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In plain words
Once, to begin with, in a kitchen, the relation of cause and effect between the of fire and the of smoke is grasped by the force of perception and non-perception. There, on the view of the , the is other and other in each stream, so the relation of cause and effect is grasped only between one’s own , and not between those in another stream, since what goes on there is not felt. And so now there would be no inference, from the of smoke in one’s own stream, of the of fire that rests in another stream, of a who is a worm, an omniscient one or another: that is certain. But on this view, at the stage of grasping the pervasion, for as many as can be thought to be present in that place, that of smoke and that of fire are one for all of them, as on the view of outer objects; for it has been said that to that extent the Supreme Lord has made them one. So, setting aside the particular of one’s own stream or another’s, when the pervasion has been grasped that the bare of smoke is the effect of the bare of fire, then again, remembering the pervasion, “the of smoke on the mountain too comes only from the of fire”, one infers, “Here on the mountain there is the of fire.” That is to say: having become one with other so far in that particular of smoke, one becomes one with other in the part that is the general of fire, together with its part whose form is out of sight, and set apart from other particular . “Again”: having grasped the pervasion, the of smoke that comes once more, and by the words “and the rest” the of sprout and the rest are taken in; that too is “new”, not had before, and not stale like smoke born of smoke. And it can arise from the ruling of fire, which is not felt, or from the of seed and the rest; from that alone is it able to be born, and from nothing else. The optative is in the sense of being able. And that is one alone in this and that ; if it were many, this would not hold at all: this is the intent. And since that of fire, one and ruling, is the cause of smoke, the of smoke is the never-straying effect of this very of fire, and its mark, once it has been settled that it is not of a ’s making. So it is inferred from that effect, since it is out of sight, and that because it is the ruling one.
But surely, in this way there would be inference of the of fire even from an of smoke that has stayed long inside a cowherd’s pot and come out. With this doubt in view, he says:
An effect that never strays is the mark of this one; but the other of it comes only from the of it in another , as the ruling one.
“The other”: the of smoke that is other than the new one comes only from an of smoke that is in another , ruling in form and out of sight. So from an of smoke of that kind, how could an of fire, which is not its cause, be inferred? This is the rest of the intent. And the skilled do mark the distinction. With the intent that a grounding in this matter, which serves very many dealings of inference, should be made with care, what was hinted by “new” has been made clear by way of what it shuts out.
But surely, if it is accepted in this way that the of smoke comes from the of fire, then how does what was said hold, that being the doer belongs to the sentient alone? Consider: this that is seen, “When there is a seed, a sprout comes to be”, is just like smoke and fire; so how can it be set at naught? With this doubt in view, he says:
Even the relation of cause and effect that is “When this is, that is”, that too does not hold for insentient things, which have no looking to another.