तस्य वा एतस्य पुरुषस्य द्वे एव स्थाने भवतः ।इदं च परलोकस्थानं च ।सन्ध्यं तृतीयं स्वप्नस्थानम् ।तस्मिन्सन्ध्ये स्थाने तिष्ठनुभे स्थाने पश्यतीदं च परलोकस्थानं च ।अथ यथाक्रमोऽयं परलोकस्थाने भवति ।तमाक्रममाक्रम्योभयान् पाप्मन आनन्दांश्च पश्यति ।स यत्र प्रस्वपित्यस्य लोकस्य सर्वावतो मात्रामपादाय स्वयं विहत्य स्वयं निर्माय स्वेन भासा स्वेन ज्योतिषा प्रस्वपिति ।अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिर्भवति ॥बृह. ४,३.९ ॥
In plain words
This person has just two states: this one and the state of the world beyond. There is a third, an intermediate state, the state of dream. Standing in that intermediate state he sees both the others, this one and the state of the world beyond. And by whatever approach he comes to the state of the world beyond, by that approach he sees both — evils and joys. When he falls asleep, taking with him the stuff of this all-embracing world, he himself pulls it apart and himself builds it up, and sleeps by his own brightness, by his own light. Here this person becomes self-luminous.
The commentators
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam· Leaf 9.197· bhāṣya
ननु नास्त्येव धिया समानम् अन्यत् धियोऽवभासकम् आत्मज्योतिः, धीव्यतिरेकेण प्रत्यक्षेण वा अनुमानेन वा अनुपलम्भात्- यथा अन्या तत्काल एव द्वितीया धीः । यत्तु अवभास्यावभासकयोः अन्यत्वेऽपि विवेकानुपलम्भात् सादृश्यमिति घटाद्यालोकयोः- तत्र भवतु, अन्यत्वेन आलोकस्योपलम्भात् घटादेः, संश्लिष्टयोः सादृश्यं भिन्नयोरेव ; न च तथा इह घटादेरिव धियोऽवभासकं ज्योतिरन्तरं प्रत्यक्षेण वा अनुमानेन वा उपलभामहे ; धीरेव हि चित्स्वरूपवभासकत्वेन स्वाकारा विषयाकारा च ; तस्मात् नानुमानतः नापि प्रत्यक्षतः धियोऽवभासकं ज्योतिः शक्यते प्रतिपादयितुं व्यतिरिक्तम् । यदपि दृष्टान्तरूपमभिहितम्-अवभास्यावभासकयोर्भिन्नयोरेव घटाद्यालोकयोः संयुक्तयोः सादृश्यमिति -तत्र अभ्युपगममात्रमस्माभिरुक्तम् ; न तु तत्र घटाद्यवभास्यावभासकौ भिन्नौ ; परमार्थतस्तु घटादिरेव अवभासात्मकः सालोकः ; अन्यः अन्यः हि घटादिरुत्पद्यते ; विज्ञानमात्रमेव सालोकघटादिविषयाकारमवभासते ; यदा एवम्, तदा न बाह्यो दृष्टान्तोऽस्ति, विज्ञानस्वलक्षणमात्रत्वात्सर्वस्य । एवं तस्यैव विज्ञानस्य ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारताम् अलं परिकल्प्य, तस्यैव पुनर्विशुद्धिं परिकल्पयन्ति । तत् ग्राह्यग्राहकविनिर्मुक्तं विज्ञानं स्वच्छीभूतं क्षणिकं व्यवतिष्ठत इति केचित् । तस्यापि शान्तिं केचिदिच्छन्ति ; तदपि विज्ञानं संवृतं ग्राह्यग्राहकांश- विनिर्मुक्तं शून्यमेव घटादिबाह्यवस्तुवत् इत्यपरे माध्यमिका आचक्षते ॥
In plain words
Here comes the objection. Surely, someone says, there is no separate light of the Self standing behind the mind the way you claim — because nobody ever catches, by seeing or by reasoning, anything beyond the mind itself. It's exactly like looking for a second mind watching the first one at the same moment: you never find it. Now, about that earlier comparison to a pot and its lamplight — the claim that they only seem similar to mind-and-self because we fail to notice they're different — fine, let that stand for pot and lamp, because there we genuinely do see the light as something apart from the pot; things that are joined can still be two things. But mind and self aren't like that at all. We never catch, by any means, a light standing apart from the mind the way lamplight stands apart from a pot. The mind itself, precisely because it shines by its own conscious nature, is quite capable of appearing as both the knowing subject and the known object all on its own. So neither reasoning nor direct experience can ever pin down some further light distinct from the mind. And as for that pot-and-lamp example we used — that was only ever a debater's concession, not our real position. Because really, at the deepest level, even the pot and its light were never two separate things: the pot itself just is an appearance, lit up as part of what it is. A fresh pot arises fresh each instant; what's really there is only cognition, appearing in the shape of 'pot-with-light.' Once you see that, there's no example left outside cognition to point to — everything, without exception, is just its own passing flash of awareness. Building on this, some teachers grant cognition a double face, knower and known folded into one flash, and then go further, imagining that flash purified — cleared of that very subject-object split, transparent, momentary, and still somehow standing. Others push past even that and say the flash itself eventually dies out altogether. And still others, the Mādhyamikas, go further still: even that so-called pure cognition is just a convenient fiction, no more real than the subject and object it was supposed to be free of — empty, plain and simple, exactly as empty as the pot people think is sitting out there in the world.
Close to the Sanskrit
Objection: There is indeed no other light of the Self, comparable to the intellect, which illumines the intellect, because of the non-apprehension, by either direct perception or inference, of anything apart from the intellect — just as there is no second intellect apprehended at that same moment. As for what was said — that even though the illumined and the illuminator are different, there is similarity, because of non-perception of the distinction, as in the case of the pot and the light — granted, in that case; because the light is perceived as different from the pot, the similarity belongs precisely to the two that are joined yet distinct. But it is not so here: we do not perceive, by direct perception or by inference, as we do in the case of the pot, any other light, distinct from the intellect, which illumines the intellect. For the intellect itself, by virtue of being the illuminator whose own nature is consciousness, has both its own form and the form of the object. Therefore, neither by inference nor by direct perception can a light distinct from the intellect, which illumines the intellect, be shown to be establishable. And as for what was stated in the form of an illustration — that there is similarity between the illumined and the illuminator, namely the pot and the light, which, though conjoined, are indeed distinct — there, only a concession was made by us. But in fact the pot, as illumined, and the light, as illuminator, are not there distinct; rather, in ultimate reality, the pot itself, being of the nature of appearance, is accompanied by light. For a different pot is produced at every instant; it is cognition alone that appears in the form of the object 'pot-with-light'. This being so, then there is no external illustration, because everything is merely of the nature of cognition's own particular character. Thus, having fully postulated for that very cognition the state of having the form of the graspable and the grasper, they further postulate, for that same cognition, purification. That cognition, freed from the graspable and the grasper, having become transparent, momentary, subsists — so say some. Some hold that even that comes to cessation. That cognition too — conventional, freed from the portion of grasper and graspable, simply empty, like an external thing such as a pot — thus others, the Mādhyamikas, declare.
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam· Leaf 9.199· bhāṣya
सर्वा एताः कल्पनाः बुद्धिविज्ञानावभासकस्य व्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मज्योतिषोऽपह्नवात् अस्य श्रेयोमार्गस्य प्रतिपक्षभूता वैदिकस्य । तत्र येषां बाह्योऽर्थः अस्ति, तान्प्रत्युच्यते — न तावत् स्वात्मावभासकत्वं घटादेः; तमसि अवस्थितः घटादिस्तावत् न कदाचिदपि स्वात्मना अवभास्यते, प्रदीपाद्यालोकसंयोगेन तु नियमेनैवावभास्यमानो दृष्टः सालोको घट इति- संश्लिष्टयोरपि घटालोकयोः अन्यत्वमेव, पुनः पुनः संश्लेषे विश्लेषे च विशेषदर्शनात्, रज्जुघटयोरिव ; अन्यत्वे च व्यतिरिक्तावभासकत्वम्; न स्वात्मनैव स्वमात्मानमवभासयति' । ननु प्रदीपः स्वात्मानमेव अवभासयन् दृष्ट इति—न हि घटादिवत् प्रदीपदर्शनाय प्रकाशान्तरम् उपाददते लौकिकाः ; तस्मात् प्रदीपः स्वात्मानं प्रकाशयति—न, अवभास्यत्वाविशेषात्— यद्यपि प्रदीपः अन्यस्यावभासकः स्वयमवभासात्मकत्वात्, तथापि व्यतिरिक्तचैतन्यावभास्यत्वं न व्यभिचरति, घटादिवदेव ; यदा चैवम्, तदा व्यतिरिक्तावभास्यत्वं तावत् अवश्यंभावि । ननु यथा घटः चैतन्यावभास्यत्वेऽपि व्यतिरिक्तमालोकान्तरमपेक्षते, न त्वेवं प्रदीपः अन्यमालोकान्तरमपेक्षते ; तस्मात् प्रदीपः
In plain words
All these clever theories, once you look closely, share the same flaw: they deny that there is any light of the Self standing apart from the mind and its cognitions, illumining them from beyond. And that denial puts them squarely against the Vedic path to the highest good. So here is the answer, addressed to those who at least still accept that an external world is real. Start with the obvious: a pot cannot light itself up. Sitting in the dark, it stays completely unrevealed, no matter how long you wait — it only ever becomes visible once a lamp or some other light meets it, and everyone has seen that happen. So even though the pot and the light touch, they're still two different things, because you can watch the distinction appear and disappear, over and over, exactly as you can watch a rope tied around a pot and then untied again. And once you accept that they're different, it follows that whatever illumines something has to be distinct from the thing it illumines — a pot never lights itself up by itself. But wait, someone objects: don't we see a lamp light up itself? People certainly don't fetch a second lamp just to see the first one, the way they need a lamp to see a pot. So doesn't that mean the lamp is its own illuminator? No — because, as far as simply being an illumined thing goes, the lamp is no different from the pot. Yes, the lamp lights up other things, and yes, that's because shining is its very nature. But that doesn't let it escape needing a consciousness beyond itself to reveal it, exactly like the pot. And if that's so, then being lit up by something else turns out to be unavoidable, full stop. But then comes one more objection: doesn't the pot need an extra physical light on top of consciousness, while the lamp needs no such extra light at all? So surely the lamp is different after all — which means the lamp...
Close to the Sanskrit
All these speculative constructions are, because of their denial of a light of the Self, distinct from and illuminating the intellect and cognition, opposed to this Vedic path of the highest good. There, to those for whom an external object exists, a reply is given: In the first place, the pot and the like does not have the property of illumining its own self; the pot situated in darkness is never at all revealed by its own self, but rather it is observed that, being invariably illumined through conjunction with the light of a lamp and the like, the pot becomes light-accompanied; therefore, even though pot and light are found joined, they are indeed different, because their distinction is observed again and again both in conjunction and in disjunction, as with rope and pot. And given this difference, the illuminator must be distinct from the illumined; the pot does not illumine its own self by its own self alone. Objection: But a lamp is observed illumining precisely its own self — for indeed, ordinary people do not employ another light in order to see a lamp, as they do for a pot; therefore the lamp illumines its own self. Answer: No, because there is no difference in respect of being an illumined thing. Even though the lamp is the illuminator of something else, because it is itself of the nature of illumination, nevertheless it does not escape being illumined by a consciousness distinct from it, exactly like the pot. And since this is so, then being illumined by something distinct is, at any rate, inevitable. Objection: But just as the pot, even while being illumined by consciousness, additionally requires a distinct further light, the lamp does not likewise require another further light; therefore the lamp—
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam· Leaf 9.201· bhāṣya
आत्मा ज्योतिरन्तरं विज्ञानात् । तदा अनवस्थेति चेत्, न ; ग्राह्यत्वमात्रं हि तद्ग्राहकस्य वस्त्वन्तरत्वे लिङ्गमुक्तं न्यायतः ; न तु एकान्ततो ग्राहकत्वे तद्ग्राहकान्तरास्तित्वे वा कदा- चिदपि लिङ्गं संभवति ; तस्मात् न तदनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । विज्ञानस्य व्यतिरिक्तग्राह्यत्वे करणान्तरापेक्षायाम् अनवस्थे- ति चेत्, न, नियमाभावात्— न हि सर्वत्र अयं नियमो भवति; यत्र वस्त्वन्तरेण गृह्यते वस्त्वन्तरम्, तत्र ग्राह्यग्रा- हकव्यतिरिक्तं करणान्तरं स्यादिति नैकान्तेन नियन्तुं शक्यते, वैचित्र्यदर्शनात्; कथम्? घटस्तावत् स्वात्मव्यति- रिक्तेन आत्मना गृह्यते; तत्र प्रदीपादिलोकः ग्राह्यग्राहक- व्यतिरिक्तं करणम्; न हि प्रदीपाद्यालोकः घटांशः चक्षु- रंशो वा ; घटवत् चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वेऽपि प्रदीपस्य, चक्षुः प्रदीप- व्यतिरेकेण न बाह्यमालोकस्थानीयं किंचित्करणन्तरमपेक्षते ; तस्मात् नैव नियन्तुं शक्यते— यत्र यत्र व्यतिरिक्तग्राह्यत्वं तत्र तत्र करणान्तरं स्यादेवेति । तस्मात् विज्ञानस्य व्यति- रिक्तग्राहकग्राह्यत्वे न करणद्वारा अनवस्था, नापि ग्राहकत्व- द्वारा कदाचिदपि उपपादयितुं शक्यते । तस्मात् सिद्धं वि- ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तमात्मज्योतिरन्तरमिति । ननु नास्त्येव बाह्यो- ऽर्थः घटादिः प्रदीपो वा विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तः ; यद्धि यद्व्य- तिरेकेण नोपलभ्यते, तत् तावन्मात्रं वस्तु दृष्टम्— यथा
In plain words
So this is the answer: the Self is that further light, and it is not the same thing as cognition. But wait — doesn't that set off an infinite chain, one grasper needing another forever? No. Here's why: logic only tells you a grasper must be a separate thing when the object it grasps shows itself as something graspable. But there's no such signal that forces a grasper, just sitting there as a grasper, to always need yet another grasper behind it — that never happens, in any case whatsoever. So the regress you're worried about simply never gets started. But then — what if cognition itself turns out to be something grasped by yet another thing? Doesn't that force us to look for a further tool to do the grasping, and then another, forever? No again, because there's no law saying that has to happen. It isn't true that whenever one thing is grasped by another, a third, separate tool always has to step in. Look at the pot: a cognizer distinct from the pot grasps it, sure, and there a lamp's light really is a separate tool, neither part of the pot nor part of the eye. But now look at the lamp itself: the eye sees the lamp too, just as it sees the pot — yet the eye needs no additional light besides the lamp to do it. So you can't claim, as some fixed law, that being-grasped-by-something-else always drags in one more tool. And that means: even granting that cognition is grasped by something beyond it, no endless chain of tools follows, and no endless chain of graspers follows either. So it's settled — there really is another light, belonging to the Self, distinct from cognition. But now a deeper objection: maybe there's no external world at all, no pot, no lamp, apart from cognition — because, so the argument goes, anything that's never found apart from something else turns out to be nothing more than that other thing. Take, for instance...
Close to the Sanskrit
The Self is another light, distinct from cognition. If it be objected that then an infinite regress follows, the answer is no; for it is stated, according to logical method, that the mere state of being an object of grasping is the mark for its grasper being a distinct entity; but there is never, under any circumstance, a mark by which to establish, as an absolute rule, either that something is merely a grasper, or that a further grasper of that grasper exists; therefore that contingency of infinite regress does not arise. If it be objected that, when cognition is held to be an object graspable by something distinct, there follows a dependence on a further instrument and hence infinite regress, the answer is no, because there is no such rule; for this rule does not hold everywhere. That wherever one thing is grasped by another thing, there a further instrument distinct from the graspable and the grasper must exist — this cannot be laid down as an absolute rule, because a variety of cases is observed. How so? Take the pot: it is grasped, first, by a self distinct from its own being; there, the light of the lamp and the like is the instrument distinct from both the graspable and the grasper. For indeed the light of the lamp is neither a part of the pot nor a part of the eye. Even though the lamp, like the pot, is an object graspable by the eye, the eye, apart from the lamp itself, does not require any further external thing functioning as a light. Therefore it cannot be laid down at all that wherever there is being-graspable-by-something-distinct, there in every case a further instrument must exist. Therefore, in the case of cognition's being an object graspable by a distinct grasper, there is no infinite regress through an instrument, nor can it ever be established through further graspers either. Therefore it is established that there is another light of the Self, distinct from cognition. Objection: But there simply is no external object at all — pot or lamp — distinct from cognition; for whatever is never apprehended apart from something else is observed to be no more than that other thing — for example—
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam· Leaf 9.202· bhāṣya
स्वप्नविज्ञानग्राह्यं घटपटादिवस्तु; स्वप्नविज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणा- नुपलम्भात् स्वप्नघटप्रदीपादेः स्वप्नविज्ञानमात्रता अवग- म्यते, तथा जागरितेऽपि घटप्रदीपादेः जाग्रद्विज्ञानव्यति- रेकेण अनुपलम्भात् जाग्रद्विज्ञानमात्रतैव युक्ता भवितुम्; तस्मात् नास्ति बाह्योऽर्थः घटप्रदीपादिः, विज्ञानमात्रमेव तु सर्वम्; तत्र यदुक्तम्, विज्ञानस्य व्यतिरिक्तावभास्यत्वात् विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तमास्ति ज्योतिरन्तरं घटादेरिवेति, तन्मि- थ्या, सर्वस्य विज्ञानमात्रत्वे दृष्टान्ताभावात् । न, यावत् तावदभ्युपगमात्— न तु बाह्योऽर्थः भवता एकान्तेनैव ना- भ्युपगम्यते; ननु मया नाभ्युपगम्यत एव- न, विज्ञानं घ- टः प्रदीप इति च शब्दार्थपृथक्त्वात् यावत्, तावदपि बा- ह्यार्थान्तरम् अवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्; विज्ञानादर्थान्तरं वस्तु न चेदभ्युपगम्यते, विज्ञानं घटः पट इत्येवादीनां शब्दानाम् एकार्थत्वे पर्यायशब्दत्वं प्राप्नोति; तथा साधनानां फलस्य च एकत्वे, साध्यसाधनभेदोपदेशशास्त्रानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः; त- त्कर्तुः अज्ञानप्रसङ्गो वा । किंचान्यत्— विज्ञानव्यतिरे- केण वादिप्रतिवादिवाददोषाभ्युपगमात्; न हि आत्मवि- ज्ञानमात्रमेव वादिप्रतिवादिवादः तद्दोषो वा अभ्युपगम्यते, निराकर्तव्यत्वात्, प्रतिवाद्यादीनाम्; न हि आत्मीयं विज्ञानं निराकर्तव्यमभ्युपगम्यते, स्वयं वा आत्मा कस्यचित्; तथा
In plain words
Take dream: the pot or cloth you dream of is only ever found inside the dreaming itself — you never catch the dream-pot standing apart from your dream-cognition — and from that we conclude the dream-pot is nothing but that cognition. Fair enough, says the idealist; but the same holds while you're awake. You never catch a waking pot or lamp apart from your waking cognition either, so by the very same logic, waking objects should be nothing but waking cognition too. There's no world out there at all — just cognition, through and through. And that earlier proof of yours, that cognition must be lit by some further light because it's illumined by something distinct, the way a pot is lit by a lamp? That falls apart right along with the world, because once everything is just cognition, there's no pot left anywhere to serve as your example. Here's the answer: that pot-and-lamp example was only ever granted for the sake of argument, within strict limits — you never actually managed to deny an external world outright. But I do deny it completely, the idealist insists. No, you don't, and here's why: the moment you use the words 'cognition,' 'pot,' 'lamp' as three different words, you're already committed to three different things they stand for. Deny that, and 'cognition,' 'pot,' 'cloth' collapse into mere synonyms for the same nothing — which is absurd. It's exactly like ritual means and their fruit: treat them as one and the same thing, and all the scripture that carefully distinguishes goal from method becomes either pointless or the work of someone who didn't know what they were talking about. And there's more: think about what actually happens in a real argument. A debater and their opponent both treat the debate, and its errors, as something more than just one person's private cognition — nobody debates their own thoughts, because an opponent has to be a real someone, capable of being answered and refuted. Nobody ever treats their own thinking that way, and nobody treats their own self as something anyone else gets to refute at will either. In just the same way...
Close to the Sanskrit
The thing such as pot, cloth and the like is graspable within dream-cognition; because of the non-apprehension of the dream-pot, dream-lamp and the like apart from dream-cognition, it is understood that they consist in nothing but dream-cognition. Likewise, even in the waking state, because of the non-apprehension of the pot, lamp and the like apart from waking-cognition, it would be equally warranted for there to be nothing but waking-cognition; therefore there is no external object such as pot or lamp — rather, everything is cognition alone. As for what was said there — that, because cognition is illumined by something distinct, there exists another light distinct from cognition, just as with the pot and the like — that is false, because, everything being merely cognition, there is no [surviving] example. Answer: No, because the concession was made only within a limited scope. It is not the case that you have denied an external object absolutely. Objection: But I do not accept one at all! Answer: No, because, insofar as there is a distinctness of meaning among the words 'cognition,' 'pot,' 'lamp,' to that very extent a further external object must necessarily be admitted. If a thing that is a different object from cognition is not admitted, then, given the sameness of meaning of words such as 'cognition,' 'pot,' 'cloth,' they would come to be mere synonyms. Likewise, if the means and the fruit [of ritual action] were held to be one, there would follow the absurd consequence of the pointlessness of scripture that teaches the distinction between the goal and the means, or else the consequence that its author was ignorant. Moreover, another point: from the fact that proponent and opponent accept debate and its faults apart from mere cognition — for indeed debate between a proponent and an opponent, or its fault, is not accepted to be merely one's own cognition, because the opponent and the others must be things capable of being refuted; for indeed one's own cognition is not accepted as something to be refuted, nor is one's own self, by anyone. Likewise—
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam· Leaf 9.205· bhāṣya
अथ अवतिष्ठेत, क्षणिकवादहानिः; अथ अदृष्टवतो व्यप- देशः सादृश्यप्रत्ययश्च, तदानीं जात्यन्धस्येव रूपविशेषव्यप- देशः तत्सादृश्यप्रत्ययश्च सर्वमन्धपरम्परेति प्रसज्येत सर्व- ज्ञशास्त्रप्रणयनादि; न चैतदिष्यते । अकृताभ्यागमकृतविप्र- णाशदोषौ तु प्रसिद्धतरौ क्षणवादे । दृष्टव्यपदेशहेतुः पूर्वो- त्तरसहित एक एव हि शृङ्खलावत् प्रत्ययो जायत इति चेत्, तेनेदं सदृशमिति च- न, वर्तमानातीतयोः भिन्नकालत्वा- त्-तत्र वर्तमानप्रत्यय एकः शृङ्खलावयवस्थानीयः, अतीत- श्चापरः, तौ प्रत्ययौ भिन्नकालौ; तदुभयप्रत्ययविषयस्पृक् चेत् शृङ्खलाप्रत्ययः, ततः क्षणद्वयव्यापित्वादेकस्य विज्ञानस्य पुनः क्षणवादहानिः । ममतवतादिविशेषानुपपत्तेश्च सर्वसं- व्यवहारलोपप्रसङ्गः ॥ सर्वस्य च स्वसंवेद्यविज्ञानमात्रत्वे, विज्ञानस्य च स्वच्छा- वबोधावभासमात्रस्वाभाव्याभ्युपगमात्, तद्दर्शिनश्चान्यस्या- भावे, अनित्यदुःखशून्यानात्मत्वाद्यने ककल्पनानुपपत्तिः । न च दाडिमादेरिव विरुद्धानेकांशवत्त्वं विज्ञानस्य, स्वच्छा- वभासस्वाभाव्याद्विज्ञानस्य । अनित्यदुःखादीनां विज्ञानांशत्वे च सति अनुभूयमानत्वात् व्यतिरिक्तविषयत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ अनित्यदुःखाद्यात्मकमेकत्वमेव विज्ञानस्य, तदा तद्वियोगात् वि- शुद्धिकल्पनानुपपत्तिः; संयोगिमलवियोगाद्धि विशुद्धिर्भवति,
In plain words
Suppose that earlier moment of awareness lingered on into this one -- then the whole doctrine that everything lasts only an instant falls apart on the spot. Suppose instead it doesn't linger -- then whoever is aware right now never actually witnessed the earlier thing, and yet turns around and calls it familiar, calls it similar. That is exactly the position of a man born blind, describing a color he has never once seen: pure hearsay, passed down an endless relay of blind men with nothing behind it -- which would turn even the scriptures of an omniscient teacher into just another rumor nobody ever verified. No one who holds this view actually accepts that consequence. And momentariness carries defects far more notorious than this one: it makes someone reap the fruit of a deed he never performed, and it makes the doer's own deed vanish without ever bearing fruit. Someone may object: what gives you the sense of 'seen before' is that a single cognition arises bound to what came just before and just after, like the links of a chain -- that is why you feel 'this matches that.' It doesn't work. The present cognition and the past cognition happen at different times; the present one is only one link, the past one another, and two cognitions occupying two different moments remain two different moments. And if you now say a further, chain-like cognition reaches across and touches the content of both, then one single awareness is spanning two separate moments -- and momentariness has collapsed all over again. Since something as basic as the felt sense 'this is mine' can never be explained this way either, the whole of ordinary life falls apart along with it. There is a second failure, in the claim that everything is only consciousness, known solely to itself. If consciousness is nothing but clear, self-luminous awareness, with no one else ever watching it from outside, you cannot honestly say of it: this part is impermanent, this part is suffering, this part is empty, this part is not the self. That would make consciousness lumpy, built of clashing pieces, like the sections of a pomegranate -- yet you have already said its very nature is clear luminosity straight through, nothing else. And if impermanence and suffering really were pieces of it, then the instant you experience them, they stand apart from it as objects -- which is exactly what your own position denies. Say instead that impermanence and suffering are not pieces but consciousness's own single identity. Then freedom can never truly be called 'getting free of them' -- because you only earn the word purification when what falls away was a stain that arrived from outside. Nothing is purified by losing the very self it always was.
Close to the Sanskrit
Now, if the earlier cognition were to persist, the doctrine of momentariness would have to be abandoned; or, if it does not persist, there would be a designation of something not seen and a cognition of similarity made [by the one who never saw it] — in which case, exactly as with a man blind from birth, there would be a designation of a particular color and a cognition of similarity regarding it, so that it would follow that the whole thing is a succession of blind men, [and] the very composing of scripture by the omniscient one and the like [would likewise be groundless]; and this is not accepted. But the two defects — the arrival of a result upon one who did not act, and the utter loss of what was done — are far better known in the doctrine of momentariness. If it is argued that the cause of the designation 'seen' is that a single cognition alone arises together with the prior and the subsequent, like a chain, and hence 'this is similar to that' — no. Because the present and the past cognitions occur at different times: there the present cognition is one, standing in the place of a link of the chain, and the past one is another; those two cognitions belong to different times. If the chain-cognition touches the object of both those cognitions, then, because a single consciousness would thereby pervade two moments, the doctrine of momentariness collapses once again. And because a particular such as the sense of 'mine' cannot be accounted for, it follows that all worldly dealing would be lost. And when everything is held to be nothing but self-cognized consciousness, and it is admitted that consciousness has as its nature nothing but clear awareness and appearance, there being no other seer of it apart from itself, the positing of the many [predicates] such as impermanence, suffering, emptiness, selflessness, and so on becomes untenable. Nor does consciousness have a multiplicity of mutually opposed parts, like a pomegranate and the like, since consciousness has as its nature only clear appearance. And if impermanence, suffering, and the rest were parts of consciousness, then, since they are in fact experienced, it would follow that they are objects distinct from it. Or if the very oneness of consciousness itself consisted in impermanence, suffering, and the rest, then it would become impossible to conceive of purification as separation from that nature; for purification comes about only from separation from an adventitious stain.
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam· Leaf 9.209· bhāṣya
तस्य एतस्य पुरुषस्य वै द्वे एव स्थाने भवतः, न तृतीयं चतुर्थं वा; के ते? इदं च यत् प्रतिपन्नं वर्तमानं जन्म शरीरेन्द्रिय- विषयवेदनाविशिष्टं स्थानं प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुभूयमानम्, परलोक एव स्थानम् परलोकस्थानम्- तच्च शरीरादिवियोगोत्तरका- लानुभाव्यम् । ननु स्वप्नोऽपि परलोकः; तथा च सति द्वे एवेत्यवधारणमयुक्तम्- न; कथं तर्हि? संध्यं तत्- इह- लोकपरलोकयोः संधिः तस्मिन्भवं संध्यम्, यत् तृतीयं तत् स्वप्नस्थानम्; तेन स्थानद्वित्वावधारणम्; न हि ग्रामयोः संधिः तावेव ग्रामावपेक्ष्य तृतीयत्वपरिगणनमहति । कथं पुनः तस्य परलोकस्थोनस्य अस्तित्वमवगम्यते, यदपेक्ष्य स्वप्नस्थानं संध्यं भवेत्- यतः तस्मिन्संध्ये स्वप्नस्थाने तिष्ठन् भवन् वर्तमानः एते उभे स्थाने पश्यति; के ते उभे? इदं च परलोकस्थानं च । तस्मात् स्तः स्व- प्रजागरितव्यतिरेकेण उभौ लोकौ, यौ धिया समानः सन् अनुसंचरति जन्ममरणसंतानप्रबन्धेन । कथं पुनः स्वप्ने स्थितः सन् उभौ लोकौ पश्यति, किमाश्रयः केन विधिना- इत्युच्यते- अथ कथं पश्यतीति शृ- णु- यथाक्रमः आक्रामति अनेन इत्याक्रमः आश्रयः अव-
In plain words
This same person has only two real states -- never a third, never a fourth. What are they? One is right here: the present life you are living now, marked by body, senses, and what they take in, the one you experience directly. The other is the world beyond, and only that deserves the name 'the other-world state' -- you experience it only in the time after you part from this body. But wait, someone says: isn't dream also another world? If so, 'only two' can't be right. No. Dream is not a third state -- it is the seam. Think of it as the joint between this world and the other world; whatever arises within that joint is 'the joint-state', and that supposed third thing is simply the dream-state. So the count of two still holds -- the seam between two villages is never itself counted as a third village. But then how do we even know that other world exists, the one dream is the seam between? Because standing right there, in that seam we call dream, a person genuinely sees both -- this world and the other world. That is how we know. So these two worlds are real, distinct from both waking and dreaming, and the person, remaining one and the same in awareness the whole time, keeps moving between them, birth after birth, death after death, without a break. But how, lying there in a dream, does someone see both worlds -- resting on what, by what means? Listen, and I will tell you how he sees it. By whatever he moves forward upon, in due order -- that forward movement is what is called 'ākrama'. Its support...
Close to the Sanskrit
Of this same person, indeed, there are only two states, not a third or a fourth. Which two? This one -- that is, the state consisting of the present life that has been obtained, marked by body, senses, objects, and experience, directly experienced -- and the other-world state alone, 'the other-world state'; and that is to be experienced only in the time following separation from the body and the rest. But, [an objector says,] dream too is another world; and if so, the restriction 'only two' is unjustified. No. How then? 'That is the junction' -- the junction of this world and the other world; what arises in that junction is 'the junction-state', and that, which appears as a third, is the dream-state. By this the restriction to two states still holds; for the border between two villages does not deserve to be counted as a third, with reference to those same two villages. But how, again, is the existence of that other-world state -- with reference to which the dream-state is called a junction -- to be known? Because, standing right there in that junction, the dream-state, one who exists and is present sees these two states; which two? This one, and the other-world state. Therefore these two worlds exist, distinct from the states of dream and waking, which [the person], remaining the same in awareness, continually traverses through the unbroken succession of birth and death. But how, again, situated in dream, does he see both worlds -- resting on what, by what method? It is said [in reply]: now listen how he sees -- by whatever he advances in due order upon, that is 'ākrama' [the approach]; its support...
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyam· Leaf 9.210· bhāṣya
ष्टम्भ इत्यर्थः; यादृशः आक्रमोऽस्य, सोऽयं यथाक्रमः; अयं पुरुषः, परलोकस्थाने प्रतिपत्तव्ये निमित्ते, यथाक्रमो भवति यादृशेन परलोकप्रतिपत्तिसाधनेन विद्याकर्मपूर्वप्रज्ञा-लक्षणेन युक्तो भवतीत्यर्थः; तम् आक्रमम् परलोकस्थानायो-न्मुखीभूतं प्राप्ताङ्कुरीभावमिव बीजं तमाक्रमम् आक्रम्य अवष्टभ्य आश्रित्य उभयान्पश्यति- बहुवचनं धर्माधर्मफ-लानेकत्वात्- उभयान् उभयप्रकारानित्यर्थः; कांस्तान्? पा-प्मनः पापफलानि- न तु पुनः साक्षादेव पाप्मनां दर्शनं संभवति, तस्मात् पापफलानि दुःखानीत्यर्थः- आनन्दांश्च धर्मफलानि सुखानीत्येतत्- तानुभयान् पाप्मनः आन-न्दांश्च पश्यति जन्मान्तरदृष्टवासनामयान्; यानि च प्रति-पत्तव्यजन्मविषयाणि क्षुद्रधर्माधर्मफलानि, धर्माधर्मप्रयुक्तो देवतानुग्रहाद्वा पश्यति। तत्कथमवगम्यते परलोकस्थान-भावितत्पाप्मानन्ददर्शनं स्वप्ने- इत्युच्यते- यस्मात् इह ज-न्मनि अननुभाव्यमपि पश्यति बहु; न च स्वप्नो नाम अपूर्व दर्शनम्; पूर्वदृष्टस्मृतिर्हि स्वप्नः प्रायेण; तेन स्वप्न-जागरितस्थानव्यतिरेकेण स्तः उभौ लोकौ। यत् आदित्या-दिबाह्यज्योतिषामभावे अयं कार्यकारणसंघातः पुरुषः येन व्यतिरिक्तेन आत्मना ज्योतिषा व्यवहरतीत्युक्तम्- तदेव नास्ति, यत् आदित्यादिज्योतिषामभावगमनम्, यत्र इदं विविक्तं स्वयंज्योतिः उपलभ्येत ; येन सर्वदैव अयं कार्यक- रणसंघातः संसृष्ट एवोपलभ्यते ; तस्मात् असत्समः असन्नेव वा स्वेन विविक्तस्वभावेन ज्योतीरूपेण आत्मेति । अथ क- चित् विविक्तः स्वेन ज्योतीरूपेण उपलभ्येत बाह्याध्यात्मिक- भूतभौतिकसंसर्गशून्यः, ततः यथोक्तं सर्वं भविष्यतीत्येतदर्थ- माह — सः यः प्रकृत आत्मा, यत्र यस्मिन्काले, प्रस्वपिति प्रकर्षेण स्वापमनुभवति ; तदा किमुपादानः केन विधिना स्वपिति संध्यं स्थानं प्रतिपद्यत इत्युच्यते — अस्य दृष्टस्य लोकस्य जागरितलक्षणस्य, सर्वावतः सर्वमवतीति सर्वावा- न् अयं लोकः कार्यकरणसंघातः विषयवेदनासंयुक्तः ; सर्वा- वत्त्वम् अस्य व्याख्यातम् अन्नत्रयप्रकरणे ‘अथो अयं वा आत्मा’ इत्यादिना — सर्वा वा भूतभौतिकमात्राः अस्य सं- सर्गकारणभूता विद्यन्त इति सर्ववान् , सर्ववानेव सर्वावान् , तस्य सर्वावतः मात्राम् एकदेशम् अवयवम् , अपादाय अप- च्छिद्य आदाय गृहीत्वा — दृष्टजन्मवासनावासितः सन्नित्य- र्थः, स्वयम् आत्मनैव विहत्य देहं पातयित्वा निःसंबोधमा- पाद्य — जागरिते हि आदित्यादीनां चक्षुरादिष्वनुग्रहो देह- व्यवहारार्थः, देहव्यवहारश्च आत्मनो धर्माधर्मफलोपभोगप्र- युक्तः, तद्धर्माधर्मफलोपभोगोपरमणम् अस्मिन्देहे आत्मक- र्मोपरमकृतमिति आत्मा अस्य विहन्तेत्युच्यते — स्वयं नि-
In plain words
'ṣṭambha' completes the word: support, prop. Whatever momentum a person carries from his own past -- that momentum is what we call his 'due approach.' With respect to the other-world state still waiting to be reached, this is exactly what a person is equipped with: whatever means of getting there his knowledge and action have already built into him as insight. Mounting that momentum, gripping it, leaning on it -- the way a seed leans into its own readiness to sprout -- he sees two kinds of things. We use the plural because the fruits of right and wrong action come in many forms, not just one of each. Which two kinds? The fruits of wrongdoing -- never the wrongs themselves, since no one perceives a sin directly, only its result, which is suffering -- and the fruits of right action, which are joys and pleasures. Both of these he sees, and they are made entirely of impressions carried over from another life. He also glimpses the small, specific fruits of right and wrong waiting for him in the birth still to come, driven there by his own deeds or by a god's favor. But how do we know this dream-seeing of an unseen world's rewards and punishments is real? Because in this very life, a person regularly sees things in dream he has never once experienced awake -- and dream, contrary to what people assume, is not really the seeing of anything brand new. Dream is, in the main, memory of what was already seen. That is exactly how we know these two worlds exist, apart from either waking or dreaming. Now, someone had claimed that this bundle of body and senses, in the absence of the sun and every other outer light, keeps functioning by a separate light of its own -- the self. But that claim can never actually be shown, because no one has ever found the sun's light genuinely absent, with this bare inner light standing there alone to be caught in the act. This whole aggregate is always observed mixed together with outer light, never once apart from it. So a self-as-light, standing purely on its own, is as good as unreal -- call it non-existent if you like. But if there were even one case where it showed up alone, free of every trace of outer and inner matter, then everything claimed about it would hold. And that is exactly why the text goes on to say: this self, at the time it sleeps -- meaning falls into deep sleep completely -- does so by what material, by what method, entering the junction-state? Here is the explanation. This visible world, the world of waking, is called 'the all-possessor' because it protects everything; it is this same bundle of body and instruments, joined to the experience of objects. Why 'all-possessing'? Because every subtle and gross particle of matter needed to build it is already present -- that was explained earlier in the section on the threefold food. Taking a portion of that all-possessing world -- cutting off, carrying away, seizing one part of it, meaning: soaked through with the residue of this waking life -- he himself, by no other agent, knocks the body flat, drops it, and empties it of all awareness. Because in waking, the sun and its fellow lights lend their grace to the eye and the other senses purely so the body can function, and the body functions purely so the self can enjoy the fruit of its own past deeds; and when that enjoyment pauses in this particular body, it is because the self's own driving karma has paused. That is exactly why the self is called the demolisher of its own body. Himself...
Close to the Sanskrit
'ṣṭambha' -- that is the meaning [completing 'avaṣṭambha', support]. Whatever kind of approach this person has, that is 'yathākrama' [approach-in-due-order]. With respect to the cause by which the other-world state, yet to be attained, is reached, this person is 'yathākrama' -- meaning he is endowed with whatever means of attaining the other world, characterized by the insight preceded by knowledge and action. Having mounted, taken hold of, and relied upon that approach -- which has become oriented toward the other-world state, like a seed that has reached the state of sprouting -- he sees both kinds [of things]. The plural is used because the fruits of merit and demerit are manifold; 'ubhayān' means 'of both varieties.' Which two? The fruits of sin -- for direct perception of the sins themselves is not possible, so what is meant is the fruits of sin, that is, sufferings -- and joys, the fruits of merit, that is, pleasures: he sees both of these, made of impressions experienced in another birth; and whatever minor fruits of merit and demerit pertain to a birth yet to be attained, these too he sees, impelled by merit and demerit or by a deity's favor. How, then, is it known that this seeing, in dream, of sin and joy produced by the other-world state, [really occurs]? It is said: because, in this present life, one sees much that is never experienced here at all; and dream is not, by definition, the seeing of the wholly unprecedented, for dream, for the most part, is the memory of what was seen before. By this, the two worlds are proven to exist, distinct from the states of dream and waking. As for the claim that, in the absence of the sun and other external lights, this aggregate of effects and instruments, the person, functions by a light that is a separate self -- that very thing cannot be shown: namely, an actual passage into the absence of the light of the sun and the rest, in which this isolated, self-luminous principle could be apprehended; since this aggregate of effects and instruments is always found only in conjunction [with external light]. Therefore the self as an isolated light, in its own distinct nature, is as good as non-existent, or simply does not exist. But if someone, isolated, free of contact with the outer and inner elements and their products, could be apprehended in the very form of light, then everything stated would hold true. To establish exactly this point, [the text] says: 'he', the self under discussion, 'where,' at which time, 'sleeps' -- that is, experiences deep sleep intensely. Then, with what material cause, by what method does he sleep, [that is,] attain the junction-state? It is explained: of this visible world, characterized by waking -- 'sarvāvat' [all-possessing] because 'it protects everything' -- this world, the aggregate of effects and instruments, joined with the experience of objects; its being 'all-possessing' was explained in the section on the threefold food, by the passage beginning 'now, this self...'; because all the subtle and gross elemental particles that are the cause of its combination exist [in it], it is 'sarvāvat'; 'sarvavān' itself becomes 'sarvāvān' [lengthened]. Of that all-possessing world, having taken, cut off, appropriated, and seized a portion, a single part, a component -- meaning, being saturated with the impressions of this visible birth -- he himself, by himself alone, having struck down, having felled the body, having reduced it to unconsciousness -- for in the waking state, the favoring assistance of the sun and other lights upon the eye and the other senses is for the sake of the body's functioning, and the body's functioning is employed for the enjoyment of the fruits of the self's merit and demerit; the cessation of that enjoyment of the fruits of merit and demerit, in this particular body, is brought about by the cessation of the self's karma -- that is why the self is called the 'demolisher' of this body -- himself, '...ni-'