Bhashya
‘न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारम्’ इत्यत्र अक्षराणि अन्यथा व्याचक्षतेति केचिद्व्याचक्षते ।तन्न, ‘ते’ इति प्रतिज्ञानात् ; ‘एष तआत्मा’ इति हि प्रतिवचने प्रतिज्ञातम् ; न च एकस्य का-र्यकरणसंघातस्य द्वावात्मानौ उपपद्येते ; एको हि कार्य-करणसंघातः एकेन आत्मना आत्मवान् ; न च उषस्तस्यान्यःकहोळस्यान्यः जातितो भिन्न आत्मा भवति, द्वयोः अगौ-णत्वात्मत्वसर्वान्तरत्वानुपपत्तेः ; यदि एकमगौणं ब्रह्म द्वयोःइतरेण अवश्यं गौणेन भवितव्यम् ; तथा आत्मत्वं सर्वा-न्तरत्वं च- विरुद्धत्वात्पदार्थानाम् ; यदि एकं सर्वान्तरंब्रह्म आत्मा मुख्यः, इतरेण असर्वान्तरेण अनात्मना अमु-ख्येन अवश्यं भवितव्यम् ; तस्मात् एकस्यैव द्विः श्रवणंविशेषविवक्षया ।यत्तु पूर्वोक्तेन समानं द्वितीये प्रश्नान्तरउक्तम्, तावन्मात्रं पूर्वस्यैवानुवादः- तस्यैव अनुक्तः कश्चि-द्विशेषः वक्तव्य इति ।कः पुनरसौ विशेष इत्युच्यते-पूर्वस्मिन्प्रश्ने- अस्ति व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा यस्यायं सप्रयो-जको बन्ध उक्त इति द्वितीये तु- तस्यैव आत्मनः अश-नायादिसंसारधर्मातीतत्वं विशेष उच्यते-यद्विशेषपरिज्ञानात्संन्याससहितात् पूर्वोक्ताद्वन्धनात् विमुच्यते ।तस्मात् प्रश्न-प्रतिवचनयोः ‘एष त आत्मा’ इत्येवमन्तयोः तुल्यार्थतैव ।ननु कथं एकस्यैव आत्मनः अशनायाद्यतीतत्वं तद्वत्त्वं चेतिविरुद्धधर्मसमवायित्वमिति—न, परिहृतत्वात् ; नामरूपवि-कारकार्यकरणलक्षणसंघातोपाधिभेदसंपर्कजनितभ्रान्तिमात्रंहि संसारित्वमित्यसकृदवोचाम, विरुद्धश्रुतिव्याख्यानप्रसङ्गेनच ; यथा रज्जुशुक्तिकागगनाद्यः सर्परजतमलिना भवन्तिपराध्यारोपितधर्मविशिष्टाः, स्वतः केवला एव रज्जुशुक्तिका-गगनादयः— न च एवं विरुद्धधर्मसमवायित्वे पदार्थानांकश्चन विरोधः ।नामरूपोपाध्यस्तित्वे ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’‘नेह नानास्ति किंचन’ इति श्रुतयो विरुध्येरन्निति चेत्—न, सलिलफेनदृष्टान्तेन परिहृतत्वात् मदादिदृष्टान्तैश्च ; यदातु परमार्थदृष्ट्या परमात्मतत्त्वात् श्रुत्यनुसारिभिः अन्यत्वेननिरूप्यमाणे नामरूपे मृदादिविकारवत् वस्त्वन्तरे तत्त्वतोन स्तः— सलिलफेनघटादिविकारवदेव, तदा तत् अपेक्ष्य‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ ‘नेह नानास्ति किंचन’ इत्यादिपरमा-र्थदर्शनगोचरत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ; रूपवदेव स्वेन रूपेण वर्तमानंकेनचिदस्पृष्टस्वभावमपि सत् नामरूपकृतकार्यकरणोपा-धिभ्यो विवेकेन नावधार्यते, नामरूपोपाधिदृष्टिरेव च भव-ति स्वाभाविकी, तदा सर्वोऽयं वस्त्वन्तरगमितत्वव्यवहारः ।अस्ति चायं भेदकृतो मिथ्याव्यवहारः, येषां ब्रह्मतत्त्पादन्य-त्वेन वस्तु विद्यते, येषां च नास्ति ; परमार्थवादिभिस्तुनायापिपासयोः ।शोकं मोहम्- शोक इति कामः ; इष्टंवस्तु उद्दिश्य चिन्तयतो यत् अरमणम् , तत् तृष्णाभिभू-तस्य कामबीजम् ; तेन हि कामो दीप्यते ; मोहस्तु विप-रीतप्रत्ययप्रभवः अविवेकः भ्रमः ; स च अविद्या सर्व-स्यानर्थस्य प्रसवबीजम् ; भिन्नकार्यत्वात्तयोः शोकमोहयोःअसमासकरणम् ।तौ मनोऽधिकरणौ ; तथा शरीराधिक-रणौ जरां मृत्युं च अत्येति ; जरेति कार्यकारणसंघातविप-रिणामः वलीपलितादिलिङ्गः ; मृत्युरिति तद्विच्छेदः विपरि-णामावसानः ; तौ जरामृत्यू शरीराधिकरणौ अत्येति ।ये ते अशनायादयः प्राणमनःशरीराधिकरणाः प्राणिषु अनव-रतं वर्तमानाः अहोरात्रादिवत् समुद्रोर्मिवच्च प्राणिषु संसारइत्युच्यन्ते ; योऽसौ दृष्टेर्द्रष्टेत्यादिलक्षणः साक्षादव्यवहितःअपरोक्षाद्गौणः सर्वान्तर आत्मा ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तानांभूतानाम् अशनायापिपासादिभिः संसारधर्मैः सदा न स्पृ-श्यते- आकाश इव घनादिमलैः- तम् एतं वै आत्मानंस्वं तत्त्वम् , विदित्वा ज्ञात्वा- अयमहमस्मि परं ब्रह्म सदासर्वसंसारविनिर्मुक्तं नित्यतृप्तमिति, ब्राह्मणाः- ब्राह्मणाना-मेवाधिकारो व्युत्थाने, अतो ब्राह्मणग्रहणम्- व्युत्थायवैपरीत्येनोत्थानं कृत्वा ; कुत इत्याह- पुत्रैषणायाः पुत्रार्थै-षणा पुत्रैषणा- पुत्रेणेमं लोकं जयेयमिति लोकजयसाधनंपुत्रं प्रति इच्छा एषणा दारसंग्रहः; दारसंग्रहमकृत्वेत्यर्थः ;वित्तैषणायाश्च- कर्मसाधनस्य गवादेरुपदानम्- अनेन कर्मकृत्वा पितृलोकं जेष्यामीति, विद्यासंयुक्तेन वा देवलोकम्,केवल्या वा हिरण्यगर्भविद्यया दैवेन वित्तेन देवलोकम् ।दैवाद्वित्तात् व्युत्थानमेव नास्तीति केचित्, यस्मात् तद्ब-लेन हि किल व्युत्थानमिति- तदसत्, ‘एतावान्वै कामः’इति पठितत्वात् एषणामध्ये दैवस्य वित्तस्य; हिरण्यगर्भा-दिदेवताविषयैव विद्या वित्तमित्युच्यते, देवलोकहेतुत्वात्; नहि निरूपाधिकप्रज्ञानघनविषया ब्रह्मविद्या देवलोकप्राप्तिहेतुः,‘तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत्’ ‘आत्मा ह्येषां स भवति’ इति श्रुतेः;तद्बलेन हि व्युत्थानम्, ‘एतं वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा’इति विशेषवचनात् ।तस्मात् त्रिभ्योऽप्येतेभ्यः अनात्म-लोकप्राप्तिसाधनेभ्यः एषणाविषयेभ्यो व्युत्थाय- एषणाकामः, ‘एतावान्वै कामः’ इति श्रुतेः- एतस्मिन् विविधेअनात्मलोकप्राप्तिसाधने तृष्णामकृत्वेत्यर्थः ।सर्वा हिसाधनेच्छा फलेच्छैव, अतो व्याचष्टे श्रुतिः- एकैव एषणे-ति; कथम्? या ह्येव पुत्रैषणा सा वित्तैषणा, दृष्टफल-साधनत्वतुल्यत्वात्; या वित्तैषणा सा लोकैषणा; फलार्थैवसा; सर्वः फलार्थप्रयुक्त एव हि सर्वं साधनमुपादत्ते; अत एकैव एषणा या लोकैषणा सा साधनमन्तरेण संपादयितुं न शक्यत इति, साध्यसाधनभेदेन उभे हि यस्मात् एते एषणे एव भवतः ।तस्मात् ब्रह्मविदो नास्ति कर्म कर्मसाधनं वा— अतो येऽतिक्रान्ता ब्राह्मणाः, सर्वं कर्म कर्मसाधनं च सर्वं देवपितृमानुषनिमित्तं यज्ञोपवीतादि— तेन हि दैवं पित्र्यं मानुषं च कर्म क्रियते, ‘निवीतं मनुष्याणाम्’ इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।तस्मात् पूर्वे ब्राह्मणाः ब्रह्मविदः व्युत्थाय कर्मभ्यः कर्मसाधनेभ्यश्च यज्ञोपवीतादिभ्यः, परमहंसपारिव्राज्यं प्रतिपद्य, भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति- भिक्षार्थं चरणं भिक्षाचर्यम्, चरन्ति- त्यक्त्वा स्मार्तं लिङ्गं केवलमाश्रममात्रशरणानां जीवनसाधनं पारिव्राज्यव्यञ्जकम्; विद्वान् लिङ्गवर्जितः- ‘तस्मादलिङ्गो धर्मज्ञोऽव्यक्तलिङ्गोऽव्यक्ताचारः’ इत्यादिस्मृतिभ्यः, ‘अथ परिव्राड्विवर्णवासा मुण्डोऽपरिग्रहः’ इत्यादिश्रुतेः, ‘सशिखान्केशान्निकृत्य विसृज्य यज्ञोपवीतम्’ इति च ॥
In plain words
On the line "you cannot see the seer of seeing," some read the words differently [a letter is missing here in the source] — that is how certain other teachers explain it. But that will not do, because the text itself says "your": the reply "this is your Self" already commits to that very point. And one body, with its organs, cannot have two selves — a single body-organ complex is ensouled by a single Self. Uṣasta's self is not, by its very kind, a different thing from Kahola's self, because it would be impossible for both of them to be, at once, non-figurative, truly the Self, and innermost of all. If one non-figurative Brahman belongs to both, the other of the two would have to be Brahman only in a manner of speaking. Selfhood and being-innermost-of-everything are properties that would clash if split between two things. If one Brahman that is innermost of all is the real, primary Self, then whatever is not innermost of all, not the true Self, must be the secondary, borrowed one. So the Self is named twice for a reason: to bring out something further about it, not to introduce a second self. What the second question adds, where it echoes the first, is really just a repetition of the earlier point — some further detail about that same Self still needs stating. And what is that detail? In the first question: "there is a Self distinct from the body, to whom this bondage, with its cause, was declared." In the second: a further truth about that very Self is declared — that it stands beyond hunger and every other mark of transmigratory life — "knowing which in particular, together with renunciation, one is freed from that bondage." So the question and its answer, both closing on "this is your Self," carry exactly the same meaning. But how, someone may ask, can one and the same Self both transcend hunger and the rest and also be subject to them — isn't that holding two contradictory properties at once? No, because we have already untangled this: being a transmigrator at all is nothing but an illusion, born from apparent contact with the different conditioning adjuncts — the body-organ complex and its play of name and form. We have said this more than once, including while explaining scriptural passages that seem to conflict. A rope, a shell, the open sky: they become a snake, silver, a smudge of dirt, dressed in qualities superimposed by someone's error — while in themselves the rope, the shell, the sky remain exactly what they always were. Seen this way, there is no real contradiction anywhere in these opposed-seeming properties. And if name and form are granted reality as adjuncts, wouldn't that contradict "one only, without a second," and "there is no diversity here at all"? No — the water-and-foam illustration, and illustrations like intoxication, have already resolved this. But once name and form, examined by scripture's own light from the standpoint of ultimate truth, are seen — like the shapes made of clay — not to be, in reality, separate substances at all, exactly as foam or a pot are not separate from water or clay: then, and only then, do lines like "one only, without a second" and "there is no diversity here at all" come to express that vision of ultimate truth. Just as a form, though never touched in its own nature by anything, still isn't discerned apart from the body-and-organ adjuncts that name and form have fashioned — and the habit of seeing oneself as that adjunct becomes second nature — so this whole way of treating the Self as though it had been carried into some other substance takes hold. And yes, this false way of dealing with things, born of assumed difference, does exist — for those who take something as different from Brahman's true nature, and for those who don't; but for anyone speaking from ultimate truth, that distinction has no purchase on hunger and thirst. Grief and delusion: grief is desire. That restlessness that comes over someone dwelling on a longed-for thing is the seed of desire in one already gripped by craving — that is what sets desire ablaze. Delusion, though, springs from a mistaken notion: it is confusion, the failure to discriminate; and that is ignorance itself, the seed from which every misfortune grows. Because grief and delusion do different work, scripture keeps them as two separate words rather than folding them into one. Both live in the mind. In the same way, the knower passes beyond old age and death, which live in the body. Old age is the body-organ complex changing — showing itself in wrinkles, gray hair, and the like. Death is that complex finally coming apart, the last point of that same change. Both of these, seated in the body, he passes beyond. Hunger and its companions, seated in breath, mind, and body, keep occurring in every living creature without a break — like day following night, like wave following wave on the sea — and this endless occurring is what we call transmigratory existence. But that Self which the words "not the seer of seeing" point to — immediate, unmediated, real rather than a figure of speech [a letter appears to be missing from the source here], innermost of everything that is — is never touched by hunger, thirst, and the rest, in any being from Brahmā down to a blade of grass, any more than the sky is touched by passing clouds. Having known this Self, one's own true reality, and realized "I am this — the supreme Brahman, forever free of all transmigration, forever full" — Brahmins renounce. Only Brahmins are fit for this renunciation; that is why the text names Brahmins specifically. To renounce is to turn and rise the opposite way from ordinary striving. Renounce what? He tells us: renounce the desire for a son — desiring something for a son's sake is what "desire for a son" means: "through a son I will win this world," so the wish aimed at a son, as the means of winning that world, is the desire in question; and this desire calls for marriage — so the meaning is, without taking a wife. And renounce the desire for wealth — the acquiring of cattle and the like, the means for ritual action — with the thought "by this rite I will win the world of the ancestors," or, joined with a certain knowledge, the world of the gods; or, by the mere knowledge of Hiraṇyagarbha together with divine wealth, that same world of the gods. Some claim there is no renouncing divine wealth at all, since its very power is supposedly what achieves renunciation. That is wrong — because scripture itself lists divine wealth among the desires when it says "this much, indeed, is desire." One might object that "wealth" here really just means the knowledge whose object is Hiraṇyagarbha and the other deities, since that knowledge leads to the world of the gods. But no: knowledge of Brahman, whose object is the undivided mass of pure awareness with no conditioning adjunct at all, is not what wins the world of the gods — scripture itself says "therefore all of that became him" and "he indeed becomes their Self." It is by the power of that knowledge that renunciation truly comes about, exactly as scripture specifies: "having known this very Self." So, having renounced all three of these — every means of reaching some world other than the Self, every object of desire — the sense is: without forming any craving at all for these many roads to a world that is not the Self. Every desire for a means is really nothing but desire for its result; that is why scripture spells it out: it is one single desire wearing three names. How? The very desire for a son is, in substance, the desire for wealth, since both serve equally as means to a visible result; and the desire for wealth is, in substance, the desire for [heavenly] worlds — it too exists purely for the sake of a result. Anyone driven by desire for a result will take up whatever means serves it. So it comes down to a single desire — desire for those worlds — which cannot be reached without some means; and though the end and its means are, of course, distinct from each other, these three so-called desires are, in the end, one and the same craving. For the knower of Brahman, therefore, there is no ritual duty left, and no requisite for one. That is why those Brahmins who have gone beyond such things set aside every rite and every requisite for a rite — the sacred thread included — all of it undertaken, ultimately, on behalf of gods, ancestors, and fellow human beings; it is by that very thread that rites for gods, ancestors, and humans are carried out, as scripture says: "the sacred cord, for human beings," and so on. That is why the Brahmins of old, having realized Brahman, gave up rites, the requisites for rites, and the sacred thread itself, took up the highest order of wandering renunciation, and lived by begging alone — "wandering for alms" is exactly what "the practice of begging" means. They wander having set aside even the traditional emblem that otherwise marks out — and merely sustains the life of — those whose only refuge is the renunciate's path; the one who truly knows carries no mark at all. So say the law-books: "therefore the knower of dharma bears no sign, his mark unseen, his conduct unseen"; so says scripture: "then the mendicant, in faded robes, head shaved, owning nothing"; and again: "having cut away the hair and its tuft, having thrown off the sacred thread."
Close to the Sanskrit
Here, at "not the seer of seeing," some explain the syllables differently [the source shows a gap where "iti" should follow] — some [other commentators] explain it thus. That is not so, because of the assertion of "your"; for in the reply "this is your Self" that very point was asserted. And it is not possible for one body-and-organ aggregate to have two selves; for one body-and-organ aggregate is ensouled by one Self. Nor does a self, different in kind, belonging to Uṣasta become distinct from one belonging to Kahola, because it would be impossible for both to be non-figurative, to be the Self, and to be innermost-of-all at once. If one non-figurative Brahman is common to the two, the other of the two would necessarily have to be so only in a figurative sense. Likewise selfhood and being-innermost-of-all [could not both hold for two different things], since these properties would be contradictory. If one Brahman that is innermost-of-all is the Self primarily, the other, being not-innermost-of-all and not the Self, would necessarily have to be so only secondarily. Therefore the hearing of one and the same [Self] twice is for the purpose of stating a further particular. As for what was stated in the second question that is similar to what was said before — that much is merely a restatement of the former; some unstated particular of that same [Self] remains to be declared. What, then, is that particular? It is explained thus: in the former question — "there is a Self distinct [from the aggregate], to whom this bondage together with its cause was declared" — whereas in the second, a particular of that same Self is declared, namely its transcendence of the conditions of transmigratory existence beginning with hunger — "by the specific knowledge of which, together with renunciation, one is released from the aforesaid bondage." Therefore, of the question and its reply, both ending "this is your Self," there is indeed sameness of meaning. [Objection:] But how can it be that transcending hunger and the rest, and possessing them, belong to one and the same Self — is this not the inherence of contradictory properties? [Reply:] No, because this has already been resolved: mere being-a-transmigrator is nothing but the illusion born of contact with the distinction among conditioning adjuncts characterized by the modification of name-and-form and by the body-organ aggregate — this we have said more than once, and also on the occasion of explaining apparently contradictory scriptural texts. Just as the rope, the mother-of-pearl, and the sky, etc., become [respectively] snake, silver, and dirt, qualified by properties superimposed by another [i.e. by error], while in themselves the rope, mother-of-pearl, sky, etc., are simply what they are — so too there is no contradiction at all for entities in such an inherence of contradictory properties. [Objection:] If the conditioning adjunct name-and-form is taken as real, would not the scriptures "one only, without a second" and "there is no diversity whatsoever here" be contradicted? [Reply:] No, because this has been resolved by the illustration of water and foam, and by illustrations such as intoxication. But when, from the standpoint of ultimate reality, following scripture, name-and-form — being described as different [from Brahman] — like the products of clay etc., are in truth not [existing] as a separate substance, exactly as the products of water-foam, pot, etc. are not — then, with regard to that, [these texts] attain the scope of expressing the vision of ultimate reality, as in "one only, without a second," "there is no diversity whatsoever here," and the like. Just as [space], existing in its own nature though untouched by anything, is nevertheless not discerned, by discrimination, apart from the conditioning adjuncts of body and organs produced by name-and-form; and the perception that identifies with the adjunct of name-and-form becomes itself instinctive — then this whole practice of treating it as though carried over into another substance [arises]. And this false practice, produced by [the assumption of] difference, does exist — for those for whom a thing exists as different from the true nature of Brahman, and for those for whom it does not; but for those who speak from the standpoint of ultimate reality, [there is no such distinction] regarding hunger and thirst. Grief, delusion: grief means desire. That non-satisfaction which occurs to one dwelling in thought, aiming at a desired object, is the seed of desire for one overcome by craving; by that indeed desire is kindled. Delusion, however, is that which arises from a contrary cognition — non-discrimination, confusion; and that is ignorance, the seed-source of every evil. Because their effects are different, no compound is formed of the two, grief and delusion. Those two have the mind as their locus. Likewise, [the knower] transcends old age and death, which have the body as their locus. "Old age" means the transformation of the body-organ aggregate, marked by wrinkles, gray hair, and the like. "Death" means the severance of that [aggregate], the terminal point of that transformation. Those two, old age and death, which have the body as their locus, he transcends. Those conditions beginning with hunger, which have breath, mind, and body as their loci, occurring incessantly among living beings, like day and night and the like, and like the waves of the ocean among living beings, are called "transmigratory existence." That Self which is characterized as the one referred to by "not the seer of seeing" and the like — directly present, unmediated, non-figurative by virtue of immediacy [the source is here defective, apparently dropping the negating "a-"], innermost of all — is never touched, by the conditions of transmigratory existence beginning with hunger and thirst, in beings ranging from Brahmā down to a tuft of grass — just as the sky is never touched by clouds and other impurities. Having known, having realized, that very Self, one's own true reality — "I am this, the supreme Brahman, ever free from all transmigratory existence, eternally satisfied" — Brahmins [renounce]. Only Brahmins have the qualification for renunciation; hence the mention of "Brahmins." Having renounced [means]: having performed a rising-up that is the reverse [of ordinary worldly striving]. Renounced from what? — he explains: "from the desire for a son": desire for the sake of a son is desire-for-a-son — "by a son I shall conquer this world" — thus the wish directed toward a son, which is the means for conquering that world, is "desire"; this entails the taking of a wife; the meaning is "without having taken a wife." And from the desire for wealth — the acquisition of cattle and the like, which are the means of ritual action — "by this action I shall conquer the world of the fathers," or, when joined with knowledge, the world of the gods; or, by the mere knowledge of Hiraṇyagarbha alone, together with divine wealth, the world of the gods. Some say there is no renunciation at all from divine wealth, since, by its power, renunciation is [supposedly] achieved. That is not so, because it is read among the [enumerated] desires: "this much indeed is desire," including divine wealth. [Objection:] But "wealth" here means precisely the knowledge whose object is the deities beginning with Hiraṇyagarbha, since that is the cause of [attaining] the world of the gods. [Reply:] No, for the knowledge of Brahman whose object is the mass of unconditioned pure consciousness is not the cause of attaining the world of the gods, on account of the scriptural statements "therefore all that became [it]" and "he indeed becomes their Self." By the power of that [very knowledge] indeed is renunciation [achieved], on account of the specific statement "having known that very Self." Therefore, having renounced even all three of these — the means of attaining worlds other than the Self, the objects of desire — the meaning is: without having formed craving for this manifold means of attaining worlds other than the Self. For every desire for a means is nothing but desire for its result; hence scripture explains: it is one and the same desire. How so? Because that very desire for a son is, in effect, desire for wealth, on account of their equal status as means to a visible result; and that desire for wealth is, in effect, desire for worlds; it too exists solely for the sake of a result; for anyone impelled by desire for a result indeed takes up any means whatsoever. Hence it is one single desire — the desire for worlds — which cannot be accomplished apart from a means; therefore, though these two are distinguished as end and means, these [three] are nevertheless one and the same desire. Therefore, for the knower of Brahman, there is no ritual action or means of ritual action. Hence those Brahmins who have transcended [these renounce] every ritual action and every means of ritual action — the sacred thread and the like — whose purpose is action for the sake of gods, ancestors, and men; for by that [thread] indeed, action for gods, ancestors, and men is performed, on account of the scriptural statement "the sacred cord, for men," and the like. Therefore the ancient Brahmins, knowers of Brahman, having renounced ritual actions and the means of ritual action and the sacred thread and the like, having taken up the mendicancy of the paramahaṃsa, wander for alms — "wandering for the sake of alms" is what is meant by "bhikṣācaryā" — they wander, having abandoned the traditional mark, which serves merely as a means of livelihood and outward sign of mendicancy for those whose sole refuge is the [renunciate] order of life; the knower is devoid of even that mark — on the authority of such smṛti texts as "therefore the knower of dharma is without mark, of unmanifest sign, of unmanifest conduct," and such scriptural texts as "then the mendicant, clad in faded garb, shaven-headed, without possessions," and "having cut off the hair together with the tuft, having cast away the sacred thread."