Bhāṣya
अथैवमुच्यते — चैतन्यस्य द्वे रूपे स्तः, आत्मस्वरूपता चैतन्यस्वरूपता चेति ।तत्र आत्मस्वरूपतया आत्मनो न भिद्यते ; भिद्यते च चैतन्यस्वरूपतया ।अतः उभयरूपाभ्यां भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमविरुद्धमिति — तदपि न, धर्मधर्मित्वाभावात् ।तथा हि — येन रूपेण तदभिन्नं न तेन रूपेण धर्मत्वम् अभिन्नत्वादवोचाम ।येन रूपेण भिन्नम् , तेनापि न धर्मः, भिन्नत्वाद्घटादिवदित्युक्तम् ।यच्चोक्तम् उभयरूपाभ्यां भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमिति, तदपि विचारं न सहते ।ते रूपे किं चैतन्याद्भिन्ने, अभिन्ने, भिन्नाभिन्ने वा ।तत्र न तावद्भिन्ने, भिन्नत्वे घटादिवदकिञ्चित्करणत्वात् ; अभिन्नत्वे चैतन्यमात्रमेवेति न ताभ्यां भिन्नाभिन्नत्वम् ।भिन्नाभिन्नत्वं च विरोधादेव न युक्तम् ।तयोरपि रूपान्तराभ्यां भिन्नभिन्नत्वाभ्युपगमे अनवस्थापात इत्यलमतिविस्तरेण ।तस्मान्नात्मा सर्वथा चिद्धर्मा ; किं तर्हि ? चित्स्वरूप एवेति ।एतेन सदानन्दयोरपि आत्मस्वरूपत्वं व्याख्यातम् ।
In plain words
Now the objection is raised: Consciousness has two aspects—its identity as the Self and its identity as consciousness itself. Through the first, it is not separate from the Self, but through the second, it is separate. Therefore, holding that it is both separate and non-separate through these two aspects is free from contradiction. But this too is untenable, because the fundamental relationship between a substrate and its attributes collapses here. For if an aspect is non-separate from the Self, it cannot function as an attribute, as we have already shown. And if it is separate, it cannot be a quality either, for being separate would make it an inert object like a pot. Nor does your claim of a hybrid state of separation and non-separation survive scrutiny. Are these two aspects separate from consciousness, non-separate, or both? They cannot be separate, for if they were, they would be as inert and functionless as a pot. If they are non-separate, there is nothing here but pure consciousness itself, leaving no room for a dual status. Moreover, being both separate and non-separate at once is logically impossible due to direct contradiction. If you try to resolve this by imagining yet further aspects to bridge the difference, you fall straight into an endless regress—enough of such wordy extensions. Therefore, the ātman is not merely something that possesses consciousness as a quality; rather, it is pure consciousness itself. By this same reasoning, existence and bliss are also understood to be nothing other than the very nature of the Self.
Close to the Sanskrit
Now it is stated thus: 'There are two forms of consciousness, the state of self-nature and the state of consciousness-nature, 'echoes the view. There, by the self-nature it is not distinct from the Self; and it is distinct by the consciousness-nature. Therefore, the state of being both distinct and non-distinct through both forms is uncontradicted'—even that is not so, because of the absence of an attribute-and-substratum relationship. For thus: by whichever form that is non-distinct, by that form it is not an attribute, as we stated because of non-difference. By whichever form it is distinct, by that also it is not an attribute, because it is distinct, like a pot and so forth, as has been said. And whatever was said, 'the state of being both distinct and non-distinct through both forms,' that also does not endure scrutiny. Are those two forms distinct from consciousness, non-distinct, or distinct-and-non-distinct? There, certainly they are not distinct, because in the state of difference they would be inactive like a pot; in the state of non-difference it is consciousness alone, hence there is no state of being distinct and non-distinct from those two. And the state of being distinct and non-distinct is not proper simply because of contradiction. If it is accepted that those two also are distinct and non-distinct by other forms, there ensues an infinite regress, enough of excessive expansion. Therefore the ātman is not in every way possessing consciousness as an attribute; what then? It is of the very nature of consciousness. By this, the self-nature of eternity and bliss has also been explained.