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In plain words
A single thing, to begin with, is no relation of cause and effect. And two things that come to be at once do not have the form of cause and effect, like a pot and a cloth. Nor do two that come to be in sequence, if their sequence is not fixed, like the acts of knowing blue, yellow and the rest. And even where the sequence is fixed, it is not that what comes before is the effect and what comes later the cause. So in this way what is fixed as coming before is the cause, and what is fixed as coming after is the effect: this, to begin with, is the other side’s view. There, if coming before and coming after are nothing beyond their own form, then there are only two things, “this and this”. Or rather, there is not even any meaning of “and”, since that too has the form of looking to another; for it would be only “this, this”. But if coming before means having a being that sets going, and coming after means having a being that is set going, then the seed’s being, which sets the sprout going, rests in the sprout and brings the sprout within itself. Where there is no sprout, there would be bare setting going, and that too is nothing, since it looks to another. The same is to be said of what has a being that is set going. So not only do positions such as “the relation of cause and effect is mere things” fail to hold; even the relation of cause and effect whose form is this, that “this is” means, by the case-ending of what is being brought to be, having a being that is set going: that too “does not hold”, does not come about by any , for insentient things. For looking to one another is its life here, and that cannot come about for insentient things.
If it is asked, “How?”, it is answered:
For of things that rest in their own selves alone and have no linking, this meaning of the locative is not made out, even where being and not being are concerned.
The insentient, as is known, have no power to link one another’s form. Being of the form of linking one another is pervaded by , the opposite of the insentient; and linking, that is, looking to another, is the very of ; elsewhere it is spoken of only by a figure. So, since it has no linking, how would an insentient thing, its body shrunk by contentment in resting in itself alone, reach out towards another? And so, if the seed is and the sprout is not, or the reverse, or both are, or both are not; or again one can be named and the other cannot, or both can be named, or both cannot: even so there remains only the meaning of the bare stem, untouched by any further property, even by joining and the like; for all of that, having the form of looking to another, rests in .
Since looking to another does not hold among what is not sentient:
For this very reason the meaning of the case-ending, called the relation of action and factor, which rests in one alone, is the fitting joining of things together.
The meaning of the case-ending in the form of the locative, or of any other, marked by the relation of action and factor, is itself the joining together of things, to begin with, and no other bare one. And it holds if the two things come to rest in one who is free and whose form is ; otherwise it does not hold at all. Consider: even when it is dealt in by , it does not hold as resting in the real thing. For , whose life is following the real thing, comes about only by following experience, and that is not here, since it does not spring from the real thing; for experience follows the real thing, and the real thing rests in itself, as has been said. Therefore “When there is a seed, a sprout”, “When there is fire, smoke”: all this holds when it rests in a who is free and whose form is , and not otherwise.