अर्जुन
In plain words
Arjuna said: Krishna, you praise Sannyāsa of action and then again Karma-yoga. Tell me with certainty which one of these is better.
Word for word
O Kṛṣṇa, you praise renunciation of actions and again yoga; which one of these two is better, tell me that, firmly settled.
The commentators
Bhagavadgītābhāṣyam
‘कर्मण्यकर्म यः पश्येत्’(भ. गी. ४ । १८) इत्यारभ्य ‘स युक्तः कृत्स्नकर्मकृत्’(भ. गी. ४ । १८) ‘ज्ञानाग्निदग्धकर्माणम्’(भ. गी. ४ । १९) ‘शारीरं केवलं कर्म कुर्वन्’(भ. गी. ४ । २१) ‘यदृच्छालाभसन्तुष्टः’(भ. गी. ४ । २२) ‘ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविः’(भ. गी. ४ । २४) ‘कर्मजान् विद्धि तान् सर्वान्’(भ. गी. ४ । ३२) ‘सर्वं कर्माखिलं पार्थ’(भ. गी. ४ । ३३) ‘ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि’(भ. गी. ४ । ३७) ‘योगसंन्यस्तकर्माणम्’(भ. गी. ४ । ४१) इत्येतैः वचनैः सर्वकर्मसंन्यासम् अवोचत् भगवान् । ‘छित्त्वैनं संशयं योगमातिष्ठ’(भ. गी. ४ । ४२) इत्यनेन वचनेन योगं च कर्मानुष्ठानलक्षणम् अनुतिष्ठ इत्युक्तवान् । तयोरुभयोश्च कर्मानुष्ठानकर्मसंन्यासयोः स्थितिगतिवत् परस्परविरोधात् एकेन सह कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् , कालभेदेन च अनुष्ठानविधानाभावात् , अर्थात् एतयोः अन्यतरकर्तव्यताप्राप्तौ सत्यां यत् प्रशस्यतरम् एतयोः कर्मानुष्ठानकर्मसंन्यासयोः तत् कर्तव्यं न इतरत् इत्येवं मन्यमानः प्रशस्यतरबुभुत्सया अर्जुन उवाच — ‘संन्यासं कर्मणां कृष्ण’(भ. गी. ५ । १) इत्यादिना ॥
ननु च आत्मविदः ज्ञानयोगेन निष्ठां प्रतिपिपादयिषन् पूर्वोदाहृतैः वचनैः भगवान् सर्वकर्मसंन्यासम् अवोचत् , न तु अनात्मज्ञस्य । अतश्च कर्मानुष्ठानकर्मसंन्यासयोः भिन्नपुरुषविषयत्वात् अन्यतरस्य प्रशस्यतरत्वबुभुत्सया अयं प्रश्नः अनुपपन्नः । सत्यमेव त्वदभिप्रायेण प्रश्नो न उपपद्यते ; प्रष्टुः स्वाभिप्रायेण पुनः प्रश्नः युज्यत एवेति वदामः । कथम् ? पूर्वोदाहृतैः वचनैः भगवता कर्मसंन्यासस्य कर्तव्यतया विवक्षितत्वात् , प्राधान्यमन्तरेण च कर्तारं तस्य कर्तव्यत्वासम्भवात् अनात्मविदपि कर्ता पक्षे प्राप्तः अनूद्यत एव ; न पुनः आत्मवित्कर्तृकत्वमेव संन्यासस्य विवक्षितम् , इत्येवं मन्वानस्य अर्जुनस्य कर्मानुष्ठानकर्मसंन्यासयोः अविद्वत्पुरुषकर्तृकत्वमपि अस्तीति पूर्वोक्तेन प्रकारेण तयोः परस्परविरोधात् अन्यतरस्य कर्तव्यत्वे प्राप्ते प्रशस्यतरं च कर्तव्यम् न इतरत् इति प्रशस्यतरविविदिषया प्रश्नः न अनुपपन्नः ॥
प्रतिवचनवाक्यार्थनिरूपणेनापि प्रष्टुः अभिप्रायः एवमेवेति गम्यते । कथम् ? ‘संन्यासकर्मयोगौ निःश्रेयसकरौ तयोस्तु कर्मयोगो विशिष्यते’(भ. गी. ५ । २) इति प्रतिवचनम् । एतत् निरूप्यम् — किं अनेन आत्मवित्कर्तृकयोः संन्यासकर्मयोगयोः निःश्रेयसकरत्वं प्रयोजनम् उक्त्वा तयोरेव कुतश्चित् विशेषात् कर्मसंन्यासात् कर्मयोगस्य विशिष्टत्वम् उच्यते ? आहोस्वित् अनात्मवित्कर्तृकयोः संन्यासकर्मयोगयोः तदुभयम् उच्यते ? इति । किञ्चातः — यदि आत्मवित्कर्तृकयोः कर्मसंन्यासकर्मयोगयोः निःश्रेयसकरत्वम् , तयोस्तु कर्मसंन्यासात् कर्मयोगस्य विशिष्टत्वम् उच्यते ; यदि वा अनात्मवित्कर्तृकयोः संन्यासकर्मयोगयोः तदुभयम् उच्यते इति । अत्र उच्यते — आत्मवित्कर्तृकयोः संन्यासकर्मयोगयोः असम्भवात् तयोः निःश्रेयसकरत्ववचनं तदीयाच्च कर्मसंन्यासात् कर्मयोगस्य विशिष्टत्वाभिधानम् इत्येतत् उभयम् अनुपपन्नम् । यदि अनात्मविदः कर्मसंन्यासः तत्प्रतिकूलश्च कर्मानुष्ठानलक्षणः कर्मयोगः सम्भवेताम् , तदा तयोः निःश्रेयसकरत्वोक्तिः कर्मयोगस्य च कर्मसंन्यासात् विशिष्टत्वाभिधानम् इत्येतत् उभयम् उपपद्येत । आत्मविदस्तु संन्यासकर्मयोगयोः असम्भवात् तयोः निःश्रेयसकरत्वाभिधानं कर्मसंन्यासाच्च कर्मयोगः विशिष्यते इति च अनुपपन्नम् ॥
अत्र आह — किम् आत्मविदः संन्यासकर्मयोगयोः उभयोरपि असम्भवः ? आहोस्वित् अन्यतरस्य असम्भवः ? यदा च अन्यतरस्य असम्भवः, तदा किं कर्मसंन्यासस्य, उत कर्मयोगस्य ? इति ; असम्भवे कारणं च वक्तव्यम् इति । अत्र उच्यते — आत्मविदः निवृत्तमिथ्याज्ञानत्वात् विपर्ययज्ञानमूलस्य कर्मयोगस्य असम्भवः स्यात् । जन्मादिसर्वविक्रियारहितत्वेन निष्क्रियम् आत्मानम् आत्मत्वेन यो वेत्ति तस्य आत्मविदः सम्यग्दर्शनेन अपास्तमिथ्याज्ञानस्य निष्क्रियात्मस्वरूपावस्थानलक्षणं सर्वकर्मसंन्यासम् उक्त्वा तद्विपरीतस्य मिथ्याज्ञानमूलकर्तृत्वाभिमानपुरःसरस्य सक्रियात्मस्वरूपावस्थानरूपस्य कर्मयोगस्य इह गीताशास्त्रे तत्र तत्र आत्मस्वरूपनिरूपणप्रदेशेषु सम्यग्ज्ञानमिथ्याज्ञानतत्कार्यविरोधात् अभावः प्रतिपाद्यते यस्मात् , तस्मात् आत्मविदः निवृत्तमिथ्याज्ञानस्य विपर्ययज्ञानमूलः कर्मयोगो न सम्भवतीति युक्तम् उक्तं स्यात् ॥
केषु केषु पुनः आत्मस्वरूपनिरूपणप्रदेशेषु आत्मविदः कर्माभावः प्रतिपाद्यते इति अत्र उच्यते — ‘अविनाशि तु तत्’(भ. गी. २ । १७) इति प्रकृत्य ‘य एनं वेत्ति हन्तारम्’(भ. गी. २ । १९) ‘वेदाविनाशिनं नित्यम्’(भ. गी. २ । २१) इत्यादौ तत्र तत्र आत्मविदः कर्माभावः उच्यते ॥
ननु च कर्मयोगोऽपि आत्मस्वरूपनिरूपणप्रदेशेषु तत्र तत्र प्रतिपाद्यते एव ; तद्यथा — ‘तस्माद्युध्यस्व भारत’(भ. गी. २ । १८) ‘स्वधर्ममपि चावेक्ष्य’(भ. गी. २ । ३१) ‘कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते’(भ. गी. २ । ४७) इत्यादौ । अतश्च कथम् आत्मविदः कर्मयोगस्य असम्भवः स्यादिति ? अत्र उच्यते — सम्यग्ज्ञानमिथ्याज्ञानतत्कार्यविरोधात् , ‘ज्ञानयोगेन साङ्ख्यानाम्’(भ. गी. ३ । ३) इत्यनेन साङ्ख्यानाम् आत्मतत्त्वविदाम् अनात्मवित्कर्तृककर्मयोगनिष्ठातः निष्क्रियात्मस्वरूपावस्थानलक्षणायाः ज्ञानयोगनिष्ठायाः पृथक्करणात् , कृतकृत्यत्वेन आत्मविदः प्रयोजनान्तराभावात् , ‘तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते’(भ. गी. ३ । १७) इति कर्तव्यान्तराभाववचनाच्च, ‘न कर्मणामनारम्भात्’(भ. गी. ३ । ४) ‘संन्यासस्तु महाबाहो दुःखमाप्तुमयोगतः’(भ. गी. ५ । ६) इत्यादिना च आत्मज्ञानाङ्गत्वेन कर्मयोगस्य विधानात् , ‘योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शमः कारणमुच्यते’(भ. गी. ६ । ३) इत्यनेन च उत्पन्नसम्यग्दर्शनस्य कर्मयोगाभाववचनात् , ‘शारीरं केवलं कर्म कुर्वन्नाप्नोति किल्बिषम्’(भ. गी. ४ । २१) इति च शरीरस्थितिकारणातिरिक्तस्य कर्मणो निवारणात् , ‘नैव किञ्चित्करोमीति युक्तो मन्येत तत्त्ववित्’(भ. गी. ५ । ८) इत्यनेन च शरीरस्थितिमात्रप्रयुक्तेष्वपि दर्शनश्रवणादिकर्मसु आत्मयाथात्म्यविदः ‘करोमि’ इति प्रत्ययस्य समाहितचेतस्तया सदा अकर्तव्यत्वोपदेशात् आत्मतत्त्वविदः सम्यग्दर्शनविरुद्धो मिथ्याज्ञानहेतुकः कर्मयोगः स्वप्नेऽपि न सम्भावयितुं शक्यते यस्मात् , तस्मात् अनात्मवित्कर्तृकयोरेव संन्यासकर्मयोगयोः निःश्रेयसकरत्ववचनम् , तदीयाच्च कर्मसंन्यासात् पूर्वोक्तात्मवित्कर्तृकसर्वकर्मसंन्यासविलक्षणात् सत्येव कर्तृत्वविज्ञाने कर्मैकदेशविषयात् यमनियमादिसहितत्वेन च दुरनुष्ठेयात् सुकरत्वेन च कर्मयोगस्य विशिष्टत्वाभिधानम् इत्येवं प्रतिवचनवाक्यार्थनिरूपणेनापि पूर्वोक्तः प्रष्टुरभिप्रायः निश्चीयते इति स्थितम् ॥
‘ज्यायसी चेत्कर्मणस्ते’(भ. गी. ३ । १) इत्यत्र ज्ञानकर्मणोः सह असम्भवे ‘यच्छ्रेय एतयोः तद्ब्रूहि’(भ. गी. ३ । २) इत्येवं पृष्टोऽर्जुनेन भगवान् साङ्ख्यानां संन्यासिनां ज्ञानयोगेन निष्ठा पुनः कर्मयोगेन योगिनां निष्ठा प्रोक्तेति निर्णयं चकार । ‘न च संन्यसनादेव केवलात् सिद्धिं समधिगच्छति’(भ. गी. ३ । ४) इति वचनात् ज्ञानसहितस्य सिद्धिसाधनत्वम् इष्टम्’ कर्मयोगस्य च, विधानात् । ज्ञानरहितस्य संन्यासः श्रेयान् , किं वा कर्मयोगः श्रेयान् ? ’ इति एतयोः विशेषबुभुत्सया —
संन्यासं परित्यागं कर्मणां शास्त्रीयाणाम् अनुष्ठेयविशेषाणां शंससि प्रशंससि कथयसि इत्येतत् । पुनः योगं च तेषामेव अनुष्ठानम् अवश्यकर्तव्यं शंससि । अतः मे कतरत् श्रेयः इति संशयः — किं कर्मानुष्ठानं श्रेयः, किं वा तद्धानम् इति । प्रशस्यतरं च अनुष्ठेयम् । अतश्च यत् श्रेयः प्रशस्यतरम् एतयोः कर्मसंन्यासकर्मयोगयोः यदनुष्ठानात् श्रेयोवाप्तिः मम स्यादिति मन्यसे, तत् एकम् अन्यतरम् सह एकपुरुषानुष्ठेयत्वासम्भवात् मे ब्रूहि सुनिश्चितम् अभिप्रेतं तवेति ॥ १ ॥
In plain words
Beginning with 'let him see inaction within action' (4.18) and running through 'he is disciplined, the doer of all action' (4.18), 'one whose actions are burnt to ash by the fire of knowledge' (4.19), 'performing only the body's bare actions' (4.21), 'content with whatever comes unsought' (4.22), 'Brahman is the offering, Brahman the oblation' (4.24), 'know all these to be born of action' (4.32), 'all action, entire, Pārtha' (4.33), 'the fire of knowledge burns all actions' (4.37), and 'one whose actions are renounced through yoga' (4.41) — through all of this, the Blessed Lord has been speaking of renouncing all action. Then, with the words 'having cut this doubt, take up yoga' (4.42), he told Arjuna instead to take up yoga — the actual performance of action. Now, these two paths, action and its renunciation, oppose each other the way standing still opposes moving; no one person can do both at once, and there's no provision anywhere for doing them in sequence either. So, by implication, when a person is faced with choosing one or the other, thinking 'whichever of these two — acting or renouncing action — is more commendable, that is what I should do, and not the other' — it was out of exactly this wish to know which one is more commendable that Arjuna spoke: 'Kṛṣṇa, renunciation of actions...' (5.1) and so on.
Objection: But surely, in all those verses cited earlier, the Blessed Lord was trying to establish the discipline of the knower of the Self through the path of knowledge — he was speaking of renouncing all action for the one who already knows the Self, not for someone who doesn't. So, since acting and renouncing action belong to two different kinds of person, Arjuna's question about which of the two is better makes no sense at all. Reply: True enough, on your reading the question wouldn't arise. But on the questioner's own understanding, we say it's perfectly valid. How so? Because in those earlier statements, the Lord meant renunciation of action as something to be undertaken as a duty — and a duty is impossible without an agent to carry it out. So even someone who doesn't know the Self is implicitly included as a possible agent there; it was never meant that only a knower of the Self could renounce action. Thinking along these lines, Arjuna took it that both acting and renouncing action can be done even by someone unlearned — and so, exactly as described before, since the two oppose each other, when the duty to choose one or the other arises, and one thinks, 'whichever is more commendable is what I should do, and not the other' — his question, born of the wish to know which one is more commendable, is not untenable after all.
Even just working through the meaning of Krishna's reply, we can see the questioner really did mean what we've just said. How? Krishna's reply is: 'Renunciation and the path of action both lead to the highest good; but of the two, the path of action is the better one' (5.2). Now we need to examine this. Does this reply mean that renunciation and the path of action, when both are done by a knower of the Self, lead to the highest good, and that, for some reason, action is still superior to renunciation between the two? Or does it mean that same thing about renunciation and action done by someone who doesn't know the Self? And further: if it means that renunciation and action, done by a knower of the Self, both lead to the highest good, but action is superior to renunciation between the two; or if it means that same pair of things about renunciation and action done by a non-knower — here's the answer: since renunciation and action can't both be done together by a knower of the Self, both claims — that they both lead to the highest good, and that action is superior to renunciation between them — simply don't hold. If, on the other hand, a non-knower's renunciation of action, and the opposite path of actually performing action, could both really be possible, then both claims — that they lead to the highest good, and that action is superior — would make sense. But for the knower of the Self, since renunciation and action can't coexist at all, both claims — that they lead to the highest good, and that action is superior to renunciation — are, in exactly the same way, untenable.
Here an objector asks: 'Are both renunciation and the path of action impossible for the knower of the Self? Or is it just one of them that's impossible — and if so, is it renunciation, or is it action?' The reason must be given. Here is the answer: for the knower of the Self, since his false knowledge is already gone, the path of action — which is rooted precisely in erroneous knowledge — would necessarily be impossible for him. Someone who knows the Self as actionless, free from birth and every other change, as being nothing other than his own true nature — for such a knower, whose false knowledge has been dispelled by right vision, this Gītā, having taught the renunciation of all action as abiding in that actionless nature of the Self, goes on, again and again throughout the text wherever it discusses the nature of the Self, to rule out the opposite of that: the path of action, which begins with the false pride of being a doer rooted in wrong knowledge and takes the form of treating the Self as though it were active. It rules this out because right knowledge simply cannot coexist with false knowledge and its effects. Given all this, it is entirely correct to say that, for the knower of the Self whose false knowledge has ceased, the path of action rooted in erroneous knowledge is simply not possible.
But where exactly? In which of the passages that set out the Self's own nature is it established that the knower of the Self has no action left to do? Here is the answer. The theme opens at 'But that is indestructible' (2.17), and then in lines like 'he who takes this Self to be a slayer' (2.19) and 'one who knows it as indestructible, eternal' (2.21) — in place after place, what is being said is precisely this: for the knower of the Self there is no action.
Objection: But surely the path of action itself is taught, again and again, wherever this text discusses the nature of the Self — for example, 'therefore fight, Bhārata' (2.18), 'and also, considering your own duty' (2.31), 'your right is to action alone' (2.47), and so on. So how could the path of action possibly be impossible for the knower of the Self? Reply: Because right knowledge simply cannot coexist with false knowledge and its effects. Because the verse 'through the path of knowledge, for the Sāṅkhyas' (3.3) explicitly separates the discipline of knowledge — abiding in the Self's actionless nature — as belonging to the Sāṅkhyas, the true knowers of the Self, from the discipline of action, which belongs to one who does not yet know the Self. Because the knower of the Self has already accomplished everything there is to accomplish, and has no further purpose — as the text itself says, 'for him no duty exists' (3.17). Because the path of action is prescribed only as an aid toward Self-knowledge, in verses like 'not by abstaining from action' (3.4) and 'renunciation, mighty-armed one, is hard to reach without yoga first' (5.6). Because 'for one established in yoga, tranquility alone is called the means' (6.3) shows that the path of action has no place once right vision has already dawned. Because 'performing only the body's bare actions, he incurs no sin' (4.21) rules out any action beyond what keeping the body alive requires. And because 'the knower of truth, disciplined, should think, I do nothing at all' (5.8) teaches that even in acts merely needed to sustain the body — seeing, hearing, and so on — the very thought 'I am doing this' must never arise for someone whose mind stays composed and who knows the Self as it truly is. For all these reasons, the path of action, opposed to right vision and rooted in false knowledge, cannot be imagined even in a dream for the true knower of the Self. So the statement that renunciation and action both bring the highest good applies only when both are done by someone who does not yet know the Self; and the claim that action is superior to renunciation there is because that ordinary renunciation — quite distinct from the total renunciation of a knower described earlier — only lets go of part of one's actions while the sense of being a doer still remains real, and because action, being bound up with all sorts of restraints and observances, is hard to practice, while such partial renunciation is easy. In this way, simply by working through the meaning of the reply itself, we confirm the questioner's intention as already described. So this point stands settled.
Here, in 'is knowledge really better than action for you?' (3.1), when it seemed knowledge and action couldn't both be undertaken at once, and Arjuna asked, 'then tell me plainly which of the two is better' (3.2) — the Blessed Lord settled the matter: the discipline through knowledge belongs to the renunciate Sāṅkhyas, while the discipline through action belongs to the yogins. And by saying 'not by renunciation alone does one reach perfection' (3.4), he meant that renunciation becomes a means to perfection only when joined with knowledge, while the path of action is a means simply because it is directly prescribed. What remains is the question: 'Is renunciation without knowledge better, or is the path of action better?' — and it is out of this wish to understand the difference between the two —
'Renunciation' — meaning giving up scripturally prescribed actions, the specific duties one is supposed to perform — you speak highly of, you praise. And yet you also praise yoga — actually carrying out those very same duties as a mandatory obligation. So here is my doubt: which is better for me — doing the action, or giving it up? Whatever is more commendable is surely what I should do. So tell me clearly, with certainty, which one of these two — renouncing action or performing it — you genuinely believe would bring me the better result, since no one person can do both at once. What is your settled view?
Close to the Sanskrit
Beginning with 'let him see inaction in action' (4.18) — 'he is disciplined, the doer of all action' (4.18), 'one whose actions are burnt by the fire of knowledge' (4.19), 'performing only bodily action' (4.21), 'content with what comes unsought' (4.22), 'Brahman is the offering, Brahman the oblation' (4.24), 'know all those to be born of action' (4.32), 'all action entire, Pārtha' (4.33), 'the fire of knowledge [reduces] all actions [to ashes]' (4.37), 'one whose actions have been renounced through yoga' (4.41) — by these statements the Blessed Lord has spoken of the renunciation of all action. By the statement 'having cut this doubt, take up yoga' (4.42) he has told him to undertake yoga, characterized by the performance of action. And since these two — the performance of action and the renunciation of action — are opposed to each other like standing still and moving, since it is impossible for one person to do both at once, and since there is no provision, even by staggering them over time, for performing both — by implication, when the obligation to do one or the other of these two arises, thinking 'whichever of these two, the performance of action or the renunciation of action, is more praiseworthy, that is to be done, and not the other' — out of a desire to know which one is more praiseworthy, Arjuna spoke: 'the renunciation of actions, Kṛṣṇa' (5.1) and so on.
Objection: but, intending to establish the discipline of the knower of the Self through the path of knowledge, the Blessed Lord, by the statements cited earlier, spoke of the renunciation of all action — not for one who does not know the Self. And therefore, since the performance of action and its renunciation pertain to different kinds of person, this question, out of a wish to know which of the two is more praiseworthy, is untenable. Reply: It is indeed true that, on your interpretation, the question does not arise; but on the questioner's own intention, however, we say the question is indeed valid. How so? Because, by the statements cited earlier, the Blessed Lord intended the renunciation of action as an obligation to be undertaken — and since, without an agent as the principal factor, its very obligatoriness is impossible — even one who does not know the Self is thereby implicitly included as agent in that case; it is not that renunciation is meant to have exclusively the knower of the Self as its agent. Thinking thus, Arjuna held that both the performance and the renunciation of action can have even an unlearned person as their agent — and so, in the manner already described, since these two oppose one another, when the obligation to do one or the other arises, thinking 'whichever is more praiseworthy is to be done, and not the other' — the question, out of a desire to know which is more praiseworthy, is not untenable after all.
Even from examining the meaning of the reply itself, the questioner's own intention is understood to be exactly this. How so? 'Renunciation and the path of action both bring the highest good; but of the two, the path of action is superior' (5.2) — this is the reply. This is to be examined: does this, having stated that renunciation and the path of action, both having the knower of the Self as agent, bring the highest good, then say that, from some distinction between the two themselves, the path of action is superior to that renunciation of action? Or does it say that same pair of things of renunciation and the path of action having a non-knower as agent? And furthermore — if it says that renunciation and the path of action, having the knower of the Self as agent, bring the highest good, but of the two the path of action is superior to renunciation; or if it says that same pair of things of renunciation and the path of action having a non-knower as agent. Here it is said in reply: since renunciation and the path of action, both having the knower of the Self as agent, are impossible together, both statements — that the two bring the highest good, and that the path of action is superior to that renunciation — are untenable. If the renunciation of action of one not knowing the Self, and the path of action opposed to it, characterized by actually performing action, were both possible together, then the statement that both bring the highest good, and that the path of action is superior to renunciation of action, would both be tenable. But for the knower of the Self, since renunciation and the path of action are both impossible, the statement that they bring the highest good, and that the path of action is superior to renunciation of action, are both, likewise, untenable.
Here an objector says: 'Is it that, for the knower of the Self, both renunciation and the path of action are impossible? Or is it that only one of the two is impossible? And when it is that only one of the two is impossible, is it renunciation of action, or the path of action?' — the reason for the impossibility must be stated. Here it is said in reply: for the knower of the Self, since his false knowledge has ceased, the path of action, which is rooted in erroneous knowledge, would be impossible. Since it is free of birth and every other modification, he who knows the Self as actionless, as being his very own self — for that knower of the Self, whose false knowledge has been dispelled by right vision, having stated the renunciation of all action, characterized as abiding in the actionless nature of the Self, [the Gītā] teaches, in place after place throughout this Gītā scripture where the nature of the Self is being determined, the absence of its opposite — the path of action, preceded by the conceit of agency rooted in false knowledge, and having the form of abiding in the Self as though it were active — because right knowledge is incompatible with false knowledge and its effects. Since this is so, it would rightly have been said that, for the knower of the Self, whose false knowledge has ceased, the path of action, rooted in erroneous knowledge, is not possible.
But in which and which passages that set forth the Self's own nature is the absence of action for the knower of the Self established? — here it is said: having taken up the theme with 'But that is indestructible' (Gītā 2.17), then in passages such as 'he who knows this as the slayer' (Gītā 2.19) and 'knows it as indestructible, eternal' (Gītā 2.21), there and there the absence of action for the knower of the Self is stated.
Objection: but surely the path of action too is indeed taught, again and again, in the passages that determine the nature of the Self — for example, 'therefore fight, Bhārata' (2.18), 'and also, considering your own duty' (2.31), 'your right is to action alone' (2.47), and so on. So how, then, could the path of action be impossible for the knower of the Self? Reply: here it is said — because right knowledge is incompatible with false knowledge and its effects; because, by 'through the path of knowledge, for the Sāṅkhyas' (3.3), the discipline of knowledge, characterized as abiding in the actionless nature of the Self, is distinguished, as belonging to the Sāṅkhyas, the knowers of the truth of the Self, from the discipline of the path of action that has a non-knower of the Self as its agent; because, having accomplished all there is to accomplish, the knower of the Self has no further purpose, and because of the statement declaring the absence of any other duty, 'for him no duty exists' (3.17); and because the path of action is enjoined as an aid to Self-knowledge in statements like 'not by non-commencement of actions' (3.4) and 'renunciation, mighty-armed one, is hard to attain without yoga' (5.6) and such; and because, by 'for one who has ascended to yoga, tranquility alone is called the means' (6.3), it declares the absence of the path of action for one in whom right vision has already arisen; and because, in 'performing only bodily action, he incurs no sin' (4.21), every action beyond what maintaining the body requires is prohibited; and because, by 'the knower of truth, disciplined, should think: I do nothing at all' (5.8), it is taught that even in acts merely required to keep the body going — seeing, hearing, and so on — the very notion 'I do', given his composed state of mind, is always to be avoided, for the knower of the true nature of the Self — since, for all these reasons, the path of action, opposed to right vision and caused by false knowledge, cannot be conceived even in a dream for the knower of the truth of the Self — therefore, the statement that renunciation and the path of action bring the highest good applies only to those two when they have a non-knower of the Self as agent; and the statement that the path of action is superior to that renunciation of action — distinct from the previously described renunciation of all action by a knower of the Self, having only part of action as its scope even while the sense of agency remains real, and because, being bound up with restraints, observances, and the rest, the path of action is hard to practice while renunciation is easy — [applies only there]. In this way, even from examining the meaning of the reply itself, the previously stated intention of the questioner is ascertained. So this stands established.
Here, in 'is it better than action for you' (3.1), when knowledge and action seemed impossible together, and Arjuna, having asked in this way, 'tell me which of the two is better' (3.2) — the Blessed Lord made the determination that the discipline of the renunciate Sāṅkhyas comes through the path of knowledge, while, again, the discipline of the yogins comes through the path of action. By the statement 'and not by renunciation alone, by itself, does one attain perfection' (3.4), it is meant that being a means to perfection belongs to renunciation only when accompanied by knowledge, and to the path of action because it is directly enjoined. [The remaining question is:] 'Is renunciation without knowledge better, or is the path of action better?' — out of a desire to know the distinction between these two —
'Renunciation' — meaning the abandonment of scripturally prescribed actions, specific actions that are to be performed — you praise, you extol, you speak of; this is the sense. Again, you praise yoga — the mandatory performance of those very actions. Therefore my doubt is: which of the two is better for me — is the performance of action better, or is its abandonment [better]? And whatever is more praiseworthy is what should be done. So, whichever of these two — the renunciation of action or the path of action — by performing which you think I would attain the better, that one, either one — since it is impossible for one person to perform both together — tell me that with certainty, what your considered view is.