Bhashya
तं तथाभूतम् आलक्ष्य गार्ग्यं स होवाच अजातशत्रुः- एतावन्नू ३ इति- किमेतावद्ब्रह्म विज्ञातम्, आहोस्विदधिकमप्यस्तीति ; इतर आह-एतावद्धीति ।नैतावता विदितेन ब्रह्म विदितं भवतीत्याह अजातशत्रुः- किमर्थं गर्वितोऽसि ब्रह्म ते ब्रवाणीति ।किमेतावद्विदितं विदितमेव न भवतीत्युच्यते ? न, फलवद्विज्ञानश्रवणात् ; न चार्थवादत्वमेव वाक्यानामवगन्तुं शक्यम् ; अपूर्वविधानपराणि हि वाक्यानि प्रत्युपासनोपदेशं लक्ष्यन्ते- 'अतिष्ठाः सर्वेषां भूतानाम्' इत्यादीनि ; तदनुरूपाणि च फलानि सर्वत्र श्रूयन्ते विभक्तानि ; अर्थवादत्वे एतदसमञ्जसम् ।कथं तर्हि नैतावतात्थानैः गार्ग्याभिमतस्य ब्रह्मणोऽब्रह्मत्वं ज्ञापितमिति? जाग-रितकाले यो गार्ग्याभिप्रतः पुरुषः कर्ता भोक्ता ब्रह्म सं-निहितः करणेषु यथा, तथा अजातशत्र्वभिप्रतोऽपि तत्स्वा-मी भृत्येष्विव राजा संनिहित एव; किं तु भृत्यस्वा-मिनोः गार्ग्याजातशत्र्वभिप्रतयोः यद्विवेकावधारणकारणम्,तत् संकीर्णत्वाद नवधारितविशेषम्; यत् द्रष्टृत्वमेव भोक्तुःन दृश्यत्वम्, यच्च अभोक्तुर्दृश्यत्वमेव न तु द्रष्टृत्वम्, तच्चउभयम् इह संकीर्णत्वाद्विविच्य दर्शयितुमशक्यमिति सुप्त-पुरुषगमनम् ।ननु सुप्तेऽपि पुरुषे विशिष्टैर्नामभिरा मन्त्रितोभोक्तैव प्रतिपत्स्यते, न अभोक्ता- इति नैव निर्णयः स्या-दिति ।न, निर्धारितविशेषत्वाद्गार्ग्याभिप्रतस्य- यो हिसत्येन च्छन्नः प्राण आत्मा अमृतः वागादिषु अनस्तमितःनिम्लोचत्सु, यस्य आपः शरीरं पाण्डरवासाः, यश्च अस-पत्नत्वात् बृहन्, यश्च सोमो राजा षोडशकलः, स स्वव्या-पारा रूढो यथा निर्ज्ञात एव अनस्तमितस्वभाव आस्ते; नच अन्यस्य कस्यचिद्व्यापारः तस्मिन्काले गार्ग्येणाभिप्रयेतेतद्विरोधिनः; तस्मात् स्वनामभिरा मन्त्रितेन प्रतिबोद्धव्यम्;न च प्रत्यबुध्यत; तस्मात् पारिशेष्यात् गार्ग्याभिप्रतस्य अभो-क्तृत्वं ब्रह्मणः ।भोक्तृस्वभावश्चेत् भुञ्जीतैव स्वं विषयं प्राप्तम्;न हि दग्धृस्वभावः प्रकाशयितृस्वभावः सन् वह्निः तृणोल-पादि दाह्यं स्वविषयं प्राप्तं न दहति, प्रकाशयं वा न प्रका-शयति ; न चेत् दहति प्रकाशयति वा प्राप्तं स्वं विषयम् ,नासौ वह्निः दग्धा प्रकाशयिता वेति निश्चीयते ; तथा असौप्राप्तशब्दादिविषयोपलब्धृस्वभावश्चेत् गार्ग्याभिप्रेतः प्राणः,बृहत्पाण्डरवास इत्येवमादिशब्दं स्वं विषयमुपलभेत —यथा प्राप्तं तृणोलपादि वह्निः दहेत् प्रकाशयेच्च अव्यभि-चारेण तद्वत् ।तस्मात् प्राप्तानां शब्दादीनाम् अप्रतिबोधात्अभोक्तृस्वभाव इति निश्चीयते ; न हि यस्य यः स्वभावोनिश्चितः, स तं व्यभिचरति कदाचिदपि ; अतः सिद्धं प्रा-णस्याभोक्तृत्वम् ।संबोधनार्थनामविशेषेण संबन्धाग्रहणात्अप्रतिबोध इति चेत् — स्यादेतत् — यथा बहुष्वासीनेषु स्व-नामविशेषेण संबन्धाग्रहणात् मामयं संबोधयतीति, शृण्व-न्नपि संबोध्यमानः विशेषतो न प्रतिपद्यते ; तथा इमानिबृहन्नित्येवमादीनि मम नामानीति अगृहीतसंबन्धत्वात् प्रा-णो न गृह्णाति संबोधनार्थं शब्दम् , न त्वविज्ञातृत्वादेव —इति चेत् — न, देवताभ्युपगमे अग्रहणानुपपत्तेः ; यस्य हिचन्द्राद्यभिमानिनी देवता अध्यात्मं प्राणो भोक्ता अभ्युप-गम्यते, तस्य तया संव्यवहाराय विशेषनाम्ना संबन्धोऽवश्यंसन्ति हि प्राणविषयाणि प्रसिद्धानि प्राणादिनामानि ;तान्यपोह्य अप्रसिद्धैर्बृहत्त्वादिनामभिः संबोधनमुक्तम्, लौ-किकन्यायापोहात्; तस्मात् भोक्तुरेव स्वतः प्राणस्याप्रति-पत्तिरिति चेत्- न देवताप्रत्याख्यानार्थत्वात्; केवलसं-बोधनमात्राप्रतिपत्त्यैव असुप्तस्य आध्यात्मिकस्य प्राणस्या-भोक्तृत्वे सिद्धे, यत् चन्द्रदेवताविषयैर्नामभिः संबोधनम्,तत् चन्द्रदेवता प्राणः अस्मिञ्छरीरे भोक्तेति गार्ग्यस्यविशेषप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणार्थम् ; न हि तत् लौकिकनाम्नासंबोधने शक्यं कर्तुम् ।प्राणप्रत्याख्यानेनैव प्राणग्रस्तत्वात्क-रणान्तराणां प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः भोक्तृत्वाशङ्कानुपपत्तिः ।देव-तान्तराभावाच्च ; ननु अतिष्ठा इत्याद्यात्मन्वीत्यन्तेन ग्रन्थेनगुणवद्देवताभेदस्य दर्शितत्वादिति चेत्, न, तस्य प्राण एवएकत्वाभ्युपगमात् सर्वश्रुतिषु अरनाभिनिदर्शनेन, 'सत्येनच्छन्नः' 'प्राणो वा अमृतम्' इति च प्राणबाह्यस्यअन्यस्य अनभ्युपगमात् भोक्तुः ।'एष उ ह्येव सर्वेदेवाः, कतम एको देव इति, प्राणः' इति च सर्वदेवांनांप्राण एव एकत्वोपपादनाच्च ।तथा करणभेदेष्वनाशङ्का,देहभेदेष्विव स्मृतिज्ञानेच्छादिप्रतिसंधानानुपपत्तेः; न हिअन्यदृष्टम् अन्यः स्मरति जानाति इच्छति प्रतिसंधधातिजातीयव्यतिरिक्तार्थं संहन्यत इत्येवम् अवगच्छाम ।स्तम्भकुड्यतृणकाष्ठादिगृहावयवानां स्वात्मजन्मोपचयापचयविनाशनामाकृतिकार्यधर्मनिरपेक्षलब्धसत्तादि-तद्विषयद्रष्टृश्रोतृमन्तृविज्ञातृर्थत्वं दृष्ट्वा, मन्यामहे, तत्संघातस्य च—तथा, प्राणाद्यवयवानां तत्संघातस्य च स्वात्मजन्मोपचयापचयविनाशनामाकृतिकार्यधर्मनिरपेक्षलब्धसत्तादि-तद्विषयद्रष्टृश्रोतृमन्तृविज्ञातृर्थत्वं भवितुमर्हतीति ।देवताचेतनावत्त्वे समत्वाद्गुणभावानुपगम इति चेत्— प्राणस्य विशिष्टैर्नामभिरा मन्त्रणदर्शनात् चेतनावत्त्वमभ्युपगतम्; चेतनावत्त्वे च पारार्थ्योपगमः समत्वादुनुपपन्न इति चेत्— न निरूपाधिकस्य केवलस्य विजिज्ञापयिषितत्वात् क्रियाकारकफलासक्ता हि आत्मनो नामरूपोपाधिजनिता अविद्याध्यारोपिता ; तन्निमित्तो लोकस्य क्रियाकारकफलाभिमानलक्षणः संसारः ; स निरूपाधिकात्मस्वरूपविद्यया निवर्तयितव्य इति तत्स्वरूपविजिज्ञापयिषया उपनिषदारम्भः—' ब्रह्म ते ब्रवाणि ' ' नैतावता विदितं भवति ' इति च उपक्रम्य ' एतावदरे खल्वमृतत्वम् ' इति च उपसंहारात् ; न च अतोऽन्यत् अन्तराले विवक्षितम् उक्तं वा अस्ति ; तस्मादनवसरः समत्वाद्गुणभावानुपगम इति चोद्यस्य ।विशेषवतो हि सोपाधि-योश्च अत्रासंभवात् पारिशेष्यात् प्रायार्थतैव ; तस्मात् संक-ल्पविकल्पाद्यात्मक मन्तःकरणं तन्मय इत्येतत् ; पुरुषः, पुरिशयनात् ।कैष तदा अभूदिति प्रश्नः स्वभावविजिज्ञापयिषया—प्राक् प्रतिबोधात् क्रियाकारकफलविपरीतस्वभाव आत्मेतिकार्याभावेन दिदर्शयिषितम् ; न हि प्राक्प्रतिबोधात्कर्मादिकार्यंसुखादि किंचन गृह्यते ; तस्मात् अकर्मप्रयुक्तत्वात् तथास्वा-भाव्यमेव आत्मनोऽवगम्यते-यस्मिन्स्वाभाव्येऽभूत्, यतश्चस्वाभाव्यात्प्रच्युतः संसारी स्वभावविलक्षण इति— एतद्वि-वक्षया पृच्छति गार्ग्यं प्रतिभानरहितं बुद्धिव्युत्पादनाय ।कैषतदाभूत्, कुत एतदागात्- इत्येतदुभयं गार्ग्येणैव प्रष्टव्यमा-सीत् ; तथापि गार्ग्येण न पृष्टमिति नोदास्तेऽजातशत्रुः ;बोधयितव्य एवेति प्रवर्तते, ज्ञापयिष्याम्येवेति प्रतिज्ञात-त्वात् ।एवमसौ व्युत्पाद्यमानोऽपि गार्ग्यः-यत्रैष आत्माभूत्प्राक्प्रतिबोधात्, यतश्चैतदागमनमागात्- तदुभयं न व्युत्पेदेवक्तुं वा प्रष्टुं वा—गार्ग्यो ह न मेने न ज्ञातवान् ॥
In plain words
Watching Gārgya fall silent like this, Ajātaśatru said, 'Is that really all?' — 'Is this all there is to know of Brahman, or is there more?' Gārgya answered, 'That's all, truly.' 'Knowing only this much,' Ajātaśatru replied, 'doesn't get you to Brahman. Why are you so sure of yourself? Let me teach you.' Does that mean what Gārgya knew wasn't really knowledge at all? No — scripture itself tells us this kind of knowledge bears fruit, and these teachings can't be brushed aside as mere praise-talk with no force of their own. Each teaching of meditation carries its own distinct instruction — think of lines like 'you stood supreme over every creature' — and each comes with its own fruit, spelled out separately every time. If these were just ornamental language, none of that would make sense. So how, exactly, has it been shown that what Gārgya took for Brahman isn't Brahman at all? Here's how: while awake, the person Gārgya has in mind — the one who acts, who enjoys, whom he calls Brahman — sits right there among the senses. Ajātaśatru's candidate sits there too, the way a king sits among his attendants. Both agree on that much. But which one is master and which is servant? While we're awake, everything is too tangled together to tell. The one thing that marks the true enjoyer is pure seeing, never being seen; the one thing that marks the mere instrument is being seen, never truly seeing. In the waking state the two blur past separating. That's why we turn instead to a person fast asleep. But wait — someone might object — even a sleeping man, called by his own special names, would only respond as the enjoyer, never as the non-enjoyer. So sleep doesn't settle it either. Not so — because we already know exactly who Gārgya means: the one veiled by the True, called Prāṇa, the self, the deathless, still wide awake even as speech and the other senses go quiet; whose body is water, robed in white; called 'the vast' because nothing rivals him; identified with Soma the king, sixteen parts complete. He simply rests in his own function, already perfectly well-known, his nature never dimming — and nothing else is doing anything, competing with him, at that hour, in Gārgya's own account. So he should have woken at the sound of his own names. He did not wake. By elimination, then: whatever Gārgya means by Brahman is not the one who enjoys. If it really were an enjoyer, it would enjoy whatever came its way. Fire burns and lights up whatever combustible thing touches it — straw, kindling, anything — without fail. If fire ever failed to burn or to shine on what reached it, we simply wouldn't call it fire at all. In just the same way, if this Prāṇa that Gārgya has in mind truly perceived whatever reached it, it would have caught the very sound of its own name — 'Bṛhat, robed in white' — the instant it was spoken, exactly as fire never fails to burn what touches it. But it caught nothing. So we can say for certain: its nature is that of something that does not enjoy. A thing's nature, once fixed, never wavers — not once, not ever. And so it stands proven: Prāṇa does not enjoy. Someone might push back: maybe he just didn't recognize the connection between himself and those particular names — the way a person in a crowded room, hearing 'someone's calling me,' doesn't realize it's actually their own name being called, even while hearing it perfectly well. Maybe Prāṇa simply never learned that 'Bṛhat' and the rest were his own names — not because he can't know anything at all. But no — that excuse falls apart the moment you grant that a deity is involved. Anyone who identifies Prāṇa, at the personal level, with a deity like the one presiding over the moon, has to also grant that this deity can be addressed by a proper name — and everyday, familiar names for Prāṇa already exist. The Upaniṣad sidesteps those and calls him by unfamiliar names like 'Bṛhat' instead — precisely to break from the ordinary way of doing things. So if someone insists this is just an accidental lapse on the enjoyer's part, no — the whole point of the unusual naming is to rule out identifying Prāṇa with any particular deity at all. His non-enjoyer status is already settled simply by the fact that he doesn't respond to being addressed; the deity-names are there specifically to knock down Gārgya's idea that the moon-deity, as Prāṇa, is the one enjoying inside this body. And that could never be shown by calling him an everyday name. Once Prāṇa himself is ruled out, the other organs are ruled out too — they're all swallowed up in him during sleep and simply can't function, so there's no room to suspect any of them either. And there's no other deity around to fill the gap. But, one might object, doesn't the passage running from 'you stood supreme' all the way to 'possessing a self' point to several distinct deities, each with its own qualities? No — every scriptural text uses the same image, spokes converging on the hub of a wheel, to show that this being is one, and one only: Prāṇa. Lines like 'concealed by the True' and 'Prāṇa indeed is deathless' never make room for any enjoyer beyond Prāṇa. And when scripture asks, 'This one is truly all the gods — so which single god is it?' and answers, 'Prāṇa' — that settles it: every god collapses into Prāṇa alone. The same goes for each organ individually — there's no reason to suspect any one of them, any more than you'd expect memory, knowledge, or desire to somehow link up across two entirely separate bodies. What one person has seen, another simply doesn't remember, know, want, or connect to their own experience; things that belong to different kinds don't fuse into a single thing. We all understand this already. Think of a house: pillar, wall, thatch, timber — each one exists in its own right, quite apart from its birth, growth, decay, name, shape, or use, and all of them together, the whole house included, are known by one and the same seer, hearer, thinker, knower. The same must be true, we conclude, of the body's own parts — Prāṇa and the rest — and of the body as a whole: each exists in its own right, apart from its birth, growth, decay, name, shape, and use, and all of it is known by one and the same seer, hearer, thinker, knower. But then — if all these deities are equally conscious, why would any one of them count as subordinate to another? Prāṇa's consciousness is granted, yes, because scripture calls out to him by name. But if he's conscious just like everything else, how can he be said to exist for someone else's sake, given that they're all equal? Because the whole teaching is aimed at something else entirely: the one Self that carries no conditioning at all, alone and unmixed. The whole tangle of doer, deed, and result is just name-and-form clinging to the Self, a false overlay stitched on by ignorance — and that overlay is the very root of the cycle people call the world, this constant, mistaken sense of being the one who acts, who causes, who reaps the fruit. It's dissolved only by knowing the Self exactly as it is, free of every condition. That's the whole reason the Upaniṣad exists: to make that true nature known. It opens with 'let me teach you Brahman' and 'this much doesn't get you there,' and it closes with 'this much, friend, is immortality itself' — nothing else is meant anywhere in between, nothing else is said. So the whole objection about equal consciousness and subordination simply doesn't apply here; ranking one conditioned thing beneath another only makes sense between two things that are equally hemmed in by conditions, and that situation doesn't arise here at all. By elimination, all that earlier talk about hierarchy among the gods was never meant literally — only loosely, for the sake of the argument. So: the mind, made of resolve and doubt and all its restless activity, filled with that one same reality — this is what 'puruṣa' means, the one who lies in the city of the body. 'Where was this one then?' — the question is asked precisely to reveal the Self's true nature: that before waking, with nothing accomplished, its nature is the exact opposite of doer, deed, and result. Because before waking, nobody experiences the least trace of pleasure or anything else that action produces. So, since it isn't engaged in any action at all, we come to understand that this — its own natural state — really is the Self's nature: the very state it rested in, and the state from which, having slipped away, the wandering, transmigrating self becomes something other than what it truly is. It's with exactly this in mind that Ajātaśatru puts the question to Gārgya, who by now has nothing left to offer, so as to draw out his understanding. 'Where was this one then, and where did this coming-back come from?' Both of these questions were really Gārgya's to ask. He never asked them. But Ajātaśatru doesn't leave it at that — he presses on, determined that Gārgya must be made to understand, true to his earlier word: 'I will make you know.' And yet, even while being led this far, Gārgya — faced with where the Self was before waking, and where its return came from — simply couldn't work either one out, couldn't even find the words to answer, or to ask. Gārgya, in the end, neither grasped it nor knew it.
Close to the Sanskrit
Having observed Gārgya to be in that state, Ajātaśatru said: 'Only this much?' — 'Is this much of Brahman known, or is there something more?' The other one said, 'Only this much, indeed.' 'By this much that is known, Brahman does not become known,' said Ajātaśatru; 'why are you so proud? Let me tell you Brahman.' Is it being said that this much, though known, is not known at all? No — because we hear that this knowledge bears fruit; and it is not possible to understand these statements as mere arthavāda; for the statements are seen to be intent on a new injunction with respect to each teaching of meditation — such as 'you stood supreme over all beings' and so on; and correspondingly, fruits are heard everywhere, distinctly assigned; if they were mere arthavāda, this would be improper. How then, by these considerations, has the non-Brahman-status of what Gārgya held to be Brahman been made known? In the waking state, just as the person Gārgya has in mind — the agent, the enjoyer, that is, Brahman — is present in the organs, so too, in Ajātaśatru's view, that master is present, just as a king is present among his servants; but as for what would determine the distinction between the servant and the master, as conceived respectively by Gārgya and by Ajātaśatru — that, because of commingling, is not clearly ascertained; namely, that being-the-seer alone belongs to the enjoyer, not being-the-seen; and that being-the-seen alone belongs to the non-enjoyer, not being-the-seer; and both of these, being commingled here, are impossible to show apart — hence the recourse to the sleeping man. But surely, even in the sleeping man, when addressed by his particular names, it is the enjoyer alone who would be recognized to respond, not the non-enjoyer — so there would be no determination even by this method. No — because what Gārgya has in mind has already been precisely determined: namely, he who, concealed by the True, is Prāṇa, the self, the immortal, unset among speech and the rest as they set; whose body is the waters, called 'having the white garment'; who, because he has no rival, is called 'the vast'; and who is Soma, the king, of sixteen parts — he, established in his own function, abides, being already well-known, of unset nature; and no activity of anyone else opposed to him is in question at that time, in what Gārgya has in mind. Therefore he ought to have been roused by being addressed with his own names; but he was not awakened; therefore, by elimination, what Gārgya has in mind is not the enjoyer of Brahman. If it had the nature of an enjoyer, it would indeed enjoy its own object once attained; for fire, whose nature is to burn and to illuminate, does not fail to burn, or illuminate, the straw and the like — its combustible, proper object — once reached; and if it did not burn or illuminate the object it had reached, it could not be determined that this is fire, a burner, or an illuminator. Likewise, if this Prāṇa that Gārgya has in mind had the nature of one who perceives its object, sound and the rest, once reached, it would perceive its own object — the very sound 'Bṛhat, having the white garment' and so on — just as fire, without fail, would burn and illuminate straw once reached, in the same way. Therefore, because of the non-perception of the sounds and so on that had reached it, it is determined that its nature is that of a non-enjoyer; for a thing whose nature has been determined never deviates from it, ever; hence it is established that Prāṇa is a non-enjoyer. If it is said that the non-recognition is due to not grasping the connection with the particular name used for addressing — this could be so, just as, among many seated together, because of not grasping the connection with one's own particular name, one being addressed, even while hearing 'this one is addressing me,' does not specifically recognize it; likewise, Prāṇa does not grasp the word used for addressing — names such as 'Bṛhat' and so on — because he has not grasped the connection 'these are my names,' not because he lacks the capacity to know at all — if this is said, no, because it is untenable that there be non-recognition once a deity is granted. For one for whom a deity presiding over, say, the moon, is accepted as being, at the individual level, Prāṇa, the enjoyer — for him, the connection with a particular name, for the sake of communication with that deity, must certainly exist; for there do exist well-known names — 'Prāṇa' and so on — pertaining to Prāṇa; setting those aside, the address is stated with unfamiliar names such as 'Bṛhat,' because of the deliberate avoidance of the ordinary convention. Therefore, if it is said that this is merely the enjoyer's own spontaneous non-recognition — no, because the purpose is to rule out identifying Prāṇa with a particular deity; since, by the mere non-recognition of the address alone, the non-enjoyer-status of the individual, non-sleeping Prāṇa is already established, the address by names pertaining to the deity of the moon is for the purpose of refuting Gārgya's particular notion that the deity of the moon, namely Prāṇa, is the enjoyer in this body; for that could not be accomplished by addressing him with an ordinary name. By the very refutation of Prāṇa, since the other organs, being absorbed in Prāṇa, cannot function, there is no possibility even of suspecting them as the enjoyer; and this is also because there is no other deity at that time. But surely, the passage from 'you stood supreme' up to 'possessing self' shows a distinction of deities possessing qualities? — No, because it is accepted, by the illustration of the spokes and the nave found in all the scriptures, that he is one alone as Prāṇa; and because, in statements such as 'concealed by the True' and 'Prāṇa indeed is the immortal,' there is no acceptance of any enjoyer other than, external to, Prāṇa. And because it is said, 'this one indeed is all the gods; which is the one god? — Prāṇa' — this establishes the oneness of all the gods as Prāṇa alone. Likewise, there is no room for doubt among the various organs, since, as in the case of separate bodies, the linking-up of memory, cognition, desire and the rest would be impossible; for we do not find that what one has seen, another remembers, knows, desires, or connects up, nor that things of a different kind are combined into one object — this we understand. Having observed that the parts of a house — pillar, wall, straw, wood and so on — possess an existence obtained independently of their own birth, growth, decline, destruction, name, form, function and properties, and that they, and their aggregate as well, are the object for one seer, hearer, thinker, and knower, we conclude that likewise the parts beginning with Prāṇa, and their aggregate as well, ought to possess such an existence obtained independently of their own birth, growth, decline, destruction, name, form, function and properties, and be the object for one seer, hearer, thinker, and knower. If it is said that, the deities being equally conscious, there is no acceptance of a subordinate status because of that equality — we reply: Prāṇa's possession of consciousness is granted because he is seen to be addressed by particular names; and if it is said that, granting consciousness, the acceptance of his being for-another's-sake is untenable because of equality — no, because the intention is to make known the Self that is free of limiting adjuncts and alone. For attachment to action, agent, and result is born of the limiting adjunct of name and form belonging to the Self, superimposed by ignorance; the cause of this is the world's transmigratory existence, characterized by the false identification with action, agent, and result; that is to be removed by the knowledge of the Self's own true nature, free of limiting adjuncts; and it is with the intention of making known that true nature that the Upaniṣad begins — opening with 'let me tell you Brahman' and 'by this much it does not become known,' and concluding with 'this much indeed, friend, is immortality'; and there is nothing else, in between, either intended or stated; therefore the objection, that there is no acceptance of subordination because of equality, has no scope. For, since a relation of subordination between two things possessing particular attributes, both bearing limiting adjuncts, is impossible here, by elimination it is only a matter of general, approximate meaning. Therefore, the inner organ — whose nature is resolve, doubt, and the rest, identified with that — this is 'puruṣa,' from lying in the city, the body. 'Where was this one then?' — this question, with the intention of making known its true nature, is meant to show, by the absence of effect, that prior to waking, the Self's nature is the opposite of action, agent, and result; for prior to waking, no effect of action, such as pleasure, is perceived at all; therefore, because it is not engaged in action, it is understood that this very natural state belongs to the Self — the state in which it was, and from which, having fallen away, the transmigrating being becomes different from its true nature. With this intention, he questions Gārgya, now devoid of any further insight, in order to develop his understanding. 'Where was this one then, and whence did this coming come?' — this pair ought indeed to have been asked by Gārgya himself; nevertheless, though not asked by Gārgya, Ajātaśatru does not remain indifferent; he proceeds, resolved that 'he must be made to understand,' because he had promised, 'I will surely make him know.' Thus, even while being instructed, Gārgya — as to where this Self was prior to waking, and from where this coming came — could not work out either of these, whether to state or to ask; Gārgya indeed neither grasped nor knew.