Unity to Division; Unreal to Real

Invocation

(Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka 1.7)

[I pay obeisance to Śankara whose feet are worshipped by the seekers of the Truth and who is that exponent of the scripture on attaining whom the Veda, the eternal word, became free from the mire of fallacious logic and connected with its true meaning.]

I have been discoursing upon Sage Vyāsa’s pithy and Bhagavatpāda’s comprehensive rebuttals of objections that have been raised against Advaita, the scripture’s conclusive view. I shall now take up another such point of protest.

Objection: Advaita Undoes the ‘Enjoyer-enjoyed’ Division

Everyone experiences through the senses of hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell, the corresponding sensory objects. The distinction between ‘bhoktṛ, the one who experiences’ and ‘bhogya, that which is experienced’ is patent in the world. The soul (jīva), which is conscious, is the bhoktṛ and the material world of sensory objects is the bhogya.

The disputant contends as follows: ‘According to the Vedāntin, Brahman is the material cause of the world; further, the soul is not other than the Supreme. If, thus, the bhogya, by virtue of an effect being non-different from its material cause, and the bhoktṛ were both to be but Brahman, the perceptually well-established division between the bhogya and the bhoktṛ would be absent and either of them could well become the other. Chaos would be the consequence. For instance, it is a matter of everyone’s experience that it is we who taste food and not the other way around but were the Vedāntin’s position that all is Brahman to be correct, we could well be eaten anytime by what we sit to eat! That is absurd.’

Vedāntin: Non-difference and Division Accountable

Disputants raise objections like this because they fail to appreciate that Advaita-vedāntins do admit empirical distinction between the soul, the material world and God and affirm non-duality only from the standpoint of the Absolute.

Sage Vyāsa has abridged the aforesaid objection and empirically counterbalanced it in brief thus:

[If it be said that (Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world) since, with objects becoming the enjoyer, the distinction between the enjoyer and the enjoyed will cease, we reply that the distinction can well exist as is observed in the world.]

Bhagavatpāda has elucidated that while the soul, which experiences, and the world, which is experienced, are not other than Brahman, nevertheless they can and do maintain their distinctness with respect to each other. Their non-difference from Brahman does not imply the catastrophic consequence imputed by the disputant that:

(Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 2.1.13)

[The enjoyer would become the enjoyed or the enjoyed would become the enjoyer.]

In view of Sage Vyāsa having said ‘as is seen in the world’, Bhagavatpāda has proffered a worldly example.

(Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 2.1.13)

[Though foam, waves and the like are not different from the watery ocean, whose modifications they all are, yet, they remain distinct from each other.]

We see waves and foam appearing and disappearing in the ocean. Are they disparate from the ocean? No; they are constituted by the watery ocean and are essentially water. Nevertheless, waves and foam do not lose their individuality in relation to each other; their distinction is discernible. Likewise, though the soul and the world are actually not different from Brahman, they remain distinct as the enjoyer and the enjoyed. Therefore, the Vedāntin’s position that Brahman is the material cause of the world is not contradicted by people’s apprehension of the distinction between the bhoktṛ and the bhogya.

Objection: Unreal Veda Cannot Yield Valid Knowledge

A different charge levelled by the opponent of Advaita-vedāṇta is: You claim that everything but Brahman is mithyā, false. If so, the Vedas, which are included in the cosmos, must also be untrue. Are you not led to this conclusion even because of Vedic passages such as the following, which you find favourable to non-dualism?

[In that state, the Vedas cease to be the Vedas.]

According to you, the unity of the soul and Brahman is a fact, liberation is the fruit of realizing this and this right knowledge arises from Vedic declarations such as:

[You are That (the Supreme).]

If the Veda is false, how can true enlightenment arise from it? An unreal cause cannot produce a real effect.

Suppose that a rope is misperceived as a snake.

[None dies because of being bitten by a snake that is actually a rope so mistaken.]

There is no question of such a snake killing anyone by injecting venom; a false snake cannot cause death, a real effect. Similarly, if, as you think, the Veda is false, it cannot give rise to true knowledge of the identity of the soul and Brahman.

An Analogy: Unreal Poison can Result in Real Death

Bhagavatpāda confutes the disputant’s contention by proffering a counterexample to show that it is possible for even an unreal cause to bring about a real effect.

(Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 2.1.14)

[A real consequence such as death is seen to stem from a (false) cause, such as hypothetical poison.]

A person partook of a meal at a house. Subsequently, a prankster lied to him that his host had laced his food with poison. He swallowed the lie hook, line and sinker, panicked and became obsessed with the thought that on account of his having ingested poison, his death was inevitable and imminent. So intense was his emotional distress that he soon collapsed and died. Thus, in this case, imagined poison lead to real death.

Dreams, though Unreal, May Predict True Events

Bhagavatpāda has presented another example, that of dreams, to buttress His point that a true effect may arise from an unreal cause; though false, dreams may, at times, point to the occurrence of some real events.

Two instances of prognosticative dreams reported in the Rāmāyaṇa come to mind. The first is from its Ayodhyā-kāṇḍa.¹ When King Daśaratha breathed his last, Sage Vaśiṣṭha sent emissaries to bring back Bharata from his maternal grandfather, the monarch of Kekeya’s place to Ayodhya. As for Bharata, he had a disturbing dream. Recalling it, he said, ‘I saw my father gulping down oil, plunging himself into it and then proceeding southwards in a chariot drawn by donkeys. This dream indicates a mortal danger to my father, to Rāma or to me.’² Later, on reaching Ayodhyā, he learnt that Daśaratha had died. What Bharata beheld in his dream was untrue; his father did not actually quaff oil, submerge in it or head south. Yet, it rightly signalled a real tragedy.

The second of the instances from the Rāmāyaṇa is that portrayed in the Sundara-kāṇḍa. Sītā, held captive by

______________________________ Rāvaṇa, given an ultimatum by him and harassed by the ogresses guarding her was feeling so desolate as to think of giving up her life. Trijaṭā (Vibhīṣaṇa’s daughter) pressed her companions to desist from menacing Sītā and narrated to them a poignant dream that she had had.

She said, ‘I saw Rāma comely attired, seated atop a big elephant with four tusks. I even beheld him heading north. I perceived Rāvaṇa, drenched in oil, mounted on an ass and moving south. So, Rāma shall be victorious and Rāvaṇa shall perish.’¹ Sītā rejoiced on hearing this.

Trijaṭā’s dream is a significant event in the Sundara-kāṇḍa. Rāma never really mounted an elephant with four tusks and Rāvaṇa never sat on a donkey and proceeded to the south. Nonetheless, the false dream did correctly point to Rāma’s later triumph and Rāvaṇa’s defeat and death.

Thus, as highlighted by these two instances, there is recognition in the world that dreams, though unreal, may hint at what shall come to pass¹; likewise, though unreal from the ultimate standpoint, Upaniṣadic passages can give rise to valid knowledge about the identity of the soul and Brahman.

One ought not to be suspicious of even what is observed in the world of the unreal pointing to the real. Moreover, the scripture itself speaks of prognosticative dreams.

Bhagavatpāda has drawn attention to the words of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad that:

[When, over the course of rites done for desired fruit, the sacrificer beholds a woman in dreams, he should know in view of that, that there will success.]

If a person who has embarked on a good work happens to have a dream in which he beholds a sumaṅgalī (a chaste lady with a living spouse) adorned with ornaments and other insignia that are considered auspicious, he could infer from the dream that he will attain his aim without impediments. On the other hand:

[A black man with black teeth seen in a dream causes the death of the dreamer.]

One’s seeing in a dream a person with black skin tone and black teeth indicates that a fatal danger awaits one.

Details about what is prognosticated by which type of a dream are found in works such as Svapnādhyāya (a treatise dealing with the interpretation of dreams).

Just as imagined poison may result in an actual death and just as a dream, though false, can indicate something real, so too can the ultimately unreal Vedāntic teachings give rise to a real knowledge of the unity of the soul and Brahman.

Impeccability of Advaita-vedānta

Objections against Advaita philosophy such as the one just taken up are rooted in misconceptions about it. As Advaita is the conclusive view of the śruti as well as the Brahmasūtras, there is no ground for anyone to deny its soundness. Our position, as stipulated at the outset, is that we admit diversity at the empirical level and wholly deny it only from the standpoint of the Absolute. If one bears this in mind, one will not be buffeted by misgivings. Various disputants baulk at digesting it and then carp at Advaita-vedānta. Bhagavatpāda shouldered the onus of totally confuting every one of the objections directed at Advaita-vedānta to preclude any claim that it can be successfully challenged. One with a shallow knowledge of Advaita-vedānta may have some reservations about its tenability. However, if one were to properly enquire into it, one would surely conclude that it is impeccable. So, we ought to go into it and properly assimilate it.

Faith, Certitude, and Proper Reasoning

Lack of faith and being ever doubtful augur ill for one. When a young boy, Lord Kṛṣṇa lifted the Govardhana mountain¹ and held it up with his little finger. Sceptics dismiss this as impossible. However, the incident did take place; after all, the power of the Lord beggars belief. Lord Rāma slew Subāhu with a single arrow and, again with a single arrow, hurled Mārīca far and dumped him into the ocean², notwithstanding the fact that Subābhu and Mārīca were tremendously mighty demons and, at that time, Rāma was but a lad less than sixteen years of age.

[(Daśaratha:) My lotus-eyed Rama is yet to be sixteen.]

What could be done if someone obdurately disbelieves the factuality of these awe-inspiring feats? You cannot effectively convince a person who is ever incredulous.

[One who is ignorant and faithless and has a doubting mind perishes.]

According to the Lord, great is the loss of a person who lacks faith in anything and keeps doubting everything.

[Direct perception alone is the means to right knowledge.]

A materialist may claim that he will accept as true only what he himself perceives. However, his claim is hollow.

(Vedāntin:) Do you admit your grandfather’s existence?

(Materialist:) Why do you even ask such a question?

(Vedāntin:) You say that you are willing to accept as true only what you have perceived; as for your grandfather, you have never seen him. So, as per your position, you never had any grandfather.

(Materialist:) Of course, my grandfather existed; else my father could not have been born.

(Vedāntin:) In that case, you are inferring his existence and, thus, relying on a means of knowledge other than perception. Moreover, you depend on your father’s words to know who your grandfather was. Therefore, willy-nilly, you admit other means of valid knowledge. It would be unintelligent to deny them; in fact, you cannot conduct your life as you do without them.

The foremost of the means of valid knowledge is the śruti and it has Advaita as its settled conclusion. If one were to repudiate the authority of the śruti, that would be the acme of inanity. We should, contrariwise, employ reasoning to engender conviction in Advaita, which has been presented by the śruti. Bhagavatpāda has said:

(Upadeśapañcaka 3) [Enquire into the import of the scriptural avouchment (about the non-dual Truth). Adopt as final the view of the Upaniṣads. Wholly desist from reasoning that is discordant with the scripture. Reflect through reasoning that is in line with the import of the scripture.]

As noted, Bhagavatpāda’s expatiation of Advaita-vedānta lays to rest all objections. Further, all the passages of the Veda are given their rightful place, with none set aside or downplayed on the ground that it is problematic. Bhagavatpāda has laid down that:

[It is improper to interpret some Vedic sentences as meaningful and some as meaningless, for all are valid.]

It is not as though some passages of the Veda are valid while some others are not. Bhagavatpāda has, in fact, even kindly reconciled for us, in His Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, those scriptural passages that, at the first blush, seem to be mutually contradictory.

May you all comprehend Advaita-vedānta, conduct your lives as advocated by the scripture and attain beatitude.

॥ हर नमः पार्वतीपतये । हर हर महादेव ॥