Mantra 20

In plain words

How does this happen? Here is the answer:

Here's the picture: think of a spider — just one creature, nothing unusual about that — spinning itself outward on a thread that is nothing but itself. There's no separate helper involved in its spinning; it needs nothing beyond itself. Or think of a single fire, giving off countless tiny sparks in every direction — mere fragments of the fire itself. Both pictures show the same thing: things pour outward without any second agent being needed, and before any of that pouring-out begins, there is only oneness. It's exactly the same with the awareness-self: before it wakes, whatever its own nature was — that is the very source everything comes from. 'All the vital breaths' means speech and the rest; 'all the worlds' means the earth and the rest, along with everything action produces; 'all the gods' means those who preside over the vital functions and the worlds, fire chief among them; 'all beings' means every living thing there is, from Brahmā all the way down to a blade of grass. And by one reading of the text, 'all these come from the self' points to the individual selves that come into being wherever this one self meets a particular set of limiting conditions. All of this pours out of the self. Because it is from this self that the whole world, everything that moves and everything that doesn't, is forever pouring forth — like sparks from a fire — and it is into this very self that the world dissolves again, the way a bubble dissolves back into water, and it is this self's own nature that the world is made of for as long as it lasts — because of all this, this self, Brahman, is given the name 'upaniṣad,' a word that means 'that which brings you near.' Scripture itself fixes exactly what that nearness means: it is what leads a person close to the truth. So what is this upaniṣad, really? Here is the answer: 'the truth behind the truth.' Wherever this word appears, it is pointing at something beyond ordinary experience — which is exactly why it's so hard to grasp. That's why scripture spells it out directly: 'the breaths of life are real' — … — 'you would end up fabricating something, and that can't be right,' someone might object. No — because scripture itself is the ground for this teaching: for people still caught in the cycle of rebirth, it shows, through the words 'just so, from this very self,' how the whole world comes into being. So everything here deserves to be trusted. That, at least, is one way of looking at it.

Close to the Sanskrit

'How is that?'—[thus] it is said:

Here is the illustration: just as, in the world, the spider — being just one, well known as such — comes forth, issues out, by a thread not distinct from its own self, and there is nothing else, beyond itself, that is a further factor in its emergence; and just as, from one and the same fire, tiny, minute sparks — fragments, particles of fire — fly forth variously, in many ways; just as these two illustrations show activity occurring even without any difference of agent, and show oneness of nature prior to that activity — exactly so, from this self, the vijñānamaya self, because of [its state] prior to awakening, whatever was its own nature, from that [same nature everything now proceeds] — that is the meaning: 'all the vital breaths' means speech and so on; 'all the worlds' means the earth and so on, and all the fruits of action; 'all the gods' means those presiding over the vital functions and the worlds, fire and so on; 'all beings' means the classes of living creatures from Brahmā down to a blade of grass — and, in this variant reading, 'all these [proceed] from the self' means the particular selves that become manifest through contact with limiting adjuncts — that is the meaning: [all of this] issues forth. Because, from this self, this world, moving and unmoving, issues forth unceasingly like sparks from fire, and into which alone it dissolves like a bubble in water, and whose very substance it consists of during the period of its persistence — of this very self, Brahman, the word 'upaniṣad' — being the word expressing 'it brings one near' — is used, thus called; from the authority of scripture, a particular sense belonging to this word is ascertained, namely the quality of 'leading one near.' [One asks:] 'What is this upaniṣad?' — the answer is given: 'the truth of the truth.' For this upaniṣad, everywhere, having a transcendent referent, has a meaning hard to grasp; therefore [scripture] explains that meaning: 'the vital breaths, indeed, are the truth' — … — 'would fabricate [something], hence this would be improper' — if this is the objection — no, because of scripture; scripture shows, to those bound in transmigration, by the words 'even so, from this self,' the origination of the world and so on; therefore everything here is to be trusted — this would be one position.

In plain words

'He knows everything, in every way there is to know.' 'He has moved beyond hunger and thirst.' 'Untouched, he clings to nothing.' 'Under the rule of this Imperishable, everything holds its place.' 'He lives inside every creature — the deathless one steering from within.' 'He rose above every state of being and simply passed beyond them.' 'This vast, unborn Self.' 'The bridge that keeps the worlds from colliding.' 'Master of everything, ruler of everything.' 'The Self that evil never touches, that never ages, that never dies.' 'That Being sent forth fire.' 'In the very beginning, the Self alone was — nothing else at all.' 'Standing outside it all, untouched by the world's pain.' From these — and a hundred verses like them, and the tradition-texts too, including 'I am the source of everything; everything moves because of me' — we know there is a Supreme, beyond birth and death, on the word of scripture, tradition, and reason alike. And this Supreme is the world's cause. But someone might object: didn't we already agree that 'just so, from this very self' describes only how an ordinary, still-bound self comes to be — not the Supreme? No. Because 'the space within the heart' is exactly what is under discussion here, and that is the Supreme; so 'from this self' points only to the Supreme. As the answer to 'who was this, then,' it is the Supreme Self, named here as 'space,' that is meant: 'the space within the heart — that is where he rests,' and 'then, dear one, he becomes one with Being.' 'Day after day...' … — having first declared this oneness, and having shown, through examples and reasoning, that the world is a transformation, a part, springing from the Supreme Self, scripture circles back and concludes with oneness once more. Take the clearest case: it opens by declaring 'all this is nothing but this Self,' works out — through the arising, the persisting, and the dissolving of things — every reason there is to see oneness even within all that change, and then closes with 'nothing within it, nothing outside it' and 'this Self is Brahman.' Because the opening and the closing agree, we know exactly what these teachings are for: every passage about how the world begins, continues, and ends exists only to make the truth of oneness with the Supreme Self unshakeable. Otherwise you would be left with a broken scripture, its sentences pointing nowhere in particular. Every Upanishad, without exception, teaches this same oneness of the individual self with the Supreme Self — every commentator agrees on that much. And one teaching does the job perfectly well on its own. If you insist the passages about the world's origin mean something else entirely, you have no evidence for it — and you would be forced to invent some extra payoff for them out of nowhere. So: every scriptural word about how the world comes to be exists for exactly one purpose — to teach that the self and the Supreme are one.

Close to the Sanskrit

'He who is omniscient, all-knowing'; 'he who transcends hunger and thirst'; 'the unattached one, indeed, does not cling'; 'under the rule of this Imperishable'; 'he who, dwelling in all beings, is the immortal inner controller'; 'he who, having mounted those states, transcended them'; 'this great, unborn Self'; 'this is the bridge, the sustainer'; 'the controller of all, the ruler of all'; 'the Self free from evil, free from old age, free from death'; 'That created fire'; 'the Self alone, indeed, was this in the beginning'; 'standing outside, untouched by the world's suffering' — from these and hundreds of such scriptural statements, and from the Smṛti as well, [including] 'I am the source of all; from me everything proceeds' — a Supreme exists, free from transmigration, on the grounds of scripture, tradition, and reasoning; and that is the cause of the world. Objection: it has already been said that '[thus] indeed, from this self' shows only the origination of the transmigrating self. No — because '[this] space that is within the heart' refers to what is under discussion, namely the Supreme; hence 'from this self' is properly understood as referring to the Supreme alone. As the answer to the question 'who was this, then,' the Supreme Self, denoted by the word 'space,' has been declared — '[this] space within the heart: in that he lies'; '[and] then, O gentle one, he becomes one with Being.' 'Day by day...' … — having postulated oneness, and having established, by illustrations and reasons, that the world is a modification, a portion, and so on, of the Supreme Self, [scripture] again concludes with oneness. For example: here, to begin with, having postulated 'all this is what this Self is,' and having established, through the illustrations and reasons concerning origination, continuance, and dissolution, the grounds for the notion of oneness amid modification and its states, [scripture] will conclude with 'nothing within, nothing without' and 'this Self is Brahman.' Therefore, by the agreement of opening and conclusion, this meaning is ascertained: that the sentences teaching origination, continuance, and dissolution exist for the firming-up of the notion of oneness with the Supreme Self — otherwise, a splitting of the sentence would result. For in all the Upaniṣads there is unanimity, among all expounders of the Upaniṣads, that the notion of oneness of the cognitive self with the Supreme Self is enjoined; and this is possible in connection with a single injunctive sentence. Whereas, on the supposition that the sentences about origination and so on refer to something else, there is no proof, and a further, separate result would have to be assumed. Therefore the scriptural statements about origination and so on are devoted to establishing the oneness of the self.

In plain words

Here the tradition carries a story. A prince, torn from his parents the moment he was born, grows up in a hunter's house. He has no idea he belongs to a royal line — he takes himself for a hunter, and lives like one, never once thinking, 'I am a king.' Then someone deeply compassionate, seeing what he's actually fit for, tells him the truth: 'You are not a hunter. You are the son of that king. Somehow you wandered into a hunter's home.' The moment he hears it, he drops the hunter's ways and steps into the place that was always his by birth — 'I am the king.' You are that prince. You broke off from the Supreme the way a spark breaks off from fire, and you wandered into this thicket of body and senses. Nothing about you actually transmigrates, yet you've been living as if you do — 'I am this body, these senses, I am thin, I am heavy, I am happy, I am in pain' — because you never knew the Self you already are. Then the teacher wakes you: 'You are not this. You alone are Brahman, beyond all transmigration.' Let go of chasing what you crave, and you find yourself simply saying, 'I am Brahman.' Just as the prince's sense of himself as king becomes unshakeable once he hears it, your sense of being Brahman becomes unshakeable too — the moment you're told 'you fell from Brahman like a spark,' you see the spark was one with the fire even before it fell. That's why the images of gold and jewel, iron and spark, are there: to make the truth of oneness stick, not to prove that something real came into being and split apart. Because scripture holds one essence through and through, like a block of salt, and says 'see it as one alone' — if it had actually meant to paint many separate qualities onto Brahman, the way a canvas holds many colors or the world holds trees and oceans, it would never have said 'no inside, no outside, one taste throughout,' never said 'see it as one alone,' and never scolded, 'he who sees many here.' So every talk of creation, sustaining, and dissolution in the Vedanta is only there to fix the single truth in you — not to hand you a multiplied world.

Close to the Sanskrit

And here the knowers of the tradition relate a story: A certain king's son, cast off by his mother and father as soon as he was born, was raised in a hunter's house. Not knowing his belonging to that lineage, taking himself to be of the hunter's caste, he follows only the acts belonging to the hunter caste; he does not follow the acts belonging to the royal caste, thinking 'I am a king.' But when a certain extremely compassionate person, knowing his fitness for attaining royal fortune, informs him of his sonship — 'You are not a hunter; you are the son of that king; somehow you entered a hunter's house' — then he, thus informed, having abandoned the notions and acts belonging to the hunter caste, follows the position that is his own by father and grandfather: 'I am a king.' Likewise, indeed, this one, separated from the Supreme like a spark from fire, entered here into the dense thicket of body and senses; though not subject to transmigration, he follows the transmigratory nature of body and senses — 'I am the aggregate of body and senses, I am thin, I am stout, I am happy, I am unhappy' — not knowing the Supreme Self as his own self. When, by the teacher, he is awakened thus: 'You are not this; you alone are the supreme Brahman, free from transmigration' — then, having abandoned the pursuit of the three desires, he comes to realize 'I am Brahman alone.' Here, as the notion 'king' becomes firm for the king's son, so the notion 'Brahman' becomes firm — just as, when it is said 'You have fallen from the Supreme Brahman, exactly like a spark,' the oneness with fire is seen from the spark's prior separation from the fire. Therefore the illustrations of gold, jewel, iron, and fire-and-spark are for the firming of the notion of oneness, not intent on establishing difference by origination and the like. Because, from the ascertainment through wisdom of the unbroken continuity of one essence, like a lump of rock-salt, and from 'it should be seen only as one' — if a manifold diversity of properties such as origination were meant to be established of Brahman, like a painted canvas or like trees and the ocean, then it would not have concluded 'one-essenced, like a lump of salt, without an interior or an exterior,' nor would it have used 'it should be seen only as one,' nor the reproachful statement 'he who sees as if manifold here.' Therefore, in all the Vedanta texts, the positing of origination, subsistence, dissolution and the like is solely for the firming of the notion of oneness of one form, not for producing the notion of that [multiplicity].

In plain words

You cannot picture a transmigrating piece inside the Supreme Self, which has no parts and does not transmigrate — because the Supreme, by its very nature, takes up no space at all. Imagine a 'part' of something spaceless doing the transmigrating, and you've simply made the whole Supreme into the transmigrator — there's no way around it. Or say the 'part' comes from some limiting condition, the way a pot or a jar seems to carve out its own little piece of space. Even then, no one who actually sees clearly ever mistakes that pocket of space for a truly separate thing. 'But don't both the confused and the clear-sighted talk this way?' Yes — but for the confused it's simply a mistake, and for the clear-sighted it's only a convenience of speech. Just like when we say the sky is black, or red: even wise people say it, for the sake of getting by in conversation — but the sky was never actually black or red. So the wise never let themselves picture Brahman as a whole with pieces, a thing with fragments, something that changes and something changed — because stripping away exactly that kind of picture is the whole point of every Upanishad. Let go of every such construction, and understand: Brahman has no more distinguishing marks than space does — 'all-pervading and eternal, like space,' 'standing outside, untouched by the world's pain,' say hundreds of scriptures. Don't imagine the Self differs from Brahman the way a cold patch might sit inside fire, whose very nature is heat, or a dark patch inside the sun, whose very nature is light — because, again, every Upanishad exists only to clear such pictures away. So every distinction we make about the Self — which by nature never changes at all — comes only from the labels of name and form we hang on it. 'It took on form after form, matching each one,' 'the wise one names all the shapes he sees, and rests, simply speaking them,' say the ancient verses. Transmigration was never the Self's own nature; it's a trick of the eye, like a clear crystal that looks red because a piece of dyed cloth sits beside it — not real, just seeming. 'It seems to think, seems to waver'; 'it grows no bigger by what it does, no smaller either'; 'no wrongdoing ever stains it'; 'it stands the same in every creature'; 'the same in a dog as in the lowest outcaste' — and from all of this, one thing is settled: the Supreme Self simply does not transmigrate. So once you accept that it has no parts, you cannot seriously entertain a part of it, a change in it, a power belonging to it, or the individual self as something else again. When scripture speaks of a 'portion' of Brahman becoming the self, it is teaching you oneness — not handing you real division. Read alongside what the text actually means, it can only be saying one thing. That is what we have said.

Close to the Sanskrit

And it is not reasonable to imagine a transmigrating part in the partless, non-transmigrating Supreme Self, because the Supreme Self is by its own nature without location. If one imagines a part of the locationless Supreme to be a transmigrator, it would amount to imagining that the Supreme itself is the transmigrator. Or [if one says] the part of the Supreme is made by an adjunct of the Supreme, like space delimited by a pot or jar — then, in that case, no cognition arises in discerning people that a part of the Supreme Self is the subject of separate practical dealing. If [you say]: 'A figurative cognition is observed in both the non-discerning and the discerning' — no; because for the non-discerning it is simply a false cognition, and for the discerning it serves only as a support for mere practical dealing — just as, when it is said 'the sky is black' or 'red', even discerning people sometimes accept the blackness or redness of the sky only for the sake of practical dealing, but the sky cannot in ultimate reality be black or red. Therefore the wise should not, in the matter of understanding Brahman's true nature, entertain the notion of Brahman as portion and portion-holder, part and part-holder, modification and subject of modification — because the whole essence of all the Upanishads is devoted to the removal of every such imagining. Therefore, having abandoned all such imagining, one should understand freedom from distinguishing attributes, just like that of space — 'and, like space, all-pervading and eternal,' 'being external, it is not tainted by the suffering of the world' — from hundreds of such scriptural statements. One should not imagine the Self to be different in character from Brahman — like [imagining] a portion of cold in fire, whose nature is heat, or a portion of darkness in the sun, whose nature is light — because the whole essence of all the Upanishads is devoted to the removal of every such imagining. Therefore, all practical distinctions in the Self, which by nature does not transmigrate, are caused only by the adjuncts of name and form — 'he became conformed to every form, form after form,' 'the wise one, having differentiated all forms and given them names, sits speaking them' — from these and other such Vedic passages. The state of transmigrating does not belong to the Self by its own nature; it is merely an illusion, like the notion of a red crystal produced by conjunction with an adjunct such as lac-dye — not something real in the ultimate sense. 'It seems to meditate, it seems to waver,' 'it does not grow by action, nor become lesser,' 'it is not tainted by evil action,' 'abiding equally in all beings,' 'in a dog, and even in an outcaste' — from these and other reasonings of scripture and tradition, the Supreme Self's very freedom from transmigration [is established]. Therefore, once partlessness is accepted, it is not at all possible to conceive of a part, a modification, a power, or the individual cognizing self, or anything else [as literally being a portion of it]. And the scriptural and traditional statements about 'a portion' and the like serve the purpose of oneness; they do not establish real difference — because they must form a single coherent statement with the intended meaning. Thus we have said.

In plain words

No — we've already answered this. Whether any means of knowledge is valid or not comes down to one thing alone: does it produce correct knowledge, or doesn't it? If that weren't the test, then even a bare post could count as a valid authority on the meaning of words. So where does that leave us? If the Upanishads do produce correct knowledge that Brahman is one, how could they possibly be invalid? Say you insist they produce no such thing — that's exactly like insisting fire is cold. Here's the answer you're owed: does your own statement, whose entire purpose is to deny the Upanishads' authority, actually manage to deny it — the way fire manages to give off light? Or doesn't it? If it does succeed, then your statement is a valid instrument for that denial, and by the same measure fire is a valid producer of light — fine. But grant your denial-statement its validity, and the Upanishads' validity comes along with it, by the very same logic. So let our opponents tell us: what is the way out of this? 'But surely,' they say, 'my own understanding that I'm denying the Upanishads, and the way I directly perceive light coming from fire, are both simply valid knowledge.' Then what exactly do you have against the Upanishads, which we watch producing valid knowledge of Brahman's oneness right in front of us? There's no way to deny them that makes sense. And the visible fruit of that knowledge — the falling away of grief and confusion — follows directly from realizing that Brahman is one, as we've already shown. So because this has already been settled, there is, in the end, no real doubt left about whether the Upanishads can be trusted.

As for the claim that the Upanishads are invalid because they undercut their own point — that's not right either. And the claim that the Upanishadic teaching undermines the ritual scriptures' authority — that's not right, because the two are simply not talking about the same thing. The Upanishads exist to teach that Brahman is one; they never once forbid teaching someone how to get what they want, or telling them to go do it — one text can't sensibly pull in two different directions at once, so there's no need for it to. And it's not as though the ritual texts fail to give real knowledge within their own territory — if a statement gives valid knowledge about its own proper subject, how could it possibly clash with something in a completely different territory? Say you object: 'Brahman's oneness can't be known at all, because nothing can grasp it as an object.' No — because that knowledge is itself immediately obvious once you encounter the teaching. Just as 'let the one who wants heaven perform the new-moon and full-moon rites' or 'never kill a brahmin' produce plain, direct knowledge — you might say the same won't happen with the Upanishads, since 'the Upanishads teach Brahman's oneness' is only an inference, and an inference can't outrank direct evidence. So — the objector concludes — the claim that no real knowledge comes from them rests on nothing at all. And here's the deeper point: scripture speaks to someone who is already living inside the ordinary picture of doer, deed, and result — a picture ignorance itself has set up — pursuing, in a general way, what he wants and avoiding what he doesn't, without asking whether that whole picture is even true. Scripture doesn't step in to certify it or refute it. It isn't its job to. Its job is simply to tell him how to get what he's after. Take the rites people perform for particular results: even though the desires behind them come from a mistaken view of things, scripture meets people exactly where they are and just teaches them the means — again and again, in detail. From there, people choose for themselves, according to their own taste, which of those means to pursue; scripture, like the sun or a lamp, just gives light without playing favorites. And so what looks, to one person, like a genuine goal worth pursuing, can look to someone else like nothing at all — each person sees it exactly as it appears to him, and reaches for the means that fit that appearance. This is exactly the spirit of a passage like 'Prajapati's three kinds of children lived as students under their father, Prajapati' and others like it. So the Vedanta texts, which are here to teach that Brahman is one, are not tearing down the ritual scriptures. Nor does that leave the ritual scriptures with nothing to do. And the ritual portion, with its talk of doer and deed, doesn't touch the Upanishads' authority to teach that Brahman is one, either. Every means of knowledge is simply unbeatable on its own ground — the ear for sound, the eye for form, and the Upanishads for exactly this.

Close to the Sanskrit

No, because this has already been answered. For the validity or invalidity of a means of knowledge has as its cause the production or non-production of valid cognition; otherwise, there would follow the undesired consequence that a pillar and the like are valid means of knowledge regarding an object such as word. So what then? If, to begin with, the Upanishads produce valid cognition of the realization of Brahman's oneness, how could they be invalid? If [you say]: 'They do not produce it at all' — that would be like saying 'fire is cold.' You, sir, speaking thus, must be answered: does your statement, whose purpose is to deny the validity of the Upanishads, fail to produce that very denial — the way fire fails to produce the manifestation of form? Or does it succeed? If it succeeds, then let your statement be a valid means of knowledge for the purpose of denial, and let fire too be a producer of the manifestation of form; [but] once the denying statement's validity is granted, the validity of the Upanishads certainly follows as well. Let the venerable opponents state what way out there is. But surely, [you say,] here the cognition of the purport of my statement denying the Upanishads' validity, and likewise the cognition of the manifestation of form in fire, are both directly evident valid cognitions; what, then, is your hostility toward the Upanishads, which are directly seen producing valid cognition regarding the notion of Brahman's oneness? — Because denying them makes no sense. And the cessation of grief, delusion, and the like is the directly observed result born, in due sequence, from realizing the oneness of Brahman — as we have already said. Therefore, because this has already been answered, there is, to that extent, no doubt at all about the Upanishads' invalidity.

As for what was said — 'because it destroys its own purport, it is invalid' — that too is not [correct]. As for what was said — 'the Upanishadic statement is a destroyer of the validity of the ritual portion' — that is not [correct] either, because it has a different purpose. For the Upanishads, being devoted to teaching the oneness of Brahman, do not forbid the teaching of a means for attaining a desired object, nor the engaging of a person in that means — simply because it is untenable for one thing to serve several purposes. Nor does it happen that valid cognition fails to arise, within its own sphere, from the statements of the ritual portion. If a statement produces valid cognition in its own exclusive sphere, how could there be conflict with something else? If [you say]: 'Regarding the oneness of Brahman, valid cognition simply does not arise at all, because it has no object [of any means of knowledge]' — no, because that cognition is itself directly evident. Just as, from statements such as 'One desiring heaven should sacrifice with the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices' [and] 'a brahmin is not to be killed,' directly evident valid cognition arises — that [same kind of cognition] will surely not occur, [you might object,] since 'the Upanishads will teach the oneness of Brahman' is a mere inference; and an inference does not gain validity when it conflicts with direct perception. Therefore this — that valid cognition simply does not arise — is grasped only as something groundless. Moreover, scripture, addressing one who — relying on action, agent, and result exactly as apprehended and presented by nescience — has engaged in the general means for obtaining the desired and avoiding the undesired, without knowing its particulars, neither declares nor denies the reality or unreality of the popularly recognized distinction of action and agent, nor does it forbid it — because its concern is with prescribing the means for obtaining a desired and avoiding an undesired result. Just as scripture, in dealing with desire-motivated rites, though desires indeed arise from false knowledge, nevertheless takes up desires exactly as apprehended and prescribes only the means for them, teaching in many ways the particular connections of the means. There, people themselves, according to their own liking, take up the particular means; but scripture, like the sun or a lamp, simply remains impartial. Likewise, for someone, even a supreme human goal may appear as though it were not one at all; as a thing appears to him, so he sees that goal in just that form, and wishes to take up the means corresponding to it. And so too the explanatory passage — 'the three sons of Prajapati practiced celibate studentship under Prajapati their father' — and so on. Therefore the Vedanta texts, which are going to make known the oneness of Brahman, are not underminers of the injunctive scripture. Nor would the injunctive scripture, merely on this account, become without an object. Nor does the injunctive scripture, which teaches the aforementioned distinction of agent and the rest, negate the Upanishads' validity with regard to the oneness of Brahman. For the means of valid knowledge are each unassailable within their own domain — like the ear and the other senses.

In plain words

Now, some people who think rather too well of their own learning, going purely on their own impressions, hold that every means of knowledge contradicts every other, and on that basis they raise a specific charge against the oneness of Brahman: sound and the other sense-objects are plainly perceived, they say, as distinct things, through direct perception itself — so anyone who teaches that Brahman is one must be contradicting the plain evidence of the senses. In the same way, through hearing and the rest, the perceivers of sound and the agents of good and bad action are inferred to be different in every single body — separate transmigrating souls — so the teacher of oneness runs into inference as well. And they press the same charge from scripture: sentences like 'let one who wants a village perform this rite,' 'let one who wants cattle perform this rite,' 'let one who wants heaven perform this rite' clearly presuppose different people wanting different things and performing different rites to get them. Here is the answer. Those objectors have minds corrupted by bad logic — they are the lowest of their class, honestly more to be pitied than blamed, because they have lost the living thread of what scripture actually means. How do we know? Ask them this: does the difference among sounds heard in different rooms actually break the oneness of space itself? If it doesn't — and of course it doesn't — then perception hasn't touched Brahman's oneness either. As for the inference argument: ask them plainly, distinct by what means? If they answer, 'by our own collective skill at inference,' ask who exactly is skilled in this way — body? senses? mind? self? Each one alone fails the test. If they retreat to 'we, the selves, using body, senses, and mind as our tools, are the skilled ones, because any action needs several factors working together,' then watch what follows: since inference is itself an action, and by their own admission needs body, senses, mind, and self all working together with the self as agent, each of these 'skilled selves' turns out, on their own logic, to be internally many. What a display of inferential skill — from tailless, hornless logician-oxen! Someone who doesn't even know the Self cannot possibly know whether it's one or many; what would he even be inferring, and from what evidence? The Self offers no mark of its own that points to difference, nothing anyone could use to prove it. Whatever marks people wave around to prove the Self is divided always turn out to be made of name and form — which makes them nothing but adjuncts, like a pot, a jar, a room, or a hole in the ground appearing to carve up empty space. Show me a real mark of division in space itself — not in the pot, in space — and then I'll grant you one in the Self. No army of logicians has ever managed that, because the Self simply isn't the kind of thing that can be made an object and divided up; that possibility is ruled out from the very start. Every single attribute anyone offers as belonging to the Self turns out, on their own admission, to be built of name and form — and they also admit the Self is different from name and form. Scripture says exactly this: 'Space indeed carries name and form; what lies between the two, that is Brahman,' and 'Let me differentiate name and form.' Name and form arise and pass away; Brahman does not. So Brahman was never a possible object of inference to begin with — which means the charge of contradicting inference never gets off the ground. And that same point answers the scriptural charge too. As for the objection that oneness would make scripture's own teaching pointless, since there'd be no one to teach and no one to benefit — that fails for the same reason actions in general need multiple factors to occur at all. In the one Brahman, free of every limiting condition, there is indeed no teaching, no teacher, no fruit of teaching — we already accept that completely. But if you push the objection down to the ordinary level, where teacher and student do function, it still fails, because it would contradict what believers in a self already grant about how that level works. So this teaching stands as a fortress no clever debater can storm — secure, closed to shallow minds, closed to anyone without the grace of scripture and a teacher. As the old lines say: 'Who but the deity itself could ever know that god who is beyond every opposite,' 'Even the gods once doubted this,' 'No amount of reasoning will get you there' — it comes only through grace. And the mantras themselves hold Brahman's contradictions together without apology: 'It moves; it does not move. It is far; it is near.' The Gītā says the same: 'All beings dwell in me.' So there is, in the end, no separate thing called 'the transmigrating soul' apart from the one Supreme Brahman. Which is exactly why scripture is right to say: 'In the beginning, this was Brahman alone. It knew only itself: I am Brahman' — confirmed by hundreds of passages like 'There is no other seer than this, no other hearer than this.' And that is why the Real of the real is nothing other than the Supreme Brahman — and that, by name, is the highest secret teaching there is.

Close to the Sanskrit

There, some who consider themselves learned, under the sway of their own minds, think that every means of knowledge contradicts every other, and likewise they raise a charge of contradiction with perception and the rest against the oneness of Brahman: sound and the rest, the objects of hearing and the other senses, are indeed perceived as distinct through direct perception; for those who assert the oneness of Brahman, there would be a contradiction with perception. Likewise, by hearing and the other senses, the perceivers of sound and the rest, and the agents of merit and demerit, are inferred as distinct from body to body, as transmigrating souls; there too, for those who assert the oneness of Brahman, there is a contradiction with inference as well. And likewise they state a contradiction with scripture: from sentences such as 'One desirous of a village should sacrifice,' 'One desirous of cattle should sacrifice,' 'One desirous of heaven should sacrifice,' those desiring a village, cattle, heaven and so on, and the performers of the means thereto, are understood to be distinct. Here it is replied: those objectors, whose inner faculties are corrupted by bad reasoning, are the lowest of the classes beginning with the brāhmaṇa, to be pitied, their understanding of the tradition of scriptural meaning severed. How so? Those who say that the oneness of Brahman is contradicted by sound and the rest, directly perceived through the gateways of hearing and the other senses, are to be asked: is the oneness of space contradicted by the difference of sounds and the rest? If it is not contradicted, then there is no contradiction with perception either. As for what was said — that the perceivers of sound and the rest, and the agents of merit and demerit, are inferred as distinct from body to body, and thus there is a contradiction with inference regarding the oneness of Brahman — they are to be asked: by what means are they inferred to be distinct? If they should say, 'by all of us, who are skilled in inference,' then, to those asked, 'who are you that are skilled in inference,' what is the answer? When skill in inference is denied of each, severally, among body, sense-organ, mind, and self, if they say, 'We, the selves, using body, sense-organ, and mind as instruments, are skilled in inference, because actions are accomplishable by multiple factors,' then it would follow that you yourselves are manifold with respect to that very skill in inference; for it is admitted by you yourselves that an action is accomplishable by multiple factors, and inference, there, is itself an action; that action, it was just claimed, is accomplished by the factors body, sense-organ, mind, and self as instruments, with the self as agent. There, by you who say 'we are skilled in inference,' it would be admitted that 'we, the selves, using body, sense-organ, and mind as instruments, are each severally many.' Ah, what skill in inference has been displayed by these tailless, hornless logician-oxen! For he who does not even know the Self itself — how could that fool know difference or non-difference pertaining to it? What, then, does he infer? Or by what mark? For there is, of the Self's own nature, no mark whatsoever indicative of difference, by which one might establish a difference in the Self. Whatever marks, possessing name-and-form, they put forward to establish a difference in the Self, those, belonging to name-and-form, are merely limiting adjuncts of the Self — like a pot, a jar, a chamber, a hole in the ground, in relation to space. When one sees a mark of difference in space itself, then one might also obtain a mark of difference in the Self; for not even by hundreds of logicians who postulate a distinctness apart from adjuncts can a mark of difference in the Self be shown. Of itself, indeed, difference is excluded from afar, because the Self is not an object. Whatever an opponent admits as an attribute of the Self, because of admitting, in each such case, that it has the nature of name-and-form, and because of admitting that the Self is other than name-and-form — from the scriptural statement, 'Space, indeed, is the carrier of name-and-form; that which is between the two, that is Brahman,' and 'May I differentiate name-and-form' — for name-and-form indeed have the nature of origination and dissolution, and Brahman is distinct in character from that — therefore, since it is simply not an object of inference at all, whence a contradiction with inference? By this, the contradiction with scripture has also been refuted. As for what was said — 'in the oneness of Brahman, there is no one to whom the teaching is given, and no one for whom there is the fruit of receiving the teaching; because of the absence of that, the teaching of oneness would be pointless' — that too is not valid: what objection could there be from actions being accomplishable by multiple factors? In the one Brahman, free of limiting adjuncts, there is no teaching, no teacher, and no fruit of receiving the teaching; therefore that the Upanishads too are pointless — this indeed is already admitted. But if pointlessness is urged with respect to the domain of multiple factors, no — because that would contradict what the upholders of the doctrine of the Self admit of themselves. Therefore this is a fortress not to be entered by the flatterer-soldier-kings of logic, secure, unreachable by those of little intelligence, and by those devoid of the grace of scripture and teacher — 'Who other than He is fit to know that god beyond intoxication and non-intoxication,' 'Even the gods, in this matter, were formerly in doubt,' 'This understanding is not to be attained by logic' — and from scriptural and traditional statements of its being attainable through the grace of a boon; and from mantra-passages such as 'That moves, that moves not; that is far, that is near,' revealing an association with contradictory attributes; and in the Gītā, 'All beings abide in Me,' and so on. Therefore, apart from the Supreme Brahman, there is no other separate entity called the transmigrator. Therefore it is rightly said: 'Brahman, indeed, was this in the beginning; it knew only itself: I am Brahman' — from hundreds of scriptural passages such as 'There is no other seer besides this, there is no other hearer besides this.' Therefore, that the Real of the real is the Supreme Brahman itself — this, by name, is the supreme secret teaching.