जात एव न जायते को न्वेनं जनयेत्पुनः ।विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म रातिर्दातुः परायणम् ॥बृह. ३,९.३५ ॥
In plain words
He who is born is not born again; who indeed should beget him anew? Brahman is understanding and bliss, the highest goal of the giver of gifts.
The commentators
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam· Leaf 9.154· bhāṣya
किं तावद्युक्तम्? आनन्दादिश्रवणात् 'जक्षत्क्रीडन्रममा- णः' 'स यदि पितृलोककामो भवति' 'यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्' 'सर्वान्कामान्समश्नुते' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः मोक्षे सुखं संवेद्यमिति । ननु एकत्वे कारकविभागाभावात् विज्ञानानुपपत्तिः, क्रियायाश्चानेककारकसाध्यत्वात् विज्ञानस्य च क्रियात्वात्— नैष दोषः; शब्दप्रामाण्यात् भवेत् विज्ञानमानन्दविषये ; 'विज्ञानमानन्दम्' इत्यादीनि आनन्दस्वरूपस्यासंवेद्यत्वेऽनुपपन्नानि वचनानीत्यवोचाम । ननु वचनेनापि अग्नेः शैत्यम् उदकस्य च औष्ण्यं न क्रियत एव, ज्ञापकत्वाद्वचनानाम्; न च देशान्तरेऽग्निः शीत इति शक्यते ज्ञापयितुम्; अगम्ये वा देशान्तरे उष्णमुदकमिति— न, प्रत्यगात्मन्यानन्दविज्ञानदर्शनात्; न 'विज्ञानमानन्दम्' इत्येवमादीनां वचनानां शीतोऽग्निरित्यादिवाक्यवत् प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धार्थप्रतिपादकत्वम् । अनुभूयते तु अविरुद्धार्थता; सुखी अहम् इति सुखात्मकमात्मानं स्वयमेव वेदयते; तस्मात् सुतरां प्रत्यक्षाविरुद्धार्थता; तस्मात् आनन्दं ब्रह्म विज्ञानात्मकं सत् स्वयमेव वेदयते । तथा आनन्दप्रतिपादिकाः श्रुतयः समञ्जसाः स्युः 'जक्षत्क्रीडन्रममाणः' इत्येवमाद्याः पूर्वोक्ताः ॥
In plain words
So which side is right? Scripture keeps describing liberation this way -- 'eating, playing, delighting,' 'if he wants the world of his ancestors, he gets it,' 'the one who knows everything, perceives everything,' 'he gets every desire fulfilled.' Passages like these say plainly: liberation includes pleasure you actually feel. Someone objects: in pure oneness there's no split between knower, known, and knowing -- so cognition itself becomes impossible, since any act, including an act of knowing, needs several distinct parts working together. But that's no real problem. Scripture's own words are authority enough for cognition to occur with bliss as its object; we've already shown that a phrase like 'cognition is bliss' would be meaningless if bliss weren't something experienced. Another objection: mere words can't make fire cold or water hot -- they don't create anything, just inform, and you can't 'inform' someone that fire somewhere else is cold, or that water in some unreachable place is hot. True -- but that misses the point: you feel bliss as cognition directly, inside your own awareness. Saying 'cognition is bliss' isn't like saying 'fire is cold' -- one contradicts what you can check, the other doesn't. What you actually experience is uncontradicted: 'I am happy' -- you know yourself, made of happiness, immediately and by nothing but yourself. So this is, if anything, even more clearly a truth perception can't contradict. Which means Brahman, which is bliss, being pure consciousness, is simply self-revealing -- known by nothing other than itself. And that's exactly why all those passages about bliss hold together as one consistent teaching: 'eating, playing, delighting,' and the rest already named.
Close to the Sanskrit
Which, then, is proper? Because of hearing [scriptural words like] bliss and so on -- 'eating, playing, delighting', 'if he becomes one desiring the world of the fathers', 'the one who is all-knowing, all-perceiving', 'attains all desires' -- from such scriptural passages, [it follows that] in liberation pleasure is an object of experience. Objection: in the state of oneness, since there is no division of factors, cognition is impossible, because an action is accomplished by multiple factors, and cognition too is an action. This is not a flaw; by the authority of scriptural words, cognition can occur with regard to bliss as an object; we have already stated that statements such as 'cognition is bliss' would be untenable if the nature of bliss were not an object of experience. Objection: even by a mere statement, the coldness of fire or the heat of water is not thereby brought about, because words are only informative; nor can it be established by words that fire elsewhere is cold, or that water in some inaccessible place is hot. No -- because the cognition of bliss is directly seen within the inner Self; statements like 'cognition is bliss' do not, like the statement 'fire is cold', assert a meaning contradicted by perception and the like. Rather, a non-contradicted meaning is directly experienced: 'I am happy' -- thus one experiences the self, of the nature of happiness, by oneself alone; therefore, all the more, this is a meaning not contradicted by perception; therefore Brahman, which is bliss, being of the nature of consciousness, reveals itself by itself alone. Thus the scriptural passages that teach bliss would be consistent -- 'eating, playing, delighting' and such passages already mentioned.
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam· Leaf 9.155· bhāṣya
न, कार्यकारणाभावे अनुपपत्तेर्विज्ञानस्य— शरीरवियो- गो हि मोक्ष आत्यन्तिकः; शरीराभावे च करणानुपपत्तिः, आश्रयाभावात्; ततश्च विज्ञानानुपपत्तिः अकार्यकरणत्वात्; देहाद्यभावे च विज्ञानोत्पत्तौ सर्वेषां कार्यकरणोपादानानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः । एकत्वविरोधाच्च— परं चेद्ब्रह्म आनन्दात्मकम् आत्मानं नित्यविज्ञानत्वात् नित्यमेव विजानीयात्, तन्न;- संसार्यपि संसारविनिर्मुक्तः स्वाभाव्यं प्रतिपद्येत; जलाशय इवोदकाञ्जलिः क्षिप्तः न पृथक्त्वेन व्यवतिष्ठते आनन्दात्मकब्रह्मविज्ञानाय; तदा मुक्त आनन्दात्मकमात्मानं वेदयत इत्येतदनर्थकं वाक्यम् । अथ ब्रह्मानन्दम् अन्यः सन् मुक्तो वेदयते, प्रत्यगात्मानं च, अहमस्म्यानन्दस्वरूप इति; तदा एकत्वविरोधः; तथा च सति सर्वश्रुतिविरोधः । तृतीया च कल्पना नोपपद्यते । किञ्चान्यत्, ब्रह्मणश्च निरन्तरात्मानन्दविज्ञाने विज्ञानाविज्ञानकल्पनानर्थक्यम्; निरन्तरं चेत् आत्मानन्दविषयं ब्रह्मणो विज्ञानम्, तदेव तस्य स्वभाव इति आत्मानन्दं विजानातीति कल्पना अनुपपन्ना; अतद्विज्ञानप्रसङ्गे हि कल्पनाया अर्थवत्त्वम्, यथा आत्मानं परं च वेत्तीति; न हि इष्वाद्यासक्तमनसो नैरन्तर्येण इषुज्ञानाज्ञानकल्पनाया अर्थवत्त्वम् । अथ विच्छिन्नमात्मानन्दं विजानाति- विज्ञानस्य आत्मविज्ञानच्छिद्रे अन्यविषयत्वप्रसङ्गः; आत्मनश्च विक्रि- यावत्त्वम्, ततश्चानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः । तस्मात् 'विज्ञानमान- न्दम्' इति स्वरूपान्वाख्यानपरैव श्रुतिः, नात्मानन्दसंवे- द्यत्वार्था । 'जक्षत्क्रीडन्' इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधोऽसंवेद्यत्व इति चेन्न, सर्वात्मैकत्वे यथाप्राप्तानुवादित्वात्- मुक्तस्य सर्वा- त्मभावे सति यत्र क्वचित् योगिषु देवेषु वा जक्षणादि प्राप्तम्; तत् यथाप्राप्तमेवानूद्यते- तत् तस्यैव सर्वात्मभा- वादिति सर्वात्मभावमोक्षस्तुतये । यथाप्राप्तानुवादित्वे दुः- खित्त्वमपीति चेत्- योग्यादिषु यथाप्राप्तजक्षणादिवत् स्था- वरादिषु यथाप्राप्तदुःखित्वमपीति चेत्- न, नामरूप- कृतकार्यकरणोपाधिसंपर्कजनितभ्रान्त्यध्यारोपितत्वात् सुखि- त्वदुःखित्वादिविशेषस्येति परिहृतमेतत्सर्वम् । विरुद्धश्रुतीनां च विषयमवोचाम । तस्मात् 'एषोऽस्य परम आनन्दः' इतिवत् सर्वाण्यानन्दवाक्यानि द्रष्टव्यानि ॥
In plain words
Here's the real problem with that: cognition needs a body and organs to work with at all, and liberation means being finally free of the body. No body, no organs; no organs, no cognition -- it has nothing left to work through. And if cognition could somehow still happen without a body, everyone's having a body in the first place would turn out to be pointless. There's a deeper problem too. If Brahman, being bliss itself, went on eternally knowing itself as an object -- because knowing is simply what it eternally does -- that can't be right either. Because then even an ordinary soul, once released from the wheel of rebirth, would simply merge into that same nature, the way a handful of water poured into a lake stops being a separate handful. There would be no one left standing apart to go on 'knowing' Brahman's bliss. So the sentence 'the liberated one experiences the self of bliss' would mean nothing at all. Suppose instead the liberated person stays distinct and knows Brahman's bliss as something other than himself, while also knowing his inner self as 'I am bliss itself' -- now you've broken the very oneness scripture teaches, and with it, you've broken every scripture that teaches that oneness. A third option doesn't work either. And notice this: if Brahman's knowing of its own bliss never stops, then talking about it 'knowing' at all -- as opposed to 'not knowing' -- is empty talk, because knowing just is what Brahman is, not something it does on and off. We only bother saying someone 'knows' a thing when not-knowing it is a real possibility -- the way we'd say 'he knows both his own self and the highest Self,' where the two really are distinguishable. Nobody says an archer, eyes locked on the target without a flicker, keeps 'knowing and not-knowing' the arrow moment to moment -- the idea is empty because his attention never breaks. So suppose instead the knowing is broken, on and off. Then in every gap, cognition would have to be pointed at something else -- and the Self would be changing from moment to moment, which means it isn't eternal after all. So when scripture says 'cognition is bliss,' it's simply describing what Brahman is -- not claiming that bliss is some object out there to be experienced. You might object: doesn't this then clash with passages like 'eating, playing, delighting'? Not at all. Because the liberated person is the Self of everyone, scripture is free to describe, exactly as it's found, whatever shows up somewhere -- eating in a yogi, delighting in a god -- simply because it's all him anyway, and doing so celebrates that very truth, that he is everyone's Self. But then, you might press further: shouldn't suffering get the same treatment -- describing the pain found in a plant or a stone, just as freely as the pleasure found in a yogi? No. Because happiness and suffering aren't real features of anyone at all; they're a mistake, laid over things by a confusion that arises the moment name and form -- the whole apparatus of bodies and senses -- come into contact with awareness. We've already dealt with all of that. And we've already shown exactly where these seemingly conflicting scriptures each belong. So read every single passage about bliss the same way you'd read 'this is his own highest bliss' -- as a description of what is, never as a report of something felt.
Close to the Sanskrit
No -- because cognition is impossible in the absence of body and organs; for liberation is the absolute separation from the body. When the body is absent, the organs too become impossible, because their support is gone; and from that, cognition becomes impossible, since it has no instrument. And if cognition arose even in the absence of the body etc., it would absurdly follow that everyone's taking up of a body and organs is pointless. And also because of a contradiction with oneness: if the supreme Brahman, being of the nature of bliss, were to know the Self eternally, because it is of the nature of eternal cognition -- that is not tenable; for then even the transmigrating soul, once freed from transmigration, would attain that same nature -- like a handful of water thrown into a reservoir, which no longer stands apart, [the liberated self] would not remain separate so as to cognize the bliss-natured Brahman; and then the statement 'the liberated one experiences the self whose nature is bliss' becomes a meaningless statement. Or, if the liberated one, remaining distinct, knows Brahman's bliss, and also knows the inner self, [thinking] 'I am of the nature of bliss' -- then there is a contradiction with oneness, and that being so, a contradiction with the whole of scripture. And a third hypothesis is not tenable either. Moreover: if Brahman's cognition of the Self's bliss is continuous, then positing cognition and non-cognition [as alternating] becomes pointless; if Brahman's cognition, having the Self's bliss as its object, is continuous, then that very cognition is its own nature -- so the notion 'it knows the Self's bliss' [as a separate act] does not hold; for positing an act of knowing is meaningful only where not-knowing that thing is possible, as when one is said to know both the self and the supreme -- there is no meaning, for instance, in positing alternating knowledge and non-knowledge of an arrow in one whose mind is continuously fixed on it. If, instead, [Brahman] knows the Self's bliss intermittently, then in the gap of that self-cognition, cognition would need some other object -- and the Self would then possess modification, from which impermanence would follow. Therefore the statement 'cognition is bliss' is concerned solely with describing [Brahman's] own nature, not with saying that the Self's bliss is an object of experience. If it is objected that this would contradict passages like 'eating, playing' -- if bliss is not an object of experience -- no; because, given the oneness of the universal Self, such passages merely restate things as ordinarily found: since the liberated one is the Self of all, whatever is found -- eating and so on, among yogis or gods -- is merely restated as found, precisely because he is the Self of all, for the sake of praising that very state. If it is then objected that suffering too should be restated, just as eating is restated of yogis, so suffering found among plants should be restated of the liberated -- no; because states like happiness and suffering are themselves superimposed by a delusion born from contact with the adjunct of name-and-form made of body and organs. All this has thus been answered. And we have already stated the proper scope of the seemingly conflicting scriptures. Therefore, all statements about bliss are to be understood in the manner of 'this is his supreme bliss.'