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In plain words
But surely, if effects come to be whose working is just like that of the particular effects of the well-known causes, even when those causes are overstepped, then the accounts of inference are broken. Consider: with the doubt “How could one thing be bound by rule to another?” in view, those who think themselves the more versed in have taken being of one self with a thing and arising from it as the source of the rule. For no real thing is without an own nature, nor is it of different own natures, since a difference of own nature makes it different; and if those two own natures were absent by turns, it would follow that it has no own nature. The same is to be said of an effect that has no cause, or a different cause. And in both cases the ordering is made by the cause alone. For it is from its own cause that the is born never straying from the own nature of a tree, and from its own cause that fire has the own nature of bringing forth smoke. Now, if the relation of cause and effect oversteps , all this would fall apart. For by a ’s will even a could have an own nature that is not a tree’s; and with smoke the charge is double: the gathering of causes, fire and the rest, sprung from a ’s will, would not bring forth smoke, or a ’s will would bring forth smoke without fire. So there would be no inference; and in the world there is. With this doubt in view, he says:
When it has been settled by another that a thing is not of a ’s making, an effect, or an own nature born of the root of arising, is a reason, for this very reason.
It was said that a ’s will too brings forth an effect in every way of just that kind, and not one that differs somehow in taste, potency and the rest, in the way scorpions and the like are born from scorpions, cow-dung and the rest. “For this very reason”: from this very cause an effect, smoke and the rest, in inferring fire and the rest, or an own nature, being a and the rest, in inferring being a tree and the rest, is a reason in this way. If it is by another , then in inference practice in another birth, what is well known in the world, and the like must of necessity be drawn on; and “it is the seed of the insight that comes from what is heard and from inference”: so spoke of the domain of . And other logicians have supposed that there is a perception like the perception of , for grasping all real things. And we bear no burden over the of everyday dealings; for our matter in hand is the of the Lord, and that is self-luminous; even when the is hindered it is not hindered, as has been said more than once. But surely, in the reason that is an own nature, what need is there of any other thought? He says: from that which is the root, the cause, of the arising of the , which never strays from being a tree, from that alone is born its own nature, which follows on mere being. And so:
“From taste there is knowing of colour and the rest, which depend on a single gathering of causes, by inferring a property of the cause, as with the change in the fuel from smoke.”