूतः ‘अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः परः’(मु. उ. २ । १ । २) केवलः अविक्रियः इत्येवं पश्यतीति एतत् — बुद्धिः अन्तःकरणं यस्य आत्मनः उपाधिभूता न लिप्यते न अनुशयिनी भवति — ‘इदमहमकार्षम् , तेन अहं नरकं गमिष्यामि’ इत्येवं यस्य बुद्धिः न लिप्यते — सः सुमतिः, सः पश्यति । हत्वा अपि सः इमान् लोकान् , सर्वान् इमान् प्राणिनः इत्यर्थः, न हन्ति हननक्रियां न करोति, न निबध्यते नापि तत्कार्येण अधर्मफलेन सम्बध्यते ॥
ननु हत्वापि न हन्ति इति विप्रतिषिद्धम् उच्यते यद्यपि स्तुतिः । नैष दोषः, लौकिकपारमार्थिकदृष्ट्यपेक्षया तदुपपत्तेः । देहाद्यात्मबुद्ध्या ‘हन्ता अहम्’ इति लौकिकीं दृष्टिम् आश्रित्य ‘हत्वापि’ इति आह । यथादर्शितां पारमार्थिकीं दृष्टिम् आश्रित्य ‘न हन्ति न निबध्यते’ इति । एतत् उभयम् उपपद्यते एव ॥
ननु अधिष्ठानादिभिः सम्भूय करोत्येव आत्मा, ‘कर्तारमात्मानं केवलं तु’(भ. गी. १८ । १६) इति केवलशब्दप्रयोगात् । नैष दोषः, आत्मनः अविक्रियस्वभावत्वे अधिष्ठानादिभिः, संहतत्वानुपपत्तेः । विक्रियावतो हि अन्यैः संहननं सम्भवति, संहत्य वा कर्तृत्वं स्यात् । न तु अविक्रियस्य आत्मनः केनचित् संहननम् अस्ति इति न सम्भूय कर्तृत्वम् उपपद्यते । अतः केवलत्वम् आत्मनः स्वाभाविकमिति केवलशब्दः अनुवादमात्रम् । अविक्रियत्वं च आत्मनः श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायप्रसिद्धम् । ‘अविकार्योऽयमुच्यते’(भ. गी. २ । २५) ‘गुणैरेव कर्माणि क्रियन्ते’(भ. गी. ३ । २७) ‘शरीरस्थोऽपि न करोति’(भ. गी. १३ । ३१) इत्यादि असकृत् उपपादितं गीतास्वेव तावत् । श्रुतिषु च ‘ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव’(बृ. उ. ४ । ३ । ७) इत्येवमाद्यासु । न्यायतश्च — निरवयवम् अपरतन्त्रम् अविक्रियम् आत्मतत्त्वम् इति राजमार्गः । विक्रियावत्त्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि आत्मनः स्वकीयैव विक्रिया स्वस्य भवितुम् अर्हति, न अधिष्ठानादीनां कर्माणि आत्मकर्तृकाणि स्युः । न हि परस्य कर्म परेण अकृतम् आगन्तुम् अर्हति । यत्तु अविद्यया गमितम् , न तत् तस्य । यथा रजतत्वं न शुक्तिकायाः ; यथा वा तलमलिनत्वं बालैः गमितम् अविद्यया, न आकाशस्य, तथा अधिष्ठानादिविक्रियापि तेषामेव, न आत्मनः । तस्मात् युक्तम् उक्तम् ‘अहङ्कृतत्वबुद्धिलेपाभावात् विद्वान् न हन्ति न निबध्यते’ इति । ‘नायं हन्ति न हन्यते’(भ. गी. २ । १९) इति प्रतिज्ञाय ‘न जायते’(भ. गी. २ । २०) इत्यादिहेतुवचनेन अविक्रियत्वम् आत्मनः उक्त्वा, ‘वेदाविनाशिनम्’(भ. गी. २ । २१) इति विदुषः कर्माधिकारनिवृत्तिं शास्त्रादौ सङ्क्षेपतः उक्त्वा, मध्ये प्रसारितां तत्र तत्र प्रसङ्गं कृत्वा इह उपसंहरति शास्त्रार्थपिण्डीकरणाय ‘विद्वान् न हन्ति न निबध्यते’ इति । एवं च सति देहभृत्त्वाभिमानानुपपत्तौ अविद्याकृताशेषकर्मसंन्यासोपपत्तेः संन्यासिनाम् अनिष्टादि त्रिविधं कर्मणः फलं न भवति इति उपपन्नम् ; तद्विपर्ययाच्च इतरेषां भवति इत्येतच्च अपरिहार्यम् इति एषः गीताशास्त्रार्थः उपसंहृतः । स एषः सर्ववेदार्थसारः निपुणमतिभिः पण्डितैः विचार्य प्रतिपत्तव्यः इति तत्र तत्र प्रकरणविभागेन दर्शितः अस्माभिः शास्त्रन्यायानुसारेण ॥ १७ ॥
In plain words
But who is this person of sound understanding, the one who sees correctly? Here is the answer —
For someone whose very being has been refined by scripture and a teacher's instruction, the thought 'I am the doer' simply never arises. It is these same five factors — the substratum and the rest, only ever superimposed on the Self by ignorance — that are the true agents of every action, not I. I am simply the witness of their activity: 'breathless, mindless, pure, beyond even the imperishable, supreme' (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2.1.2), utterly alone, unchanging — this is how the knower actually sees. 'The intellect' is the inner instrument — a mere adjunct on the Self — and it is not stained, carries no residue of guilt: unlike an ordinary thought such as 'I did this, so I'll go to hell', the intellect of one whose mind is not stained this way is called wise; it is he who truly sees. Even should he 'kill these worlds' — meaning, all these living beings — he does not really kill, does not perform any act of killing; he is not bound, nor is he touched even by the demeritorious fruit such an act would otherwise produce.
But surely this is a contradiction: "even having killed, he does not kill." Calling it praise does not fix it. — There is no contradiction. The two halves are spoken from two different standpoints, and each one holds. "Even having killed" is said from the ordinary view, where a person takes the body and the rest to be himself and thinks, "I am the one doing the killing." "He does not kill, he is not bound" is said from the ultimate view, the one already set out. Both statements stand.
Someone might ask: doesn't the Self actually act, in combination with the body and the other factors — since the verse itself says 'the agent, the Self, alone, however' (Bhagavad Gītā 18.16), seeming to imply a contrast? No — there's no real flaw here, because, given that the Self is changeless by nature, real combination with the body and the rest is simply impossible. Only something capable of change could combine with other things and thereby become an agent through that combination. But nothing whatsoever can combine with the changeless Self, so agency arising from combination just doesn't apply to it. So the Self's 'aloneness' is simply its own natural state — the word 'alone' in the verse only restates this, it isn't marking some special exception. And the Self's changelessness is confirmed on every front — by revealed scripture, by tradition, and by reasoning itself. The Gītā says it again and again: 'this is called unchangeable' (2.25), 'actions are performed by the guṇas alone' (3.27), 'even dwelling in the body, it does not act' (13.31) — and that's just within the Gītā. The Upaniṣads say the same: 'it only seems to think, only seems to waver' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.7), and similar passages. And by reasoning too, the well-worn path is this: the true nature of the Self is partless, independent, and changeless. And even if, purely for argument's sake, we granted that the Self does change, still only its own change could belong to it — the actions of the body and the other factors could never have the Self as their agent, because one person's unperformed deed can never rightly come to belong to someone else. And whatever ignorance merely makes something seem to be does not actually belong to it — just as apparent silver doesn't really belong to a piece of mother-of-pearl, or the way children mistake a dusty surface for making the sky itself dirty. In just the same way, the changes of the body and the other factors belong only to those factors themselves — never to the Self. That is why it was rightly said: 'because his intellect carries no stain of the sense of being a doer, the knower neither kills nor gets bound.' Having first asserted 'this Self neither kills nor is killed' (Bhagavad Gītā 2.19), having then established the Self's changelessness through reasons like 'it is not born' (2.20), and having briefly, at the very start of the text, shown that the knower is freed from any qualification for action through 'one who knows the imperishable' (2.21) — and having drawn that thread out again and again throughout the middle of the text — the Gītā now, here, brings the whole teaching to a close, compressing it into one line: 'the knower neither kills nor is bound.' Given all this, once the very idea of identifying with the body is shown to be untenable, and once it becomes clear that complete renunciation of action really is possible, achieved by dispelling ignorance, it follows that the threefold fruit of action — undesired and the rest — simply does not occur for renunciates; and, by the same reasoning turned around, it inescapably does occur for everyone else. That is how this entire teaching of the Gītā comes to its conclusion. This, indeed, is the very essence of the meaning of the whole Veda — something learned scholars of sharp intellect should grasp only after careful reflection. And that is exactly what we have shown, section by section, throughout, always in keeping with the reasoning of scripture.
Close to the Sanskrit
But who is the right-minded one, who sees rightly? — thus [the question]; it is said —
Of whom, whose self has been refined by the methods of scripture and teacher's instruction, the sense of 'I-doing' does not arise — 'I am the doer', a state, a conception, a notion characterized thus. These very five, the substratum and the rest, imagined by ignorance on the Self, are the agents of all actions — not I; I, however, am the witness of their activities — 'breathless indeed, mindless indeed, pure, indeed beyond the imperishable, supreme' (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 2|1|2), alone, changeless — thus he sees; this much is meant. The intellect, the inner instrument — of whom, of the Self, having become a limiting adjunct — is not stained, does not become subject to remorse — as in 'I did this, therefore I shall go to hell' — thus, whoever's intellect is not stained by this, he is the wise one, he truly sees. Even having killed these worlds — all these beings, this is the meaning — he does not kill, does not perform the act of killing; he is not bound, nor even connected to the demeritorious fruit that is its effect.
But surely, 'even having killed, he does not kill' — this that is said is self-contradictory, even though it is praise. This is not a fault, because that holds good with reference to the worldly and the ultimate points of view. Having resorted to the worldly view, 'I am the killer,' which comes of the notion that the body and the rest are the self, he says 'even having killed.' Having resorted to the ultimate view as already shown, [he says] 'he does not kill, he is not bound.' Both of these do indeed hold good.
Now: does the Self indeed act, having combined with the substratum and the rest, because of the use of the word 'kevala' (alone) in '[the Self as] agent, alone, however' (Bhagavad Gītā 18|16)? This is not a flaw, because of the impossibility of combination with the substratum and the rest, given the Self's changeless nature. For combination with other things is possible only for one possessing modification; or, having combined, agency would then occur. But for the changeless Self, no combination with anything exists; therefore, agency through combination does not hold. Therefore, the Self's aloneness is simply its own natural state; thus the word 'kevala' is a mere restatement. And the Self's changelessness is well established by revealed scripture, tradition, and reasoning. 'This is called unchangeable' (Bhagavad Gītā 2|25), 'actions are performed by the guṇas alone' (Bhagavad Gītā 3|27), 'even dwelling in the body, does not act' (Bhagavad Gītā 13|31), and so on — this has been established repeatedly, within the Gītā itself, to begin with. And in the revealed scriptures too: 'seems to think, seems to waver' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4|3|7) and similar passages. And by reasoning — 'partless, independent, changeless is the true nature of the Self' — this is the royal road of argument. Even granting, for argument's sake, that the Self possesses modification, only its own modification could rightly belong to itself; the actions of the substratum and the rest could not have the Self as their agent. For indeed, another's action, not performed by that other, cannot rightly come to belong to someone else. And whatever is merely brought about by ignorance does not truly belong to its apparent possessor. Just as silverness does not truly belong to mother-of-pearl; or just as the dirtiness of a surface, misperceived by children through ignorance, does not truly belong to space — in that same way, the modification of the substratum and the rest belongs only to those factors themselves, not to the Self. Therefore it was rightly said: 'because of the absence of the intellect's staining by the sense of I-doing, the knower neither kills nor is bound.' Having asserted 'this Self neither kills nor is killed' (Bhagavad Gītā 2|19), and having stated the Self's changelessness by the reason-giving statement 'is not born' (Bhagavad Gītā 2|20) and similar statements, and having stated concisely, at the beginning of the treatise, the cessation of the knower's qualification for action through 'one who knows the imperishable' (Bhagavad Gītā 2|21), and having, in the middle, elaborated this application at various points, the text now concludes here, for the sake of condensing the treatise's whole meaning: 'the knower neither kills nor is bound.' This being so, given the untenability of the conceit of being a body-bearer, and given the tenability of the complete renunciation of action wrought by dispelling ignorance, it is established that the threefold fruit of action, beginning with the undesired, does not occur for renunciates; and, by the reverse of this, that it does occur, unavoidably, for others — thus this meaning of the Gītā's teaching is concluded. That very thing is the essence of the meaning of the entire Veda, to be grasped by learned scholars of keen intellect only after careful reflection — thus it has been shown by us, at various points, through the division into topics, in accordance with the reasoning of scripture.