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In plain words
It is not only that, by the arguments set out in the verse just before, the outer object does not shine through perception, for perception is just this much, “and that blue shines”, which has the form of self-luminous , and there is nothing more. Rather, this outer thing is not established even by inference: that is the intent of the word “api”. On this, two things are shown by this pair of : that inference cannot so much as set to work here, and that, even if it did set to work, it would not bring about the establishing of the matter in hand. Now inference is , and it is well known that every is rooted in experience. So, for what has in no way appeared before and has never been experienced, no disputant at all accepts inference, the working of inferring, whose self is . But surely, let this talk hold for inference “seen by perception”; but what will you say of inference “seen in general”, as in the inference of a sense faculty from the perceiving of objects? It is answered: there too the settled position is that the thing is inferred just as it is touched by . And does not touch an object such as a sense faculty in a particular nature, through some particular arrangement or the like, but in this nature: “something is the cause of perceiving”. And that nature, whose mark is being a cause, is indeed grasped by perception. So, in “the sprout from the seed”, “the cloth from the threads” and the like, the relation of cause and effect is first to be ascertained by the strength of perception and non-perception. And there perception is a by , since the working of right knowing, whose mark is , goes out to an object expressed by one word at a time, and since the follows that working. So it will be said:
“About a real thing that is the content of a single name, knowing is uncancelled.”
And it will be settled that a universal is alone. Non-perception too, having the form of the perceiving of something else, rests in alone. So, in the understanding “the sprout from the seed”, what is taken up is the of the cause, empty of particulars. “What follows the fixed rule of another without departing from it is its effect”: so it is, since for each pot there is the of no more than its cause, in the form of clay and the like, and of what has that cause.
But what is outside is not of the form of , and that it should appear is a contradiction. And where there is no , inference, which has the form of , has no working. As for what is outside a village, a house and the like, it is not called so because it has a form that is not the village and so on, for then the absurd consequence would follow that each of them, the fence, the marshland, the wall, the beam and the rest, is outside; rather, it is what lies near. Therefore “outside the village” and “outside ” share a likeness of words only, not a likeness of real things. So even for those who hold that a real thing does not shine in , the of inference does not, to begin with, hold for the outer. But we have made it good in the “and if determining is error” that determination too has what is appearing for its content. So if an object, blue and the like, is not entered by , even by in the form of the of inference, then it would not be inferred at all. But if it is indeed entered, then, by the principle “an object would be unlit, as it was before”, its own nature is alone, and it is not outer. So whatever is brought in when the outer is to be proved proves, on the contrary, only that it is not outer; so it is simply contradictory. For this very reason he says “in any way”: never, in any mode, whether as perceived or as inferred, did there come about an , a shining, of the outer, which is not . Therefore it is established that “the is the that is and nothing else”.