॥ २ ॥ । । ॥} ---- , ॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥। ।} {॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥ ॥} । । । । । ---- ---- ---- । । । ॥ §०§ ---- । ---- । , , ? , ; । , ---- । , ॥१॥ ---- । ॥ §१§
In plain words
Here ends the second , named The Setting Out of the , in the of the , composed by the venerable master .
Now the third .
We praise that whose is an awareness that never sets, and without whom nothing at all could be, not even all the views together.
It was said in this that memory is established from alone. To refute just that, there is the passage that begins
“True”
and so on, and ends
“who has the of knowledge, memory and exclusion”:
a group of seven verses. The rebuttal of the faults found in action and in relation will come in the second , the . But as for knowledge as something separate, which the other side refuted in the views of , of the and the rest, that is just what the author himself holds, and so that is simply another refutation. Of these seven, two verses show that, because knowing has the form of self-awareness, the experience does not shine in memory, even though memory is born of . Then two verses first raise as a doubt that memory is error and set it aside, and with the third the doubt that, as a further consequence, all determinations would be error too is laid to rest. Then, having said in one verse that if memory does not hold together even where there is a , dealings are cut off, he says in one verse that on our own side it does hold together. This is the gist. Now the meaning of the text is set out.
True; but the knowing that is memory, even though it is born of the of an earlier experience, rests in itself, and so it does not know the first experience.
By “True” he shows: “Much from within the I must, for now, accept.” And by “but”, a word that names a distinction, he says: “What is not to be accepted is refuted.” Here, in memory, what has to be defended is not the of the bare content, which could be established from alone. Rather, without the of the experience, how could there be a memory of the form “that”? And without that memory, how could there be dealings through desire? For experience settled that this thing is a means to pleasure, and from that comes taking it up. Here, from the produced by the earlier experience, this much has come about: although that knowing was not produced by its content, it still has that content. But that much achieves nothing, for in a self-luminous knowing that rests in itself the earlier experience does not shine, just as the content does not.
“But surely, just because it is born of , let memory take the earlier experience too as its content.” With this doubt in view, he says:
Seeing shines by itself alone, and it is not to be known by another, as the seeing of taste is not known by the seeing of form. Being born of a is being like it, not the grasping of it.