God Only Appears as the World; He is Impartial

Invocation

(Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka 1.7)

[I pay obeisance to Śaṅkara whose feet are worshipped by the seekers of the Truth and who is that exponent of the scripture on attaining whom the Veda, the eternal word, became free from the mire of fallacious logic and connected with its true meaning.]

Based on Sage Vyāsa’s aphorisms and Bhagavatpāda’s commentary thereon, I have been presenting Advaita, the final position of the scripture, some of the objections raised against it and their rebuttal.

Objection: Problems with Brahman Becoming the World

An objection that I had taken up in an earlier talk was, ‘If God is the maker of the cosmos, what raw material does He have to fashion it?’ The Vedāntin’s reply, as seen, is that He Himself is its material cause. The disputant tries to put the Vedāntin on the horns of a dilemma as follows.

If Brahman is to be the world’s material cause, It must change into the latter just as clay, the material cause of an earthen pot, becomes transformed into a pot. Then, just as after the modification, the pot takes the place of clay and just as milk wholly becomes curd, post-creation, Brahman would subsist only in the form of the universe. The realization of the Supreme, which the Vedāntin holds to be the sole means to emancipation, would, thereupon, have no scope as no transcendent Brahman would be left to realize; as for Brahman in the form of the world, It is already patent to all. If the Supreme were to change not wholly but only partially into the world, Its unchanged and transcendent part would remain to be realized and attained. The śruti, however, says:

(Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.19)

[It is without parts, without activity, serene, impeccable, untainted, the ultimate bridge to immortality and like fire with fuel spent.]

The word niṣkalaṁ here specifies that Brahman is not partite. Thus, the view that It has parts vitiates the śruti.

The upshot is that Brahman could have neither wholly nor partially become the world and, so, the Vedāntin’s position that the Supreme is Itself the world’s material cause is untenable.¹

Indivisible Brahman Appears Partially as the World

Bhagavatpāda points out that the scripture teaches us that Brahman is indivisible and transcendent and yet, manifests, in part, as the universe.² There are two ways in which a cause manifests as an effect. In some cases, the cause undergoes a change and becomes the effect; this is termed ‘pariṇāma’. In others, the cause appears as the effect without actually undergoing any modification; this is called ‘vivarta’. The conversion of clay into a pot and that of milk into curd are instances of the first kind. A rope appearing as a snake to one who misapprehends it in dim light is an example of ‘vivarta’. The objection

___________________________________ rests on the erroneous premise that Brahman undergoes actual metamorphosis, while the fact is It only illusorily appears as the world. Just as a rope remains without any deviation from its nature even when it appears as a snake, Brahman remains indivisible and transcendent even when It apparently manifests as the cosmos.

It is because of Its illusory power, Māyā, that though without parts, the Supreme appears in part as the world; Māya effects even what is rather incongruous. Here is a verse from Bhagavatpāda’s Māyā-pañcaka:

[Māyā, which is skilful in accomplishing the impossible, brings about the distinctions of the world, God and the soul in me, who am consciousness, unique, eternal, without parts, infinite, and free from all distinctions.]

In the non-dual Brahman, Māyā conjures the differences of the soul, world and God; thus, one thinks, ‘I, the soul, am disparate from God and the world is other than both of us.’ Nothing is impossible for Māyā to accomplish.

What Bhagavatpāda has pointed out in response to the objection that though without parts, Brahman appears partially in the form of the world is based on the śruti and is a part of His expatiation of Sage Vyāsa's sūtra:

[But it must be admitted on the basis of the śruti (that Brahman is without parts and yet does not fully become the world), for Brahman is knowable only from the śruti.]

The objection is out of place as the Supreme and its appearing as the cosmos can be discerned only from the Upaniṣads and not through mere argumentation.¹

Sage Vyāsa has further said in response to the objection:

[Besides (varied creation can take place without Brahman undergoing change) because it occurs in the soul (in dreams) and in the case of others (such as the devas).]

In His commentary on this aphorism, Bhagavatpāda points out in support of Brahman manifesting the world without being affected that even we do produce a diverse world, during dreams, without ourselves undergoing any loss of our nature. That the objects of the dream-world are illusory and created by the individual soul has been indicated by Sage Vyāsa and settled by Bhagavatpāda in the ‘Sandhyādhikaraṇa’ of the Brahmasūtras.¹

Let us suppose that in a dream, we go on a pilgrimage, arrive at Kashi, bathe in the Ganga, perform much charity and worship Lord Viśveśvara. We then wake up and find ourselves not at Kashi but only at the place where we lay down and went to sleep. The Kashi that we saw is not the real Kashi, which is afar, but one that we conjured up. When we can create a diverse world of dreams in and while remaining ourselves, why cannot God?

Objection: God would be Partial and Cruel

The disputant now objects as follows to the Vedāntin’s conclusion that God is the efficient cause of the world. You hold that God has ordained this universe. If so, He dispenses sorrow to some while He bestows happiness on others. He blesses some with riches while He denies even a meal to some. He who confers widely varying degrees of joy to beings must be deemed partial. As He awards misery to many, He must be cruel. While we feel distraught when we see even a single person losing his life, God annihilates all beings at the time of cosmic dissolution. How cruel! So, if God is the maker of the world, He is partial and merciless and, thus, ungodly, rather than impartial and kind, as God should be.

God is not Biased or Unkind

Sage Vyāsa in brief and Bhagavatpāda at length confute this objection as follows. God is neither partial nor cruel, for in giving joy or sorrow on beings, He duly takes into account their past actions.¹ A teaching of the śruti is:

[One becomes virtuous through virtuous deeds and a sinner through bad deeds.]

God gives beings joy or sorrow, of varying degrees and at various times, as per their own dharma and adharma. Hence, God cannot be charged with bias or cruelty.

Bhagavatpāda has given an analogy for God’s neutrality.

[God should be seen to be like rain.]

Rain has no bias; God is like it. Consider two adjacent farmlands. Rain falls uniformly on both the fields. The farmer owning one of them diligently cultivates his land and reaps a bountiful harvest, while the peasant of the adjacent land whiles away his time and, so, obtains no yield. Can the latter blame the rain that enabled the sown seeds to grow as being partial to the industrious farmer? No; even the pattern and extent of rainfall on the two fields were the same. God is unbiased like rain.

Sage Vyāsa has described God in a hymn as:

[(Worship the Lord) who is free from defects such as attachment and aversion.]

God is untouched by likes and dislikes. He has Himself stated this thus:

[I am the same towards all beings. None is hateful or dear to Me.]

Take the case of a fair judge. He punishes those guilty of offenses and exonerates those who are blameless. He cannot be rightly accused of animosity towards the former and love for the latter. He would, if needed, clarify that he goes only by the facts of each case and not by personal preferences. Like a fair judge, God rewards or punishes us in accordance with our karma. We would be blundering if we impute partiality and cruelty to Him.

Objection: Disparity at the Start of Creation Unjustified

The disputant counterattacks that even if be conceded that God gives happiness and unhappiness to a person now in keeping with what he did in his previous births, God’s rewarding or punishing him in his very first birth, when he was without past karma, would be unjustified.

Vedantin’s Response: Creation Has No Beginning

Sage Vyāsa has responded that transmigratory existence is sans beginning, this being what the scripture teaches and what is reasonable.¹ The Veda, for instance, says:

God’s present creation is in line with His previous one, that creation accorded with the one preceding it and so on ad infinitum. So, none has a very first birth where one starts without any store of karma that God can consider. God cannot be charged with cruelty even on the ground that He destroys all beings at the onset of each cosmic dissolution. This is because that is when, for a time, there is no karma that is on the point of fructifying; there is a natural lull. Accordingly, God, in His kindness, provides, a deep-sleep like period of total rest to all till it is time for karma to start fructifying again and creation restarts.

Advaita Alone is Unquestionable

I had drawn attention in an earlier discourse to the norm that a conclusion arrived at by one on the basis of just one’s analytical acumen will be confuted someday by some brighter intellectual. Bhagavatpāda has, however, declared, ‘What I have propounded is not a product of independent intellection. It is only the śruti’s teaching that I have spelt out and substantiated. All of us need to bow to the authority of the śruti, for we are vaidikas, the adherents of the Veda.’ The term vaidika denotes not just a purohit (a priest who conducts religious rites), as some think, but applies to all of us who esteem the Veda. As it is the Veda that is the fount of Advaita philosophy, we should never entertain any misgiving about it. Instead, as would be becoming of us, we should have and fortify conviction in it.

Sage Vyāsa in the Brahmasūtras and Bhagavatpāda in His commentary thereon have forcefully brought out the immaculateness and unassailability of Advaita, the final purport of the Upaniṣads. While the adherents of other schools vainly and variously try to fault Advaita-vedānta, they overlook the fact that their positions are on a weak footing. More than once, Sage Vyāsa has pointed out that a disputant’s charge assails his own school by writing:

Those who opposed Advaita-vedānta and were dealt with often by Sage Vyāsa and Bhagavatpāda were the adherents of one of two philosophical schools: Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika. Exposing the fatal fallacies in both these and neutralising the objections voiced by their votaries against Advaita-vedānta, Bhagavatpāda informed them, ‘Your tenets are riddled with irremediable shortcomings. When counter-attacked, you are, thus, at your wits end. Our position is, however, held safe by the unassailable śruti.’ Apart from the ancient Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika, various philosophical schools have arisen over the ages; their followers too have attempted but failed to find any weakness in Advaita-vedānta.

Eminent intellectuals of other nations too are clear that Advaita is the best among Indian philosophies, is logical and possesses answers to potential objections, while other schools are far from being so.

You should sincerely strive to grasp Advaita-vedānta as expounded by Bhagavatpāda and repeatedly cogitate on it so that you may realize the Truth. May God bless all of you to do so.

॥ हर नमः पार्वतीपतये । हर हर महादेव ॥