Conscious and Pure Cause; Inert and Impure Effect

Invocation

(Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka 1.7)

[I pay obeisance to Śankara whose feet are worshipped by the seekers of the Truth and who is that exponent of the scripture on attaining whom the Veda, the eternal word, became free from the mire of fallacious logic and connected with its true meaning.]

I have been discoursing on how Bhagavatpāda has, in His commentary on the Brahmasūtras, established that Advaita is the settled conclusion of the Upaniṣads and is logically irreproachable. I have, apropos, presented several objections posited by disputants against Advaita-vedānta and their rebuttal by Bhagavatpāda. I shall now dwell on few a more such objections and how they have been countered.

In an earlier talk, I had enunciated the scriptural position that God is the maker of the world and its material cause too. Prior to creation, there was no entity other than the Supreme and, so, nothing else that could have served as the material cause – the upādāna-kāraṇa or prakṛti, in scriptural parlance – of the universe. Taking exception to the Vedic teaching that God is the cosmos’ material basis, the antagonist sets forth his objection as follows.

Objection: Effect Cannot Be Dissimilar to Its Cause

We observe in the world that the qualities of objects are essentially those of the raw materials from which they arise. For example, sugarcane is intrinsically sweet and, accordingly, sugar, whose product it is, is also sweet, not otherwise. Brahman is a conscious entity; the world is insentient. Were Brahman to be the material cause of the world, the latter must, like Brahman, be sentient only. However, unlike its supposed cause, it is inert. Hence, Brahman cannot be its material cause. The rule that an effect’s qualities are akin to those of its cause would, otherwise, be contravened.

Not only is the world inert, it is ‘aśuddha, impure’ too. In what sense is it impure? In the cosmos, every object can effect joy in some, misery in some and disillusionment in others. Consider, for instance, a mango fruit. When eaten, it delights an individual who loves mangoes. On the other hand, when consumed by a person who has been advised by a physician to avoid partaking of it, it triggers some ailment in him and causes unhappiness. To a person who craves for but is unable to obtain it, the same fruit causes disillusionment. Similarly, all other objects have the potential to effect happiness, misery or disappointment in different beings.¹ Because all worldly objects are of this kind, the world is deemed, as stated, to be impure. As for Brahman, It is pure; It is utterly free from any defilement. If the world arose from Brahman, it too should have been pure, but it is not. Since, unlike Brahman, which is conscious and pure, the world is inert and impure, Brahman cannot be its material cause.

Response: Not Essential that Effects Resemble Causes

Bhagavatpāda rebuts this objection by pointing out that it is not a hard and fast rule that the characteristics of any effect should be the same as that of its cause. In keeping with Sage Vyāsa’s words¹, He gives an example.

[It is seen that scorpions and other such creatures arise from cow-dung and the like that are known to be inert.²]

A scorpion, which is sentient, originates from cow-dung, which is insentient. As a conscious entity may emanate from something inert, the opponent’s rule that an effect must inherit all the characteristics of its cause turns out to be violable.

Bhagavatpāda has given a counterexample of another kind too. Humans, who are a conscious beings, grow hair, which is insentient³. The examples relating to the genesis of scorpions and hair disfavour the opponent’s avowal that an effect’s characteristics cannot be different from those of its cause.¹ When it is seen in the world that an effect can be dissimilar to its cause, why cannot the universe, Bhagavatpāda asks the opponent, arise from Brahman just because it is inert and impure, while Brahman is not? Moreover, the indisputably authoritative śruti itself declares that Brahman is the material cause of the universe.² Thus, we Advaitins have the authority of the śruti as well as the support of the illustrations in the world to show that an effect can have features that are unlike those of its cause¹.

Though Present, Consciousness Need not Manifest

We find in the bhāṣya that a partial response has also been given to the objection raised by the opponent. It is contended that the entire universe is actually sentient. This position gives rise to the objection that if such is the case, every object of the world, be it a stone, a pillar, or a mountain should show signs of life. The answer is that there is no such requirement. While consciousness is there everywhere, it is manifest in certain entities and not manifest in others. The objects where consciousness, though present, is not manifest are deemed inert. There is no rule that just because consciousness is present in all objects, it should be also be patent in all of them. Further, when a person falls deeply asleep or faints, no purposeful movement or response is seen in him. So, though he is a conscious being, this is not evident at that time to others. On the other hand, when he is awake and talks to someone in the waking state, his sentience is patent. Thus, there are times when consciousness is not manifest even in entities that are regarded as sentient.

The objection that the universe could not have arisen from Brahman since it is inert and, thus, dissimilar to Brahman would not hold water if it were admitted that the universe is actually conscious in its entirety and that what is seen as an insentient object is just one in which consciousness, though present, is not manifest.¹

Objection: The World Degrades Brahman at Merger

Another line of argument adopted by the disputant is as follows. A passage of the śruti that testifies, according to the Vedāntin, to the cosmos having its roots in Brahman is:

[Seek to realize that from which all these beings are born, that by which they live and proceeding to which, they merge. That is Brahman.]

It speaks of entities ‘proceeding towards (prayanti)’ and ‘entering into (abhisaṁviśanti)’ Brahman. We become sullied when filthy water drenches us. When the world unites with Brahman, would not the latter become inert and impure like the universe? Such is a preposterous corollary of the Vedāntin’s contention that Brahman is the world’s material basis. Sage Vyāsa has condensed this objection thus:

[(The view that Brahman is the material cause of the world is) absurd because the cause may become like the effect at the time of the effect’s dissolution into it.]

No Defilement of the Supreme by the World

Bhagavatpāda clarifies to the opponent that unlike what is presumed by him, an effect does not merge with its cause while its special features are intact; it does so after becoming stripped of its various characteristics by virtue of which it was identifiable as a specific effect. For example, an earthen pot does not revert to earth with its typical rotund form intact; it does so only after losing its shape, upon, say, being smashed to smithereens and dispersed in the clayey soil.¹ As it is bereft of its distinctive features prior to moving into its cause, there is no question of the pot imparting rotundity to clay, its source. An effect could corrupt its cause only if it were to go into the latter while preserving its inferior features but were it maintain them, its association with its source would not amount to its ‘laya, dissolution’ at all. The term ‘abhisaṁviśanti, enter’ of the scriptural passage does not refer to association with distinguishing features intact. As the world merges with the Supreme only after it is free of its particularities, there is no question of its degrading the Supreme.

Two views, one that an effect is non-existent before it arises and the other that it was present in a latent form earlier, are encountered in our philosophical literature. The former is termed ‘ārambha-vāda (the theory of the origin of what did not exist)’. According to it, an effect such as a pot that was totally non-existent earlier arose consequent to a potter’s working on clay. The latter has two closely related variants named ‘pariṇāma-vāda (the theory of transformation) and ‘vivarta-vāda, (the theory of apparent transfiguration); while vivarta-vāda is what Vedāntins primarily subscribe to, they do adopt pariṇāma-vāda in their empirical explanations. The pariṇāma-vāda vision is that a pot pre-exists in clay in a potential form and manifests due to a potter’s processing clay. The cause undergoes a real transformation that culminates in the effect’s manifestation. As per vivarta-vāda, the cause, without actually changing, appears as the effect; a stock example is that of a rope being misperceived as a snake.

The Upaniṣads and, thus, Bhagavatpāda reject the view that an effect was once non-existent. If a pot was non-existent earlier, why should it arise only from clay and not from any other entity for it is equally absent there?

Hence, the reasonable position is that the pot was latent in clay. The world was, likewise, present in a potential form in the Supreme. It manifests at the time of creation, then persists for some time in a manifested state, with distinguishing features, and, at the time of dissolution, reverts to its former, undifferentiated condition. Since the world’s dissolution spoken of in the scripture is that which takes place after it has shed its gross form, unlike what the opponent argues, its merger with the Supreme by reversion to the latent state in which it had been prior to creation has no negative impact on the Supreme.

Inconclusiveness of Logic Unfounded on the Scripture

Sage Vyāsa and Bhagavatpāda point out to the opponent that he ought not to raise objections about the world’s source on the basis of just reasoning because, in such matters, logic without a scriptural prop is inconclusive.¹

– What can known only through the scripture should not be challenged by recourse to mere logic, since reasoning that disregards the scripture and is rooted in only human conjecture is inconclusive, as conjecture is unregulated. (Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 2.1.11)

It is said:

(Vakyapadīya 1.34)

[Even what has been painstakingly demonstrated by adroit logicians is proved to be otherwise by defter dialecticians.]

Buoyed by confidence in his being an incisive logician, a person may advance a philosophical position but that would fall out of favour among scholars upon a more discerning dialectician overturning it. We observe that scientists of today have radically revised conclusions reached centuries ago by some scientists following deep thought. Thus, ratiocination, per se, lacks finality.

Logic Concordant with and Conviction in the Scripture

Whatever the śruti establishes about matters that are supersensible is ever valid and hence the conclusion reached through reasoning that is bedded in the scripture has an irrevocable finality. Accordingly, Bhagavatpāda has given the following beneficial counsel:

(Upadeśapañcaka 3) (Wholly desist from reasoning that is discordant with the scripture. Reflect through reasoning that is in line with the import of the scripture.)

Reasoning should be pressed into service to support, and never to contest, what the śruti teaches. The world owes its origin, sustenance and dissolution to God. As this is the revelation of the scripture, we should, through logic, put doubts to rest and firm up our imbuement of this. Sage Vyāsa and Bhagavatpāda incarnated to spell out the true purport of the scripture to the world.

As the scripture’s decisive purport is unexceptionable, he, who persists, like one driven, in questioning Vedānta lacks the faith vital to know the Truth and stands to lose.

He who yearns to realize the Truth should refrain from raising question upon question. It is, of course, not as though there are any chinks in Vedānta’s armour or that there is any objection from any quarter that cannot be adequately met. From Bhagavatpāda’s works, it is patent that He never shied away from squarely facing up to the challenges of disputants. If the opponent’s case was weak or not presented optimally, He even helped the disputant by refining and adding punch to his objections.

एतदेव मे स्वस्त्ययनं यन्मामेकयोगिनमनेकयोगिबहुप्रतिपक्षमात्थ । अतो जेष्यामि सर्वान् ; आरभे च चिन्ताम् । (Bhāṣya onTaittirīya Upaniṣad 2.8.5)

[(Disputant: Being committed to the teaching of the Veda, you are a monist. Many are the opponents who subscribe to plurality and are unwedded to the Vedas.) (Bhagavatpāda:) This itself is a benediction for me that you say that I am a (Vedic) monist who is confronted by many (non-Vedic) pluralists. Hence, I shall prevail against them all. I shall now initiate the discussion.]

He asserts in His bhāṣya on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad that He is geared up to take up the gauntlet of a host of critics.

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad relates that several savants grilled Yājñavalkya about Vedānta with a view to putting him down but he silenced each of them with his forceful replies. He then challenged them to singly or collectively test him further or to face his questioning.¹ On hearing his words, not one of the scholars dared to even try to trip him up and all held their peace. When he directed a query at them about the Truth, they were flummoxed. What conviction Sage Yājñavalkya and Bhagavatpāda must have had in Vedānta!

If we correctly understand Advaita-vedānta, the final view of the scripture, as explained by Bhagavatpāda, we would be convinced that it is irreproachable and not be troubled by doubts. We should be grateful and devoted to Him. May you all be the recipients of His blessings.

॥हर नमः पार्वतीपतये । हर हर महादेव ॥