दृक् ज्ञानम् , तच्च जडात् विभिद्यते स्वप्रकाशैकरूपतया , जडो हि प्रकाशात् पृथग्भूतो वक्तव्यः , तेन दृक् स्वाभासा , आभासः प्रकाशमानता सा स्वं रूपमव्यव्हिचारि यस्याः , स्वस्य च आभासनं रूपं यस्याः । सत्यपि बाह्ये तच्छरीरसंक्रान्तं न प्रकाशनं ज्ञानस्य रूपं भवितुमर्हति , परप्रकाशनात्मकनिजरूपप्रकाशनमेव हि स्वप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानस्य भण्यते । ननु स्वाभासमेव सत् तत् अनुभवज्ञानं स्मरणे भासिष्यते , न ---- इत्याह नान्येन वेद्या । परत्र यदि दृक् भासेत तर्हि न सा स्वाभासा , इदमेव हि स्वप्रकाशस्य लक्षणम् ---- स्वयं हि यदि प्रकाशेत तदा परेण सह असंबन्धात् संबन्धप्राणा कथं परत्र इति सप्तमी संगच्छताम् ; तथा च रूपज्ञानेन रसे दृक् रसविषयं ज्ञानं न वेद्यते , एवं हि चक्षुषैव रसः फलतो गृहीत एव स्यात् । ननु यदि न आभाति स्मरणे ऽनुभवः किं तर्हि संस्कारेण कृतं स्यात् , रूपज्ञानं न रसज्ञानजात् संस्कारात् जातम् , तत् कथम् अयं प्रसङ्गः , तस्मात् संस्कार एव भवत्संभावितदोषभङ्गाय प्रभवेत् । नैतत् , यतो हि असौ तत्संस्कारसंस्कृतात् समनन्तरप्रत्ययात् उत्थितः स्मृतिबोधः , तेन तत्सदृशो भवतु शास्वासंनिवेश इव पूर्वसंनिवेशतुल्यः , न तु यो यत्संस्कारात् जातः स तस्य वेदनस्वभावो भवति ---- इति युक्तम् । सदृशत्वस्यापि गतिरवगमः कथम् ? न हि अनुभवज्ञानं सादृश्यं गमयति , नापि स्मृतिज्ञानम् , परस्परम् असंवेदने द्वयनिष्ठसादृश्याध्यवसायायोगात् , अभ्यस्य च तदुभयवेदनरूपस्य अभावात् इति संस्कारात् परं सविषयतामात्रं स्मृतेः सिद्धम् , न तु अनुभवविषयत्वम् , नापि अस्य विषयस्य पूर्वानुभवविषयीकृतत्वम् ---- इति निश्चयः एषः ॥२॥
ननु यदि स्मृतिज्ञाने अनुभवस्य सत्यतः प्रकाशः स्यात् , तन्मुखेन च तद्विषयस्य , तदा भवेत् भवदुक्तेरवकाशः , यावता स्मृतिर्विकल्परूपत्वात् केवलमपरकाशमानमेव अनुभवं तद्विषयं च अध्यवस्यति , तत् इयं भ्रान्तिस्वभावा , तत्र कोऽयं निर्बन्धः ? तदेतत् दर्शयति शङ्क्यमानत्वेन
अथातद्विषयत्वेऽपि स्मृतेस्तदवसायतः ।
दृष्टालम्बनता भ्रान्त्या ॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥। ॥ §०§
न तद्दर्शनं नापि तद्विषयः स्मृतेर्विषयः , तथापि तु उभयम् अध्यवसीयते , भ्रमरूपतया स्मृतेः । एतत् निराकरोति
॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥॥। तदेतदसमञ्जसम् ॥ इप्क्_१,३।३ ॥
अत्र कारिकया उपपत्तिम् आह
स्मृतितैव कथं तावद्भ्रान्तेश्चार्थस्थितिः कथम् ।
पूर्वानुभवसंकारापेक्षा च किमितीष्यते ॥ §१§
In plain words
“Seeing” is knowing. It differs from the insentient in that its one form is to be self-luminous; for the insentient has to be described as what stands apart from . So seeing is “svābhāsā”: is shining, and seeing is that whose own form, never failing it, is that shining, and also that whose form is the making shine of itself. Even if there is an outer thing, a making shine that has passed over into that thing’s body cannot be the form of knowing. For what is called the self-luminousness of knowing is just the making shine of its own form, a form which is itself the making shine of another. But surely that knowing which is experience, while still shining by itself, will shine in remembering? He says no, with “it is not to be known by another”. If seeing shone in another, it would not be shining by itself; for this is the very mark of the self-luminous. If it shines by itself, then, since it has no relation to another, how could the locative “in another”, whose life is relation, fit it? And so the seeing of taste, the knowing whose content is taste, is not known by the knowing of form; for then taste would in effect be grasped by the eye itself. But if the experience does not shine in remembering, what then would the have done? The knowing of form is not born of a born of the knowing of taste; so how does this absurd consequence apply? So the itself should be able to break the fault you suppose. That is not so. For this awareness that is memory has arisen from the awareness just before it, shaped by that ; so let it be like the experience, as one arrangement resembles an earlier arrangement. But it is not right that whatever is born of the of something has the nature of knowing that thing. And how is even the likeness grasped, that is, known? The knowing that is experience does not convey the likeness, nor does the knowing that is memory; for since they are not aware of each other, a likeness resting in the two cannot be determined, and there is no other knowing whose form is to be aware of both. So from the memory gains no more than having a content; it does not gain the experience as its content, nor is this content shown to have been made the content of the earlier experience. This is the settled conclusion.
But surely, if in the knowing that is memory there were truly a of the experience, and through it of its content, then what you say would have room. But since memory, having the form of , merely determines the experience and its content, which do not shine at all, it is error by nature. So why this insistence? He presents this as a doubt to be raised:
But if, though memory does not have that as its content, it has what was seen as its support, through error, because it determines it so
Neither that seeing nor its content is the content of memory; yet both are determined, because memory has the form of error. This he rejects:
this is incoherent.
Here, in a , he gives the reasoning:
How, to begin with, could error be memory at all? And how could error establish an object? And why is dependence on the of an earlier experience accepted?