In plain words
Know Me also as the kṣetrajña in all kṣetras, Bharata. Jñāna of the kṣetra and kṣetrajña—that I regard as true jñāna.
Word for word
And know Me also as the kṣetrajña in all kṣetras, O Bhārata; the knowledge of kṣetra and kṣetrajña which [is], that [is] knowledge, held [so] by Me.
क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि सर्वक्षेत्रेषु भारतक्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोर्ज्ञानं यत् तज्ज्ञानं मतं मम
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▸Bhagavadgītābhāṣyam
एवं क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञौ उक्तौ । किम् एतावन्मात्रेण ज्ञानेन ज्ञातव्यौ इति ? न इति उच्यते —
क्षेत्रज्ञं यथोक्तलक्षणं चापि मां परमेश्वरम् असंसारिणं विद्धि जानीहि । सर्वक्षेत्रेषु यः क्षेत्रज्ञः ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तानेकक्षेत्रोपाधिप्रविभक्तः, तं निरस्तसर्वोपाधिभेदं सदसदादिशब्दप्रत्ययागोचरं विद्धि इति अभिप्रायः । हे भारत, यस्मात् क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरयाथात्म्यव्यतिरेकेण न ज्ञानगोचरम् अन्यत् अवशिष्टम् अस्ति, तस्मात् क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञयोः ज्ञेयभूतयोः यत् ज्ञानं क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञौ येन ज्ञानेन विषयीक्रियेते, तत् ज्ञानं सम्यग्ज्ञानम् इति मतम् अभिप्रायः मम ईश्वरस्य विष्णोः ॥
ननु सर्वक्षेत्रेषु एक एव ईश्वरः, न अन्यः तद्व्यतिरिक्तः भोक्ता विद्यते चेत् , ततः ईस्वरस्य संसारित्वं प्राप्तम् ; ईश्वरव्यतिरेकेण वा संसारिणः अन्यस्य अभावात् संसाराभावप्रसङ्गः । तच्च उभयमनिष्टम् , बन्धमोक्षतद्धेतुशास्त्रानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् , प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविरोधाच्च । प्रत्यक्षेण तावत् सुखदुःखतद्धेतुलक्षणः संसारः उपलभ्यते ; जगद्वैचित्र्योपलब्धेश्च धर्माधर्मनिमित्तः संसारः अनुमीयते । सर्वमेतत् अनुपपन्नमात्मेश्वरैकत्वे ॥
न ; ज्ञानाज्ञानयोः अन्यत्वेनोपपत्तेः — ‘दूरमेते विपरीते विषूची अविद्या या च विद्येति ज्ञाता’(क. उ. १ । २ । ४) । तथा तयोः विद्याविद्याविषययोः फलभेदोऽपि विरुद्धः निर्दिष्टः — ‘श्रेयश्च प्रेयश्च’(क. उ. १ । २ । २) इति ; विद्याविषयः श्रेयः, प्रेयस्तु अविद्याकार्यम् इति । तथा च व्यासः — ‘द्वाविमावथ पन्थानौ’(मो. ध. २४१ । ६) इत्यादि, ‘इमौ द्वावेव पन्थानौ’ इत्यादि च । इह च द्वे निष्ठे उक्ते । अविद्या च सह कार्येण हातव्या इति श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायेभ्यः अवगम्यते । श्रुतयः तावत् — ‘इह चेदवेदीदथ सत्यमस्ति न चेदिहावेदीन्महती विनष्टिः’(के. उ. २ । ५) ‘तमेवं विद्वानमृत इह भवति । नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय’(तै. आ. ३ । १३) ‘विद्वान्न बिभेति कुतश्चन’(तै. उ. २ । ९ । १) । अविदुषस्तु — ‘अथ तस्य भयं भवति’(तै. उ. २ । ७ । १) , ‘अविद्यायामन्तरे वर्तमानाः’(क. उ. १ । २ । ५) , ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’ ‘अन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद यथा पशुरेवं स देवानाम्’(बृ. उ. १ । ४ । १०) आत्मवित् यः ‘स इदं सर्वं भवति’(बृ. उ. १ । ४ । १०) ; ‘यदा चर्मवत्’(श्वे. उ. ६ । २०) इत्याद्याः सहस्रशः । स्मृतयश्च — ‘अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः’(भ. गी. ५ । १५) ‘इहैव तैर्जितः सर्गो येषां साम्ये स्थितं मनः’(भ. गी. ५ । १९) ‘समं पश्यन् हि सर्वत्र’(भ. गी. १३ । २८) इत्याद्याः । न्यायतश्च — ‘सर्पान्कुशाग्राणि तथोदपानं ज्ञात्वा मनुष्याः परिवर्जयन्ति । अज्ञानतस्तत्र पतन्ति केचिज्ज्ञाने फलं पश्य यथाविशिष्टम्’(मो. ध. २०१ । १७) । तथा च — देहादिषु आत्मबुद्धिः अविद्वान् रागद्वेषादिप्रयुक्तः धर्माधर्मानुष्ठानकृत् जायते म्रियते च इति अवगम्यते ; देहादिव्यतिरिक्तात्मदर्शिनः रागद्वेषादिप्रहाणापेक्षधर्माधर्मप्रवृत्त्युपशमात् मुच्यन्ते इति न केनचित् प्रत्याख्यातुं शक्यं न्यायतः । तत्र एवं सति, क्षेत्रज्ञस्य ईश्वरस्यैव सतः अविद्याकृतोपाधिभेदतः संसारित्वमिव भवति, यथा देहाद्यात्मत्वमात्मनः । सर्वजन्तूनां हि प्रसिद्धः देहादिषु अनात्मसु आत्मभावः निश्चितः अविद्याकृतः, यथा स्थाणौ पुरुषनिश्चयः ; न च एतावता पुरुषधर्मः स्थाणोः भवति, स्थाणुधर्मो वा पुरुषस्य, तथा न चैतन्यधर्मो देहस्य, देहधर्मो वा चेतनस्य सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वादिः आत्मनः न युक्तः ; अविद्याकृतत्वाविशेषात् , जरामृत्युवत् ॥
न, अतुल्यत्वात् ; इति चेत् — स्थाणुपुरुषौ ज्ञेयावेव सन्तौ ज्ञात्रा अन्योन्यस्मिन् अध्यस्तौ अविद्यया ; देहात्मनोस्तु ज्ञेयज्ञात्रोरेव इतरेतराध्यासः, इति न समः दृष्टान्तः । अतः देहधर्मः ज्ञेयोऽपि ज्ञातुरात्मनः भवतीति चेत् , न ; अचैतन्यादिप्रसङ्गात् । यदि हि ज्ञेयस्य देहादेः क्षेत्रस्य धर्माः सुखदुःखमोहेच्छादयः ज्ञातुः भवन्ति, तर्हि, ‘ज्ञेयस्य क्षेत्रस्य धर्माः केचित् आत्मनः भवन्ति अविद्याध्यारोपिताः, जरामरणादयस्तु न भवन्ति’ इति विशेषहेतुः वक्तव्यः । ‘न भवन्ति’ इति अस्ति अनुमानम् — अविद्याध्यारोपितत्वात् जरामरणादिवत् इति, हेयत्वात् , उपादेयत्वाच्च इत्यादि । तत्र एवं सति, कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वलक्षणः संसारः ज्ञेयस्थः ज्ञातरि अविद्यया अध्यारोपितः इति, न तेन ज्ञातुः किञ्चित् दुष्यति, यथा बालैः अध्यारोपितेन आकाशस्य तलमलिनत्वादिना ॥
एवं च सति, सर्वक्षेत्रेष्वपि सतः भगवतः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य ईश्वरस्य संसारित्वगन्धमात्रमपि नाशङ्क्यम् । न हि क्वचिदपि लोके अविद्याध्यस्तेन धर्मेण कस्यचित् उपकारः अपकारो वा दृष्टः ॥
यत्तु उक्तम् — न समः दृष्टान्तः इति, तत् असत् । कथम् ? अविद्याध्यासमात्रं हि दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः साधर्म्यं विवक्षितम् । तत् न व्यभिचरति । यत्तु ज्ञातरि व्यभिचरति इति मन्यसे, तस्यापि अनैकान्तिकत्वं दर्शितं जरादिभिः ॥
अविद्यावत्त्वात् क्षेत्रज्ञस्य संसारित्वम् इति चेत् , न ; अविद्यायाः तामसत्वात् । तामसो हि प्रत्ययः, आवरणात्मकत्वात् अविद्या विपरीतग्राहकः, संशयोपस्थापको वा, अग्रहणात्मको वा ; विवेकप्रकाशभावे तदभावात् , तामसे च आवरणात्मके तिमिरादिदोषे सति अग्रहणादेः अविद्यात्रयस्य उपलब्धेः ॥
अत्र आह — एवं तर्हि ज्ञातृधर्मः अविद्या । न ; करणे चक्षुषि तैमिरिकत्वादिदोषोपलब्धेः । यत्तु मन्यसे — ज्ञातृधर्मः अविद्या, तदेव च अविद्याधर्मवत्त्वं क्षेत्रज्ञस्य संसारित्वम् ; तत्र यदुक्तम् ‘ईश्वर एव क्षेत्रज्ञः, न संसारी’ इत्येतत् अयुक्तमिति — तत् न ; यथा करणे चक्षुषि विपरीतग्राहकादिदोषस्य दर्शनात् । न विपरीतादिग्रहणं तन्निमित्तं वा तैमिरिकत्वादिदोषः ग्रहीतुः, चक्षुषः संस्कारेण तिमिरे अपनीते ग्रहीतुः अदर्शनात् न ग्रहीतुर्धर्मः यथा ; तथा सर्वत्रैव अग्रहणविपरीतसंशयप्रत्ययास्तन्निमित्ताः करणस्यैव कस्यचित् भवितुमर्हन्ति, न ज्ञातुः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य । संवेद्यत्वाच्च तेषां प्रदीपप्रकाशवत् न ज्ञातृधर्मत्वम् — संवेद्यत्वादेव स्वात्मव्यतिरिक्तसंवेद्यत्वम् ; सर्वकरणवियोगे च कैवल्ये सर्ववादिभिः अविद्यादिदोषवत्त्वानभ्युपगमात् । आत्मनः यदि क्षेत्रज्ञस्य अग्न्युष्णवत् स्वः धर्मः, ततः न कदाचिदपि तेन वियोगः स्यात् । अविक्रियस्य च व्योमवत् सर्वगतस्य अमूर्तस्य आत्मनः केनचित् संयोगवियोगानुपपत्तेः, सिद्धं क्षेत्रज्ञस्य नित्यमेव ईश्वरत्वम् ; ‘अनादित्वान्निर्गुणत्वात्’(भ. गी. १३ । ३१) इत्यादीश्वरवचनाच्च ॥
ननु एवं सति संसारसंसारित्वाभावे शास्त्रानर्थक्यादिदोषः स्यादिति चेत् , न ; सर्वैरभ्युपगतत्वात् । सर्वैः आत्मवादिभिः अभ्युपगतः दोषः न एकेन परिहर्तव्यः भवति । कथम् अभ्युपगतः इति ? मुक्तात्मनां हि संसारसंसारित्वव्यवहाराभावः सर्वैरेव आत्मवादिभिः इष्यते । न च तेषां शास्त्रानर्थक्यादिदोषप्राप्तिः अभ्युपगता । तथा नः क्षेत्रज्ञानाम् ईश्वरैकत्वे सति, शास्त्रानर्थक्यं भवतु ; अविद्याविषये च अर्थवत्त्वम् — यथा द्वैतिनां सर्वेषां बन्धावस्थायामेव शास्त्राद्यर्थवत्त्वम् , न मुक्तावस्थायाम् , एवम् ॥
ननु आत्मनः बन्धमुक्तावस्थे परमार्थत एव वस्तुभूते द्वैतिनां सर्वेषाम् । अतः हेयोपादेयतत्साधनसद्भावे शास्त्राद्यर्थवत्त्वं स्यात् । अद्वैतिनां पुनः, द्वैतस्य अपरमार्थत्वात् , अविद्याकृतत्वात् बन्धावस्थायाश्च आत्मनः अपरमार्थत्वे निर्विषयत्वात् , शास्त्राद्यानर्थक्यम् इति चेत् , न ; आत्मनः अवस्थाभेदानुपपत्तेः । यदि तावत् आत्मनः बन्धमुक्तावस्थे, युगपत् स्याताम् , क्रमेण वा । युगपत् तावत् विरोधात् न सम्भवतः स्थितिगती इव एकस्मिन् । क्रमभावित्वे च, निर्निमित्तत्वे अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः । अन्यनिमित्तत्वे च स्वतः अभावात् अपरमार्थत्वप्रसङ्गः । तथा च सति अभ्युपगमहानिः । किञ्च, बन्धमुक्तावस्थयोः पौर्वापर्यनिरूपणायां बन्धावस्था पूर्वं प्रकल्प्या, अनादिमती अन्तवती च ; तच्च प्रमाणविरुद्धम् । तथा मोक्षावस्था आदिमती अनन्ता च प्रमाणविरुद्धैव अभ्युपगम्यते । न च अवस्थावतः अवस्थान्तरं गच्छतः नित्यत्वम् उपपादयितुं शक्यम् । अथ अनित्यत्वदोषपरिहाराय बन्धमुक्तावस्थाभेदो न कल्प्यते, अतः द्वैतिनामपि शास्त्रानर्थक्यादिदोषः अपरिहार्य एव ; इति समानत्वात् न अद्वैतवादिना परिहर्तव्यः दोषः ॥
न च शास्त्रानर्थक्यम् , यथाप्रसिद्धाविद्वत्पुरुषविषयत्वात् शास्त्रस्य । अविदुषां हि फलहेत्वोः अनात्मनोः आत्मदर्शनम् , न विदुषाम् ; विदुषां हि फलहेतुभ्याम् आत्मनः अन्यत्वदर्शने सति, तयोः अहमिति आत्मदर्शनानुपपत्तेः । न हि अत्यन्तमूढः उन्मत्तादिरपि जलाग्न्योः छायाप्रकाशयोर्वा ऐकात्म्यं पश्यति ; किमुत विवेकी । तस्मात् न विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रं तावत् फलहेतुभ्याम् आत्मनः अन्यत्वदर्शिनः भवति । न हि ‘देवदत्त, त्वम् इदं कुरु’ इति कस्मिंश्चित् कर्मणि नियुक्ते, विष्णुमित्रः ‘अहं नियुक्तः’ इति तत्रस्थः नियोगं शृण्वन्नपि प्रतिपद्यते । वियोगविषयविवेकाग्रहणात् तु उपपद्यते प्रतिपत्तिः ; तथा फलहेत्वोरपि ॥
ननु प्राकृतसम्बन्धापेक्षया युक्तैव प्रतिपत्तिः शास्त्रार्थविषया — फलहेतुभ्याम् अन्यात्मविषयदर्शनेऽपि सति — इष्टफलहेतौ प्रवर्तितः अस्मि, अनिष्टफलहेतोश्च निवर्तितः अस्मीति ; यथा पितृपुत्रादीनाम् इतरेतरात्मान्यत्वदर्शने सत्यपि अन्योन्यनियोगप्रतिषेधार्थप्रतिपत्तिः । न ; व्यतिरिक्तात्मदर्शनप्रतिपत्तेः प्रागेव फलहेत्वोः आत्माभिमानस्य सिद्धत्वात् । प्रतिपन्ननियोगप्रतिषेधार्थो हि फलहेतुभ्याम् आत्मनः अन्यत्वं प्रतिपद्यते, न पूर्वम् । तस्मात् विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रम् अविद्वद्विषयम् इति सिद्धम् ॥
ननु ‘स्वर्गकामो यजेत’(?) ‘न कलञ्जं भक्षयेत्’(?) इत्यादौ आत्मव्यतिरेकदर्शिनाम् अप्रवृत्तौ, केवलदेहाद्यात्मदृष्टीनां च ; अतः कर्तुः अभावात् शास्त्रानर्थक्यमिति चेत् , न ; यथाप्रसिद्धित एव प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्युपपत्तेः । ईश्वरक्षेत्रज्ञैकत्वदर्शी ब्रह्मवित् तावत् न प्रवर्तते । तथा नैरात्म्यवाद्यपि नास्ति परलोकः इति न प्रवर्तते । यथाप्रसिद्धितस्तु विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रश्रवणान्यथानुपपत्त्या अनुमितात्मास्तित्वः आत्मविशेषानभिज्ञः कर्मफलसञ्जाततृष्णः श्रद्दधानतया च प्रवर्तते । इति सर्वेषां नः प्रत्यक्षम् । अतः न शास्त्रानर्थक्यम् ॥
विवेकिनाम् अप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् तदनुगामिनाम् अप्रवृत्तौ शास्त्रानर्थक्यम् इति चेत् , न ;
कस्यचिदेव विवेकोपपत्तेः । अनेकेषु हि प्राणिषु कश्चिदेव विवेकी स्यात् , यथेदानीम् । न च विवेकिनम् अनुवर्तन्ते मूढाः, रागादिदोषतन्त्रत्वात् प्रवृत्तेः, अभिचरणादौ च प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् , स्वाभाव्याच्च प्रवृत्तेः — ‘स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्तते’(भ. गी. ५ । १४) इति हि उक्तम् ॥
तस्मात् अविद्यामात्रं संसारः यथादृष्टविषयः एव । न क्षेत्रज्ञस्य केवलस्य अविद्या तत्कार्यं च । न च मिथ्याज्ञानं परमार्थवस्तु दूषयितुं समर्थम् । न हि ऊषरदेशं स्नेहेन पङ्कीकर्तुं शक्नोति मरीच्युदकम् । तथा अविद्या क्षेत्रज्ञस्य न किञ्चित् कर्तुं शक्नोति । अतश्चेदमुक्तम् — ‘क्षेत्रज्ञं चापि मां विद्धि’(भ. गी. १३ । २) , ‘अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानम्’(भ. गी. ५ । १५) इति च ॥
अथ किमिदं संसारिणामिव ‘अहमेवं’ ‘ममैवेदम्’ इति पण्डितानामपि ? शृणु ; इदं तत् पाण्डित्यम् , यत् क्षेत्रे एव आत्मदर्शनम् । यदि पुनः क्षेत्रज्ञम् अविक्रियं पश्येयुः, ततः न भोगं कर्म वा आकाङ्क्षेयुः ‘मम स्यात्’ इति । विक्रियैव भोगकर्मणी । अथ एवं सति, फलार्थित्वात् अविद्वान् प्रवर्तते । विदुषः पुनः अविक्रियात्मदर्शिनः फलार्थित्वाभावात् प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तौ कार्यकरणसङ्घातव्यापारोपरमे निवृत्तिः उपचर्यते ॥
इदं च अन्यत् पाण्डित्यं केषाञ्चित् अस्तु — क्षेत्रज्ञः ईश्वर एव । क्षेत्रं च अन्यत् क्षेत्रज्ञस्यैव विषयः । अहं तु संसारी सुखी दुःखी च । संसारोपरमश्च मम कर्तव्यः क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञविज्ञानेन, ध्यानेन च ईश्वरं क्षेत्रज्ञं साक्षात्कृत्वा तत्स्वरूपावस्थानेनेति । यश्च एवं बुध्यते, यश्च बोधयति, नासौ क्षेत्रज्ञः इति । एवं मन्वानः यः सः पण्डितापशदः, संसारमोक्षयोः शास्त्रस्य च अर्थवत्त्वं करोमीति ; आत्महा स्वयं मूढः अन्यांश्च व्यामोहयति शास्त्रार्थसम्प्रदायरहितत्वात् , श्रुतहानिम् अश्रुतकल्पनां च कुर्वन् । तस्मात् असम्प्रदायवित् सर्वशास्त्रविदपि मूर्खवदेव उपेक्षणीयः ॥
यत्तूक्तम् ‘ईश्वरस्य क्षेत्रज्ञैकत्वे संसारित्वं प्राप्नोति, क्षेत्रज्ञानां च ईश्वरैकत्वे संसारिणः अभावात् संसाराभावप्रसङ्गः’ इति, एतौ दोषौ प्रत्युक्तौ ‘विद्याविद्ययोः वैलक्षण्याभ्युपगमात्’ इति । कथम् ? अविद्यापरिकल्पितदोषेण तद्विषयं वस्तु पारमार्थिकं न दुष्यतीति । तथा च दृष्टान्तः दर्शितः — मरीच्यम्भसा ऊषरदेशो न पङ्कीक्रियते इति । संसारिणः अभावात् संसाराभावप्रसङ्गदोषोऽपि संसारसंसारिणोः अविद्याकल्पितत्वोपपत्त्या प्रत्युक्तः ॥
ननु अविद्यावत्त्वमेव क्षेत्रज्ञस्य संसारित्वदोषः । तत्कृतं च सुखित्वदुःखित्वादि प्रत्यक्षम् उपलभ्यते इति चेत् , न ; ज्ञेयस्य क्षेत्रधर्मत्वात् , ज्ञातुः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य तत्कृतदोषानुपपत्तेः । यावत् किञ्चित् क्षेत्रज्ञस्य दोषजातम् अविद्यमानम् आसञ्जयसि, तस्य ज्ञेयत्वोपपत्तेः क्षेत्रधर्मत्वमेव, न क्षेत्रज्ञधर्मत्वम् । न च तेन क्षेत्रज्ञः दुष्यति, ज्ञेयेन ज्ञातुः संसर्गानुपपत्तेः । यदि हि संसर्गः स्यात् , ज्ञेयत्वमेव नोपपद्येत । यदि आत्मनः धर्मः अविद्यावत्त्वं दुःखित्वादि च कथं भोः प्रत्यक्षम् उपलभ्यते, कथं वा क्षेत्रज्ञधर्मः । ‘ज्ञेयं च सर्वं क्षेत्रं ज्ञातैव क्षेत्रज्ञः’ इति अवधारिते, ‘अविद्यादुःखित्वादेः क्षेत्रज्ञविशेषणत्वं क्षेत्रज्ञधर्मत्वं तस्य च प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यत्वम्’ इति विरुद्धम् उच्यते अविद्यामात्रावष्टम्भात् केवलम् ॥
अत्र आह — सा अविद्या कस्य इति । यस्य दृश्यते तस्य एव । कस्य दृश्यते इति । अत्र उच्यते — ‘अविद्या कस्य दृश्यते ? ’ इति प्रश्नः निरर्थकः । कथम् ? दृश्यते चेत् अविद्या, तद्वन्तमपि पश्यसि । न च तद्वति उपलभ्यमाने ‘सा कस्य ? ’ इति प्रश्नो युक्तः । न हि गोमति उपलभ्यमाने ‘गावः कस्य ? ’ इति प्रश्नः अर्थवान् भवति । ननु विषमो दृष्टान्तः । गवां तद्वतश्च प्रत्यक्षत्वात् तत्सम्बन्धोऽपि प्रत्यक्ष इति प्रश्नो निरर्थकः । न तथा अविद्या तद्वांश्च प्रत्यक्षौ, यतः प्रश्नः निरर्थकः स्यात् । अप्रत्यक्षेण अविद्यावता अविद्यासम्बन्धे ज्ञाते, किं तव स्यात् ? अविद्यायाः अनर्थहेतुत्वात् परिहर्तव्या स्यात् । यस्य अविद्या, सः तां परिहरिष्यति । ननु ममैव अविद्या । जानासि तर्हि अविद्यां तद्वन्तं च आत्मानम् । जानामि, न तु प्रत्यक्षेण । अनुमानेन चेत् जानासि, कथं सम्बन्धग्रहणम् ? न हि तव ज्ञातुः ज्ञेयभूतया अविद्यया तत्काले सम्बन्धः ग्रहीतुं शक्यते, अविद्याया विषयत्वेनैव ज्ञातुः उपयुक्तत्वात् । न च ज्ञातुः अविद्यायाश्च सम्बन्धस्य यः ग्रहीता, ज्ञानं च अन्यत् तद्विषयं सम्भवति ; अनवस्थाप्राप्तेः । यदि ज्ञात्रापि ज्ञेयसम्बन्धो ज्ञायते, अन्यः ज्ञाता कल्प्यः स्यात् , तस्यापि अन्यः, तस्यापि अन्यः इति अनवस्था अपरिहार्या । यदि पुनः अविद्या ज्ञेया, अन्यद्वा ज्ञेयं ज्ञेयमेव । तथा ज्ञातापि ज्ञातैव, न ज्ञेयं भवति । यदा च एवम् , अविद्यादुःखित्वाद्यैः न ज्ञातुः क्षेत्रज्ञस्य किञ्चित् दुष्यति ॥
ननु अयमेव दोषः, यत् दोषवत्क्षेत्रविज्ञातृत्वम् ; न च विज्ञानस्वरूपस्यैव अविक्रियस्य विज्ञातृत्वोपचारात् ; यथा उष्णतामात्रेण अग्नेः तप्तिक्रियोपचारः तद्वत् । यथा अत्र भगवता क्रियाकारकफलात्मत्वाभावः आत्मनि स्वत एव दर्शितः — अविद्याध्यारोपितः एव क्रियाकारकादिः आत्मनि उपचर्यते ; तथा तत्र तत्र ‘य एवं वेत्ति हन्तारम्’(भ. गी. २ । १९) , ‘प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः’(भ. गी. ३ । २७) , ‘नादत्ते कस्यचित्पापम्’(भ. गी. ५ । १५) इत्यादिप्रकरणेषु दर्शितः । तथैव च व्याख्यातम् अस्माभिः । उत्तरेषु च प्रकरणेषु दर्शयिष्यामः ॥
हन्त । तर्हि आत्मनि क्रियाकारकफलात्मतायाः स्वतः अभावे, अविद्यया च अध्यारोपितत्वे, कर्माणि अविद्वत्कर्तव्यान्येव, न विदुषाम् इति प्राप्तम् । सत्यम् एवं प्राप्तम् , एतदेव च ‘न हि देहभृता शक्यम्’(भ. गी. १८ । ११) इत्यत्र दर्शयिष्यामः । सर्वशास्त्रार्थोपसंहारप्रकरणे च ‘समासेनैव कौन्तेय निष्ठा ज्ञानस्य या परा’(भ. गी. १८ । ५०) इत्यत्र विशेषतः दर्शयिष्यामः । अलम् इह बहुप्रपञ्चनेन, इति उपसंह्रियते ॥ २ ॥
In plain words
So the field and the knower of the field have been stated. Is that much knowledge all there is to know of them? No, comes the answer —
Know me as the knower of the field, exactly as I've described, and know me too as the Supreme Lord, untouched by any cycle of birth and death. In every field, that same knower of the field appears divided by countless field-conditions, from Brahmā all the way down to a single blade of grass — but know him, once every one of those conditions has fallen away, as something no word like 'existing' or 'not existing' could ever quite reach. That's the point. And here's why, Arjuna: apart from the true nature of the field, its knower, and the Lord, there is nothing else left to know. So whatever knowledge takes the field and its knower as its object, once they're understood as what they truly are — that, and only that, is real knowledge. This is my own view, the Lord's, Viṣṇu's own.
Here's the objection: if there's really just one Lord present in every field, with no separate experiencer apart from him, then one of two things follows, and neither is good. Either the Lord himself ends up caught in the cycle of birth and death, or, since there's no other being to be caught in it, that whole cycle simply doesn't exist at all. Both options are unacceptable — because then all the scripture about bondage, liberation, and the paths to them becomes pointless, and because it flatly contradicts what we actually perceive. After all, we perceive transmigration directly: pleasure and pain and their causes are right there in experience. And we infer it too, from all the variety we see in the world, which points back to merit and demerit as its cause. So this whole picture simply breaks down if self and Lord are said to be one and the same.
No — because knowledge and ignorance are simply, categorically different. As it's written, 'these two are worlds apart, opposed, running in opposite directions: ignorance, and what we call knowledge.' Even what each one produces is opposed: 'the better and the merely pleasant' — knowledge leads to the good, while the pleasant is only what ignorance produces. Vyāsa says the same: 'these two paths...' and elsewhere, 'these are the only two paths there are.' So two disciplines are being taught here, and that ignorance, root and fruit together, has to go — scripture, tradition, and plain reasoning all agree on this. Scripture first: 'know here, and there is truth; fail to know here, and the loss is immense.' 'Knowing him this way, one becomes immortal right in this life — there is no other road to that goal.' 'The knower fears absolutely nothing.' The ignorant one, though, gets the opposite: 'then fear takes hold of him.' 'Those who live out their days stuck in the middle of ignorance.' 'Whoever knows Brahman becomes Brahman.' 'Thinking that deity is one thing and I am another, he doesn't really know — he's no better than an animal owned by the gods.' But the one who knows the self, 'he becomes this whole universe.' And there are a thousand passages like these. Tradition agrees too: 'knowledge is covered over by ignorance, and creatures are lost in delusion because of it'; 'those whose mind rests in equanimity conquer rebirth right here'; 'seeing, always, the same reality everywhere.' And plain reason backs it up: people who recognize a snake, a sharp blade of grass, or an open well step around them, but some, not knowing any better, walk right in — just see how different the outcome is when knowledge is present. So this is how it stands: someone who has not woken up, who takes the body and such for the self, driven by attraction and aversion, doing right and wrong, keeps being born and dying. Someone who sees the self as separate from the body is freed, because craving and aversion fall away, and with them all that driven activity. No one can honestly argue against this. That being so, something that looks like bondage does arise for the knower of the field — who is really nothing but the Lord — simply because ignorance manufactures the appearance of distinctions, exactly the way the self seems to be the body. Every creature, after all, fixes a false sense of self on the body and its like, which isn't the self at all — the way we fix, in the dark, the settled thought 'that's a man' onto a mere tree-stump. But that mistake never actually makes manhood belong to the stump, or stump-ness belong to the man. In just the same way, consciousness never really becomes a property of the body, nor does the body's nature ever become a property of the conscious self — so pinning pleasure, pain, and delusion onto the self simply doesn't hold up. Both mistakes come from the very same ignorance, exactly like old age and death.
No, that won't hold, because the two cases aren't really comparable. Someone might object: the stump and the man are both simply things known — a person mistakes one for the other, out of ignorance. But with body and self, it's not two knowns getting confused; it's the knower and the known themselves getting tangled together. So the illustration doesn't really fit. From this the objector concludes: a property of the body, even though it's only ever an object of knowledge, must still somehow become a property of the knower, the self. No — because that would mean the self could become unconscious, among other absurdities. Think it through: if the properties of the knowable field — the body and its pleasure, pain, delusion, desire, and so on — really did belong to the knower, then someone would have to explain why only some of them, like pleasure, count as superimposed by ignorance, while old age and death supposedly don't. There is a way to try to argue 'they don't belong': say they're superimposed by ignorance, just like old age and death; or that pleasure is something to reject, desire something to embrace, and so on. But even granting all of that, here's the real picture: transmigration — being an agent, being an enjoyer — actually belongs to the knowable, the body, and it only gets superimposed onto the knower by ignorance. And because of that, nothing whatsoever actually stains the knower — just as nothing stains the sky, even though children imagine it has a flat, dirty surface.
Given all that, we shouldn't suspect even the faintest trace of bondage in the Blessed Lord, present as the knower of every field there is. And that's simply because nowhere in the world has anyone ever actually been helped or harmed by a quality that ignorance merely imagined onto them.
As for the objection that the illustration doesn't really match — that's simply wrong. Why? Because all the illustration is meant to show is this one thing: mere superimposition caused by ignorance. And that holds perfectly well in both cases. As for your further worry, that it breaks down specifically when it comes to the knower — that worry has already been answered, by the very example of old age and death.
Suppose someone says the field-knower transmigrates simply because he possesses ignorance. No — because ignorance itself is a product of tamas, of dullness. This very notion we call ignorance is tamasic, precisely because its whole nature is to veil: it either grasps things backwards, or it throws up doubt, or it's simply a failure to grasp anything at all. We know this because wherever the light of discrimination shines, ignorance disappears; and wherever a tamasic defect that veils, like a cataract on the eye, is present, exactly these three — misapprehension, doubt, or blank non-apprehension — are what actually shows up.
Here someone objects: if that's so, then ignorance really is a property of the knower himself. No — because defects like being affected by cataract show up in the instrument, the eye, not in the seer. You might think that ignorance being the knower's own property is exactly what transmigration means, and that this makes the earlier claim — 'the Lord alone is the field-knower, never subject to transmigration' — fall apart. It doesn't. Consider the eye again: the defect of seeing things backwards clearly belongs to the instrument. Misperceiving things, or whatever causes that misperception, the defect of cataract, is never a property of the one who sees — because once the eye is treated and the cataract removed, the seer simply stops experiencing it. In exactly the same way, everywhere, failing to grasp something, grasping it wrongly, or doubting it, and whatever produces those states, belong only to some instrument, never to the knower, never to the field-knower himself. And because these states are themselves things that get perceived, just like the light thrown by a lamp, they can't possibly be properties of the knower — being perceived at all already means being something other than one's own self. And no philosophical school, whatever else it disagrees on, admits that the self, once free of every instrument, standing utterly alone, still carries defects like ignorance. If ignorance really belonged to the self the way heat belongs to fire, there could never be a moment of separation from it. But the self is changeless, all-pervading like space, without any form at all — nothing could ever unite with it or separate from it. So it stands proven: the field-knower's Lordship is eternal, exactly as the Lord himself says, and elsewhere too — 'because it is beginningless, because it is without qualities.'
Someone might object: if this is so, then with no real transmigration and no real transmigrator left, scripture becomes pointless, and other such problems follow. No — because that very difficulty is one every school that believes in a self already lives with. It's not a problem any single side has to solve alone. How is it already admitted? Because every school that accepts a self agrees that once a self is liberated, talk of transmigration and being a transmigrator simply doesn't apply to it anymore — and none of them thinks this makes scripture pointless for such a being. In just the same way, on our own view, once the field-knower and the Lord are seen as one, fine — let scripture become pointless there, in that state. But scripture still does its work within the domain of ignorance. It's exactly like the dualists' own position: for them too, scripture and its practices matter only in the state of bondage, not in liberation. The same holds here.
Here's the dualist claim: for us, bondage and liberation are both real states of the self, truly and ultimately so. That's exactly why scripture keeps its purpose — because what's to be rejected, what's to be embraced, and the means to both are all genuinely real. For the non-dualist, though, since duality isn't ultimately real at all, being simply a product of ignorance, and since the self's bondage isn't ultimately real either, scripture would have nothing real left to address, and would become pointless. So goes the objection. But no — because the self simply cannot coherently have two different states at all. Think it through: if the self really has both bondage and liberation, they'd have to happen either together or one after the other. Together is impossible, plainly contradictory, like being both at rest and in motion in the very same thing at once. In succession, then: if nothing causes the shift, liberation could never actually arrive; and if something else causes it, then since the state isn't intrinsic to the self, it turns out not to be ultimately real after all — which undercuts the dualist's own starting claim. What's more, in working out which state comes first, bondage would have to be placed first, and somehow both without beginning and yet coming to an end — which no sound reasoning supports. Likewise liberation would have to have a beginning and yet never end — equally unsupportable. And there's simply no way to call something eternal if it keeps passing from one state into another. Now, if someone tries to dodge this by refusing to distinguish bondage from liberation at all, in order to avoid the charge of impermanence, then the very same difficulty about scripture becoming pointless lands on the dualists too. Since the two sides are on equal footing here, the non-dualist is under no special obligation to solve a problem everyone shares.
Scripture isn't pointless at all, because its real audience has always been the ordinary, unenlightened person. It's only the unlearned who mistake fruit and its cause — neither of which is really the self — for the self itself. The wise don't make that mistake, because once someone truly sees that the self is distinct from both the fruit and its cause, the thought 'I am these' simply can't arise for them anymore. After all, not even a hopelessly deluded person, not even a madman, ever mistakes water for fire, or shadow for light — so how much less would someone genuinely discerning make that mistake. That's why the scripture of do's and don'ts was never really meant for someone who already sees the self as distinct from fruit and cause. Think of it this way: if someone says, 'Devadatta, you do this,' about some task, Viṣṇumitra, standing right there and hearing every word, never once thinks, 'that's me being told to act.' That mistaken sense of being addressed only happens when someone fails to notice who exactly is excluded by the very shape of the command. And the same is true when it comes to fruit and its cause.
Here's a further objection: even granting that we can perceive the self as distinct from fruit and its cause, our sense of being addressed by scripture is still perfectly justified, on the model of an ordinary human relationship — the way a person thinks, 'I'm drawn toward whatever brings a desired result, and I hold back from whatever brings an unwanted one.' After all, even a father and son, who each clearly see the other as a distinct person, still take each other's instructions and warnings personally. No — that doesn't work here, because the sense of 'this is my self' gets fastened onto fruit and cause long before any perception of the self as something distinct ever arises. Someone who has already grasped what a command or a warning means only afterward comes to see the self as different from fruit and cause — never before. So it's established: the scripture of commands and prohibitions is meant for the person who hasn't yet woken up.
Here's another objection: in injunctions like 'let one who wants heaven perform the sacrifice,' or 'let one not eat this forbidden food,' those who already see the self as distinct from action don't act on them, and neither do those who wrongly think the body alone is the self. So there's no fit person left to act, and scripture becomes pointless. No — because ordinary, everyday, unexamined recognition is fully enough to explain why people do or don't act. Someone who sees the Lord and the field-knower as one, a knower of Brahman, simply doesn't act on such injunctions. Neither does someone who denies the self altogether, thinking there's no hereafter to speak of. But the ordinary person is different: he infers that a self must exist at all, simply because hearing scripture's commands and prohibitions wouldn't make sense otherwise, even though he has no real acquaintance with what that self actually is. Craving for the fruit of his actions has taken root in him, and so he acts, trustingly, on faith. All of us can see this plainly for ourselves. So scripture is not pointless after all.
Someone might object: since we see that those who have truly discerned the truth don't act on scripture, their followers, imitating them, would stop acting too, and scripture would become pointless. No —
True discernment is rare — it dawns in only some particular person. Among countless beings, only a handful ever become truly discerning, exactly as we see now. And the deluded don't actually follow the discerning person anyway, because what drives them is attachment and flaws like it, because we can see them acting even in harmful rites like sorcery, and simply because of their own inborn nature. As it's already been said: 'no, it's one's own nature that drives one to act.'
So, in the end, this whole cycle of birth and death is nothing but ignorance, and it reaches no further than what we've already traced out. Ignorance and everything it produces never actually touch the field-knower himself, taken purely as he is. False knowledge simply cannot stain something that is really, truly there. Water in a mirage can never turn a dry, barren stretch of land into mud — and in exactly the same way, ignorance can never do a single thing to the field-knower. That's exactly why it was said: 'know me too as the field-knower,' and 'knowledge is covered over by ignorance.'
Here's a fair question: why do even learned people still catch themselves thinking 'I am like this,' 'this is mine' — the very thoughts of someone still caught in the cycle? Listen: that right there is exactly what passes for scholarship — seeing the self as nothing more than the field. But if they actually saw the field-knower as unchanging, they would stop wanting either enjoyment or action, stop thinking 'let this be mine.' Enjoyment and action, after all, are nothing but change. So here's how it plays out: someone still unenlightened acts because he wants the fruit. But the wise person, who sees the self as unchanging, has no such desire, so acting simply doesn't make sense for him anymore — and when the whole working of body and mind together finally winds down, we call that 'cessation,' but really that's just a figure of speech.
And here's yet another kind of so-called scholarship some people fall into: 'the field-knower is only the Lord, off there somewhere; the field is something else entirely, merely his object; but I myself am a transmigrator, sometimes happy, sometimes miserable, and it's my job to end this cycle, through discriminating field from field-knower, and through meditation, by directly realizing the Lord as the field-knower, and then resting in his nature.' Whoever thinks this way, and whoever teaches it to others, is not really a knower of the field at all. Whoever holds this view and congratulates himself, 'I'm the one giving meaning to bondage, to liberation, to scripture itself' — that person is the lowest of the so-called learned. He destroys his own self, lost in his own delusion, and drags others down with him, simply because he has no living connection to the tradition that carries scripture's actual meaning — leaving out what scripture really teaches while inventing what it never said. So someone without that living tradition, no matter how many scriptures he can quote, should be dismissed exactly like a fool.
Remember the earlier objection: 'if the Lord and the field-knower are one, the Lord himself would get caught up in transmigration; and if all the field-knowers are one with the Lord, then since there's no separate transmigrator left, transmigration itself would simply cease to exist.' Both of these have already been answered — because we've admitted that knowledge and ignorance are simply different in kind. How does that answer it? Because something truly, ultimately real is never actually stained by a defect that ignorance merely imagines onto it. We already gave the illustration for this: the water of a mirage never actually turns dry, barren ground into mud. And the second worry — that with no separate transmigrator, transmigration would vanish altogether — is answered the same way: both transmigration and the transmigrator are, it turns out, nothing but constructs of ignorance to begin with.
Here's another attempt: 'simply possessing ignorance is itself the field-knower's flaw of transmigration, and its results — happiness, unhappiness, and so on — are things we directly perceive.' No — because all of that belongs to the field, not to the knower, the field-knower; a flaw produced by ignorance simply cannot attach to him. Try to pin any flaw on the field-knower, even an entirely imaginary one, and by the very fact that it can be known at all, it turns out to be a property of the field, never of the field-knower. And the field-knower is never actually stained by it, because the knower can never really come into contact with what is merely known. If real contact were possible, the very idea of something being 'known' would fall apart. So if ignorance and unhappiness really were properties of the self, tell me, friend, how could they ever be directly perceived, and how could they be properties of the knower at all? Once we're clear that everything knowable is the field, and the knower alone is the field-knower, then to say 'ignorance and unhappiness are attributes and properties of the field-knower, and we perceive this directly' is simply a contradiction — one that stands on nothing but sheer ignorance.
Here someone asks: whose ignorance is this? Whoever's it's seen in — his, precisely. But whose is it seen in? Here's the answer: that very question — whose is ignorance seen in — is meaningless. Why? Because the moment you see ignorance, you've already seen its owner too. And once the owner is already right there in view, asking 'whose is it?' makes no sense — the way, once you already see the cowherd, asking 'whose cows are these?' is pointless. But wait, someone objects, that's not a fair comparison: cows and their owner are both plainly visible, so their relationship is plainly visible too — that's why the cow-question falls flat. Ignorance and its supposed owner aren't both plainly visible in the same way, so the question about ignorance still stands. But even if the connection to ignorance is somehow known by an owner who himself isn't directly seen, what does that get you? Since ignorance causes harm, it would still have to be gotten rid of — and whoever it belongs to is the one who will get rid of it. 'Well,' says the interlocutor, 'it's my ignorance, clearly.' Then do you actually know both the ignorance and yourself, its owner? 'I know it, yes — but not by directly seeing it.' If you know it by inference, then how did you ever grasp the connection between the two in the first place? You, the knower, can't possibly grasp that connection at the very moment ignorance is functioning as your object of knowledge — right then, your whole attention as knower is already used up on that one object. And there can't be some separate act of knowing the connection itself either, because that would need yet another knower to know it, and that knower would need another, and so on forever — an endless regress with no way out. So really, ignorance, if it's known at all, is simply something known — like anything else that's known, it just stays known. And the knower, in exactly the same way, simply stays the knower; he never turns into an object of knowledge. And once you see this, it becomes clear: nothing — not ignorance, not unhappiness, nothing at all — ever actually taints the knower, the field-knower himself.
Here's one last objection: isn't this itself the problem — that the field-knower's whole status comes down to being the knower of a flawed field? No — because for something whose very nature is pure consciousness, unchanging through and through, calling it a 'knower' at all is only a figure of speech, the same way we say fire itself 'burns,' when really it's simply hot, and the burning is figurative. Krishna himself has already shown, right here in the Gita, that action, agency, and fruit never truly belong to the self at all — that comes from the self's own intrinsic nature. They only ever get superimposed by ignorance, and applied to the self as a mere figure of speech. He shows this again and again — 'whoever thinks the self is a slayer,' 'all actions, without exception, are carried out by the guṇas of nature,' 'takes on no one's sin.' We've already explained this in exactly the same way, back where these verses appear, and we'll show it again in the chapters still to come.
Well then — if that's so, since action, agency, and fruit never really belong to the self at all, and are only ever superimposed by ignorance, it seems to follow that acting is something only the unenlightened need do, never the wise. And that's true — it really does follow. We'll take this up fully later, where it says 'no embodied being can truly avoid acting,' and again, in even more detail, in the closing section that sums up the whole teaching, at 'in brief, Arjuna, this is the supreme culmination of knowledge.' No need to spell it all out further here — with that, this discussion comes to its close.
Close to the Sanskrit
Thus the field and the knower of the field have been stated. What — are they to be known by this much knowledge alone? No, it is said —
Know Me, the field-knower, characterized as described, also the supreme Lord, free of transmigration. In all fields, the field-knower who appears divided by the many field-adjuncts ranging from Brahmā down to a blade of grass — know him, whose distinction arising from all adjuncts has been cast off, as beyond the range of such words and notions as 'existent,' 'non-existent,' and so forth — such is the intent. O Bhārata, because, apart from the true nature of the field, the field-knower, and the Lord, nothing else remains as an object of knowledge, therefore, of these two, the field and the field-knower, insofar as they have become objects to be known, whatever knowledge makes the field and the field-knower its object, that knowledge is true knowledge — such is My own opinion, the Lord's, Viṣṇu's.
Now, if it is held that in all fields there is only a single Lord, and that no other experiencer distinct from that Lord exists, then it would follow that the Lord is subject to transmigration; or, apart from the Lord, because of the non-existence of any other transmigrator, the consequence follows that transmigration itself would not exist. Both of these are undesirable, because of the consequence that scripture on bondage, liberation, and the means to these would become pointless, and because of contradiction with perception and the other means of knowledge. By perception, to begin with, transmigration, characterized by pleasure, pain, and their causes, is perceived; and from perceiving the diversity of the universe, transmigration, occasioned by merit and demerit, is inferred. All this is untenable on the theory of the oneness of self and Lord.
No; because it is established that knowledge and ignorance are simply different — 'these two are far apart, opposed, going in different directions: ignorance, and what is known as knowledge' (Kaṭha Up. 1.2.4). Likewise, even the difference of their fruits, belonging to the domains of knowledge and of ignorance, is indicated as an outright opposition — 'the better and the pleasant' (Kaṭha Up. 1.2.2) — thus; the domain of knowledge is the better, while the pleasant is the product of ignorance. And so too Vyāsa: 'these two paths, now...' (Mokṣadharma 241.6) and so forth, and 'these are the only two paths' and so forth. Here, then, two disciplines are taught. And that ignorance, together with its effect, is to be abandoned, is understood from śruti, smṛti, and reasoning. The śruti passages, to begin with — 'if one has known here, then there is truth; if one has not known here, there is great loss' (Kena Up. 2.5); 'knowing him thus, the knower becomes immortal here; there is no other path for reaching that goal' (Tai. Ār. 3.13); 'the knower fears nothing at all' (Tai. Up. 2.9.1). Of the ignorant one, on the other hand — 'then fear arises for him' (Tai. Up. 2.7.1), 'those who dwell in the very midst of ignorance' (Kaṭha Up. 1.2.5), 'whoever knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself'; 'thinking, that deity is one, I am another, he does not [truly] know; he is like a mere animal belonging to the gods' (Bṛ. Up. 1.4.10) — the knower of the self who [knows], 'he becomes all this' (Bṛ. Up. 1.4.10); 'when, like a piece of leather...' (Śvet. Up. 6.20) — and such passages, by the thousand. And the smṛti texts — 'knowledge is covered by ignorance; by that, creatures are deluded' (BG 5.15); 'rebirth is conquered right here by those whose mind is fixed in equanimity' (BG 5.19); 'seeing indeed the same everywhere' (BG 13.28) — and such. And by reasoning too — 'having recognized snakes, tips of kuśa grass, and a well, people avoid them; but some, out of ignorance, fall in — see how different the fruit is, in the case of knowledge' (Mokṣadharma 201.17). And thus: it is understood that the unlearned one, with the notion 'self' applied to body and the like, impelled by attraction, aversion, and so forth, the doer of meritorious and demeritorious acts, is born and dies; whereas the seer of the self as distinct from body and the like is liberated, from the cessation of engagement in merit and demerit, which depends on the elimination of attraction, aversion, and so forth — this cannot logically be denied by anyone. That being so, something like the state of transmigration comes about for the field-knower, who is indeed none other than the Lord, from the distinction caused by ignorance-made adjuncts, just as the self appears identified with the body and the like. For it is well known of all creatures that the sense of self is firmly, though falsely, fixed on the body and the like, which are not the self — just as the settled conviction 'this is a man' is fixed on a tree-stump. But merely on this account, the property of being a man does not come to belong to the stump, nor the property of being a stump to the man; likewise, the property of consciousness does not belong to the body, nor the property of the body to the conscious self; so the attribution to the self of the nature of pleasure, pain, delusion, and the like is not logically sound — because there is no difference, both being alike caused by ignorance, just as with old age and death.
No, because of non-comparability — if one says this: the stump and the man, both being mere objects of knowledge, are superimposed on one another by ignorance through the agency of the knower; whereas of the body and the self, it is precisely the knowable and the knower themselves that are mutually superimposed — thus the illustration is not a matching one. Therefore, if one argues that a property of the body, though merely knowable, nonetheless becomes a property of the knower, the self — no; because it would entail the absurdity of unconsciousness and the like [befalling the self]. For if the properties of the knowable field, the body and the like — pleasure, pain, delusion, desire, and so forth — belong to the knower, then a distinguishing reason would have to be given for [the claim that] 'some properties of the knowable field, such as pleasure, are superimposed by ignorance onto the self, while old age, death, and the like are not.' There is indeed an inference [that might serve as] 'do not belong': because of being superimposed by ignorance, like old age and death and so on — thus; because of being to-be-rejected, and because of being to-be-accepted, and so forth. In that case, even granting all this, transmigration, characterized by agency and enjoyership, properly residing in the knowable, is superimposed onto the knower by ignorance; and by that, nothing at all taints the knower — just as, by what is superimposed by children, such as flatness and sullied-ness, [nothing at all taints] the sky.
This being so, even the merest trace of the state of transmigration is not to be suspected of the Blessed Lord, the field-knower, the Lord, who is present even in all fields. For nowhere at all in the world has any benefit or harm ever been seen to occur to anyone by a property superimposed by ignorance.
As for what was said — 'the illustration is not a matching one' — that is incorrect. How so? Mere superimposition due to ignorance is indeed the point of resemblance intended between the illustration and the case illustrated. That does not fail to hold. And as for what you think — that it fails in the case of the knower — the inconclusiveness of that too has already been shown, by [the example of] old age and the like.
If it is said that the field-knower's transmigration follows from his possessing ignorance — no; because ignorance is of the nature of tamas. This cognition is indeed tamasic, because it consists in the very nature of veiling: ignorance is an apprehender of the contrary, or that which sets up doubt, or consisting in the nature of mere non-apprehension; because, when the light of discrimination is present, that [ignorance] is absent, and because, when a tamasic defect consisting in veiling, such as a cataract, is present, non-apprehension and the rest, the threefold ignorance, are observed to occur.
Here [an objector] says — if so, then ignorance is a property of the knower himself. No; because such defects as being affected by cataract are observed to occur in the instrument, the eye. As for what you think — that ignorance is a property of the knower, and that this very possession of ignorance as a property is the field-knower's transmigration; and, in that case, what was said, 'the Lord alone is the field-knower, not one subject to transmigration,' is untenable — that does not hold; just as, in the case of the instrument, the eye, it is observed that the defect of misapprehending things as contrary and the like [belongs to the instrument]. The apprehending of things as contrary and the like, or the cause thereof, the defect of being affected by cataract, is not a property of the perceiver, because, once the cataract is removed by treatment of the eye, it is no longer observed to occur for the perceiver; just so, everywhere, the cognitions of non-apprehension, contrary apprehension, and doubt, and whatever causes them, deserve to belong to some instrument alone, not to the knower, the field-knower. And because these are objects of cognition, like the light of a lamp, they do not have the status of being properties of the knower — precisely because being an object of cognition means being an object distinct from one's own self; and because no philosophical school admits that, in the state of isolation from all instruments, [the self] then possesses defects such as ignorance. If ignorance were an inherent property of the self, the field-knower, like heat is of fire, then there could never, at any time, be separation from it. And because union or separation with anything is impossible for the unchanging self, all-pervading like space, formless — it is established that the field-knower's Lordship is eternal; and this is confirmed by the Lord's own statement and others like it, 'because of beginninglessness, because of being without qualities' (BG 13.31).
Now, if it is said that, this being so, in the absence of transmigration and of any transmigrator, the fault of scripture becoming pointless and the like would follow — no; because this is admitted by all. The fault admitted by all proponents of a self is not something to be refuted by any single party alone. How is it admitted? Indeed, the absence of any application of transmigration or being-a-transmigrator to liberated selves is accepted by every proponent of a self; nor is it admitted that they thereby incur the fault of scripture's pointlessness and the like. Likewise, in our own view, given the oneness of the field-knowers with the Lord, let scripture's pointlessness follow, if you will; but within the domain of ignorance it retains its meaningfulness — just as, for all dualists, scripture and the like are meaningful only in the state of bondage, not in the state of liberation; so too here.
Now, for all dualists, bondage and liberation are, in ultimate reality, real states of the self. Therefore, given the real existence of what is to be rejected, what is to be accepted, and the means thereto, scripture and the like retain meaningfulness. For the non-dualists, however, because duality is not ultimately real, being made by ignorance, and because, the state of bondage of the self not being ultimately real, [scripture] has no object, the pointlessness of scripture and the like follows — if this is said, no; because a difference of states in the self is untenable. If, to begin with, the self's states of bondage and liberation exist, they would be either simultaneous or successive. Simultaneously, first of all, they are not possible, because of contradiction, like rest and motion at once in one thing. And if they occur in succession: if causeless, the absurd consequence of never attaining liberation follows; and if caused by something else, because [the state] is then absent from the self intrinsically, the consequence follows that it is not ultimately real — and that being so, one's own thesis is undermined. Moreover, in determining the sequence of these two states, the state of bondage would have to be posited as first, both beginningless and yet having an end; and that is contradicted by valid means of knowledge. Likewise, the state of liberation would have to be accepted as having a beginning yet being endless, though this too is flatly contradicted by valid means of knowledge. Nor is it possible to establish the eternality of that which, possessing states, passes from one state into another. Now, if, to avoid the fault of impermanence, no distinction between the states of bondage and liberation is posited, then the fault of scripture's pointlessness and the like becomes unavoidable for the dualists too — thus, because of this equal footing, this fault need not be remedied by the non-dualist.
Nor is scripture pointless, because scripture has as its domain the ordinarily recognized unlearned person. For it is indeed the unlearned who perceive fruit and its cause, which are not the self, as the self — not the wise; for, once the wise perceive the self's difference from fruit and cause, the perception 'I am these,' [taking them] as the self, is untenable for them. For not even an utterly deluded person, even a madman or the like, perceives the identity of water and fire, or of shadow and light; how much less a discerning person. Therefore, at any rate, the scripture of injunction and prohibition does not pertain to one who already sees the self's difference from fruit and cause. For when, in some particular task, [it is said,] 'Devadatta, you do this,' Viṣṇumitra, standing there, even while hearing the command, does not take it as 'I am the one enjoined.' Rather, [such mistaken] understanding occurs only from failing to discern the object excluded by the disjunction [between addressee and bystander]; likewise also in the case of fruit and cause.
Now, in view of an ordinary worldly relation, this sense of being addressed by scripture's purport is indeed justified — even though there is a perception of the self as different from fruit and cause — [as when one thinks:] 'I am impelled toward the cause of a desired fruit, and I am restrained from the cause of an undesired one'; just as, even though father and son and the like perceive each other's selves as distinct, they still understand each other's mutual commands and prohibitions as addressed to themselves. No; because the identification of fruit and cause with the self is already established prior to the arising of the perception of the self as distinct from them. For one who has already grasped the purport of a command or prohibition only then comes to grasp the self's difference from fruit and cause, not beforehand. Therefore it is established that the scripture of injunction and prohibition has the unlearned person as its domain.
Now, in such injunctions as 'let one who desires heaven sacrifice' and 'let one not eat kalañja,' seers of the self's distinctness from action do not engage, nor do those whose view is merely that the body and the like alone are the self; therefore, because of the absence of a fit agent, scripture would be pointless — if this is said, no; because engagement and disengagement are fully accounted for precisely on the ground of ordinary, unexamined recognition. The seer of the oneness of the Lord and the field-knower, the knower of Brahman, to begin with, does not engage. Likewise, the proponent of the no-self doctrine too, [thinking] 'there is no hereafter,' does not engage. But the ordinary person, whose self's existence is inferred simply because the hearing of the scripture of injunction and prohibition could not otherwise be accounted for, who is not acquainted with the self's specific nature, in whom craving for the fruit of action has arisen, does engage, and with faith. This is evident to all of us. Therefore scripture is not pointless.
From observing the non-engagement of the discerning, if it is said that scripture would be pointless because their followers too would fail to engage — no;
Because discernment occurs only in some particular one. For among many creatures, only some one particular being would be discerning, as is the case now. Nor do the deluded follow the discerning person, because their activity is under the control of attachment and other such flaws, because engagement is observed even in such rites as sorcery, and because of the very nature of their activity — for it has indeed been said, 'rather, one's own nature impels one' (BG 5.14).
Therefore, transmigration is mere ignorance, having as its scope only what has already been described. Ignorance and its effect do not belong to the field-knower taken purely in himself. Nor is false cognition capable of tainting a really existing entity. For the water of a mirage is not able to turn a barren tract of land into mud. Likewise, ignorance is not able to do anything at all to the field-knower. And therefore this was said: 'know Me too as the field-knower' (BG 13.2), and 'knowledge is covered by ignorance' (BG 5.15).
Now, what is this — as if belonging to transmigrating beings — 'I am thus,' 'this indeed is mine,' even for the learned? Listen: this is exactly that scholarship which consists in perceiving the self precisely in the field. If, however, they were to see the field-knower as unchanging, then they would desire neither enjoyment nor action, [thinking] 'may this be mine.' Enjoyment and action are nothing but change. This being so, the unlearned one engages, because of desiring the fruit. The wise one, however, the seer of the self as unchanging, engagement being untenable because of the absence of desire for fruit, when the operation of the aggregate of effects and instruments ceases, the term 'cessation' is applied only figuratively.
And let there be this further scholarship of some people — the field-knower is only the Lord; and the field is something else, merely the object belonging to that field-knower alone; I, however, am a transmigrator, happy and unhappy; and the cessation of transmigration is my task, to be accomplished by discriminative knowledge of field and field-knower, and by meditation, having directly realized the Lord, the field-knower, and by then abiding in that Lord's own nature — thus. Whoever thinks this way, and whoever teaches it, he is not a [true] field-knower. Whoever, holding this view, thinks 'I give meaning to transmigration, to liberation, and to scripture' — he is the very lowest of the so-called learned; a destroyer of his own self, himself deluded, he deludes others too, because he lacks the traditional transmission of scripture's meaning, committing both the omission of what is actually taught and the fabrication of what is not taught. Therefore, one who lacks this traditional transmission, even if he knows all the scriptures, is to be disregarded entirely, exactly like a fool.
As for what was said — 'in the oneness of the Lord with the field-knower, [the Lord] would incur the state of transmigration; and in the oneness of the field-knowers with the Lord, because of the non-existence of any transmigrator, the consequence follows that transmigration itself would not exist' — these two difficulties have already been answered, because of the admission of a distinctness between knowledge and ignorance. How so? Because a real, ultimately existent entity is not tainted by a defect merely imagined by ignorance. And an illustration was accordingly given: the water of a mirage does not turn a barren tract of land into mud. The second difficulty too — that, because of the non-existence of any transmigrator, transmigration itself would not exist — has been answered, by the established fact that both transmigration and the transmigrator are mere constructs of ignorance.
Now, the mere possessing of ignorance is itself the field-knower's flaw of transmigration; and happiness, unhappiness, and the like, produced by that, are directly perceived — if this is said, no; because these have the status of properties of the field, not of the knower, the field-knower, since a flaw produced by that ignorance cannot belong to him. Whatever kind of flaw, even a non-existent one, you attach to the field-knower, because it necessarily has the status of being knowable, it has only the status of a property of the field, not the status of a property of the field-knower. Nor is the field-knower ever tainted by it, because real contact between the knower and the knowable is impossible. For if such contact were to occur, the very status of being knowable would no longer be tenable. If ignorance, or such states as unhappiness, were properties of the self, how, friend, would they be directly perceived, and how would they be a property of the field-knower? This settled maxim being firmly in place — 'everything knowable is the field; the knower alone is the field-knower' — the claim, 'ignorance, unhappiness, and the like are qualifying attributes and properties of the field-knower, and this is directly perceived,' is a self-contradictory statement, resting on nothing but bare ignorance alone.
Here [someone] asks — whose is this ignorance? [Reply:] of whomever it is seen, precisely of him. [Question:] Of whom is it seen? Here it is replied — the question 'of whom is ignorance seen?' is itself meaningless. How so? If ignorance is seen, you thereby see its possessor too. And once the possessor is already perceived, the question 'whose is it?' is not justified. For once the cow-owner is perceived, the question 'whose are the cows?' is not meaningful. [Objection:] But the illustration is mismatched: because cows and their owner are both directly perceptible, their relation too is directly perceptible — that is why the cow-question is meaningless. It is not so with ignorance and its possessor, both directly perceptible, so that the question would not be meaningless [in the same way]. Even if the connection with ignorance is known by a possessor who is not himself directly perceived, what would that give you? Because ignorance is the cause of harm, it would have to be avoided; whoever it belongs to will avoid it. [Interlocutor:] It is precisely my own ignorance. [Śaṅkara:] Then do you know ignorance and yourself, its possessor? [Interlocutor:] I know, but not by direct perception. [Śaṅkara:] If you know it by inference, then how is the connection grasped? For it is not possible for you, the knower, to grasp the connection at that very time with ignorance, which has [then] become an object of knowledge — because the knower is, at that moment, occupied solely with [ignorance] as an object. Nor is it possible for there to be a further, separate cognition, having that connection [between knower and ignorance] as its object, whose grasper is [again] the knower — because this would incur an infinite regress. For if the connection with the knowable were known even by the knower himself, another knower would have to be posited, and of him too another, and of him too another — this regress is unavoidable. If, on the other hand, ignorance is [merely] knowable, then, like anything else knowable, it remains merely knowable. Likewise, the knower too remains merely the knower; he does not become an object of knowledge. And this being so, the knower, the field-knower, is not tainted at all by ignorance, unhappiness, and the like.
Now, this is precisely the flaw — that the field-knower's very status is that of the knower of a flawed field. No; because, for one whose very nature is consciousness and who is unchanging, 'knowership' is applied only figuratively — just as, by mere heat alone, the act of 'heating' is figuratively applied to fire. Just as here, by the Blessed Lord himself, the absence of the nature of action, agency, and fruit in the self has been shown to be intrinsic — [action, agency, and the like are] only ever superimposed by ignorance, and applied to the self merely figuratively — so too, here and there, this was shown in such passages as 'whoever thinks of the self thus, as the slayer' (BG 2.19), 'all actions are performed, in every respect, by the guṇas of material nature' (BG 3.27), and 'takes on no one's sin' (BG 5.15). And this was explained by us in exactly the same way there. And we shall show it again in later sections.
Well then; in that case, the nature of action, agency, and fruit being intrinsically absent in the self, and being merely superimposed by ignorance, it follows that actions are to be performed only by the unlearned, not by the wise. True, this does indeed follow; and this very point we shall show at the passage 'it is not indeed possible for an embodied being' (BG 18.11); and, in the section summing up the teaching of the whole scripture, we shall show it specifically at the passage 'in brief, O son of Kuntī, the supreme culmination of knowledge' (BG 18.50). Enough of extensive elaboration here — with this, the discussion is brought to a close.