90. व्याससूत्रार्थतत्त्ववित् Vyāsa-sūtrārtha-tattva-vit

One who knew the true import of the Vyāsa-sūtras

The Prasthāna-traya or the triad of systems, consists of the Upaniṣads (Upadeśa-prasthāna), the Brahma-sūtras (Nyāya-prasthāna) and the Bhagavad-gītā (Sādhana-prasthāna), and constitute the fundamental basis for Vedānta. The Brahma-sūtras, formulated by Sage Vyāsa and therefore also referred to as Vyāsa-sūtras, form the fulcrum of any scholarly debate on Vedānta. For an interpretation of Vedānta to be considered valid, it is a sine qua non that it be aligned with the sūtras. Bhagavatpāda’s commentary on the Brahma-sūtras forms a very important part of the repertoire of Advaitins to demonstrate that Advaita is the true import of Vedānta.

It is said that only one who has understood Bhagavatpāda’s commentary is artha-tattva-vit, a knower of the true import of the sūtras. His Holiness not just understood, but was an authority on the Brahma-sūtras and Bhagavatpāda’s commentary thereon. His expertise in making beguilingly lucid, complex philosophical nuances dealt with in the sūtras to a lay audience, was awe-inspiring.

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[The following is an exposition of His Holiness on how the Brahma-sūtras establish that the Ātman is distinct from the body.]

Bādarāyaṇa’s aphorisms, the Brahma-sūtras, consist of four parts: samanvaya (reconciliation through proper interpretation), avirodha (non-contradiction), sādhanā (spiritual practice) and phala (result). In the third quarter of the third part, in the 53^rd aphorism, the opponent’s view point that there is no soul apart from the body is presented and then in the 54^th aphorism this view is refuted. Let us consider these two aphorisms in some detail. The opponent’s contention is stated as “Some deny the existence of the soul owing to its existence being dependent on the existence of the body.”

Bādarāyaṇa seeks to confirm in this section that the soul is distinct from the body for if there be no soul apart from the body, there can be no basis for imparting instructions about results to be attained in another world. Further,

238 90. Vyāsa-sūtrārtha-tattva-vit if there be no distinct soul then how can it be taught that the soul is, in reality, identical with Brahman, the Supreme?

The aphorism in question is formulated by way of doubting the soul’s existence. The idea is that when the statement of refutation comes after raising the doubt, it produces a firm conviction about the subject matter.

The opponent’s view is as follows: ‘‘It is seen that consciousness does not belong to external things such as earth, taken either individually or collectively. Still, consciousness may belong to the elements transformed into bodies. Apart from the body, there cannot be any soul, for the body itself comprises the soul.”

The reason adduced by the opponent is: “Its existence is dependent on the body.” Anything whose existence depends on the existence of another and which ceases to be when the other is not there is ascertained to be the attribute of the latter.

For instance, heat and light are seen to be attributes of fire, for their existence depends on the existence of fire. As regards other attributes, such as memory, which are held to belong to the soul by believers, the opponent says that these too are perceived within the body and not outside. His view is, “So long as any substance other than the body cannot be proved, these must be taken to be the attributes of the body. Hence, the soul is not distinct from the body.”

Under this predicament, the aphorist’s answer is: “But this is not so. There is distinction between the soul and the body because consciousness may not exist even when the body exists, as in the case of perception.”

The soul is not identical with the body because consciousness may not exist even when the body is there. If it be inferred that attributes of sentience, etc., belong to the body because they are seen when the body is seen then why should it not be held that they are not attributes because they may not be seen even when the body is seen?

Characteristics such as consciousness, are not seen in dead bodies. Further, while it is possible to determine the presence of consciousness, etc., when a man is alive, it is not possible to conclusively ascertain their nonexistence after death. For, even when this body has fallen, these may well persist by virtue of transfer into another body. Even if this not be a conclusive proof, still it can demolish the opponent’s claim of conclusive establishment of consciousness as an attribute of the body.

Further, the materialist does not accept any principle other than the elements. What then does he think of consciousness? If consciousness be regarded by him as perception of the elements and their derivatives, then we assert that sentience cannot be an attribute of the elements for a thing cannot act on itself. An attribute of the elements cannot perceive the elements just as form is not perceived by form. Hence, just as the perception of elements and their attributes is admitted, so too must distinctness from them, of consciousness, be admitted.

According to us, the soul is of the nature of consciousness and is distinct from the body. It is eternal because consciousness is uniform by nature. Experiences, such as ‘‘It is I who beheld this” confirm the identity of consciousness as the perceiver of various states.

Perception takes place when light and other accessories are there. Further, perception does not occur when these are absent. From this it does not follow that perception is an attribute of light, etc. That being the case, it cannot be inferred that consciousness is an attribute of the body just because it is recognised to occur only when the body is there. The body can be like the light in the example. That apart, the body is not a vital contributory factor for perception since, even when the body remains inactive, in dream, many kinds of perception are seen to take place. Hence, the existence of the soul distinct from the body must be accepted.

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