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In plain words
That other act of seeing which have is a particular knowing that arises from meditation and the like and has another’s as its content. In it, “acts of seeing”, that is, apprehensions, do not shine. Consider: for the Buddhists, to begin with, knowing has the one form of being self-luminous. If it were to be known by another knowing, then its very own body, which is its shining as known by no other, would not have been made to shine. For the too, apprehension is nothing but a reflection of , and is entirely beyond being known; so how could apprehension be known? For the too, awareness inheres in the without being different from it; how could an awareness that belongs to another be grasped by , which works within the body? But if were to enter within that other body, then that very body would be taken on as one’s own body, as “I”; and since it would be made to appear with I-ness, the difference of the would melt away. But it does not hold that the is forever to be inferred. And where knowing is to be known by another knowing, infinite regress and the rest have already been stated.
Therefore, when a is aware of another’s , there is this much : a of a pot, of pleasure and the like, going along with the of this body. There the pot, the pleasure and the like shine with this-ness; but the within them shines as self-luminous, simply as “I”. Yet the in whom the division of self and other has not melted away, by the of the appearing of another’s body, and the rest as made into a , takes the this-ness that rests in them to belong to the part that is as well, and so he supposes: “This is another’s knowing.” But one who has reached the height, seeing everything as himself, holds the division of self and other to be his own creation. So knowing is not made to shine by a ’s knowing. Or let it be so; even then the matter in hand is not like this. Consider: the ’s of that experience rests wholly in the other, as “this one is experiencing”, and does not abide by rising into the , as “I am experiencing”. But here, in “I experienced”, the experience rests in the part that is “I”, untouched by this-ness. So it was rightly said: because the experience does not shine as separate, therefore the oneness of of different times is the knower.
If it is said that the experience does not shine as separate in memory because it rests in I-ness, then another is also met with, which holds the experience in awareness directly as “this”, or else spreads before one the experience’s resting in a pot or the like, as befits this-ness. So why are dealings not carried on in keeping with that as well? He rejects this intent of the other side:
That which is remembered even thus, with difference, as “that seeing was mine”, is only an analysis of this memory, “seen by me”.