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In plain words
So it goes with the reason that is an own nature. But surely, to begin with, it is seen that scorpions and the like have many causes, insects, cow-dung and the rest; but there is a difference of taste, potency and the rest there: that is another matter. So let being born of a be borne even for smoke without fire. But how could a reversal of an own nature be thought possible? For no one who goes by would believe that what is blue becomes not blue, while it is still blue, by a ’s will. It is answered. Here the reason that is an own nature is of two kinds: one within which a relation of cause and effect lies hidden, and its opposite. “This mountain has fire, because it has smoke”; “This is impermanent, because it is made.” Of the first, to begin with, this relation of cause and effect is the root: so what is there to say about it? But the other is to be examined. If, to begin with, being made has for its own nature dependence on a cause, how could being impermanent, which is having for its own nature a coming to be bounded by not coming to be, be its own nature, since the differ? But if the is not different, then, since what is to be proved is proved in the very proving of the reason, at most it is dealings that are proved, on the pattern “This is a taru, because it is a vṛkṣa”; and dealings, made of knowing and naming, are nothing but an effect; and there you too have accepted the of . Therefore in all reasons that are an own nature, without a difference of , there is only the proving of dealings; for there the of what is to be proved is no more than the reason, since it is made of the of the reason itself. This is the whole story of exclusions; this is the very path of universals. So it is fixed, in the way set out before, by the force of its cause, that there is the of sharing a common ground between the of and the of tree. So this own nature has its root only in the relation of cause and what has a cause; and for that very reason this is to be seen as said in general: every reason that is an own nature is born of the root of arising. And it was argued before that alone are the real thing. And so, when a single alone is being created, and other objects with branches and the rest are not created, it can well be supposed that there is not even the name of the of tree, general in nature, as what is to be proved. But that being a tree which is of one form and particular is surely just being a , and that is established; so it is not to be proved. Even when there is the “this depends on a cause”, there would be no of impermanence. In the same way, even when there is no doing of effective action, there is no of momentariness. So every reason that is an own nature holds only by looking to , and not otherwise: this is a rule without exception.
But surely, on the view that is the real thing, fire that has not appeared is not a real thing. So how is smoke brought forth by what has not appeared? And then how is there inference of fire, the cause, from smoke? With this doubt in view, to make the case, he says:
Again, from the of fire and the rest, one for this and that , the ruling one, even though it is out of sight, a new of smoke and the rest can arise.