Bhashya
यत्तु कैश्चिदुच्यते— विद्यासहितं कर्म निरभिसंधिविषदध्यादिवत् कार्यान्तरमारभत इति— तन्न, अनारभ्य-त्वान्मोक्षस्य ; बन्धननाश एव हि मोक्षः, न कार्यभूतः ;बन्धनं च अविद्येत्यवोचाम ; अविद्यायाश्च न कर्मणा नाशउपपद्यते, दृष्टविषयत्वाच्च कर्मसामर्थ्यस्य ; उत्पत्त्याप्तिवि-कारसंस्कारा हि कर्मसामर्थ्यस्य विषयाः ; उत्पादयितुंप्रापयितुं विकर्तुं संस्कर्तुं च सामर्थ्यं कर्मणः, न अतो व्य-तिरिक्तविषयोऽस्ति कर्मसामर्थ्यस्य, लोके अप्रसिद्धत्वात् ; नच मोक्ष एषां पदार्थानामन्यतमः ; अविद्यामात्रव्यवहितइत्यवोचाम ।बाढम् ; भवतु केवलस्यैव कर्मण एवस्वभा-वता ; विद्यासंयुक्तस्य तु निरभिसंधेः भवति अन्यथा स्व-कर्मकार्यं न भवति, नित्यानां कर्मणां फलं मोक्ष इत्यस्यावचनव्यक्तेः कोऽर्थ इति वक्तव्यम् ।न च कार्यफलशब्द-भेदमात्रेण विशेषः शक्यः कल्पयितुम् ।अफलं च मोक्षः,नित्यैश्च कर्मभिः क्रियते— नित्यानां कर्मणां फलं न, का-र्यम्—इति च एषोऽर्थः विप्रतिषिद्धोऽभिधीयते-यथा अग्निःशीत इति ।ज्ञानवदिति चेत्— यथा ज्ञानस्य कार्यंमोक्षः ज्ञानेनाक्रियमाणोऽप्युच्यते, तद्वत् कर्मकार्यत्वमितिचेत्— न, अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वात् ज्ञानस्य ; अज्ञानव्यवधान-निवर्तकत्वात् ज्ञानस्य मोक्षो ज्ञानकार्यमित्युपचर्यते ।नतु कर्मणा निवर्तयितव्यमज्ञानम् ; न च अज्ञानव्यति-रेकेण मोक्षस्य व्यवधानान्तरं कल्पयितुं शक्यम्- नित्यत्वा-न्मोक्षस्य साधकस्वरूपाव्यतिरेकाच्च-यत्कर्मणा निवर्त्येत ।अ-ज्ञानमेव निवर्तयतीति चेत्, न, विलक्षणत्वात्— अनभि-व्यक्तिः अज्ञानम् अभिव्यक्तिलक्षणेन ज्ञानेन विरुध्यते ; कर्मतु नाज्ञानेन विरुध्यते ; तेन ज्ञानविलक्षणं कर्म ।यदिज्ञानाभावः, यदि संशयज्ञानम् , यदि विपरीतज्ञानं वा उच्य-ते अज्ञानमिति, सर्वं हि तत् ज्ञानेनैव निवर्त्यते ; न तु कर्म-णा अन्यतमेनापि विरोधाभावात् ।अथ अदृष्टं कर्मणाम् अ-ज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वं कल्प्यमिति चेत्, न, ज्ञानेन अज्ञाननिवृत्तौस्कारनिर्वर्त्यो वा- यूपादिवत्; पारिशेष्यात् आप्यः स्यात्; न आप्योऽपि, आत्मस्वभावत्वात् एकत्वाच्च ।इतरैः कर्म- भिर्वैलक्षण्यात् नित्यानां कर्मणाम्, तत्फलेनापि विलक्षणेन भवितव्यमिति चेत्, न- कर्मत्वसालक्षण्यात् सलक्षणं कस्मात् फलं न भवति इतरकर्मफलैः? निमित्तवैलक्षण्यादि- ति चेत्, न, क्षामवत्यादिभिः समानत्वात्; यथा हि- गृहदाहादौ निमित्ते क्षामवत्यादीष्टिः, यथा- 'भिन्ने जुहोति, स्कन्ने जुहोति' इति- एवमादौ नैमित्तिकेषु कर्मसु न मोक्षः फलं कल्प्यते- तैश्चाविशेषान्नैमित्तिकत्वेन, जीवना- दिनिमित्ते च श्रवणात्, तथा नित्यानामपि न मोक्षः फलम् ।आलोकस्य सर्वेषां रूपदर्शनसाधनत्वे, उलूकादयः आलो- केन रूपं न पश्यन्तीति उलूकादिचक्षुषो वैलक्षण्यादितर- लोकचक्षुर्भिः, न रसादिविषयत्वं परिकल्प्यते, रसादिवि- षये सामर्थ्यस्यादृष्टत्वात् ।सुदूरमपि गत्वा यद्विषयं दृष्टं सामर्थ्यं तत्रैव कश्चिद्विशेषः कल्पयितव्यः ।यत्पुनरुक्तम्, विद्यामन्त्रशर्करादिसंयुक्तविषदध्यादिवत् नित्यानि कार्या- न्तरमारभन्त इति- आरभ्यतां विशिष्टं कार्यम्, तत् इष्टत्वाद्विरोधः; निरभिसंधेः कर्मणो विद्यासंयुक्तस्य वि- शिष्टकार्यान्तरारम्भे न कश्चिद्विरोधः, देवयाज्यात्मयाजिनोःआत्मयाजिनो विशेषश्रवणात्- ‘देवयाजिनः श्रेयानात्म-याजी’ इत्यादौ ‘यदेव विद्यया करोति’ इत्यादौ च ।यस्तु परमात्मदर्शनविषये मनुनोक्तः आत्मयाजिशब्दः ‘संप-श्यन्नात्मयाजी’ इत्यत्र- समं पश्यन् आत्मयाजी भव-तीत्यर्थः ।अथवा भूतपूर्वगत्या- आत्मयाजी आत्मसं-स्कारार्थं नित्यानि कर्माणि करोति- ‘इदं मेऽनेनाङ्गं संस्क्रि-यते’ इति श्रुतेः ; तथा ‘गार्भैर्होमैः’ इत्यादिप्रकरणे कार्य-करणसंस्कारार्थत्वं नित्यानां कर्मणां दर्शयति ; संस्कृतश्च यआत्मयाजी तैः कर्मभिः समं द्रष्टुं समर्थो भवति, तस्य इहजन्मान्तरे वा समम् आत्मदर्शनमुत्पद्यते ; समं पश्यन् स्वा-राज्यमधिगच्छतीत्येषोऽर्थः ; आत्मयाजिशब्दस्तु भूतपूर्वगत्याप्रयुज्यते ज्ञानयुक्तानां नित्यानां कर्मणां ज्ञानोत्पत्तिसाधनत्वप्र-दर्शनार्थम् ।किंचान्यत्-‘ब्रह्मा विश्वसृजो धर्मो महानव्यक्त-मेव च ।उत्तमां सात्त्विकीमेतां गतिमाहुर्मनीषिणः’ इति चदेवसार्ष्टिव्यतिरेकेण भूताप्ययं दर्शयति- ‘भूतान्यप्येति पञ्चवै’ ‘भूतान्यत्येति’ इति पाठं ये कुर्वन्ति, तेषां वेदविषयेपरिच्छिन्नबुद्धित्वाददोषः ; न च अर्थवादत्वम्- अध्यायस्यब्रह्मान्तकर्मविपाकार्थस्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तात्मज्ञानार्थस्य च कर्म-काण्डोपनिषद्भ्यां तुल्यार्थत्वदर्शनात्, विहिताकरणप्रतिषिद्ध-कर्मणां च स्थावरश्वसूकरादिफलदर्शनात्, वान्ताश्यादिप्रेत-दर्शनाच्च ।न च श्रुतिस्मृतिविहितप्रतिषिद्धव्यतिरेकेण विहि-तानि वा प्रतिषिद्धानि वा कर्माणि केनचिदवगन्तुं शक्य-न्ते, येषाम् अकरणादनुष्ठानाच्च प्रेतश्वसूकरस्थावरादीनिकर्मफलानि प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामुपलभ्यन्ते; न च एषाम्कर्मफलत्वं केनचिदभ्युपगम्यते ।तस्मात् विहिताकरणप्रति-षिद्धसेवानां यथा एते कर्मविपाकाः प्रेततिर्यक्स्थावरादयः,तथा उत्कृष्टेष्वपि ब्रह्मान्तेषु कर्मविपाकत्वं वेदितव्यम्;तस्मात् 'स आत्मनो वपामुदखिदत्' 'सोऽरोदीत्' इत्यादि-वत् न अभूतार्थवादत्वम् ।तत्रापि अभूतार्थवादत्वं मा भू-दिति चेत्- भवत्वेवम्; न च एतावता अस्य न्यायस्यबाधो भवति; न च अस्मत्पक्षो वा दुष्यति ।न च 'ब्रह्माविश्वसृजः' इत्यादीनां काम्यकर्मफलत्वं शक्यं वक्तुम्,तेषां देवसाष्टितायाः फलस्योक्तत्वात् ।तस्मात् साभिसंधी-नां नित्यानां कर्मणां सर्वमेधाश्वमेधादीनां च ब्रह्मत्वादीनिफलानि; येषां पुनः नित्यानि निरभिसंधीनि आत्मसंस्का-रार्थानि, तेषां ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यर्थानि तानि, 'ब्राह्मीयं क्रियते तनुः'इति स्मरणात्; तेषाम् आरादुपकारकत्वात् मोक्षसाधनान्यपिकर्माणि भवन्तीति न विरुध्यते; यथा चायमर्थः, षष्ठे ज-नकाख्यायिकासमाप्तौ वक्ष्यामः ।यत्तु विषदध्यादिवदित्यु-क्तम्, तत्र प्रत्यक्षानुमानविषयत्वादविरोधः ; यस्तु अत्यन्त-शब्दगम्योऽर्थः, तत्र वाक्यस्याभावे तदर्थप्रतिपादकस्य नशक्यं कल्पयितुं विषदध्यादिसाधर्म्यम् ।न च प्रमाणान्तर-विरुद्धार्थविषये श्रुतेः प्रामाण्यं कल्प्यते, यथा- शीतोऽग्निःक्लेदयतीति ; श्रुते तु तादर्थ्ये वाक्यस्य, प्रमाणान्तरस्यआभासत्वम् — यथा ‘खद्योतोऽग्निः’ इति ‘तलमलिन-मन्तरिक्षम्’ इति बालानां यत्प्रत्यक्षमपि, तद्विषयप्रमाणान्त-रस्य यथार्थत्वे निश्चिते, निश्चितार्थमपि बालप्रत्यक्षम् आभा-सी भवति ; तस्मात् वेदप्रामाण्यस्याव्यभिचारात् तादर्थ्ये सतिवाक्यस्य तथात्वं स्यात्, न तु पुरुषमतिकौशलम् ; न हिपुरुषमतिकौशलात् सविता रूपं न प्रकाशयति ; तथा वेद-वाक्यान्यपि न अन्यार्थानि भवन्ति ।तस्मात् न मोक्षार्थानिकर्माणीति सिद्धम् ।अतः कर्मफलानां संसारत्वप्रदर्शनायैवब्राह्मणमारभ्यते ॥
In plain words
Some people say this: an action performed together with knowledge, done without any personal stake in the result, sets off a further hidden effect — the way poisoned curd, laced with something else, works a change you don't see coming. That is not right. Liberation cannot be manufactured at all. Liberation is nothing but the collapse of bondage — it never became anything, it was never made. And we have already shown that bondage is ignorance, avidyā. Action simply cannot burn that away, because action's power only ever reaches things you can observe. Action can make something exist, help you obtain something, change something, or refine something — that's the whole list, four items, no more. Nowhere in ordinary experience does action's power reach beyond that. And liberation is not one of those four things. We've already said it: the Self is hidden by ignorance alone. 'Fine,' comes the reply, 'grant that bare action, on its own, is limited to those four things. But action joined with knowledge, done without any personal motive — that has to do something more. Otherwise, what would it even mean when scripture plainly says the daily rites bear liberation as their fruit?' And you can't manufacture a real difference here just by using two different words, 'effect' and 'fruit.' Here is the truth of it: liberation has no fruit at all, and yet you want the daily rites to produce it — 'the fruit of the eternal rites is not a fruit, it's an effect.' Said that way, it cancels itself out. It's exactly like saying fire is cold. 'But it's like knowledge,' the objection continues. 'Liberation isn't literally manufactured by knowledge either, yet we still call it knowledge's effect. Why not call it action's effect the same way?' No. Knowledge earns that description because it removes ignorance — it clears away the very thing standing in the way. That's all 'effect of knowledge' ever meant; it's a figure of speech. Action cannot remove ignorance. And there is no second, separate obstruction blocking liberation that action could ever clear, because liberation is eternal — it was never other than your own nature to begin with. Say instead that action removes ignorance directly? No — the two are simply not the same kind of thing. Ignorance is a failure to show up; knowledge is precisely what makes things show up, so knowledge and ignorance cancel each other by nature. Action carries no such built-in opposition to ignorance. So action, whatever else it is, is not the kind of thing that can touch ignorance. And it doesn't matter how you define 'ignorance' — a plain absence of knowing, a state of doubt, or an outright mistake — every one of those is undone by knowledge and only by knowledge, because nothing about action stands opposed to any of them. Suppose someone falls back on an unseen power carried by the rites themselves, and says that this hidden force is what dissolves ignorance. No. Once knowledge has cleared ignorance away, whatever is left has to be one of two things: either produced through some kind of refining process, the way wood is shaped into a sacrificial post, or — if not that — something newly obtained. But it isn't even something newly obtained, because it was your own nature all along; there was never a second thing to go and get. 'These rites are unlike ordinary ones,' comes another attempt, 'so their fruit must be unlike ordinary fruit too.' But they're still all called 'action' — why would the fruit suddenly stop resembling other fruits of action just because of that? 'Because the occasions differ,' then? No — think of the Kṣāmāvatī offerings: performed only when a fire breaks out, or a ritual vessel cracks, or the oblation spills. Nobody imagines those occasional rites deliver liberation, even though their occasions are every bit as specific — because scripture enjoins rites like that purely to meet the occasion, the way you'd act to save your life. The daily rites work the same way; liberation still isn't their fruit. Light lets every creature see shapes — except owls, whose eyes are built differently and see nothing by daylight. Nobody concludes from this that light must therefore also carry flavors or smells; light's power has simply never been seen reaching that far. However far you push an argument, you're only allowed to claim a special power exactly where that power has actually been witnessed, nowhere further. Now, back to that opening claim — that rites combined with knowledge, mantra, sugar and the rest work like poisoned curd and set off some further effect. Fine — let a special effect follow. We're not troubled by that at all; we want that. There is nothing here that contradicts us: a rite free of self-interest, joined with knowledge, launching some special further effect creates no problem whatsoever, because scripture itself distinguishes the one who merely sacrifices to the gods from the one who sacrifices through the Self — 'the self-sacrificer is greater than the god-sacrificer,' and 'whatever he does, he does with knowledge.' When Manu uses the word 'ātma-yājin' for someone seeing the Supreme Self — 'seeing everywhere alike, he is a self-sacrificer' — he simply means: the one who sees everything as equal becomes a self-sacrificer. Or, read another way, describing what such a person used to do: the knower keeps performing the daily rites purely to refine the instrument, the body — as scripture says, 'by this rite, this limb of mine is being shaped.' The section on rites performed over the womb makes the same point: these obligatory rites exist to purify the body and the senses. And once someone is refined by those rites and capable of seeing everything as one, that vision of the Self dawns for him, whether in this life or another. 'Seeing everything as equal, he reaches his own sovereignty' — that's the whole meaning. 'Ātma-yājin,' then, only describes what that person used to do, back when the rites were still building toward the knowledge that has now dawned. There's more. 'Brahmā, the world-creator, Dharma, the Great Principle, the Unmanifest — the wise call this the highest, purest destiny.' That line is pointing past mere companionship with the gods, toward dissolving into the five elements: 'one goes, indeed, to the five elements.' Some read it as 'goes beyond' the elements instead — that's simply a narrower grasp of the Veda on their part, no fault in the text itself. None of this is empty praise. The whole chapter has exactly two purposes — showing where ritual action ripens, all the way up to the world of Brahmā, and pointing toward the knowledge of a Self altogether beyond that — and both purposes track perfectly with what the ritual texts and the Upaniṣads already teach elsewhere. We see, too, that failing to do what's enjoined, or doing what's forbidden, ripens into rebirth as a ghost, a dog, a pig, a plant — and there are people who've clearly ended up as hungry, vomit-eating ghosts. No one can even identify a right or wrong act except through what scripture and tradition themselves lay down; yet everyone can see, through direct evidence, that failing or fulfilling such acts leads to exactly these fates — even though no one could have worked out, on their own, that these fates were the fruit of those acts. So exactly as those lower rebirths are ripenings of action, the loftiest destinies too, all the way up to Brahmā's own world, have to be understood the same way — as ripenings of action, nothing more. This is no different from saying, mythically, 'he tore out his own fat' or 'he wept' — none of it is empty fiction. And even granting, for argument's sake, that those mythic lines are not fiction either — fine, grant it — our reasoning still stands untouched, and our own position loses nothing. Nor can 'Brahmā, the world-creator' be called the fruit of some desire-driven rite, since its fruit has already been named: companionship with the gods. So here is the real shape of it. Rites performed with a personal stake — the great sacrifices like the Sarvamedha and the Aśvamedha — bear fruits like reaching Brahmā's own state. But the daily rites performed without any personal stake, purely to refine oneself, exist for a different purpose altogether: the arising of knowledge — as tradition says, 'this very body is being shaped into something fit for Brahman.' Because they help that way, at one remove, it's not a contradiction to call even action a means to liberation, in that indirect sense. We'll say more about this when we come to the end of Janaka's story, in the sixth chapter. As for the poisoned-curd comparison itself — that one holds, because what it points to can actually be perceived or inferred. But some things can only ever be known through words, through scripture alone, and there, without an actual scriptural statement to establish the point, you cannot borrow that same analogy and expect it to carry any weight. Scripture is never assumed valid where it flatly contradicts some other means of knowing — no one takes seriously a scripture that says fire is cold and wet. But once a meaning really is fixed by scripture, it's the other source that turns out to be the unreliable one. A child looks at a firefly and calls it fire; a child looks at the sky and calls it a dark ceiling. That is a real, direct perception — and yet, once some more reliable source settles what's actually true, that same childish perception, certain as it felt, is exposed as nothing but an illusion. In just this way, because the Veda's authority never breaks down, once its meaning is settled, that is simply how things are — no amount of clever human argument gets to overrule it. The sun doesn't stop showing you shapes just because someone argues cleverly that it should; the Veda's words don't suddenly mean something else either. So it stands proven: the rites are not there to deliver liberation. And that is exactly why what comes next takes up the fruits of action — to show, plainly, that they are nothing but the wheel of birth and death turning once again.
Close to the Sanskrit
But as for what is said by some — that action combined with knowledge, being without ulterior motive, produces a further effect, like poisoned curd, etc. — that is not so, because liberation cannot be produced. For liberation is precisely the destruction of bondage, not something that has come to be as an effect. And we have already said that bondage is ignorance. And the destruction of ignorance by action is not tenable, because the capacity of action has only observed things as its scope. For production, attainment, modification, and refinement are the four objects of the capacity of action: the capacity of action extends only to producing, causing-to-attain, transforming, and refining. There is no scope for the capacity of action beyond these, since no such further scope is recognized in the world. And liberation is not one among these four categories. We have said that the Self is screened by ignorance alone. Granted — the opponent says. Let this be only the nature of mere, isolated action. But of action joined with knowledge and free of ulterior motive, [a further effect] must occur; otherwise the effect proper to its own action would not hold — one would have to explain what is the point of the plain scriptural statement, 'the fruit of the obligatory rites is liberation.' And a real distinction cannot be posited merely by the difference between the words 'effect' and 'fruit.' [We reply:] Liberation is fruitless, and yet it is said to be produced by the obligatory rites — 'the fruit of the obligatory rites is not a mere fruit, but an effect' — this claim, so stated, is self-contradictory, like saying 'fire is cold.' If it be said: 'like knowledge — just as liberation, though not actively produced by knowledge, is still called knowledge's effect, so too it may be called action's effect' — no. Because knowledge removes ignorance, because it removes the obstruction of ignorance, liberation is figuratively called 'the effect of knowledge.' But ignorance is not something to be removed by action. And apart from ignorance, no other obstruction of liberation that could be removed by action can be posited, because liberation is eternal and not different from the seeker's own nature. If it be said that action removes ignorance itself — no, because of a difference in character: ignorance is non-manifestation, and it is opposed by knowledge, which is characterized by manifestation; but action is not opposed to ignorance; therefore action is of a different character from knowledge. Whether ignorance means absence of knowledge, doubtful knowledge, or erroneous knowledge — all of it is removed by knowledge alone, never by action, since there is no opposition between action and any of these. Now, if it be said that the unseen potency of the obligatory rites should be posited as the remover of ignorance — no. When ignorance is removed by knowledge, [what remains] would have to be either something produced through refinement, like a sacrificial post, or, by elimination, something to be attained. But it is not even something to be attained, because it is of the very nature of the Self, and because of [the Self's] oneness [with it]. If it be said: 'because the obligatory rites differ in character from other rites, their fruit too must differ in character' — no. Since they share the common character of being 'action,' why should their fruit not be of a common character with the fruits of other actions? If it be said, 'because of a difference in the occasioning circumstance' — no, because of an analogy with rites like the Kṣāmāvatī. For example: on the occasion of a house-fire, etc., the Kṣāmāvatī offering is performed, as is said: 'when the vessel cracks, one offers; when the oblation spills, one offers.' In such occasional rites, liberation is not assumed to be the fruit, because these rites are indifferently classed as occasional, and because scripture enjoins them on occasions such as preserving one's life. Likewise, for the obligatory rites too, liberation is not the fruit. Though light is the means for all beings to see form, owls, etc., do not see form by that same light, because of the different nature of the eyes of owls compared with other creatures — yet one does not therefore assume that light has taste, etc., as its object, because the power of light is never observed in the sphere of taste. Even extending one's reasoning very far, a special distinction should be posited only within the sphere where a capacity has actually been observed. As for what was said again — that rites combined with knowledge, sacred formula, sugar, etc., like poisoned curd, produce a further effect for the obligatory rites — let a special effect be produced; that is in fact something we too accept; there is no contradiction. In the initiation of a special further effect by a rite that is free of ulterior motive and joined with knowledge, there is no contradiction at all, because of the specific scriptural statement distinguishing the sacrificer-to-the-gods from the sacrificer-through-the-Self — as in 'the ātma-yājin is superior to the deva-yājin,' and 'whatever he does with knowledge...' As for the word 'ātmayājin' used by Manu with reference to the vision of the Supreme Self, in 'seeing everywhere alike, one is an ātma-yājin' — the meaning is: one who sees equally becomes an ātma-yājin. Or alternatively, by way of describing a former state, the ātma-yājin [i.e. the knower] performs the obligatory rites for the purpose of purifying the self, on the strength of the statement, 'by this rite this limb of mine is being purified.' Likewise, in the section on embryo-oblations and the like, scripture shows that the purpose of the obligatory rites is the purification of the body and the senses. And the ātma-yājin who, purified by those rites, becomes capable of seeing equally — for him, whether in this life or in another birth, the equal vision of the Self arises. 'Seeing equally, one attains self-sovereignty' — this is the meaning. But the word 'ātmayājin' is used by way of describing a former state, in order to show that the obligatory rites, when joined with knowledge, are a means to the arising of knowledge. Moreover: 'Brahmā, the world-creator, Dharma, the Great Principle, and the Unmanifest alone — the wise declare this to be the highest, sāttvika destiny.' By this, apart from mere equal-status with the gods, scripture shows dissolution into the five elements: 'indeed, one goes to the five elements.' As for those who read instead 'transcends the elements' — that is owing to their limited understanding of the Veda; it is no fault [of the text]. And this is not mere eulogy, because we see the chapter — whose purport in one part is the fruition of action culminating in the world of Brahmā, and whose other purport is knowledge of the Self distinct from that — as parallel in meaning with both the ritual portion and the Upaniṣads; and because we see the fruit of the non-performance of enjoined rites and the practice of prohibited ones in the sight of rebirth as a plant, dog, pig, etc., and the sight of a vomit-eating ghost. And enjoined or prohibited acts cannot be known by anyone apart from what scripture and tradition enjoin and prohibit — acts from whose omission or performance the fruits, [rebirth] as a ghost, dog, pig, plant, etc., are apprehended by perception and inference; yet the status of these as fruits of any particular action is not [directly] accepted by anyone [without scripture]. Therefore, just as these fruitions — ghost, animal, plant, etc. — belong to the non-performance of enjoined acts and the practice of prohibited ones, so too, even in the exalted states culminating in Brahmā, the status of being a fruition of action should be understood. Therefore, like 'he tore out his own omentum,' 'he wept,' etc., this too is not a statement about the unreal. If it be said, 'even there, let it not be a statement about the unreal' — let it be so; even so, our reasoning is not thereby refuted, nor is our position vitiated in any way. And it cannot be said that [attaining] 'Brahmā, the world-creator,' etc., is the fruit of desire-driven rites, because the fruit of these has already been stated to be equal-status with the gods. Therefore, for the obligatory rites performed with an ulterior desire, such as the Sarvamedha, Aśvamedha, etc., the fruits are states like Brahmā-hood, etc.; but for those obligatory rites that are free of ulterior desire and are for the purpose of self-purification, their purpose is instead the arising of knowledge, because of the statement, 'this body is being made fit for Brahman.' Since these are helpful indirectly, it is not contradictory to say that even actions can be means to liberation. How this stands we shall explain at the conclusion of the Janaka narrative in the sixth chapter. As for what was said — 'like poisoned curd, etc.' — there, there is no contradiction, because that effect is within the scope of perception and inference. But as for a matter knowable exclusively through words [i.e. through scripture alone] — there, in the absence of a scriptural statement establishing that meaning, one cannot posit any analogy with poisoned curd, etc. And the authority of scripture is not to be assumed in a matter whose content is contradicted by another means of knowledge — as, for example, [if scripture said] 'fire is cold and moistens.' But when a meaning is [firmly] established in scripture, it is rather another means of knowledge that turns out to be a mere fallacious semblance — as, for example, children think 'the firefly is fire,' or 'the sky is a dark surface'; even though this is their direct perception, once the correctness of another means of knowledge having that same object is ascertained, the children's perception, though it seemed certain, turns out to be a mere semblance. Therefore, because the authority of the Veda never fails, once its purport is fixed, the statement must be so, and not overturned by mere cleverness of human intellect — for indeed the sun does not fail to reveal form because of the cleverness of human intellect; likewise the statements of the Veda, too, do not carry some other meaning. Therefore it is established that rites are not for the purpose of liberation. Hence, precisely to show that the fruits of action are nothing but transmigration, the brāhmaṇa [section] is now begun.