In plain words
dust and dirtiness are wrongly superimposed, so too, under the influence of avidyā, it is natural to think of the Ātma as qualified by the upādhi of the Buddhi, as possessed of agency and enjoyership, as the experiencer of pleasure and pain, and as bound and liberated, different from the ultimate reality when viewed from the standpoint of empirical reality. Through Jñāna, delusion perishes, and the true reality becomes apparent. Although space is one and undivided, it comes to be spoken of, according to the vehicles that contain it, by such distinctions as house-space, pot-space, monastery-space, and cloth-space — that is, it is spoken of with distinctions made by its vehicles. But in reality, space itself bears no distinction whatsoever. A water-pot, a house, a pond, a pot, and the like may each have different shapes, names, and uses, yet the space contained within them bears no distinction and remains one and the same, however it may appear. In just the same way, though the jīvas' names, forms, and dealings may be endlessly varied, consciousness alone remains one, like the thread running through a string of beads. The śruti makes this plain and teaches the true reality: that this very caitanya is the Ātma; that you, who at present, deluded, take yourself to be the jīva, are yourself that very Ātma; and that until this Jñāna arises, saṃsāra will not let you go.
By knowing what single thing can everything become known? 'Know the Ātma, and you shall become one who has known everything' — so the śruti itself declares. The world is a mithyā matter, a portion of the untrue; no benefit whatsoever comes from knowing such a thing. Coming to know it is not a puruṣārtha. It is by the Jñāna of the Ātma-tattva that the puruṣārtha is attained — this the śruti urges in many ways. Nowhere in the śruti, the smṛti, the itihāsas, the Purāṇas, or any other scripture is it taught that one must know how the world was created, or that one should come to know this. Nor have they taught that misfortune would follow merely from not coming to know it. Indeed, it even declares that coming to know it is altogether impossible.