Bhashya
'य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते' इति च्छायापुरुष एवदिष्ट इति ग्रहणस्याप्यपनयनकारणं वक्तव्यं स्यात् ।स्वप्न-सुषुप्तात्मग्रहणयोरपि तदपनयनकारणं च स्वयं ब्रूयात् ।न च उक्तम् ।तेन मन्यामहे न अक्षिणि च्छायात्माप्रजापतिना उपदिष्टः ।किं चान्यत्, अक्षिणि द्रष्टा चेत्'दृश्यते' इत्युपदिष्टः स्यात्, तत इदं युक्तम् ।'एतं त्वेवते' इत्युक्त्वा स्वप्नेऽपि द्रष्टुरेवोपदेशः ।स्वप्ने न द्रष्टोपदिष्टइति चेत्, न, 'अपि रोदितीव' 'अप्रियवेत्तेव' इत्युपदे-शात् ।न च द्रष्टुरन्यः कश्चित्स्वप्ने महीयमानश्चरति ।'अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिः' इति न्यायतः श्रुत्यन्तरे सि-द्धत्वात् ।यद्यपि स्वप्ने सधीर्भवति, तथापि न धीःस्वप्नभोगोपलब्धिं प्रति करणत्वं भजते ।किं तर्हि,पटचित्रवज्जाग्रद्वासनाश्रया दृश्यैव धीर्भवतीति न द्रष्टुःस्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वबाधः स्यात् ।किंचान्यत्, जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोर्भू-तानि च आत्मानं च जानाति- इमानि भूतान्ययमह-मस्मीति ।प्राप्तौ सत्यां प्रतिषेधो युक्तः स्यात्- नाह खल्व-यमित्यादि ।तथा चेतनस्यैव अविद्यानिमित्तयोः सशरी-रत्वे सति प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिर्नास्तीत्युक्त्वा तस्यैवाशरी-रस्य सतो विद्यायां सत्यां सशरीरत्वे प्राप्तयोः प्रतिषेधोयुक्तः 'अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः' इति ।
In plain words
If the person seen within the eye were merely the shadow-self, the teacher would have had to explain how to discard that interpretation, just as he would need to account for the states of dream and deep sleep. Yet no such correction is given. We therefore conclude that Prajapati did not teach the shadow-self as the ultimate reality in the eye. Moreover, if the seer within the eye were designated simply as an object of sight, the subsequent teaching addressed directly to you—'This is indeed yours'—would not consistently point to the inner seer even in the dream state. To argue that the seer is absent in dreams is refuted by the text's own descriptions: 'he weeps as it were,' and 'he experiences unpleasantness as it were.' No other witness roams the dream state, for another scripture establishes through clear reasoning that 'here this person is self-luminous.' Even though the self is associated with the intellect during a dream, the intellect does not function as an independent instrument for generating dream experiences. Rather, like a picture painted on cloth, the mind simply reflects latent impressions from the waking state, leaving the self-luminous nature of the true seer entirely intact. Furthermore, in both waking and dreaming states, a person clearly recognizes external beings and the self, knowing 'I am this.' Where such ordinary identification is already present, a negation such as 'not this, not this' makes sense. Similarly, the text first declares that embodiment caused by ignorance leaves one subject to pleasant and unpleasant experiences; it then appropriately denies those very dualities to the unembodied self, stating, 'Bodiless indeed, pleasant and unpleasant do not touch him.'
Close to the Sanskrit
If the statement 'the person who is seen in the eye' refers to the shadow-person alone, then a reason for the removal of [that interpretation] should be stated. He should also state himself the reason for its removal in the grasping of the dream and deep sleep states. And that has not been stated. Therefore we think the shadow-self is not taught by Prajapati in the eye. Furthermore, if the seer in the eye were taught as 'is seen', then this is apt: saying 'this indeed of you', the instruction is of the seer alone even in dream. If it is said the seer is not taught in dream, no, because of the instruction 'weeps as it were', 'experiences unpleasant things as if'. And no other seer besides roams about in dream, since it is established in another Śruti from reasoning: 'here this person is self-luminous'. Although in dream he is associated with the intellect, nevertheless the intellect does not attain the status of being an instrument towards the perception of dream-enjoyment. What then? Like a painted cloth, the intellect is merely an object seen resting on waking impressions, so the self-luminousness of the seer is not sublated. What else? In waking and dream he knows beings and the self—'I am this being, I am this'. When attainment is present, prohibition is proper—'not indeed this I', etc. Similarly, having stated that for the conscious being alone, when embodied, there is no warding off of the pleasant and unpleasant, the prohibition of them when they arise upon embodiment for that very unembodied one is proper: 'bodiless indeed being him, pleasant and unpleasant do not touch'.