Verse 66

In plain words

Having finished the deepest secret of steady action — surrender to the Lord — the text now turns to what that discipline ripens into: true seeing itself, the very heart of everything the Upaniṣads teach. And so it begins to speak of that next.

Let go of every duty — and here, 'dharma' means wrongdoing too, because what's really being asked of you is complete freedom from action, as scripture itself says: 'one who has not ceased from wrongdoing...' and 'let go of both merit and wrongdoing.' Let go of it all, every action there is. Come, instead, for refuge to Me alone — the one, the Self within everyone, present equally in every being, the Lord, imperishable, untouched by birth or death. Know, with complete certainty: nothing exists apart from Me. And once your mind rests firmly there, I will free you from every sin, from the whole binding weight of merit and wrongdoing alike, simply by letting the truth of your own Self shine through. As it's said elsewhere: 'I destroy it, standing in the Self, with the blazing lamp of knowledge.' So — do not grieve. Let go of the sorrow.

In this teaching of the Gītā — what, really, is the means to the highest good? Is it knowledge? Action? Or both together? Where does this doubt even come from? Some verses seem to say knowledge alone is enough: 'knowing this, one becomes immortal,' 'having known Me in truth, one enters at once.' Other verses seem to insist on action: 'your right is to action alone,' 'act — only act.' Since both are taught as necessary, someone might well wonder whether the two combined are what actually leads to liberation. So what's the point of asking this at all? Simply this: to settle, with certainty, which of these is truly the means to the highest good. And that deserves a fuller, more careful look.

Self-knowledge alone is what frees you — because it dissolves the very sense of separateness, and in dissolving it, comes to rest in the fruit of isolation, the Self standing utterly alone. Since beginningless time, ignorance has kept insisting, 'this is my doing, I am the one doing it, I'll act to get that result' — a notion of difference running constantly through the mind. What removes it is a single recognition: 'I am this alone — not an agent, actionless, without a result; there is nothing else besides me.' That very knowledge removes the root cause of all activity, so nothing further is needed. The word 'but' rules out two rival positions: that the highest good comes from karma alone, or from jñāna and karma combined. Since the highest good is not something produced, karma cannot manufacture it; what is eternal is made neither by karma nor by knowledge. Does that make jñāna pointless too? No. Jñāna removes ignorance and culminates in kaivalya, as lamplight removes the imagined snake and leaves the rope alone. Once an act with an observable purpose has reached its result, its agent and instruments do not continue toward some other result through that same act. In the same way, when steadfastness in jñāna reaches the kaivalya of the ātman, no further karma remains to be combined with it. Once water is flooded everywhere, no one still seeks the fruit of digging a well; one who has gained a kingdom does not set out for a mere field. Jñāna needs no help from karma, because karma born of ignorance cannot remove ignorance: darkness does not remove darkness. And yet — can we really set duty aside once we know this? No: neglecting what scripture requires still brings real consequence, and in any case freedom was never something to be produced — it's already eternal, prior to any doing. Keeping up your obligations doesn't earn merit toward some future prize; it simply keeps demerit from accruing. Avoiding what's forbidden keeps an unwanted birth from arising; letting go of what's merely desired keeps a further craved birth from arising too. And once this body's fruit runs its course, with no craving left to drive another birth, nothing remains but to abide in your own nature — which is exactly what isolation is. But can old, unripened karma from countless past lives simply vanish this way? Yes — because the very hardship of keeping up your duties can itself be that karma ripening and being spent. Obligatory practice, like a penance, wears down what was gathered before. And once no new karma is begun, and the old is worn away through living it out, freedom arrives without any further striving. Still, one thing scripture will not allow: that any of this by itself, without knowledge, actually reaches the goal. 'Having known Him alone, one goes beyond death — there is no other path.' The scriptures are equally clear that liberation is impossible for one without knowledge, as impossible as wrapping the sky in leather. And unripened merit cannot simply be assumed away, any more than unripened sin can — both need another body to work themselves out, which means ritual duty alone, however faithfully kept, cannot reach the goal. Passion, aversion, and delusion — the real roots of merit and demerit — are uprooted by nothing but knowledge of the Self. And scripture itself says obligatory rites yield merit, not exhaustion, and that each person's duty simply belongs to their station in life. So duty alone was never going to burn away what only knowledge can dissolve.

Some say obligatory rites are, by their very hardship, nothing but the working-off of old sin — with no other fruit at all, since scripture names none, and since the rite itself is prescribed just to keep body and soul together. That doesn't hold up. Karma that hasn't yet sprouted can't yield fruit, and this theory can't explain the wildly different sufferings people actually undergo. If a rite already fructifying gave you heaven, and then in that same life the hardship of daily worship supposedly paid off some entirely different hell-bound sin — that makes no sense; unfructified karma from the past can't be cashed out that way in a life a different karma has already begun. And notice: this theory quietly answers the wrong question. It only speaks to karma whose fruit has already started ripening — never to what hasn't. If you insist all past wrongdoing has already started ripening, then the whole restriction collapses, and worse, the obligatory rite becomes pointless, since ripened karma wears off through experience regardless. And really, the ache of daily discipline is just what effort feels like — like fatigue from exercise, not evidence of some hidden debt from a past life. Scripture itself says these rites exist for one plain purpose: to sustain ordinary life. That's nothing like expiation, which is tied to a specific, named sin. If you insist the ache itself is the fruit of that sin, the same logic would force you to say the tiredness of an ordinary chore is the fruit of nothing more than the chore's own purpose — which is absurd. And if the hardship of an obligatory rite and an optional one is identical, but only the obligatory one supposedly burns off sin, that distinction can't stand — either both count, or neither does. Push it further: perform an optional rite and you automatically perform its obligatory twin in the same act. If the ache alone wears karma away, the optional rite's reward should vanish too, used up in that same act. Claim its reward is something separate, like heaven — then its ache should feel separate too, and it never does. Think about it structurally, too: unregulated acts bear fruit right away; scripturally governed ones don't — that's exactly why people strive for heaven at all, trusting an unseen future reward. Deny that, and no one would ever bother. So this whole theory that daily duty simply pays off old sin doesn't survive scrutiny; an obligatory rite really does carry its own unseen fruit. Here is what actually follows: every action rooted in ignorance and craving — and all action is rooted in ignorance and craving — is exhausted by knowledge alone, never by ritual performance, whether the karma is good or bad. So action belongs to the domain of the one who doesn't yet know; fixity in knowledge, which requires giving up every action entirely, belongs to the domain of the one who does. This is written throughout: 'neither truly knows'; 'know the Self as indestructible and eternal'; 'knowledge for the contemplative, action for the active'; 'the ignorant cling to action'; 'the knower of truth sees the forces of nature simply playing among themselves and stays unattached'; 'having renounced every action in the mind, one simply rests'; 'the true knower thinks, I do nothing at all' — only the unenlightened think 'I am doing this.' For someone trying to climb toward yoga, action is the ladder; for someone who has already arrived, stillness alone is the way. Even the noblest devotees — the distressed, the seeker, the one after gain — still count as not-yet-knowers; only the one who realizes 'I am your very Self' is the knower. Those still driven by ritual, however sincere, keep returning, life after life, chasing what they still crave. Those who think of nothing else, who meditate constantly on the Self as vast as open space — to them the Lord gives the very discipline that brings them home; the merely ritual-minded do not arrive this way. Even those who dedicate every action to the Lord, disciplined as they are, are still not-yet-knowers; their path is a long unlearning, a gradual giving up of what they hoped to gain. But those who worship the boundless, indescribable Absolute — free from hatred toward every being — and those instructed in the three chapters on the field of experience and its knower: for these, and above all for the renunciate who has let go of every action rooted in the five factors of doing, who knows the Self's oneness and non-agency, who abides in the highest fixity of knowledge, who has found true refuge in oneness with the Lord — for this wandering, all-renouncing sage alone, the threefold fruit of action never touches them at all. For everyone else — for the sincere but still-ignorant doer who has not renounced — it touches them still. This, in the end, is exactly how the Gītā divides what duty means.

But how do we know that all action is rooted in ignorance to begin with? Think of killing a Brahmin. Scripture forbids it — yet people still do it, and only because ignorance and craving still grip them; otherwise no one would ever act that way at all. Every kind of ritual duty, obligatory or occasional or optional, works exactly the same way: even when scripture itself commands it, only someone still caught in not-knowing performs it. And you don't need to have already realized the Self beyond the body before you can act — after all, people say 'I do this' and simply get on with living, the same way movement happens without the mover ever being the real Self. But is the sense of 'I' in this body just a figure of speech, not a real error? No — because then even its effects would be mere figures of speech, and they plainly aren't. There is a kind of genuine, harmless figurative 'I' — as when scripture calls a son one's own Self, or someone calls a favorite cow 'my very breath.' That's not a false notion at all. A false notion is like mistaking a stump for a man in the dark, when you can't make out the details. And figurative language never actually produces anything real — it only exists to praise whoever it's describing. When we call Devadatta a lion or a boy fire, it's shorthand for 'like a lion, like fire,' because they share some quality — ferocity, a fiery glow — and it's said purely to honor them, not because a lion's or fire's actual power is thereby unleashed. Everyone still knows, underneath the compliment, 'I'm not really a lion,' 'he's not really fire' — no one goes on to think the lion's deeds or fire's deeds are somehow their own. In just the same way, the truer thought would be: 'the body's actions aren't mine, the real Self's' — never 'I am the doer, this action is mine.' And if someone claims the Self acts through its own memory, desire, and effort — no: those very things already presuppose the false 'I.' Memory, desire, effort — all of them are built from impressions left by pleasant and unpleasant experiences, which themselves trace back to identifying with this body in the first place. Exactly as it happens in this life — merit, demerit, and their fruits all rooted in taking the body as 'me,' with all its likes and dislikes — so it has happened in the life before this one, and the one before that, without any beginning we can point to. That is how we can infer a beginningless cycle stretching backward and forward. And that is exactly why only fixity in knowledge, joined with the complete renunciation of action, can bring this cycle to a final, absolute end. Since taking the body as the Self is itself nothing but ignorance, once that identification is gone, there is no cause left for another body — and so no more cycle at all. No one who genuinely knows 'I am not a cow, and a cow isn't me' ever slips and calls a cow 'I.' It's only someone who doesn't know — the way you might mistake a stump for a man in poor light — who, lacking discrimination, forms the thought 'I' about this body. Someone who truly discriminates never makes that mistake. And when scripture calls your son 'your very Self' — that is a real but figurative use, grounded in the bond between parent and child, nothing more. And just as a figurative lion can never actually do a real lion's work, a merely figurative self can never actually perform a real, ultimate act — eating, or anything else that truly matters.

Someone might say: since scripture has authority over things we can't otherwise verify, surely it's the body and senses — called 'self' — that actually do what the Self is meant to do. No: they're only called 'self' by ignorance. The body and senses aren't even genuinely figurative selves; what, then, are they? Purely by a false notion, though they are not the Self at all, they get made to seem like the Self — and we know this because that seeming appears exactly when the false notion is there, and vanishes exactly when it isn't. Watch a child who hasn't yet learned to discriminate: 'I'm tall,' 'I'm fair-skinned' — the 'I' has simply landed on the body. But someone who has learned to discriminate, who knows 'I am other than this body,' never has that thought about the body at all, not even for a moment. So this 'I' in the body is produced by the false notion alone — it isn't figurative language at all. Genuine figurative language only works when you can clearly perceive both things at once, side by side — a lion and Devadatta, fire and a boy. It cannot work when you can't tell the two apart in the first place, which is exactly the situation with the body and the Self. And as for the argument from scripture's authority — that fails too, because scripture is only authoritative about things beyond ordinary perception, like the unseen link between a ritual act and its fruit. It has no business ruling on what we can perceive directly. So it simply cannot decree that the 'I' you feel toward your body is a mere figure of speech, when its falseness is plain to see. Even a hundred scriptures insisting 'fire is cold and dark' wouldn't make it true — if scripture ever seemed to say something so plainly false, we'd have to look for what it actually meant, some deeper sense that doesn't contradict either the facts or itself. One last worry: if the only real doer of any scriptural act was always this falsely imagined self, and there's no such self in truth, wouldn't that make scripture pointless? No — because scripture still has real purpose: it leads that falsely-identified doer straight to the knowledge of Brahman, which is where the very sense of being a separate doer finally comes undone.

But wait — if the injunction to act eventually loses its authority once its purpose is served, wouldn't the very teaching of Brahman-knowledge lose its authority the same way? No — because nothing could ever arise to overturn it. Once you truly know the Self, the sense of 'I am this body' is sublated for good; but the knowing of the Self, unlike that, can never itself be overturned by anything, in any way — because this knowledge simply is its own fruit, the way fire simply is heat and light together. That doesn't undercut the authority of action-injunctions either, because their whole purpose was always to gently redirect you, engagement by engagement, ever closer toward your own inner Self. Even a means that later turns out not to be literally true can still carry real truth, borrowed from the reality of where it leads — like a commendatory verse attached to a ritual rule, or telling a child 'drink this milk and your hair will grow long' just to get them to drink it. Either way — directly, or through such skillful means — scriptural authority holds, the same way ordinary perception itself only operates within the horizon of body-identification, before the Self is known. Now, about your theory: you say the Self, though never itself doing anything, 'acts' simply by being present — the way people say 'the king fights' even while standing apart from the battle, winning or losing by presence alone; or 'the general acts' with nothing but a spoken word; and both share visibly in the outcome. Just as the priest's ritual act is credited to the patron who commissioned it, so the body's actions would be credited to the Self, since the fruit lands on the Self. Or, the way someone spinning a magnet is truly the cause of the iron's motion even without touching it — so too, you say, the Self. That doesn't hold. It would absurdly mean anyone merely present counts as a doer. You might reply that agency comes in many forms — no: because even the king and the general have real, direct agency, not just presence. The king really does fight with his own hands at times; he really does command his soldiers and pay their wages; he really does share in victory or defeat. The sacrificial patron really does make the offering and really does pay the officiant. So when we credit someone who is genuinely uninvolved with 'agency,' that's understood as figurative language — and it's figurative only because we can compare it against cases of real, direct agency, like the king's. If no one ever showed real, direct agency — if it were like the magnet-spinner, evidenced only by the iron's motion — then mere presence might indeed count as primary agency. But that's not the case here: the king's and patron's own direct activity is plainly observed. So agency by mere presence alone, for the Self, is merely figurative — and so is any connection to a fruit built on it. And a figurative cause can never produce a real effect. So this whole claim — that the Self, doing nothing itself, becomes agent and enjoyer through the body's activity — simply isn't true. What actually accounts for everything is error alone, the way a dream does, the way a magician's illusion does. And here is the proof: in deep sleep, in absorption, wherever the ordinary stream of 'I am this body' momentarily breaks, no trace of being an agent or an experiencer is found at all. So this whole wheel of transmigration is nothing but an error taking hold — never an ultimate reality. And that is exactly why, through right seeing, its ending is not partial or gradual, but absolute. This is established.

Close to the Sanskrit

Having concluded the supreme secret of the discipline of fixity in action, namely the state of taking refuge in the Lord — now, at this point, [the text says] that the fruit of the discipline of fixity in action, right vision, established as the essence of all Vedānta, is to be spoken; [so the text] says —

'All dharmas' — all, and those dharmas, all dharmas, those [accusative] — here by the word 'dharma' even non-dharma is understood, because actionlessness is what is intended to be expressed, [as proven] from such scriptural and traditional texts as 'one who has not ceased from misconduct' (Kaṭha Up. 1.2.24) and 'abandon merit and demerit' (Mo. Dha. 329.40) — having wholly abandoned, having renounced, all dharmas: this means all actions. Go for refuge to Me — the one, the Self of all, the same, abiding in all beings, the Lord, the imperishable, free from conception, birth, old age and death — [recognizing] 'I alone [am this],' thus; ascertain firmly that nothing else exists apart from Me: this is the meaning. I, thus, will liberate you, one whose intellect is so resolved, from all sins in the form of the bondage of all merit and demerit, by illumining the true nature of your own Self. And it is said: 'I destroy it, stationed in the state of the Self, with the blazing lamp of knowledge' (Bhagavad Gītā 10.11). Therefore do not grieve — do not perform sorrow: this is the meaning.

In this teaching of the Gītā, what is ascertained [to be] the means to the supreme good — is it knowledge, or action, or else both? — thus [the question arises]. On what grounds is there doubt? [Verses like] 'knowing which one attains immortality' (Bhagavad Gītā 13.12) and 'then, having known Me in truth, one enters immediately thereafter' (Bhagavad Gītā 18.55) and others of this kind show the attainment of the supreme good from knowledge alone. [Verses like] 'your right is to action alone' (Bhagavad Gītā 2.47) and 'do action alone' (Bhagavad Gītā 4.15) and others of this kind show the necessity of performing actions. Thus, from the teaching that both knowledge and action are obligatory, a doubt might arise for someone that even the two, when combined, might be the cause of the supreme good. What, then, is the fruit of this inquiry here? Indeed, this very thing — the determination of which one of these is the means to the supreme good; therefore this matter is to be investigated more extensively.

But Self-knowledge alone is the cause of the supreme good, because — by virtue of removing the notion of difference — it culminates in the fruit of isolation. The notion of difference among action, factor, and result is constantly produced in the Self by nescience — 'my action, I am the agent, for that fruit I will do this action,' thus; this nescience has operated since beginningless time. The remover of this nescience is knowledge of this very form — 'I am this alone, non-agent, actionless, without result; there is nothing else than me' — knowledge directed at the Self, arising, because it removes the notion of difference that is the very cause of engagement in action. The word 'but' has the purpose of excluding [other] positions — it excludes both the position that liberation is from action alone, and that it is from knowledge and action combined. And because the supreme good is not something to be produced, it is untenable that action is its means. For an eternal entity is not produced either by action or by knowledge. Is mere knowledge, then, also pointless? No — because, being the remover of nescience, it is observed to culminate in the fruit of isolation. The culmination of knowledge, which removes the darkness of nescience, in the fruit of isolation is observed — like the fruit of a lamp's light which removes the darkness of ignorance [that mistakes] a rope for a snake. For the fruit of that light culminates in the rope alone, the false notion of a snake having ceased; so too knowledge. And just as, for the agent and other factors engaged in acts of visible purpose such as cutting or fire-churning, engagement in another fruit or another action is untenable once the fruit — splitting in two, or the sight of fire — is obtained, so too, for the knower and other factors engaged in the visibly-purposed practice of fixity-in-knowledge, engagement in another action is untenable once the fruit, the isolation of the Self, is obtained; therefore fixity-in-knowledge accompanied by action is not tenable. If one says it would be like the combined act of the bhūjyagnihotra and the like — no; because, once knowledge whose fruit is isolation [is attained], desire for the fruit of action is untenable. For once such knowledge is attained, just as there is no desire for the fruit of acts like [digging] a well once the fruit — water flooded on all sides — [is attained], so desire for another fruit, or for the action that serves it, is untenable. For one engaged in an action whose fruit is a kingdom does not tenably engage in an action whose fruit is merely a field, nor does desire directed toward that arise. Therefore action does not have the status of being the means to the supreme good; nor do knowledge and action combined. Nor does knowledge, whose fruit is isolation, need the assistance of action, because of a contradiction arising from its very status as the remover of nescience. For darkness is not the remover of darkness. Therefore knowledge alone is the means to the supreme good — thus [runs this view]. No; because non-performance of the obligatory [rites] incurs demerit, and because isolation is [already] eternal. As for the claim that isolation is attained from knowledge alone — that is untrue; because non-performance of the scripturally enjoined obligatory rites would result in demerit characterized by [rebirth in] hell and the like. But then, in that case, there is no liberation from action — it would be simple non-liberation! This is not a flaw; because liberation is [already] eternal. By the performance of obligatory rites, demerit is not incurred; by non-performance of the forbidden, an undesired body does not arise; by abstention from optional rites, a [further] desired body does not arise; and, since when the fruit-experience of the action that initiated this present body is exhausted, there is — for lack of a cause, when passion and the rest are not indulged — no [further] arising of another body for the self, mere abiding in one's own nature alone is isolation; thus isolation is accomplished effortlessly — so [this second view holds]. If one objects that there is no such exhaustion, because it is untenable to experience the fruit — heaven, hell and the like — of karma done in numerous elapsed past lives that has not yet begun to operate — no; because it is tenable that the experience of the hardship of performing obligatory rites is itself the experiencing of that karma's fruit. Or, like expiation, the obligatory rite serves to exhaust previously accumulated wrongdoing. And since actions already begun are exhausted precisely through experience, and new actions are not begun, isolation is accomplished effortlessly — so [this view continues]. No; because of the scriptural statement 'having known Him alone, one goes beyond death; there is no other path for going [to liberation]' (Śvetāśvatara Up. 3.8) — that no path other than knowledge exists for liberation; because of the scriptural statement of the impossibility of liberation for the ignorant, like the impossibility of wrapping the sky with leather; and because of the Purāṇa-tradition statement 'from knowledge one attains isolation'; and because it is untenable that meritorious actions whose fruit has not yet begun could be exhausted [by this means]. Just as previously accumulated wrongdoings whose fruit has not begun are acknowledged to exist, so too meritorious [actions] whose fruit has not begun would exist. And since it is untenable for these to be exhausted without undergoing another body, liberation [on this scheme] is untenable. And because it is untenable that passion, aversion, and delusion — the causes of merit and demerit — could be uprooted by anything other than Self-knowledge, it is untenable that merit and demerit [themselves] could be uprooted [by ritual alone]. And because of the scriptural statement that obligatory rites have merit as their fruit, and because of the smṛti statement 'castes and life-stages, [each] fixed in its own duty...' (Gautama Dharmasūtra 2.2.29) and the like, it is untenable that action [could thereby] be exhausted.

But those who say — obligatory rites are, because they are of the nature of hardship, precisely the fruit of previously done wrongful actions; but they have no other fruit apart from their own nature, because [no such fruit] is heard [in scripture], and because they are enjoined for the purpose of subsistence and the like — thus [they say]. Not so; because it is impossible for unperformed rites to yield fruit, and the untenability of a specific painful fruit would also follow. As for what is said, that the fruit of wrongdoings done in a former birth is experienced as the hardship of performing obligatory rites — that is untrue; for it is not tenable that the fruit of karma not yet sprouted at the time of death is experienced in a life begun by another action. Otherwise, the impossibility of experiencing the fruit of hell in a life begun by an action such as the Agnihotra, [aimed] at the enjoyment of the fruit of heaven, would not hold. And because it is untenable that that wrongdoing should have a specific painful fruit — for among many wrongdoings that occur, having distinct sufferings as their instrumental fruits, when they are supposed to have only the hardship of performing obligatory rites as their fruit, affliction by opposites, disease, and the like cannot be supposed causeless — [so] the hardship of performing obligatory rites alone [cannot be] the fruit of previously accumulated wrongdoing, any more than the suffering of carrying stones on the head, and so on. And this is stated beside the actual point: 'the hardship of performing obligatory rites is the fruit of previously done wrongful action' — thus. How? Because it is untenable for wrongdoing whose fruit has not sprouted to be exhausted — that is the actual topic. There, you speak of the fruit of karma whose fruit has [already] sprouted as the hardship of performing obligatory rites, not of that whose fruit has not sprouted. Now, if you hold that absolutely all previously done wrongdoing has already begun to fructify, then the restriction 'the hardship of performing obligatory rites alone is the fruit' becomes unwarranted; and the pointlessness of the injunction of obligatory rites would also follow, since already-fructifying wrongful karma is tenably exhausted through experience alone. Moreover, if suffering is [claimed to be] the fruit of a scripturally enjoined obligatory rite, that suffering is simply observed [to arise] from the very exertion of performing it, like [fatigue] from exercise; to suppose it belongs to something else is untenable. And because it is enjoined for the purpose of subsistence and the like, it is untenable that obligatory rites, like expiation, are the fruit of previous wrongdoing. In the case where a sinful act is the occasioning cause of an enjoined expiation, that expiation is not [called] the fruit of that sin. Now, if you hold that the hardship of that very expiation is the fruit of that very sin, then, since the purpose is equally subsistence and the like, the hardship of performing obligatory rites would absurdly follow as the fruit of that very purpose of subsistence, since there is no difference between an obligatory rite and an expiation in their being occasioned [by a stated purpose]. Moreover: since the hardship of performance is equal between an obligatory and an optional [rite] such as the Agnihotra, the hardship of obligatory performance alone would be the fruit of previous wrongdoing, but not the hardship of optional performance — [but] since this distinction does not exist, that [hardship] too would absurdly follow as the fruit of previous wrongdoing. This being so, because no [further] fruit of obligatory rites is heard [in scripture], and because their injunction would otherwise be unaccountable, the presumptive-inference supposition that the hardship of obligatory performance is the fruit of previous wrongdoing is itself untenable — thus, because the injunction would [otherwise] be unaccountable, and because of the inference that obligatory rites' fruit is distinct from the hardship of performance. And because of contradiction: this contradictory thing is stated — that, when it is conceded that the fruit of another action is experienced by means of the obligatory rite being performed, that very experience is [said to be] the fruit of the obligatory rite itself, while [elsewhere] the absence of any fruit of the obligatory rite itself is also stated — a plain contradiction. Moreover, when the optional Agnihotra and the like is performed, the obligatory Agnihotra too is thereby performed by that same single act; so by that very hardship of exertion alone, the fruit of the optional Agnihotra would absurdly be exhausted, since it is performed by that same act. If, instead, the fruit of the optional Agnihotra is something entirely different, namely heaven and the like, then the hardship of performing it would also absurdly have to be distinct; but no such [distinct hardship] exists, because it contradicts observation — for no hardship of mere obligatory performance is ever observed distinct from the hardship of optional performance. Moreover: an action neither enjoined nor forbidden has its fruit at that very time, but a scripturally enjoined or forbidden action would not have its fruit at that very time. In that case, effort toward heaven and the like, motivated by the promise of an unseen fruit, would not occur — [to which the theorist replies]: since the very form of the act is identical for the Agnihotra [whether obligatory or optional], the wearing-away of obligatory rites occurs by the mere hardship of performance alone, while the great fruit of heaven and the like belongs to optional rites, on account of the surplus of subsidiary elements — or, when that surplus is absent, on account of the mere desire for the fruit. And therefore it is never tenable that obligatory rites lack an unseen fruit. And therefore, of action rooted in nescience, knowledge alone — not the performance of obligatory rites — is the cause of the complete exhaustion of both the auspicious and the inauspicious. For all action whatsoever has nescience and desire as its seed. And thus it has been established that action pertains to the domain of the non-knower, while fixity in knowledge, preceded by the renunciation of all action, pertains to the domain of the knower — [as shown by] 'neither of them [truly] knows' (BG 2.19); 'know [Him] as indestructible, eternal' (BG 2.21); 'by the discipline of knowledge for the Sāṅkhyas, by the discipline of action for the yogins' (BG 3.3); 'of the ignorant, attached to action' (BG 3.26); 'but the knower of the truth, mighty-armed one, having reflected that the guṇas [merely] operate among the guṇas, does not become attached' (BG 3.28); 'having mentally renounced all actions, sits [at ease]' (BG 5.13); 'the disciplined knower of the truth should hold, ‘I do nothing at all’' (BG 5.8) — that is, the ignorant one [alone thinks] 'I do'; for one wishing to ascend [to yoga], action is the means; for one who has ascended, established in yoga, tranquility alone is the means; even the [first] three noble types of devotee are still ignorant — 'but the knower is My very Self, in My view' (BG 7.18); 'the ignorant, men of action, desirous of desires, obtain the coming and going [of rebirth]'; those who, thinking of nothing else, ever disciplined, meditate upon the Self as already described, resembling space; 'I give that discipline of the intellect by which they come to Me' — that is, ignorant men of [mere] action do not attain in this way. Even those who perform action for the Lord, most disciplined among men of action though they are, are still ignorant; their means culminate progressively in an ever-deepening relinquishing of [their own] fruit. But the worshippers of the indescribable, imperishable [Absolute] have their means stated at the conclusion of that chapter — 'free from hatred toward all beings' (BG 12.13) — and their means of knowledge are those stated in the three chapters beginning with the Field chapter. For those who have renounced all action grounded in the five-factor cause, who possess the knowledge of the Self's oneness and non-agency, who abide in the supreme fixity of knowledge, who know the reality of the Lord — the threefold fruit of action, beginning with the undesirable, does not apply; it applies only to the paramahaṃsa wandering renunciants who have found refuge in the oneness of the Self with the Lord's own true nature. It does indeed apply to others — the ignorant, men of action, non-renouncers. This is the very division of the meaning of duty as stated in the teaching of the Gītā.

If one objects that the being-preceded-by-nescience of all action is unestablished — no; like [the case of] Brahmin-killing and the like. Although the obligatory rite is known through scripture, nevertheless it belongs to one possessed of nescience. Just as an act characterized as Brahmin-killing and the like, though known through a prohibitory scriptural text, becomes a cause of ruin for one possessed of the faults of nescience, desire, and the rest — otherwise engagement [in it] would be untenable — so too obligatory, occasional, and optional [rites]. If one objects that engagement in obligatory rites and the like is untenable when the Self distinct from the body is unknown — no; because engagement, [as in] 'I do,' is observed even where action, being of the nature of motion, does not [really] have the Self as its agent. If one objects that the notion 'I' in the body-aggregate is figurative, not false — no; because [treating it so] would entail figurativeness even in its effects. In one's own [dear] body-aggregate the notion 'I' is [indeed sometimes] figurative — as in one's own son, 'you are, indeed, the Self, by the name of son' (Tai. Ā. Ekā. 2.11), and in ordinary usage, 'this cow is indeed my very life-breath' — like that. This is not at all a false notion. A false notion, rather, [occurs] in [the case of] a stump and a man whose distinguishing particulars are not perceived. A figurative notion does not have the capacity to produce the primary [referent's] real effect, because its purpose is to praise the substrate, by means of an elided word of comparison — as when it is said 'Devadatta is a lion,' 'the boy is fire,' [meaning] like a lion, like fire, because of possessing in common qualities such as ferocity and tawny color, solely for the purpose of praising the substrate, Devadatta or the boy; not that anything real, the effect proper to a lion or to fire, is accomplished by the figurative word and notion; whereas the effect of a false notion, in contrast, one does experience as real harm. One knows the object of a figurative notion — 'this is not a lion, Devadatta,' and likewise 'this boy is not fire' — thus. For one does not [also think] 'the action of the lion, and of fire, is mine.' In the same way, the notion 'the action of the aggregate is not mine, the true Self's' would be the more proper one; not, again, 'I am the agent, the action is mine.' And as for what some say — 'by its own memory, desire, and effort, which are causes of action, the Self performs action' — no; because these [memory, desire, and effort] are themselves preceded by the false notion. For memory, desire, effort, and the like are preceded by latent impressions produced by the desired and undesired fruits of actions experienced, occasioned by the false notion. Just as, in this present birth, merit and demerit, and the experience of their fruit, are produced by identification with the body-aggregate and by passion, aversion, and the rest, so too in a past life, and in a life further past still — thus a beginningless, nescience-produced transmigration, both past and future, is to be inferred. And therefore it is established that the absolute cessation of transmigration [comes] by fixity in knowledge accompanied by the renunciation of all action. And because identification with the body is of the nature of nescience, upon the cessation of that [identification], since [any further] body becomes untenable, [continued] transmigration is untenable. The identification of the body-aggregate as the Self is of the nature of nescience. For in ordinary experience, no one, knowing 'I am other than cows and the rest, and others, cows and the rest, are different from me,' thinks 'I' with regard to them. But one not knowing, like the cognition of a man where there is [only] a stump, might, out of lack of discrimination, form the notion 'I' with regard to the body-aggregate — not one who knows out of discrimination. But he in whom the notion 'I' arises with regard to a son — 'you are, indeed, the Self, by the name of son' (Tai. Ā. Ekā. 2.11) — that [notion] is figurative, occasioned by the relation of begotten and begetter. And by a figurative self, a real effect — like eating and the rest — cannot be accomplished, just as [one cannot accomplish] the effect proper to a real lion or fire by a figurative lion or fire.

If one objects that, because of the authority of scriptural injunction regarding unseen matters, what is to be done by the Self is indeed performed by the figurative selves, the body and senses — no; because their status as 'self' is produced by nescience. Nor are the body, senses, and the like figurative selves; what then [is the truth]? Though not being the Self, they are made, by a false notion alone, to attain the status of Self — because of [that status's] presence when that [false notion] is present, and its absence when that [false notion] is absent. For among the undiscriminating, at a time of ignorance, the notion 'I' with regard to the body-aggregate is observed among children — 'I am tall,' 'I am fair.' But among the discriminating, who know 'I am other than the body-aggregate,' the notion 'I' with regard to the body-aggregate does not arise at that time. Therefore, because of its absence in the absence of the false notion, it is produced by that [false notion] alone, not figurative. For a figurative notion or use of a word could occur only where the particular and the general are perceived separately, as in the case of a lion and Devadatta, or fire and a boy — not where the particular and the general are not perceived separately. As for what was said — 'because of the authority of scripture' — that does not hold; because that [scripture's] authority has unseen matters as its domain. For scripture has authority in a matter not apprehended by perception and the other means of knowledge, such as the relation between means and end in the Agnihotra and the like, not in a matter [accessible to] perception and the like, because the domain and purpose of [its] authority is to reveal what is [otherwise] unseen. Therefore it is not possible to suppose figurativeness for the notion 'I' with regard to the body-aggregate, [a notion] occasioned by an observably false cognition. For even a hundred scriptural texts saying 'fire is cold, or without light' would not thereby attain authority. If [scripture] were to say 'fire is cold, or without light,' even so, a different, intended meaning of the text must be assumed, because otherwise its authority would be unaccountable — but not one contradicting another means of valid knowledge, or its own statement. If one objects that, because action's agent is merely one endowed with the false notion, in the absence of a [real] agent scripture would lack authority — no; because meaningfulness is tenable for scripture with respect to the knowledge of Brahman.

If one objects that, like the scriptural injunction of action, the scriptural injunction of the knowledge of Brahman too would lack authority [once superseded] — no; because a sublating cognition [of it] is untenable. Just as, by the scriptural injunction of the knowledge of Brahman, once the Self is known, the notion 'I' with regard to the body-aggregate is sublated, so the knowing of the Self, in the Self alone, can never, by anything, in any way, be sublated — because this knowledge is not distinct from its own fruit, just as fire is hot and luminous. And this does not entail the lack of authority of the injunction of action in the same way, because its purpose is to generate, by checking each preceding engagement in succession, ever-new, higher engagement oriented toward the inner Self. Even in [eventual] falsity, a means would indeed possess a [genuine] truth by virtue of the reality of the end [it leads to] — as with eulogistic passages subordinate to an injunction; and, in ordinary life too, [as with] the statement 'it will make your topknot grow,' when milk and the like is to be given to children, the deranged, and so on, to drink. And for those in another mode [of scripture], authority is established either directly or [through such means], as with the authority of perception and the rest, occasioned by identification with the body, prior to the knowledge of the Self. Now as for what you hold — that the Self, even while itself not engaging [in activity], acts by mere proximity alone, and that this very [proximity-based acting] is the Self's real agency; as it is commonly said, 'the king fights among his fighting soldiers,' [meaning] even while himself not fighting, he is, by mere presence alone, victorious or defeated; so too the general acts by word alone; and the connection with the fruit of the action is observed for both king and general. And just as the officiating priest's action belongs to the patron of the sacrifice, so the action of the body and the rest would be done by the Self, because the fruit accrues to the Self. Or, just as, because he makes the iron revolve, the one who is himself entirely uninvolved has real agency by that very fact — so too for the Self, thus [runs the theory]. That is untrue; because it entails the [absurd] consequence that even one not acting at all would have agent-status. If one says agency is of many kinds — no; because even primary, real agency is observed in the case of the king and others. The king, for one thing, does fight by his own direct activity too; and toward the soldiers, in making them fight and in the giving of wages, his agency is genuinely primary, as also in the experiencing of the fruit of victory or defeat. For the sacrificial patron too, in offering the principal oblation and in giving the sacrificial fee, his agency is genuinely primary. Therefore, it is understood that the ascription of agency to one who is [genuinely] uninvolved is figurative. If genuine agency, characterized by one's own direct activity, were not observed at all for the king, the patron, and others, then agency by mere presence alone might be supposed to be primary — as with the one who spins [a magnet], by the iron's revolving alone; but it is not the case that the direct activity of the king, the patron, and the rest is unobserved [in that same way]. Therefore, agency by mere presence alone is merely figurative. This being so, the connection with its fruit too would be merely figurative. And a figurative [cause] does not accomplish a real effect. Therefore this very thing that is asserted — 'by the activity of the body and the rest, the Self, itself uninvolved, would be the agent and experiencer' — is untrue. Rather, everything is accounted for as occasioned by error, as in a dream; and likewise in a magical illusion. And in the interruptions of the continuous stream of the erroneous notion that the body and the rest are the Self — in deep sleep, absorption, and the like — the trouble of agency, experiencership, and the rest is not observed at all. Therefore this illusion of transmigration is occasioned by an erroneous notion alone, not an ultimate reality; and so, from right vision, it is established that there is an absolute cessation [of it]. || 66 ||

In plain words

“Giving up all dharmas, take refuge in Me alone. I shall release you from all sins; do not grieve.” (Mokṣa Sannyāsa Yoga, ślokas 65 and 66)

In plain words

Before bringing His holy teaching to a close, He said, "Arjuna! Give up all dharmas and take refuge in Me. I will set you free from all sins." That is: taking refuge means giving up mamakāra and abhimāna, wiping out the Ahaṅkāra that says 'I am the body', becoming firm in the conviction 'All is the Paramātma', and dedicating oneself to the Paramātma. In that state, with no saṅkalpa or vikalpa whatever, it is doing as God says, staying as He keeps one, dancing as He makes one dance. To stand apart from the inquiry into dharma and adharma, "this is fit for me to do; this is unfit", and to perform karmas without desire for the fruit: that is the duty of such a one.

Taking this principle stated by Kṛṣṇa as their basis, some dry Vedāntins and lazy devotees stretch out their legs, close their eyes, put bead-strings round their necks, and, without doing the good karmas they ought to do, go about eating punctually at every mealtime, sleeping, wandering, and behaving without weighing whether this is good or that is bad. If the elders at home or experienced great souls question them, "What is this, my son! Instead of practising your dharma, you are behaving like this!", they reply, "Sir, you too are mistaken. Do you not know what the Paramātma said in the Gītā? I take as my basis God's words 'sarvadharmān parityajya'; I have no need of the words of others." So, like a supreme devotee, like one who obeys the Paramātma's commands, they keep making boasts! Such people hold tight only to the words that suit them and argue from those; but are the words on either side of those words not spoken by the Paramātma too? Why is it just those that they will not accept, and will not follow in practice! Well then, has he who has given up all dharmas taken refuge in the Paramātma? No. Had he done so, he would not have given up the karmas that are his duty, would he! Cravings for food and sleep would not have taken hold of him, would they! Such people are great souls in words and show-offs in their play; in practice not even an atom's worth of spiritual inclination is to be seen.

In plain words

Śloka: Giving up all dharmas, take refuge in Me alone. I shall release you from all sins; do not grieve.

Going by these words, the Paramātma said only "sarvadharmān parityajya"; He did not say "sarva karmān". That is, its meaning is that, without making an inquiry into dharma, one must do the karmas of dharma that are His command, for the pleasure of God. Having no other recourse, casting the whole burden on the Paramātma alone, like Janaka and others, they must perform the karma of lokasaṅgraha even though they themselves have nothing left to gain. Why? Because the inner Ātma of all beings is not different from one's own Ātma. Performing the karmas enjoined by scripture with an attitude free of desire, devoted to the welfare of all beings: that is what is called "niṣkāma karma". So, having understood the Gītā, one's duty is only this: in keeping with its command, to be steadfast in niṣkāma karma, to know one's svadharma well, and to do karmas regarding everything as Hari's prasāda. Blessed are the lives of those who, without desire for the fruit and with sāttvic conduct, are worthy of Hari's gracious glance.