Bhashya
ननु ‘व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति’ इति वर्तमानापदेशात् अर्थवादोऽयम्; न विधायकः प्रत्ययः कश्चिच्छ्रूयते लिङ्लोट्तव्यानामन्यतमोऽपि; तस्मात् अर्थवादमात्रेण श्रुति-हातव्यत्वेनेष्टत्वात् , यज्ञोपवीतादिसाधनानां च तद्वि-षयत्वात् ।तस्मात् असाधनफलस्वभावादात्मनः अन्यवि-षया विलक्षणा एषणा ; उभे ह्येते साधनफले एषणे एवभवतः यज्ञोपवीतादेस्तत्साध्यकर्मणां च साधनत्वात् , ‘उभेह्येते एषणे एव’ इति हेतुवचनेनावधारणात् ।यज्ञोपवीतादि-साधनात् तत्साध्येभ्यश्च कर्मभ्यः अविद्याविषयत्वात् एषणा-रूपत्वाच्च जिहासितव्यरूपत्वाच्च व्युत्थानं विधित्सितमेव ।ननुपनिषद् आत्मज्ञानपरत्वात् व्युत्थानश्रुतिः तत्स्तुत्यर्था, नविधिः—न, विधित्सितविज्ञानेन समानकर्तृकत्वश्रवणात् ; नहि अकर्तव्येन कर्तव्यस्य समानकर्तृकत्वेन वेदे कदाचिदपिश्रवणं संभवति ; कर्तव्यानामेव हि अभिषवहोमभक्षाणां यथाश्रवणम्— अभिषुत्य हुत्वा भक्षयन्तीति, तद्वत् आत्मज्ञानैष-णाव्युत्थानभिक्षाचर्याणां कर्तव्यानामेव समानकर्तृकत्वश्रवणंभवेत् ।अविद्याविषयत्वात् एषणात्वाच्च अर्थप्राप्त आत्मज्ञा-नविधेरेव यज्ञोपवीतादिपरित्यागः, न तु विधातव्य इतिचेत्— न ; सुतरामात्मज्ञानविधिनैव विहितस्य समानक-र्तृकत्वश्रवणेन दाढ्यौपपत्तिः, तथा भिक्षाचर्यस्य च ।यत्पुनरुक्तम्, वर्तमानापदेशादर्थवादमात्रमिति— न, औदु-म्बरयूपादिविधिसमानत्वाददोषः ॥
In plain words
Someone may object: "having renounced, then they wander for alms" is written in the present tense — so surely this is just a description, not a command. After all, none of the actual command-forms show up here: no optative, no imperative, no "must" construction. So the giving up of the sacred thread and its accessories looks like something scripture simply reports, not something it orders. But look closer. The Self is not the kind of thing that any means can produce as its result, so the desire for it stands apart, aimed at something entirely different from ordinary desire. Ordinary desire — for the sacred thread and everything it accomplishes — always comes paired with a means and a result; that is exactly what makes it desire in the everyday sense, and scripture itself confirms as much: "both of these really are desires." Precisely because the sacred thread and the rites built on it belong to ignorance, are themselves a form of desire, and by their very nature call for release, giving them up is indeed what is being commanded here. One might still say: since the Upaniṣad's whole concern is knowledge of the Self, this line about renunciation is only there to praise that knowledge, not to command anything. But no — it shares its grammatical subject with the very act of knowing that scripture does command, and the Veda never lets something optional share an agent with something obligatory. Think of the Soma rite: pressing, offering, and eating are all duties, and scripture states them together — "having pressed, having offered, they eat" — precisely because they share one agent. In just the same way, knowing the Self, giving up desire, renouncing, and wandering for alms must all be read as duties sharing that one agent. Someone might try once more: since giving up the sacred thread already follows automatically from the command to know the Self — being, after all, a matter of ignorance and of desire — perhaps it never needed a command of its own. But no: that shared-agent wording only makes what the command to know the Self already implies even more solidly established — and the same goes for wandering for alms. And the earlier worry, that the present tense makes this a mere description — that falls away too. There is nothing wrong with it: this is exactly the same pattern as the well-known injunction about the udumbara sacrificial post, which is likewise phrased in the present tense and is nonetheless a genuine command.
Close to the Sanskrit
[Objection:] But because "having renounced, then they practice mendicancy" is a present-tense description, this is a mere descriptive statement; for no injunctive verbal ending is heard — not the optative, the imperative, nor the gerundive in -tavya, not even one of these. Therefore, because it is held that this is merely to be abandoned as a descriptive statement of scripture, and because the sacred thread and its accessories are the very object of that statement, [therefore this is not a real command]. [Reply:] Therefore, since the Self is not, by nature, a result to be attained through a means, the desire [for Self-knowledge] has a different object and is of a different kind [than ordinary worldly desire]; for both of these [worldly desire, and the ritual injunction concerning the sacred thread] are indeed desires that have a means and a result, since the sacred thread and the like, and the actions accomplished through them, have the nature of a means — this is ascertained by the reason-giving statement, "both of these are indeed desires." From the sacred thread and its accessories, and from the actions accomplished by them, renunciation is indeed meant to be enjoined, because these belong to the sphere of ignorance, because they have the nature of desire, and because their very nature calls for abandonment. [Objection:] But since the Upaniṣad is chiefly concerned with knowledge of the Self, the scriptural statement about renunciation exists merely to praise that [knowledge]; it is not an injunction. [Reply:] No, because it is heard to share the same agent as the [act of] knowledge that is to be enjoined. For it is never possible in the Veda for something not obligatory to be heard as sharing the same agent as something obligatory. Just as, regarding the pressing, the oblation, and the eating — all of which are indeed obligatory — it is heard: "having pressed, having offered, they eat"; in the same way, the hearing of a shared agent should hold for knowledge of the Self, [renunciation of] desire, renunciation, and the practice of begging — all of which are equally obligatory. [Objection:] Since the abandonment of the sacred thread and the like is already obtained by implication from the very injunction of Self-knowledge — because it belongs to the sphere of ignorance and has the nature of desire — it need not be separately enjoined. [Reply:] No; rather, what is [already] enjoined by the injunction of Self-knowledge is all the more firmly established by the hearing of the shared agent — and likewise for the practice of begging. As for what was said again — that because of the present-tense description this is a mere descriptive statement — that is not so, since there is no fault, this being similar to the injunction concerning the udumbara sacrificial post and the like.