34. MĀYĀ

D: In dim light, a rope may falsely appear as a snake. Similarly, the Supreme Being appears as the world. This, I have learnt from the śāstra-s. If a rope is to falsely appear as a snake, someone different from both the snake and the rope is necessary. Similarly, if Brahman appears as the world, an observer, distinct from Brahman and the world, is necessary. Such an entity is not there. Therefore, is the illustration proper?

A: An analogue can never match the original perfectly. If it does, then it will be non-different from what is sought to be illustrated. The rope-snake example is advanced only to show that one thing can falsely appear as another. Only this aspect of the illustration should be considered and not the existence of a perceiver different from the rope and snake.

D: For a man to mistake a rope for a snake, he must have seen a real snake earlier. Else, the wrong notion of a snake cannot arise in him. Thus, the mistake presupposes the existence of a real snake. In the same way, if the Supreme Being is to be mistakenly seen as the world, there should be a real world. Is it wrong to argue in this manner?

A: Yes. It is wrong. To mistake a rope for a snake, knowledge of a snake is necessary. It is incorrect to say that only a real snake can produce such knowledge. I will give an example. A person mistakes a tree to be a ghost. He saw a ghost in a dream had by him earlier. When he sees the tree now, he misapprehends it to be the ghost dreamt of by him. Did that ghost really exist? No, because it was seen only in a dream. Everyone knows that whatever is seen in the dream is unreal. So, it is only the knowledge of the snake that is necessary and not a real snake. Similarly, for the Supreme Brahman to appear as the world, there is no need for a real world to exist.

D: Is māyā real? If it is, then it will be wrong to say that Brahman is advitīya (non-dual). Nor can we assert that māyā does not exist, since we are able to see the effects of māyā. Will Acharyal please explain the perplexing nature of māyā?

A: Māyā cannot be said to be ‘sat (absolutely real)’ because it is destroyed the moment true jñāna dawns, just as a dream disappears when we wake up. Hence, there is no second entity called māyā, different from Brahman, just as there is no dream-object apart from the dreamer. Māyā cannot also be termed ‘asat (non-existent)’ because we can see its effects in the form of the world. That is why it has been said, with logic as the basis, that māyā is neither sat nor asat.

D: It is said that everything except Brahman is false. Then, are not the Veda-s also untrue? If the Veda-s are false, will not Advaita philosophy, which is based on the Veda-s, be untrue?

A: Advaitin-s say that the world is untrue from the standpoint of the Absolute. They do not, however, deny the empirical validity of the world. From the vyāvahārika (empirical) standpoint, to the extent that the world is admitted to be true, so are the Veda-s. The empirical Veda gives rise to knowledge that is potent enough to sublate the empirical world. What shines thereafter, is just the non-dual Brahman. Thus, Advaita Vedānta is quite in order.

Further, no damage will be done even if it is postulated that the Veda-s are not real. This is because even an unreal thing can give us a real effect. For example, assume that a tiger chases us in our dream. We may wake up due to the fear produced. Here, the unreal tiger brings about the real effect of waking up. Hence, even if we say that the Veda-s are unreal like the world, undoubtedly liberating knowledge can arise from its teachings. In this way too, it can be seen that Advaita Vedānta is quite in order.

D: Scientists gather information about and analyse the world. If the world itself is unreal, is the research carried on by scientists meaningless?

A: No. We do not say that studying the world and analysing its laws are pointless. The empirical utility of science is unquestionable. This much, however, is certain that none can ever rightly come to the conclusion, “The world is definitely like this.” A bat recognises the presence of an object by means of ultrasonic waves. What it perceives is different from what we see. Similarly, if we had the X-ray vision, our perception of an object would be different from what it is now. Which of these perceptions is the right one? The answer has to be that the different conceptions are all valid or invalid. When we see an object, our act of perception should not modify the object. But we cannot see without altering what we observe. If we see a room through a dark glass, will not everything appear dark? We see things only as the mind “shows” them to us. Hence, it can only be said, “These are the laws of the universe as we see it” and not, “The cosmos is only like this. These alone are its laws.”

D: It is said that māyā is the cause of all bondage. Why does māyā exist?

A: As far as a jñānin is concerned, there is nothing called māyā. The Supreme Being alone exists. So, with regard to him, there is no scope for this question at all. Questions and answers are possible only in the realm of duality, in the realm of māyā. If such a question is to be answered logically, one should have understood the nature of māyā. However, the moment one grasps the true nature of māyā, it vanishes totally and Brahman alone shines. Thus, it is not fair to expect a proper answer to this question, as the question itself is faulty.

Māyā itself is like a big question mark. The Supreme Being is non-dual but māyā creates this appearance of duality. This indeed is the power of māyā.

In the absence of adequate light, a rope may seem to be a snake. Seeing this, one may ask, “Why should the rope appear as a snake when they are two different entities?” The answer is, “It does so on account of one’s ignorance.” Suppose one asks, “Why does this ignorance exist?” This question cannot be answered. A man who has no misconception ever sees the rope only as a rope. The question is ridiculous as far as he is concerned, for, to him, the rope never appeared as a snake.

Next, take the case of a man who has the wrong notion that he is seeing a snake. He too cannot answer the question because, as far as he is concerned, what is in front of him is indeed a snake, not a rope. Let us consider a third man’s view. He initially mistakes the rope to be a snake. Later, he realises that it is a rope. Suppose, he is asked, “Why did the rope appear to you as a snake?” His reply will be, “It was due to my misconception.” He is then asked, “Why does this misconception exist?” The man will not be able to answer. This is because he now sees only the rope and the misconception being asked about is totally absent.

Some questions have no answer because of the fallacy inherent in the question. What answer can be given to the question, “Where is the beginning of a circle?” The questioner asks this question with the misconception, “A circle has a beginning.” It is the question that is not proper. Likewise, the question, “Why does māyā exist?” is improper.

D: Would Acharyal show how one could conclude that the world is illusory; something conjured by māyā?

A: The seed of a banyan tree is small. If it is broken, only smaller pieces are seen. But a big banyan tree grows from it. Does this not, at first sight, seem to be a magical feat? From the semen of one person, a babe is born and gradually becomes a big man. Does this also not seem like magic? So, one can consider the world to be an illusory projection. What we see in our dream greatly matches what we see in the waking state. Hence, we cannot say with certainty that the two are different.

If we keep on posing the question, “why” with regard to anything of the world, we finally end up with the answer, “I do not know.” Such should be the case if the universe is illusory. Let us suppose that we see in a dream a huge elephant within a small room. The doors of a room are very small. If one starts enquiring in the dream as to how the elephant came into the room, the conclusion will be, “I see the elephant but I cannot understand how it came in.” Similar is the case with what is shown by one who practises indrajāla. It is in such cases that something is seen but no explanation is possible. The world too is inexplicable and so should be illusory.

After waking up from the dream just considered, we would say, “There was no elephant; nor did it enter the room.” On realising the Truth, the world is negated in the same way. The words of the Veda are:

(Know prakṛti (primordial nature) to be māyā.)

D: If the world is just an appearance, why has its creation been described in the śāstra-s?

A: If a child asks about the sun, what do we say? We reply that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. We do know that the earth rotates and that there is no actual rising and setting of the sun. Still, we say that the sun itself rises, just to satisfy the inquisitiveness of the child. Similarly, when one seeing the world gets a doubt as to its origin, the śāstra, being like a mother, speaks a little about the world. Then, it leads the enquirer stage by stage and finally explains the Truth. The final description of the Truth is:

(BU, II. 3.6) (Not this, not this.)

★ ★ ★ ★

❑ Parables of Acharyal

Māyā, the fascinating phenomenon, is the source of human

bondage. But an understanding of its nature can pave the way to liberation. It is with this in view that the scriptures have spoken extensively about māyā; the Advaitic scriptural lore abounds in information and tales on māyā. Acharyal narrated the following parable based on the yoga-vāsiṣṭha.

A young lad said to his mother, “Please entertain me with a story.” His mother agreed to do so and narrated the following thoroughly fanciful tale.

Three handsome princes lived in a city that was totally non-existent. They were courageous and righteous. Two of them had not been born, while the third had not even reached the womb of his mother. With good thoughts, they set out to acquire the best. On the way, they came across fruit-bearing trees suspended in space. They plucked and ate a variety of tasty fruits.

Moving on, they beheld three rivers prettified by ripples. Two of the rivers never had a drop of water, while the third was fully dry. The princes bathed and sported in the dried-up river. Having drunk its sweet water to their heart’s content, they reached a city that was yet to come into existence and where people were conversing and enjoying themselves.

In that city, the princes saw three lovely mansions, two of which had not at all been built, while the third had neither walls nor pillars. They entered the third mansion and, there, obtained three golden vessels. Two of the vessels had been shattered, while the third was completely pulverised. They took the pulverised vessel and put into it a quantity of rice that was hundred handfuls less than a hundred handfuls. They cooked the rice in that vessel and, with it, fed numerous Brahmins who had no mouths, but were voracious eaters. Thereafter, they ate the food that remained. Delighting themselves with hunting and other pursuits, they dwelt happily in that city that was yet to come into being.

The boy listened to his mother with rapt attention. He enjoyed the story and found nothing incongruous in it. As far as he was concerned, his mother had given him a completely factual account of what had once transpired.

Just as the undiscriminating child regarded the story as factual, unenlightened people mistake the world they see and think of it to be real. They do not realise that the universe is illusory; it appears and disappears with the onset and cessation of mental activity and has no existence apart from the non-dual Supreme that is of the nature of pure consciousness.

★ ★ ★ ★