In plain words
I shall tell you what is to be known, knowing which one attains immortality: the beginningless Supreme Brahman, said to be neither being nor non-being.
Word for word
What is to be known, that I shall declare, knowing which one attains immortality: the beginningless supreme Brahman; it is called neither being nor non-being.
ज्ञेयं यत् तत् प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वाऽमृतमश्नुतेअनादिमत् परं ब्रह्म न सत् तन्नासदुच्यते
Other commentaries
The commentators
▸Bhagavadgītābhāṣyam
यथोक्तेन ज्ञानेन ज्ञातव्यं किम् इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह — ‘ज्ञेयं यत्तत्’ इत्यादि । ननु यमाः नियमाश्च अमानित्वादयः । न तैः ज्ञेयं ज्ञायते । न हि अमानित्वादि कस्यचित् वस्तुनः परिच्छेदकं दृष्टम् । सर्वत्रैव च यद्विषयं ज्ञानं तदेव तस्य ज्ञेयस्य परिच्छेदकं दृश्यते । न हि अन्यविषयेण ज्ञानेन अन्यत् उपलभ्यते, यथा घटविषयेण ज्ञानेन अग्निः । नैष दोषः, ज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात् ज्ञानमुच्यते इति हि अवोचाम ; ज्ञानसहकारिकारणत्वाच्च —
ज्ञेयं ज्ञातव्यं यत् तत् प्रवक्ष्यामि प्रकर्षेण यथावत् वक्ष्यामि । किम्फलं तत् इति प्ररोचनेन श्रोतुः अभिमुखीकरणाय आह — यत् ज्ञेयं ज्ञात्वा अमृतम् अमृतत्वम् अश्नुते, न पुनः म्रियते इत्यर्थः । अनादिमत् आदिः अस्य अस्तीति आदिमत् , न आदिमत् अनादिमत् ; किं तत् ? परं निरतिशयं ब्रह्म, ‘ज्ञेयम्’ इति प्रकृतम् ॥
अत्र केचित् ‘अनादि मत्परम्’ इति पदं छिन्दन्ति, बहुव्रीहिणा उक्ते अर्थे मतुपः आनर्थक्यम् अनिष्टं स्यात् इति । अर्थविशेषं च दर्शयन्ति — अहं वासुदेवाख्या परा शक्तिः यस्य तत् मत्परम् इति । सत्यमेवमपुनरुक्तं स्यात् , अर्थः चेत् सम्भवति । न तु अर्थः सम्भवति, ब्रह्मणः सर्वविशेषप्रतिषेधेनैव विजिज्ञापयिषितत्वात् ‘न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते’ इति । विशिष्टशक्तिमत्त्वप्रदर्शनं विशेषप्रतिषेधश्च इति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । तस्मात् मतुपः बहुव्रीहिणा समानार्थत्वेऽपि प्रयोगः श्लोकपूरणार्थः ॥
अमृतत्वफलं ज्ञेयं मया उच्यते इति प्ररोचनेन अभिमुखीकृत्य आह — न सत् तत् ज्ञेयमुच्यते इति न अपि असत् तत् उच्यते ॥
ननु महता परिकरबन्धेन कण्ठरवेण उद्घुष्य ‘ज्ञेयं प्रवक्ष्यामि’ इति, अननुरूपमुक्तं ‘न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते’ इति । न, अनुरूपमेव उक्तम् । कथम् ? सर्वासु हि उपनिषत्सु ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म ‘नेति नेति’(बृ. उ. २ । ३ । ६) ‘अस्थूलमनणु’(बृ. उ. ३ । ८ । ८) इत्यादिविशेषप्रतिषेधेनैव निर्दिश्यते, न ‘इदं तत्’ इति, वाचः अगोचरत्वात् ॥
ननु न तदस्ति, यद्वस्तु अस्तिशब्देन नोच्यते । अथ अस्तिशब्देन नोच्यते, नास्ति तत् ज्ञेयम् । विप्रतिषिद्धं च — ‘ज्ञेयं तत् , ’ ‘अस्तिशब्देन नोच्यते’ इति च । न तावन्नास्ति, नास्तिबुद्ध्यविषयत्वात् ॥
ननु सर्वाः बुद्धयः अस्तिनास्तिबुद्ध्यनुगताः एव । तत्र एवं सति ज्ञेयमपि अस्तिबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययविषयं वा स्यात् , नास्तिबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययविषयं वा स्यात् । न, अतीन्द्रियत्वेन उभयबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययाविषयत्वात् । यद्धि इन्द्रियगम्यं वस्तु घटादिकम् , तत् अस्तिबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययविषयं वा स्यात् , नास्तिबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययविषयं वा स्यात् । इदं तु ज्ञेयम् अतीन्द्रियत्वेन शब्दैकप्रमाणगम्यत्वात् न घटादिवत् उभयबुद्ध्यनुगतप्रत्ययविषयम् इत्यतः ‘न सत्तन्नासत्’ इति उच्यते ॥
यत्तु उक्तम् — विरुद्धमुच्यते, ‘ज्ञेयं तत्’ ‘न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते’ इति — न विरुद्धम् , ‘अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि’(के. उ. १ । ४) इति श्रुतेः । श्रुतिरपि विरुद्धार्था इति चेत् — यथा यज्ञाय शालामारभ्य ‘यद्यमुष्मिंल्लोकेऽस्ति वा न वेति’(तै. सं. ६ । १ । १ । १) इत्येवमिति चेत् , न ; विदिताविदिताभ्यामन्यत्वश्रुतेः अवश्यविज्ञेयार्थप्रतिपादनपरत्वात् ‘यद्यमुष्मिन्’ इत्यादि तु विधिशेषः अर्थवादः । उपपत्तेश्च सदसदादिशब्दैः ब्रह्म नोच्यते इति । सर्वो हि शब्दः अर्थप्रकाशनाय प्रयुक्तः, श्रूयमाणश्च श्रोतृभिः, जातिक्रियागुणसम्बन्धद्वारेण सङ्केतग्रहणसव्यपेक्षः अर्थं प्रत्याययति ; न अन्यथा, अदृष्टत्वात् । तत् यथा — ‘गौः’ ‘अश्वः’ इति वा जातितः, ‘पचति’ ‘पठति’ इति वा क्रियातः, ‘शुक्लः’ ‘कृष्णः’ इति वा गुणतः, ‘धनी’ ‘गोमान्’ इति वा सम्बन्धतः । न तु ब्रह्म जातिमत् , अतः न सदादिशब्दवाच्यम् । नापि गुणवत् , येन गुणशब्देन उच्येत, निर्गुणत्वात् । नापि क्रियाशब्दवाच्यं निष्क्रियत्वात् ‘निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तम्’(श्वे. उ. ६ । १९) इति श्रुतेः । न च सम्बन्धी, एकत्वात् । अद्वयत्वात् अविषयत्वात् आत्मत्वाच्च न केनचित् शब्देन उच्यते इति युक्तम् ; ‘यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते’(तै. उ. २ । ९ । १) इत्यादिश्रुतिभिश्च ॥ १२ ॥
In plain words
Naturally, after all this, you would want to know: what exactly is this knowledge supposed to know? So Kṛṣṇa answers, with the verse beginning 'That which is to be known...' Someone might object here: humility and all these restraints and observances — surely they can't actually give you knowledge of the object itself. After all, nobody has ever seen humility pin down the nature of any real thing. Everywhere else, it's the knowledge that's actually about a thing that determines that thing — that's simply how knowledge works. Knowledge of one object never hands you another; knowledge about a pot, say, tells you nothing about fire. But this objection doesn't actually land. We've already explained why: these qualities are called 'knowledge' because they are the cause that leads toward knowledge — and also because they work together with knowledge as its supporting cause —
'Jñeyam' means: what is to be known. And that, He says, I will declare — the 'pra-' in the word means fully, and exactly as it is, nothing bent out of shape. But someone will ask: knowing it gets me what? So, to make the listener lean in, to turn him to face what is coming, the Lord holds out the fruit: knowing that knowable, one reaches the deathless — reaches amṛtatva, immortality itself. He does not die again. That is the whole meaning. Now take apart 'anādimat'. If something has a beginning, you call it ādimat, 'beginning-having'. Put 'not' in front, and you have anādimat: without any beginning at all. And what is this beginningless thing? Param brahma — supreme Brahman, with nothing above it to surpass it. 'The knowable' is the subject we have been speaking of all along, and this is it.
Here, some scholars split the phrase 'beginningless, having Me as supreme' into two separate pieces. Their reasoning: if a single compound could already say 'having no beginning,' then tacking on the suffix '-mat' would do no work at all — and surely that can't be right. So they offer their own reading: 'I' — meaning the power called Vāsudeva — 'am the supreme; and the Brahman that has me as its supreme is exactly what having Me as supreme means. Fair enough — that would indeed avoid redundancy, if such a meaning were even possible. But it isn't. Brahman is meant to be revealed only by stripping away every particular attribute — that's exactly why the verse goes on to say, 'it is called neither existent nor non-existent.' You cannot, in the same breath, claim Brahman has this special distinguishing power and also teach that every particular quality is denied of it. Those two moves cancel each other out. So here is what is actually happening: yes, the suffix '-mat' does carry the same sense a compound like that would carry — no argument there. It is simply there to fill out the metre of the verse, nothing more.
"What I am about to speak of is the knowable, and its fruit is deathlessness" — with that promise he draws Arjuna in, turns him toward it, and then says: that knowable is not called existent. And it is not called non-existent either.
Someone might object: Kṛṣṇa built this up with such fanfare, announcing in a ringing voice, 'I shall declare what is to be known' — and then what does he actually say? 'It is called neither existent nor non-existent.' That hardly seems to live up to the buildup. But no — what he says fits perfectly. Why? Because throughout every single Upaniṣad, without exception, Brahman, the object of knowledge, gets pointed to exactly this way — by taking every specific attribute away, never by adding one. 'Not this, not this' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.3.6). 'Not gross, not subtle' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.8.8). Never simply, 'This is that.' Because Brahman lies beyond anything words can actually reach.
One more objection: anything the word 'is' cannot be applied to simply does not exist. Well — Brahman, we are told, is not expressed by the word 'is'. So by that logic, Brahman, the very thing we are supposed to come to know, does not exist at all. And now there is a real contradiction: you call it 'the object to be known,' and in the same breath you say it cannot be called 'existent.' But no — that does not actually follow. Brahman is not proven non-existent by this, because the very notion of 'non-existence' does not even reach it. It sits outside both categories entirely — not because it fails some test, but because those categories were never built to hold it.
One more objection: every cognition we ever have comes stamped with either 'it exists' or 'it doesn't exist' — that's simply how thinking works. So Brahman, too, the object of knowledge, should fall under one of those two: something we cognize as existing, or something we cognize as not existing. But no — Brahman lies beyond the senses altogether, so it simply doesn't fall under either kind of cognition. Think about an ordinary thing you can actually perceive, like a pot: that, sure, will always be cognized as either existing or not existing. But this is different. Because it's beyond the senses, because the only way to reach it at all is through the word of scripture, it doesn't behave like a pot — it isn't caught by either of those two cognitions. And that is exactly why the verse says: 'it is called neither existent nor non-existent.'
Now, about that objection — that it is contradictory to call something 'the object to be known' and then say 'it is neither existent nor non-existent' — it is not contradictory at all. Scripture itself says: 'It is other than the known, and beyond the unknown too' (Kena Upaniṣad 1.4). But then someone might say: does not scripture contradict itself too? Take the line used when beginning the ritual hall for a sacrifice: 'whether it exists in that other world or not' (Taittirīya Saṃhitā 6.1.1.1). No — that does not hold, because the Kena passage, teaching Brahman's difference from both the known and the unknown, is genuinely trying to point you toward something you absolutely need to know. That line about 'whether in that other world', on the other hand, is just a supplementary flourish attached to a ritual injunction — decoration, not doctrine. And here is a further reason this makes sense: Brahman simply is not denoted by words like 'existent' and so on. Because every word, when it is actually used to convey meaning, and actually heard by someone who understands it, gets its meaning across in one of four ways: by naming a class of thing, an action, a quality, or a relationship — and only if the listener already knows the convention. No word works any other way; we have simply never seen one that does. Look at the examples: 'cow,' 'horse' — those work by naming a class. 'Cooks,' 'reads' — those work by naming an action. 'White,' 'black' — those work by naming a quality. 'Wealthy,' 'a cattle-owner' — those work by naming a relationship. But Brahman belongs to no class at all — so it simply cannot be called by a word like 'existent.' It has no qualities either, so no quality-word could ever reach it — scripture itself calls it 'without qualities.' It performs no action, so no action-word applies — scripture calls it 'partless, actionless, at peace' (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.19). And it stands in no relation to anything else, because it is simply one, without a second. Because it is non-dual, because it can never be an object at all, because it is the very Self doing the knowing rather than something known — it makes complete sense that no word whatsoever can actually name it. And that is exactly what scripture means when it says, 'the place from which words turn back' (Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.9.1), and other statements just like it.
Close to the Sanskrit
In the expectation, 'What is to be known by the knowledge just described?' — [Kṛṣṇa] says [the verse beginning] 'jñeyaṃ yat tat' [that which is to be known] and so on. Objection: the restraints and observances, [namely] humility and so on — by these, the object of knowledge is not known. For indeed, humility and so on has not been seen to be a determiner of any object whatsoever. And everywhere, indeed, knowledge whose object is a certain thing — that very [knowledge] is seen to be the determiner of that object of knowledge. For indeed, by knowledge whose object is something else, something else is not apprehended — as, by knowledge whose object is a pot, [one does not apprehend] fire. [Response:] This is not a fault — for we have already said that [humility etc.] is called 'knowledge' because it is a cause conducive to knowledge; and because it is a co-operating cause of knowledge —
'Jñeyam' — that which is to be known; that, which is to be known, I shall declare forth: with thoroughness, exactly as it is, I shall speak. 'Having what result is that?' — with this in view, by way of whetting the appetite, in order to turn the hearer toward it, He says: which knowable, having known, one attains the deathless — that is, immortality; one does not die again, this is the meaning. 'Anādimat': a beginning of this exists, thus 'ādimat'; not 'ādimat' is 'anādimat'. What is that? The supreme — the unsurpassable — Brahman; 'the knowable' being the topic already under discussion.
Here, some split the phrase 'anādi matparam' [into 'anādi' and 'matparam'], [reasoning that] if the meaning were [already] expressed by a bahuvrīhi [compound alone], the use of the suffix -mat would be pointless — [which would be] undesirable — thus [they say]. And they propose a specific meaning: 'I, the power called Vāsudeva, am supreme; that [Brahman] of which [I am the supreme] — that is, having me as supreme — thus. True, this would indeed be non-redundant, if such a meaning were possible. But such a meaning is not possible, because Brahman is meant to be made known precisely through the negation of all particular characteristics — [as it is later said] 'it is called neither existent nor non-existent'. To demonstrate that [Brahman] possesses a distinguishing power, and [to teach] the negation of particular characteristics — these are contradictory. Therefore, even though the meaning [conveyed] by the suffix -mat is the same as [that conveyed] by a bahuvrīhi [compound], its use is for the purpose of filling out the verse [metrically].
"The knowable, whose fruit is immortality, is being spoken of by me" — thus, having by this inducement turned [Arjuna] toward it, he says: "That knowable is not called existent," and "nor is that called non-existent."
Objection: having proclaimed, with great preparatory fanfare, with a resounding voice, 'I shall declare that which is to be known' — thus [having said this] — what was [then actually] said, 'it is called neither existent nor non-existent', is unfitting — thus [the objection runs]. [Response:] No — what was said is entirely fitting. How so? For in all the Upaniṣads, indeed, the object of knowledge, Brahman, is pointed out precisely by the negation of specific attributes — [in phrases] beginning with 'neti neti' [not this, not this] (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.3.6), 'not gross, not subtle' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.8.8) — not [by saying] 'this is that' — because [Brahman] is beyond the range of speech.
Objection: whatever thing is not expressed by the word 'is' — that does not exist. Now, [if the object of knowledge] is not expressed by the word 'is', then that object of knowledge does not exist. And [this is] contradictory — [namely, to say] 'that is to be known' and [also] 'it is not expressed by the word is' — thus, and [both together]. [Response:] It does not, at any rate, [thereby stand shown to] not-exist, because it is not within the range of the notion 'it does not exist'.
Objection: all cognitions are indeed accompanied by [either] the notion of existence or the notion of non-existence. In that case, this being so, the object of knowledge too would either be the object of a cognition accompanied by the notion of existence, or it would be the object of a cognition accompanied by the notion of non-existence. [Response:] No — because, by virtue of being beyond the senses, it is not the object of a cognition accompanied by either [notion]. For indeed, a thing accessible to the senses, such as a pot and so on — that would either be the object of a cognition accompanied by the notion of existence, or it would be the object of a cognition accompanied by the notion of non-existence. But this object of knowledge, by virtue of being beyond the senses, because it is accessible only through the single means of knowledge that is verbal testimony, is not, like a pot and so on, the object of a cognition accompanied by either [notion] — and therefore it is said, 'neither existent nor non-existent'.
As for what was said — 'It is contradictory [to say] that is to be known and it is called neither existent nor non-existent' — thus [the objection runs] — [Response:] it is not contradictory, because of the scriptural statement, 'It is other indeed than the known, and moreover, above the unknown' (Kena Upaniṣad 1.4). If [one objects that] scripture too has a contradictory meaning — as, having begun the sacrificial hall for a sacrifice, whether it exists in yonder world or not, thus (Taittirīya Saṃhitā 6.1.1.1) — if [this is the objection] — no; because the scriptural statement of difference from the known and the unknown is intent on teaching a necessarily-to-be-known object; whether in yonder [world] and so on, however, is a supplementary injunction, an explanatory statement. And this is also reasonable — [namely] that Brahman is not denoted by words like 'existent' and so on. For every word, when employed for the purpose of illuminating a meaning, and when heard by hearers, conveys its meaning by way of [signifying] genus, action, quality, or relation, dependent on the grasping of a convention; not otherwise, because [any other mode] is not observed. That is as follows: 'cow', 'horse' — by way of genus; 'cooks', 'reads' — by way of action; 'white', 'black' — by way of quality; 'wealthy', 'possessing cows' — by way of relation. But Brahman does not have a genus; therefore it is not denotable by words like 'existent'. Nor [is it] possessed of qualities, by which it could be denoted by a quality-word, because it is without qualities. Nor is it denotable by an action-word, because it is without action — from the scriptural statement 'partless, actionless, tranquil' (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.19). Nor [is it] something related, because of [its] oneness. Because of non-duality, because of not being an object, and because of being the [very] Self, it is reasonable that [Brahman] is not denoted by any word whatsoever — and also from scriptural statements beginning with 'from which words turn back' (Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.9.1).