Bhashya
यच्चोक्तम् स्वार्थविघातकत्वादप्रामाण्यमिति, तदपि न,यच्चोक्तम्-कर्मकाण्डप्रामाण्यविघातकृत् उपनिषद्वाक्यमिति, तन्न, अन्यार्थत्वात् ।ब्रह्मैकत्वप्रतिपादनपरा हि उपनिषदः न इष्टार्थप्राप्तौ साधनोपदेशं तस्मिन्वा पुरुषनियोगं वारयन्ति, अनेकार्थत्वानुपपत्तेरेव ।न च कर्मकाण्डवाक्यानां स्वार्थे प्रमा नोत्पद्यते ।असाधारणे चेत्स्वार्थे प्रमाम् उत्पादयति वाक्यम्, कुतोऽन्येन विरोधः स्यात् ।ब्रह्मैकत्वे निर्विषयत्वात् प्रमा नोत्पद्यत एवेति चेत्, न, प्रत्यक्षत्वात्प्रमायाः ।'दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत' 'ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः' इत्येवमादिवाक्येभ्यः प्रत्यक्षा प्रमा जायमाना; सा नैव भविष्यति, यद्युपनिषदो ब्रह्मैकत्वं बोधयिष्यन्तीत्यनुमानम्; न च अनुमानं प्रत्यक्षविरोधे प्रामाण्यं लभते; तस्मादसदैवैतद्द्घीयते-प्रमैव नोत्पद्यत इति ।अपि च यथाप्राप्तस्यैव अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितस्य क्रियाकारकफलस्य आश्रयेण इष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहारोपायसामान्ये प्रवृत्तस्य तद्विशेषमजानतः तदाचक्षाणा श्रुतिः क्रियाकारकभेदस्य लोकप्रसिद्धस्य सत्यताम् असत्यतां वा न आचष्टे न च वारयति, इष्टानिष्टफलप्राप्तिपरिहारोपायविधिपरत्वात् ।यथा काम्येषु प्रवृत्ता श्रुतिः कामानां मिथ्याज्ञानप्रभवत्वे सत्यपि यथाप्राप्तानेव कामानुपादाय तत्साधनान्येव विधत्ते,साधनसंबन्धविशेषान् अनेकधा उपदिशति ।तत्र पुरुषाः स्वयमेव यथारुचि साधनविशेषेषु प्रवर्तन्ते ; शास्त्रं तु सवितृप्रदीपादिवत् उदास्त एव ।तथा कस्यचित्परोऽपि पुरुषार्थः अपुरुषार्थवदवभासते ; यस्य यथावभासः, स तथारूपं पुरुषार्थं पश्यति ; तदनुरूपाणि साधनान्युपादित्सते ।तथा च अर्थवादोऽपि—‘त्रयाः प्राजापत्याः प्रजापतौ पितरि ब्रह्मचर्यमूषुः’ इत्यादिः ।तस्मात् न ब्रह्मैकत्वं ज्ञापयिष्यन्तो वेदान्ता विधिशास्त्रस्य बाधकाः ।न च विधिशास्त्रम् एतावता निर्विषयं स्यात् ।नापि उक्तकारकादिभेदं विधिशास्त्रम् उपनिषदां ब्रह्मैकत्वं प्रति प्रामाण्यं निवर्तयति ।स्वविषयशूराणि हि प्रमाणानि, श्रोत्रादिवत् ॥
In plain words
As for the claim that the Upanishads are invalid because they undercut their own point — that's not right either. And the claim that the Upanishadic teaching undermines the ritual scriptures' authority — that's not right, because the two are simply not talking about the same thing. The Upanishads exist to teach that Brahman is one; they never once forbid teaching someone how to get what they want, or telling them to go do it — one text can't sensibly pull in two different directions at once, so there's no need for it to. And it's not as though the ritual texts fail to give real knowledge within their own territory — if a statement gives valid knowledge about its own proper subject, how could it possibly clash with something in a completely different territory? Say you object: 'Brahman's oneness can't be known at all, because nothing can grasp it as an object.' No — because that knowledge is itself immediately obvious once you encounter the teaching. Just as 'let the one who wants heaven perform the new-moon and full-moon rites' or 'never kill a brahmin' produce plain, direct knowledge — you might say the same won't happen with the Upanishads, since 'the Upanishads teach Brahman's oneness' is only an inference, and an inference can't outrank direct evidence. So — the objector concludes — the claim that no real knowledge comes from them rests on nothing at all. And here's the deeper point: scripture speaks to someone who is already living inside the ordinary picture of doer, deed, and result — a picture ignorance itself has set up — pursuing, in a general way, what he wants and avoiding what he doesn't, without asking whether that whole picture is even true. Scripture doesn't step in to certify it or refute it. It isn't its job to. Its job is simply to tell him how to get what he's after. Take the rites people perform for particular results: even though the desires behind them come from a mistaken view of things, scripture meets people exactly where they are and just teaches them the means — again and again, in detail. From there, people choose for themselves, according to their own taste, which of those means to pursue; scripture, like the sun or a lamp, just gives light without playing favorites. And so what looks, to one person, like a genuine goal worth pursuing, can look to someone else like nothing at all — each person sees it exactly as it appears to him, and reaches for the means that fit that appearance. This is exactly the spirit of a passage like 'Prajapati's three kinds of children lived as students under their father, Prajapati' and others like it. So the Vedanta texts, which are here to teach that Brahman is one, are not tearing down the ritual scriptures. Nor does that leave the ritual scriptures with nothing to do. And the ritual portion, with its talk of doer and deed, doesn't touch the Upanishads' authority to teach that Brahman is one, either. Every means of knowledge is simply unbeatable on its own ground — the ear for sound, the eye for form, and the Upanishads for exactly this.
Close to the Sanskrit
As for what was said — 'because it destroys its own purport, it is invalid' — that too is not [correct]. As for what was said — 'the Upanishadic statement is a destroyer of the validity of the ritual portion' — that is not [correct] either, because it has a different purpose. For the Upanishads, being devoted to teaching the oneness of Brahman, do not forbid the teaching of a means for attaining a desired object, nor the engaging of a person in that means — simply because it is untenable for one thing to serve several purposes. Nor does it happen that valid cognition fails to arise, within its own sphere, from the statements of the ritual portion. If a statement produces valid cognition in its own exclusive sphere, how could there be conflict with something else? If [you say]: 'Regarding the oneness of Brahman, valid cognition simply does not arise at all, because it has no object [of any means of knowledge]' — no, because that cognition is itself directly evident. Just as, from statements such as 'One desiring heaven should sacrifice with the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices' [and] 'a brahmin is not to be killed,' directly evident valid cognition arises — that [same kind of cognition] will surely not occur, [you might object,] since 'the Upanishads will teach the oneness of Brahman' is a mere inference; and an inference does not gain validity when it conflicts with direct perception. Therefore this — that valid cognition simply does not arise — is grasped only as something groundless. Moreover, scripture, addressing one who — relying on action, agent, and result exactly as apprehended and presented by nescience — has engaged in the general means for obtaining the desired and avoiding the undesired, without knowing its particulars, neither declares nor denies the reality or unreality of the popularly recognized distinction of action and agent, nor does it forbid it — because its concern is with prescribing the means for obtaining a desired and avoiding an undesired result. Just as scripture, in dealing with desire-motivated rites, though desires indeed arise from false knowledge, nevertheless takes up desires exactly as apprehended and prescribes only the means for them, teaching in many ways the particular connections of the means. There, people themselves, according to their own liking, take up the particular means; but scripture, like the sun or a lamp, simply remains impartial. Likewise, for someone, even a supreme human goal may appear as though it were not one at all; as a thing appears to him, so he sees that goal in just that form, and wishes to take up the means corresponding to it. And so too the explanatory passage — 'the three sons of Prajapati practiced celibate studentship under Prajapati their father' — and so on. Therefore the Vedanta texts, which are going to make known the oneness of Brahman, are not underminers of the injunctive scripture. Nor would the injunctive scripture, merely on this account, become without an object. Nor does the injunctive scripture, which teaches the aforementioned distinction of agent and the rest, negate the Upanishads' validity with regard to the oneness of Brahman. For the means of valid knowledge are each unassailable within their own domain — like the ear and the other senses.