Bhashya
‘आपो वा इदमासन्’ इत्याद्या ‘तदे-तन्निष्कामस्य भवति’ इत्यन्ता ताप-नीयोपनिषत् श्रीनृसिंहाकारब्रह्मविष-या सती निराकारब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्युपायभू-ता ; अत एव पृथक्संबन्धाभिधेयप्रयो-जनानि न वक्तव्यानि ; यान्येव तु उपनिषत्संबन्धाभिधेयप्र-योजनानि तान्येवोपनिषद्याचिख्यासुना संक्षेपतो वक्तव्या-नि ।तत्र प्रयोजनसाधनाभिव्यञ्जकत्वेनाभिधेयसंबन्धशास्त्रंपारम्पर्येण प्रयोजनवत् ।किं पुनः प्रयोजनमिति, उच्यते—रोगार्तस्येव रोगनिवृत्तौ स्वस्थता, दुःखात्मकस्य आत्मनोद्वैतप्रपञ्चोपशमे स्वस्थता द्वैताभावः प्रयोजनम्, द्वैतप्रप-ञ्चस्य च अविद्याकृतत्वाद्विद्यया तदुपशमः स्यादिति ब्रह्म-विद्याप्रकाशनाय अस्या आरम्भः ।‘यत्र हि द्वैतमिव’ ‘यत्रच अन्यदिव स्यात् तत्रान्योऽन्यत्पश्येत्...विजानीयात्’ ‘यत्रत्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्...विजानीयात्’ इत्या-दिश्रुतिभ्योऽभ्यार्थस्य सिद्धिः ।तत्र तावदस्यामुपनिषदिइदं परामृश्यते— किं तावद्वेद्यं विद्याभेदः, आहोस्वित्अन्योन्यविशेषणविशेष्यभावाद्विशिष्टस्य च वेद्यस्यैक्यात् वि-द्यैक्यम् इति ।तत्र किं नः प्रतिभाति ? विद्याभेद इति ।तथा हि—प्रथमोपनिषदि लोकसाङ्गसामशुद्धसामग्र्यादि-सामान्तर्गतस्वरविशेषक्षीरोदार्णवशायिनृकेसरिशंकरसच्चिदा-नन्दमयानामन्योन्यविशेषणविशेष्यभावरहितानां वेद्यानां श्र-वणात् तथा प्रणवानुष्टुप्पदपदार्थशक्तमामबीजसामाङ्गमन्त्र-चतुष्टयानां वेद्यानां द्वितीयतृतीयचतुर्थोपनिषत्सु यथासंख्यंश्रवणात् ।अन्योपनिषदि महाचक्रविद्या श्रूयते ।नन्वन्यो-न्यविशेषणविशेष्यभावरहितानामप्यङ्गाङ्गिभावो भवतु ।नेतिब्रूमः, 'फलवत्संनिधावफलं तदङ्गम्' इति न्यायवैषम्यात् ।तथा हि—लोकादितत्तद्वेद्यानां फलसंबंधेन 'यो जानीतेसोऽमृतत्वं च गच्छति' इत्यसकृच्छ्रवणात् ।ननु लोका-दीनामन्योन्यविशेषणविशेष्यभावरहितानामपि श्रीनृसिंहाका-रब्रह्मणा सह विशेषणविशेष्यभावसंभवात् ।तथाहि—'सर्वाँल्लोकान्सर्वान्देवान्सर्वानात्मनः सर्वाणि भूतान्युद्बृहा-त्युद्बृहते' इत्यादिपदव्याख्याने सर्वेषां वेद्यानां तत्संबंध-श्रवणात् ।अतो विशिष्टस्य वेद्यस्यैक्यात् विद्यैक्यमिति ।अ-
In plain words
The Tāpanīya Upaniṣad opens with 'the waters alone were this' and closes with 'this belongs to one free of desire.' Its whole subject is Brahman wearing the form of the glorious Narasiṃha, yet what it actually does is carry a person toward the formless Brahman beyond every form. That is exactly why we don't need a separate statement of connection, subject, and purpose for each of its sections — only one, stated briefly, for the Upaniṣad as a whole. And that treatise earns its purpose in a chain: it shows us the means, and the means serves the end. What end? Think of someone sick: health arrives only when the sickness leaves. In the same way, health for the self — a self that suffers precisely because it lives inside a world split into you and other, this and that — arrives only when that split dissolves. And because the split is nothing but ignorance's own handiwork, only knowledge can dissolve it. That is why this teaching exists at all: to bring the knowledge of Brahman into the light. Scripture itself backs this up — 'where duality still seems to stand, one sees another, knows another,' but 'where everything has become nothing but the Self, what is left to see, what is left to know, and by what?' Now, within this particular Upaniṣad, one question needs settling: are its several sections teaching several different things, or, because each part qualifies and is qualified by the others, do they all converge on one single object and therefore one single teaching? My own reading is: several different things. Here is why. The first section speaks, through a particular note carried in chants like the Loka-, Sāṅga-, and Śuddha-sāman and the Sāmagrī, of four objects that simply sit side by side with no bearing on one another: the one who reclines on the ocean of milk, the man-lion, Śaṅkara, and the one who is being, consciousness, and bliss itself. The second, third, and fourth sections likewise each name, in turn, one item from another set of four — the syllable Om, the Anuṣṭubh in word and meaning, the Śakta-māma seed-mantra, the Sāma's own limb-mantra. And somewhere else again, we hear of the teaching of the 'Great Wheel.' Someone might object: fine, they don't qualify each other directly, but couldn't one still be the main teaching and the rest merely its supporting limbs? No — because the rule that lets something with no independent fruit count as a limb of something that does have a fruit simply doesn't apply here. Each of these, one after another, is promised its own fruit: 'whoever knows this attains immortality' — said again and again, for each one on its own terms. Someone might press further: even if these items don't relate to each other, couldn't each still stand in relation to Brahman-as-Narasiṃha, and so form one picture after all? After all, in explaining the phrase 'he draws up all the worlds, all the gods, all souls, all beings — draws them up into himself,' scripture does connect every one of these objects to that same Narasiṃha-Brahman. And if the qualified object turns out to be one, doesn't the teaching about it turn out to be one as well? [Here the text breaks off mid-word, before Śaṅkara's answer to this objection is given.]
Close to the Sanskrit
The Tāpanīya Upaniṣad, beginning with 'The waters indeed were this' and ending with 'This belongs to one free from desire' — though having as its subject-matter Brahman in the form of the glorious Narasiṃha — serves as the means to realizing the formless Brahman. For this very reason, separate [statements of] connection, subject-matter, and purpose [for its individual sections] need not be given; only the connection, subject-matter, and purpose of the Upaniṣad [as a whole] need be briefly stated by one who wishes to explain it. In that regard, the treatise, along with its subject-matter and connection, has a purpose derivatively, by manifesting the means to that purpose. What, then, is the purpose? It is said: just as health follows the removal of disease for one afflicted by it, so for the self whose nature is suffering, the purpose is health upon the cessation of the manifold of duality — the absence of duality. And since that manifold of duality is brought about by ignorance, its cessation would come through knowledge; hence this [Upaniṣad] is begun to reveal the knowledge of Brahman. This meaning is established from scriptures such as 'where there is, as it were, duality... one sees another, knows another,' and 'but where all this has become the Self alone, by what should one see what, know what.' Here, then, this much is examined in this Upaniṣad: is the object of knowledge different [in each section, giving] a difference of teaching, or, because of a relation of mutual qualifier and qualified and the resulting unity of the qualified object of knowledge, is there a unity of teaching? What appears right to us here is: a difference of teaching. For thus: in the first Upaniṣad-section, a particular tone within the Loka-, Sāṅga-, Śuddha-sāman, Sāmagrī, and other such chants, [applied to] the objects of knowledge — the one reclining on the ocean of milk, the man-lion, Śaṅkara, and the one consisting of being-consciousness-bliss — which lack any relation of mutual qualifier and qualified, is heard; likewise, the group of four objects of knowledge — the Praṇava, the Anuṣṭubh word and its meaning, the Śakta-māma seed-syllable, and the Sāma-limb mantra — is heard respectively in the second, third, and fourth Upaniṣad-sections. In yet another section, the 'Great Wheel' teaching is heard. [Objection:] But even for items lacking a mutual qualifier-qualified relation, let there still be a relation of subsidiary and principal! [Reply:] We say no, because the maxim 'that which has no result, in proximity to what has a result, is its subsidiary' does not apply here. For it is repeatedly heard, in connection with each particular object of knowledge beginning with 'the world,' that each has its own result: 'he who knows this attains immortality.' [Objection:] But even items like 'the world' and the rest, though lacking mutual relation among themselves, could still stand in a qualifier-qualified relation with Brahman in the form of the glorious Narasiṃha. For thus: in the explanation of the words 'he draws up all the worlds, all the gods, all the selves, all beings, draws them up for himself,' the connection of all these objects of knowledge with that [Brahman] is heard. Therefore, because of the unity of the [resulting] qualified object of knowledge, there is unity of teaching. [The reply to this objection breaks off here, mid-word, at the record boundary]