। ---- । , , , । । , । । ॥५॥ । ॥ §०§ । , । , , , , । , , । , , । , , ।
In plain words
And if other are different, then the appearances resting in them are simply different, by the principle that they are not apart from knowing. And so, since they would not rest in one , there could be no dealings of coming together and resting in one . So there is another possibility: that a is different from awareness. Since the rule that they are always perceived together, and the like, are inconclusive, what wrong has the mass of , blue, yellow and the rest, done, that its resting in its own form is not tolerated? Therefore other too are simply not established. Or, if they are established, the lying within all the would produce, in each single other one, a variety in the awakening of that causes variety of , since there is no other cause for any restriction; so even then the variety of blue and the rest is not established. So varied , and varied causes of their awakening, simply do not hold good. And so this stands: “Awareness is undivided; since it cannot be the cause of the differences among that come by chance, an outer object, to be inferred, is supposed.” If this is said by the proponent of outer objects: such is the sense of the two verses. The word “ced” shows that what the sentence of the two verses says is a doubt being raised. In this way, by its being raised as a doubt, the other side’s supposition has been shown in its strength.
But now, to loosen this supposition, he first says:
Let this be so. When dealings are settled in those very appearances, what use is something else, outer, that cannot be made good?
When “syād etat” is explained as accepting the supposition stated before, then it is to be explained thus: with “kiṃ tu” supplied to complete the sentence, the rest of the verse shows another supposition, one whose matter is the loosening of the first. But if supplying words is not tolerated, then “syād etat” means “this too could be another supposition”, namely the one this verse states, and it is to be joined with the rest as one sentence. Even when you establish outer objects by this laboured construction, you have nothing to do with them, since dealings are accomplished by those very that you have accepted. For no one has any dealings with what is only ever to be inferred. So what use is the outer, for which there is no to prove it, and for which there is what cancels it? Of the cancelling arguments, the chief, to begin with, is this: if it is different from , it does not shine, not even as something inferred. The additional arguments that cancel it are these: that the whole cannot reside in its parts; that inherence is not established; and the joining of contrary properties, such as shaking and not shaking, covered and uncovered, red and not red, the difference of directional parts, and the like.
On the doctrine that the outer is a heap of atoms too, since there is no heap other than the atoms, there are only the atoms. And if they are joined with no gap between them, then there must be a difference of directional parts. Thus, when six atoms are heaped up in the six directions, if another clings to the middle atom at the very place where one clings, then it all comes to the size of a single atom. But if one clings in one place and another in another, then a difference of parts must follow. So what there is, is only a part, and for that part too the course is the same; so in truth nothing outer is left.