Bhashya
किं पुनः दृष्ट्यादीनाम् अग्नेरौष्ण्यप्रकाशनज्वलनादिवत्धर्मभेदः, आहोस्वित् अभिन्नस्यैव धर्मस्य परोपाधिनिमित्तंधर्मान्यत्वमिति ।अत्र केचिद्व्याचक्षते— आत्मवस्तुनः स्वतएव एकत्वं नानात्वं च- यथा गोः गोद्रव्यतया एकत्वम्, सास्नादीनां धर्माणां परस्परतो भेदः ; यथा स्थूलेषु एकत्वं नानात्वं च, तथा निरवयवेषु अमूर्तवस्तुषु एकत्वं नानात्वं च अनुमेयम्; सर्वत्र अव्यभिचारदर्शनात् आत्मनोऽपि तद्वदेव द्रष्टृत्वादीनां परस्परं नानात्वम्, आत्मना चैकत्वमिति ।न, अन्यपरत्वात्-- न हि द्रष्ट्रादिधर्मभेदप्रदर्शनपरम् इदं वाक्यम् 'यद्वै तत्' इत्यादि ; किं तर्हि, यदि चैतन्यात्मज्योतिः, कथं न जानाति सुषुप्ते? नूनम् अतो न चैतन्यात्मज्योतिः- इत्येवमाशङ्काप्राप्तौ, तन्निराकरणाय एतदारब्धम् 'यद्वै तत्' इत्यादि ।यत् अस्य जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोः चक्षुराद्यनेकोपाधिद्वारं चैतन्यात्मज्योतिःस्वाभाव्यम् उपलक्षितं द्रष्टृत्वाद्यभिधेयव्यवहारापन्नम्, सुषुप्ते उपाधिभेदव्यापारनिवृत्तौ अनुद्भास्यमानत्वात् अनुपलक्ष्यमाणस्वभावमपि उपाधिभेदेन भिन्नमिव-- यथाप्राप्तानुवादेनैव विद्यमानत्वमुच्यते ; तत्र द्रष्टृत्वादिधर्मभेदकल्पना विवक्षितार्थानभिज्ञतया ; सैन्धवघनवत् प्रज्ञानैकरसघनश्रुतिविरोधाच्च ; 'विज्ञानमानन्दम्' 'सत्यं ज्ञानम्' 'प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च ।शब्दप्रवृत्तेश्च-- लौकिकी च शब्दप्रवृत्तिः-- 'चक्षुषा रूपं विजानाति' 'श्रोत्रेण शब्दं विजानाति' 'रसनेनान्नस्य रसं विजानाति' इति च सर्वत्रैव च द्रष्टृत्वादि शब्दाभिधेयानां विज्ञानशब्दवाच्यता-मेव दर्शयति ; शब्दप्रवृत्तिश्च प्रमाणम् ।दृष्टान्तोपपत्तेश्च— यथा हि लोके स्वच्छस्वाभाव्ययुक्तः स्फटिकः तन्नि- मित्तमेव केवलं हरितनीळलोहिताद्युपाधिभेदसंयोगात् तदा- कारत्वं भजते, न च स्वच्छस्वाभाव्यव्यतिरेकेण हरि- तनीळलोहितादिलक्षणा धर्मभेदाः स्फटिकस्य कल्पयितुं शक्यन्ते— तथा चक्षुराद्युपाधिभेदसंयोगात् प्रज्ञानघनस्वभा- वस्यैव आत्मज्योतिषः दृष्ट्यादिशक्तिभेद उपलक्ष्यते, प्रज्ञान- घनस्य स्वच्छस्वाभाव्यात् स्फटिकस्वच्छस्वाभाव्यवत् ।स्व- यंज्योतिष्ट्वाच्च— यथा च आदित्यज्योतिः अवभास्यभेदैः संयुज्यमानं हरितनीळपीतलोहितादिभेदैरविभाज्यं तदाका- राभासं भवति, तथा च कृत्स्नं जगत् अवभासयत् चक्षुरा- दीनि च तदाकारं भवति ; तथा चोक्तम्— ‘आत्मनैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते’ इत्यादि ।न च निरवयवेषु अनेकात्मता शक्यते कल्पयितुम्, दृष्टान्ताभावात् ।यदपि आकाशस्य सर्वगत- त्वादिधर्मभेदः परिकल्प्यते, परमाण्वादीनां च गन्धरसाद्यने- कगुणत्वम्, तदपि निरूप्यमाणं परोपाधिनिमित्तमेव भवति ; आकाशस्य तावत् सर्वगतत्वं नाम न स्वतः धर्मोऽस्ति ; स- र्वोपाधिसंश्रयाद्धि सर्वत्र स्वेन रूपेण सत्त्वमपेक्ष्य सर्वगतत्व- व्यवहारः ; न तु आकाशः कचिद्गतो वा, अगतो वा स्वतः ; गमनं हि नाम देशान्तरस्थस्य देशान्तरेण संयोगकारणम् ; साद्विद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितात् अन्यः अन्यमिव आत्मानं मन्यमानः-असति आत्मनः प्रविभक्ते वस्त्वन्तरे, असति च आत्मनिततः प्रविभक्तेः, अन्यः अन्यत् पश्येत् उपलभेत ; तच्च दर्शितंस्वप्ने प्रत्यक्षतः- ' घ्नन्तीव जिनन्तीव ' इति ।तथा अन्यःअन्यत् जिघ्रेत् रसयेत् वदेत् शृणुयात् मन्वीत स्पृशेत् वि-जानीयादिति ॥
In plain words
Here is the next question: is there really a difference among seeing, hearing and the rest -- the way fire's heat, its light, and its burning are different from one another -- or is that apparent difference just the mark of outside conditions acting on one single, undivided thing? Some say the Self itself has both oneness and manyness built into its own nature -- the way a cow is one as cow-substance, even though its parts, the dewlap and so on, differ from each other; the way gross things show both oneness and manyness; and so, they argue, the same pattern must hold even for something partless and formless, since no case is ever seen to break the rule. On this view, the Self's own powers of seeing and the rest genuinely differ from each other, even while, as the Self, they remain one. But no -- that reading misses the point of the sentence entirely. The verse 'that which indeed is that' was never trying to show a difference among the properties of seeing and the rest. So what is it doing? Here is the real worry it answers: if this is truly the light of conscious selfhood, why does it fail to know anything in deep sleep? Doesn't that prove it isn't conscious selfhood after all? It is exactly to lay that doubt to rest that this passage was written. What it is really saying is this: that self-luminous nature, glimpsed through the eye and the other organs in waking and in dream, and caught up there in ordinary talk of 'seeing' and 'hearing' -- in deep sleep, once those organs have stopped working, it simply doesn't shine forth in that same visible way. But even though it isn't indicated there, the verse is only restating that it still exists, using its ordinary name exactly as we already know it -- it isn't actually divided, it only looks divided because the surrounding conditions differ. The whole notion of a real difference in properties like seeing-ness comes only from missing what the verse actually intends. It would also contradict scripture, which calls consciousness one compact mass of a single flavor, like a solid block of rock-salt -- and which says, in so many words, that consciousness is bliss, that truth is knowledge, that consciousness is brahman. Consider, too, how we actually talk: we say 'one sees form with the eye,' 'one hears sound with the ear,' 'one tastes food with the tongue' -- and in every case, this only shows that seeing, hearing and the rest are simply different names our language gives to one thing: knowing. And how we speak is itself good evidence. Think of a crystal. Set beside something green, it looks green; beside something red, red -- purely because it is naturally clear, nothing more. You could never claim the crystal itself actually holds a rainbow of separate colors apart from that one clear nature. It's exactly the same with the light of the Self. Seen through the eye and the other organs, its one nature -- utter, clear consciousness -- looks like it has split into separate powers: seeing here, hearing there. But that's only because it is naturally clear, the way the crystal is naturally clear, and because it needs no other light to shine by. Or think of sunlight: falling on a green thing, a red thing, a yellow thing, it seems to take on each of their colors, though the light itself is never actually divided by any of them. In just that way, lighting up the whole world, it takes on the very shape of the eye and the other senses too -- without ever ceasing to be one. That is exactly what scripture means when it says, 'by this very light of the Self, a person sits, moves, works.' None of this lets you posit a crowd of separate selves in something partless -- there simply isn't a single case that would support it. And when people imagine that space is 'everywhere' as if that were one of its own built-in properties, or that atoms have several distinct qualities like smell and taste, look closely and you'll find the same thing at work: an outside condition, nothing intrinsic. Space's being 'everywhere' isn't a property space carries in itself -- it's just how we describe the plain fact that space is present, in its own way, relative to everything else that happens to rest on it. Space hasn't gone anywhere, and it hasn't failed to go anywhere either, because 'going' only makes sense for something that starts in one place and connects with another. And this brings us to the real point: the self that mistakes another for another does so only because nescience has set up something else in place of the true Self. In reality, nothing is ever cut off from the Self, and the Self is never divided within itself -- so there is, strictly, no one there to see another, or sense another, at all. That is exactly what the dream shows so vividly: 'as if striking, as if slaying' -- it only looks that way. And the same holds for every other sense: there is no real other there to smell, to taste, to speak with, to hear, to think about, or to touch.
Close to the Sanskrit
Again, is there a real difference of properties among seeing and the rest, like the difference among fire's heat, light, and burning -- or is this an 'otherness of property' caused merely by an external adjunct, of a single undivided property? On this point, some explain: the real entity called the Self has, by its own nature alone, both oneness and manyness -- just as a cow has oneness by being cow-substance, while its parts, the dewlap and the rest, differ among themselves; and just as gross things have both oneness and manyness, so too, in partless and formless entities, oneness and manyness must be inferred, since no exception is ever seen anywhere; of the Self too, in the same way, the functions of seeing and the rest differ among themselves, while as the Self they are one. [Śaṅkara replies:] No -- because the sentence aims at something else; for this sentence, 'that which indeed is that,' and so on, does not aim at showing a difference among the properties of seeing and the rest. What then? If it is the light of conscious selfhood, how does it fail to know in deep sleep? Surely, then, it is not the light of conscious selfhood -- when such a doubt has thus arisen, this passage, 'that which indeed is that,' and so on, was composed to refute it. What is meant is that this self-luminous nature of the Self, marked out through the many adjuncts of the eye and the rest in waking and dream and falling into the verbal usage denoted by seeing-ness and the rest, is -- since it fails to shine forth once the operation of the different adjuncts has ceased in deep sleep -- though its nature is then unindicated, spoken of as merely existing, by the plain restatement of it exactly as it is ordinarily known, though it appears divided by the difference of adjuncts. There, the notion of a real difference of properties like seeing-ness arises only from not knowing the intended meaning; and because it would contradict scripture's declaration that consciousness is one compact mass of a single essence, like a lump of rock-salt, and because of such texts as 'consciousness is bliss,' 'truth is knowledge,' 'consciousness is brahman.' And also because of how words are actually used -- for ordinary usage says: 'one perceives form by the eye,' 'one perceives sound by the ear,' 'one perceives the taste of food by the tongue' -- and everywhere this shows only that what the words seeing-ness and the rest denote is properly expressed by the single word 'cognition'; and the usage of words is itself a valid proof. And because the illustration holds good: just as, in the world, a crystal endowed with a naturally clear character takes on, owing to that clarity alone, the appearance of green, blue, red and other adjuncts in conjunction with it, and no properties defined as green, blue, red and so forth can be posited of the crystal itself apart from its own clear nature -- so too, in conjunction with the different adjuncts, the eye and the rest, a differentiation among the powers of seeing and the rest is perceived of the light of the Self, whose very nature is the compact mass of consciousness, owing to that mass's own clear nature, just like the crystal's own clear nature, and because it is self-luminous. And just as sunlight, conjoined with the different objects it illumines, takes on the mere semblance of the form of the different green, blue, yellow, red and other objects, though itself undivided by them -- so too, illumining the whole world, it takes on the very form of the eye and the other organs as well; as it is said, 'by the Self alone does this one abide, by its light,' and so on. Nor can a manifold of separate selves be posited of partless things, for lack of any example. And as for the difference of properties like all-pervasiveness imagined of space, and the several qualities smell, taste and the rest imagined of atoms and the like -- these too, when properly examined, turn out to be caused only by an external adjunct. Space's all-pervasiveness, to begin with, is not by itself an intrinsic property; for it is only with reference to a thing's mere presence in its own form, resting as it does on every other adjunct everywhere, that the designation 'all-pervading' arises; space has not itself gone anywhere, nor has it failed to go anywhere, of its own accord; for 'going' means the cause of a thing's conjunction with a different place, given that it is situated in one place. That [Self], regarding another as if it were another, owing to what is presented in place of it by nescience -- since, the Self not being divided from any other entity, and there being no such division within the Self -- [if it were otherwise] one would as another see, or apprehend, another; and this was shown directly in dream: 'as if striking, as if slaying.' In the same way one would, as another, smell, taste, speak to, hear, think of, or touch another.