, , ? । ॥ §०§ , ---- ; , , ॥१७॥ । , ---- , , । , ---- । , ---- । ॥ §१§ , ---- । , , , । , , ॥१८॥ , ---- , ? । ॥ §२§
In plain words
But surely, if looking to another, marked by having a being that is set going and a being that sets going, does not hold where things rest in themselves alone, then on the view of the , who hold that cause and effect are of one self, it surely can come about. So what is the use of arguing for the view that the doer is the unfolding of ? With this doubt in view, he says:
Even if cause and effect have each other’s own nature, there is only oneness; for if they are different, they cannot have each other’s form at all.
If the sprout is the seed’s own nature, then there would be only the sprout, and no seed at all, or else the reverse: so what is the cause, and what the effect? But if the seed is one thing and the sprout another, then they are not of each other’s self; for difference and non-difference, at one time and about one thing, simply conflict.
But surely, even so, the seed, which has appeared varied as sprout and the rest, is held in awareness by those whose reaches far and far again, with nothing to cancel it, as unbroken in form, like a stream. And so, when asked, “Where has the seed gone?”, people answer, “It has gone nowhere; it is there as the sprout; it has become the sprout; this sprout is that.” In the same way , having become and the rest down to earth, and spread out to the full, has reached the self of an endless chain of creations and dissolutions: this is the understanding that grasps the whole spread. But to suppose a relation of cause and effect out of clinging to parts is all but cutting up that one thing. With this doubt in view, he says:
And the differing of what is one self is action, following the sequence of time. So in that way there would be being the doer alone, through its changing thus.
Here one who sees far, resting on a rooted in some one , perception, inference or scripture, argues that this very balance of pleasure, pain and delusion has become the universe by taking on imbalance of endless kinds. There, by the force of , what is of one self, of one own nature: its differing, its being of one form and then another, is what is called action, because it follows a sequence marked by time; for those different natures do not shine at once, and having a form that has become before and after is itself what is called action. Since action is of this kind, “in that way”, that is, in that manner, marked by a particular action, and the rest would have being the doer alone, and not bare being a cause. The reason: “thus”, that is, in this and that manner, as and the rest, and the rest ever enter into action that runs in sequence, whose form is shining in that way and whose mark is change; and it is “through” their “changing”, as the cause, “thus”: that is, through their setting aside some form, giving it up, settling what is to be turned away and what is to be carried on, and bowing towards a third form that is being brought about.
But surely, by this much it has been argued that is a doer in the action of change: what fault is there in that? For it is not held to be no doer, as is. With this doubt in view, he says:
And it does not fit the insentient in this way, because difference and non-difference conflict; but it fits in one, the that is , through difference of .