108 Facets of the Inimitable Guru
63. भेदवादीभपञ्चास्यः Bheda-vādī-ibha-pañcāsyaḥ
One who is a lion to elephants, the proponents of duality
‘Bheda’ or distinction presupposes the presence of more than one entity. One who holds that duality is real, is a bheda-vādin. The Upaniṣads speak of the bheda-vādin as ignorant, akin to a slave165, petty, mortal166 and subject to fear.167 On the contrary, for the advaitin, non-duality is the Absolute Truth and all duality is mere illusion. Of such a one who has realized the Brahman-Ātman oneness and sees nothing as different from himself, the Upaniṣad says, “Where he does not comprehend anything other, that is massive and what is massive is immortal.”168 His realisation is characterised as, “Cessation of the world, tranquil, auspicious and non-dual.”169
The bheda-vādin is more of a tough nut to crack if he is a learned intellectual who harbours false notions buttressed by flawed reasoning. He is therefore spoken of as analogous to a burly elephant. His Holiness is described here as a pañcāsya, lion, to the bheda-vādin elephants, for the lion vanquishes elephants. It is not without significance that the word ‘pañcāsya’ has been used here, for it also means Śiva, the five-faced One. Śiva conquered the elephant demon Gajāsura who was terrorizing the virtuous much as the bheda-vādin confounds the minds of even those on the right path.
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A questioner once had the following dialogue with His Holiness.
Questioner: In dim light, a rope may falsely appear as a snake. Similarly, the Supreme Being appears as the world. This, I have learnt from the Śāstras. If a rope is to falsely appear as a snake, someone different from both the snake and the rope is necessary. Similarly, if Brahman appears as the world, an observer, distinct from Brahman and the world, is necessary. Such an entity is not there. Therefore, is the illustration proper?
172 63. Bheda-vādī-ibha-pañcāsyaḥ
HH: An analogue can never match the original perfectly. If it does, then it will be non-different from what is sought to be illustrated. The rope-snake example is advanced only to show that one thing can falsely appear as another. Only this aspect of the illustration should be considered and not the existence of a perceiver different from the rope and snake.
Q: For a person to mistake a rope for a snake, he must have seen a real snake earlier. Else, the wrong notion of a snake cannot arise in him. Thus, the mistake presupposes the existence of a real snake. In the same way, if the Supreme Being is to be mistakenly seen as the world, there should be a real world. Is it wrong to argue in this manner?
HH: Yes. It is wrong. To mistake a rope for a snake, knowledge of a snake is necessary. It is incorrect to say that only a real snake can produce such knowledge. I will give an example. A person mistakes a tree to be a ghost. He saw a ghost in a dream had by him earlier. When he sees the tree now, he misapprehends it to be the ghost dreamt of by him. Did that ghost really exist? No, because it was seen only in a dream. Everyone knows that whatever is seen in the dream is unreal. So, it is only the knowledge of the snake that is necessary and not a real snake. Similarly, for the Supreme Brahman to appear as the world, there is no need for a real world to exist.
Q: Is Māyā real? If it is, then it will be wrong to say that Brahman is advitīya (non-dual). Nor can we assert that Māyā does not exist, since we are able to see the effects of Māyā. What is the nature of Māyā?
HH: Māyā cannot be said to be ‘sat (absolutely real)’ because it is destroyed the moment true knowledge dawns, just as a dream disappears when we wake up. Hence, there is no second entity called Māyā, different from Brahman, just as there is no dream-object apart from the dreamer. Māyā cannot also be termed ‘asat (non-existent)’ as we can see its effects in the form of the world. That is why it has been said, with logic as the basis, that Māyā is neither sat nor asat.
Q: It is said that everything except Brahman is false. Then, are not the Vedas also false? If so, will not Advaita philosophy, which is based on the Vedas, be untrue?
HH: Advaitins say that the world is untrue from the standpoint of the Absolute. They do not, however, deny the empirical validity of the world. From the vyāvahārika (empirical) standpoint, to the extent that the world is admitted to be true, so are the Vedas. The Vedas, whose reality is no less than that of the world, give rise to the knowledge that is potent enough to sublate the ephemeral world. What shines thereafter, is just the non-dual Brahman. Thus, Advaita-vedānta is quite in order.
Further, no damage will be done even if it is postulated that the Vedas are not real. This is because even an unreal thing can give us a real effect. For example, assume that a tiger chases us in our dream. We may wake up due to the fear produced. Here, the unreal tiger brings about the real effect of waking up. Hence, even if we say that the Vedas are unreal like the world, undoubtedly liberating knowledge can arise from its teachings. In this way too, it can be seen that Advaita philosophy is quite in order.
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