, । । , । , , । ---- , । , , , । , । , । । , । , , । । , , ; । , , , । । , , । ---- ---- । ? ? ? । , , , । । , ।
In plain words
And for him this is not a mere supposition; rather, it ends in certainty. Consider: the cause of variety stated by the , marked as the awakening of , does not hold good. It is well known, to begin with, that is a that gives rise to memory; but here what has to be sought is the cause of variety in experience. Or let be a of knowing whose self is fitness, in the form of a capacity to bring about the of blue and the rest; let its awakening be its turning towards bringing about its own effect; and from that let there be variety of in acts of awareness. Even there, though, we say this. Here, even if the that lie within knowing were said not to be ultimately real, to have only conventional being, still what gives rise to them must be accepted as truly real, since what is not a real thing, whose mark is the lack of all capacity, cannot have a nature that consists in capacity, whose life is the bringing about of effects. This being so, take these that are held to be the cause of . If their form is different from awareness, and that form is ultimately real, then this is only a kind of the doctrine of outer objects, hidden under another word. But if it is conventionally real, then in that form they cannot be causes. And if they are causes in the form in which they are ultimately real, then that form is knowing alone, and that is undivided; so a difference of effects, in the form of the of blue and the rest, is not established. So, when the are not varied, what hope is there that their awakening is varied? Or let the be different. Even so, there is no varied cause beyond awareness alone, such as space, time, things and the like, held to be what awakens them; so the awakening is not varied, there is one single awakening, and the whole variety of blue and the rest would shine all at once. But if it is said that the causes of the awakening are other, varied acts of knowing within one’s own stream, that is false. For the difference of pleasure, pain, blue, yellow and the rest, and of space and time, before and after and the like, has the form of knowing alone; and the highest truth of knowing is alone, so that no difference in its own form is possible; so acts of awareness cannot differ in that way. This same way of not differing holds too for other acts of awareness that have the form of other , those named by the words “another stream”. There too, whether of the body held to be another’s, thin, stout and the rest, or of the , breathing in and breathing out and the rest, or of the qualities of the mind, pleasure, pain and the rest: when these are not different from the form of alone, as the one who infers accepts it, we do not know of which of them otherness could be said. If it is said that it belongs to the awareness resting in that body, then that too, if it is not established by a , simply does not exist; and if it is established, but as a , then it is simply insentient. And even so, just like the body and the rest, its own nature is knowing alone, since, its form being nothing but of itself, it is not established with respect to another. But surely the act of speaking and the like is seen, in one’s own case, to be pervaded, as by its cause, by will of the form “let me speak”; so in ’s body too it must have that will for its cause. And it is settled by self-awareness that there is no wish fallen within my own stream; so another’s wish is established, and that is just what another stream is. To this it is answered. Here, for the one who infers, the of speaking is of two kinds. At the time the pervasion is grasped, it has the form “I speak”, and its breath is that it is not cut off. And at the time of inference it is “this one speaks”, and its life is being cut off. The pervasion was grasped for one, and the is another: how could it now be the reason? The cause of the “speaks” is simply unknown: how then could a wish be inferred from that reason? Moreover, the appearance “this one speaks”, which appears as cut off in another accepted by the one who infers: how could it be the effect of another’s wish, which is held to be what is inferred? For the effect of that wish is the “I speak”, whose life is not being cut off. Nor is it right that what is made of being cut off should be the effect of what is made of not being cut off, since there is no means of grasping a relation of cause and effect of that kind. For it is not established by any that this uncut in oneself produces, in another, an that is cut off, of the form “he speaks”, since this matter presupposes that the other is established, and the establishing of the other depends on a matter of just this kind: so each rests on the other. Nor is there a rule that what is cut off must come from what is uncut, since there are exceptions. Nor is its arising made fixed by setting the mind on it, “let an arise, even one that is cut off”, since even when that is present it does not arise, and when that is absent it does arise. Grasping the relation of cause and effect between the wish “let an that is cut off arise in another” and the cut-off that has arisen in the other is itself not possible while the other is not established. So the pervasion itself is not established.