। , , । , ---- , , , , , , । । , , । । , , । ---- , , , । ॥} । , । ॥३॥ । , । , , । । ॥ §०§ । ॥ §१§
In plain words
If , whose self is knowing, is other than the object, and for that very reason different from the object, then in itself, since its form is nothing but , it is simply undivided. Consider: in “the of blue” and “the of yellow”, the part that is blue and the part that is yellow is not, to begin with, the form of the knowing itself, for then the doctrine of difference would have to be given up. But if it belongs to the content, then just this is what has to be examined. Here the difference between blue and yellow has to be accepted on the strength of . And how could it hold together that by the very by which blue is accepted as blue and nothing else, by that same yellow is accepted as yellow? What is said, “it is produced by blue”, “it is produced by yellow”, or “it has the same set of causes as that”, and so on, would hold only once the difference between blue and yellow is established; and that is the very thing to be examined. But if it has the shape of blue, then, if that is by the force of a reflection, it does not fit, since no original appears as a second beside it. But if it is not different from the knowing, then the doctrine of difference has been given up. Likewise, on the doctrine that the object is what produces knowing, and the like, the knowing of one who stands on a summit, produced by a great many blue things and the rest, is sharp in one place and dull in another: how can there be this difference, when the body of is undivided? And since the too is of that kind, then even when it has arisen from seeing only one of the two, there follows perforce the absurd consequence that everything is remembered: so the mixing is great indeed. Suppose one says: “Let there be the object alone; what use is this , which only brings faults in its train?” To this he says: for what is unlit there is no being established at all. For if blue is complete in itself, or is nothing at all, what would go wrong? For this very reason the author himself has said elsewhere:
“So these insentient things, in themselves as good as unreal, exist only as belonging to . alone is, for itself, through selves that are its own and others’.”
So, if it is , then it is an object. And how is it ? If being is the very body of the pot, and that same is the body of the cloth, and so on, then is established as having the universe for its body.
This much has to be brought home: sovereignty is the power, belonging to the one alone, to display such a varied form of all things as has been described, with sequence and without it, with the relation of cause and effect and the rest. And it does come home in this way, if every other cause for ’s being varied has been set aside. On that point: is not varied, and what makes it varied in sequence, by way of reflection, is whatever is of one kind with its reflection; that alone is the outer thing in the form of blue and the like. And though it is to be inferred, still, because it is determined by perception as “this is blue”, and because the standing of a draws its life from determination, it will be called perceived. So it is said in the doctrine of outer objects. He shows this other cause, whose outer form is inferred, by raising it as a doubt:
If this and that , coming by chance, should lead one to infer an outer thing, for undivided awareness cannot be the cause of varied ,
and the awakening of , being varied, could not become the cause here, for in the variety of that awakening too, what would be the ground?