Bhāṣya
अथोच्यते — प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात् भेदाभेदौ अविरुद्धौ ।तथा हि — गौरियमिति पिण्डाव्यतिरेकेण गोत्वं प्रतीयते ; तदेव पिण्डान्तरे प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् भेदेनावगम्यते ; अतः प्रत्यक्षेणैव भेदाभेदयोः प्रतीयमानत्वात् अविरोध इति — नैतत्साधु मन्यामहे, प्रत्यक्षस्य अन्यथासिद्धत्वात् — भिन्नमपि हि वस्तु प्रत्यक्षेण अत्यन्तसंनिधानादिदोषात् अभिन्नवत्प्रतीयते — यथा दीपज्वाला भिन्नापि कुतश्चित्कारणादभिन्नवत्प्रतिभासन्ते, तथा अभिन्नमपि वस्तु भिन्नमिव प्रतिभासते — यथा एकस्माच्चन्द्राद्वितीयश्चन्द्र इति — अतः प्रत्यक्षस्य अन्यथासिद्धत्वात् न तेन प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणसिद्धस्य भेदाभेदविरोधस्य प्रतिक्षेपो युक्त इति ।
In plain words
Now the opponent argues: 'Since both difference and non-difference are directly experienced, they are not contradictory. For instance, when we say 'this is a cow,' the universal quality of cowness is perceived as inseparable from the individual body; yet it is also recognized as distinct because we see the same cowness in another individual. Thus, both being directly perceived, there is no logical flaw.' We reply: This is unsound, because direct perception can be explained otherwise. For even separate objects can appear as one due to extreme proximity—just as distinct flames of a lamp merge into a single appearance under certain conditions. Conversely, a single object can appear as multiple—just as one moon appears as two to a defective eye. Therefore, since sensory perception is subject to such alternative explanations, it cannot be used to refute the established truth.
Close to the Sanskrit
Now it is stated: Because they are established by direct perception, difference and non-difference are not contradictory. Thus: 'This is a cow'—cowness is perceived without separation from the individual body; and the same is known as distinct because it is recognized in another body. Therefore, since difference and non-difference are perceived precisely through perception, there is no contradiction. We do not consider this to be sound, because perception is accounted for otherwise. For even a distinct object appears as non-distinct through perception due to a defect such as extreme proximity—just as lamp flames, though distinct, appear non-distinct due to some cause; and an object that is non-distinct appears as distinct—just as a second moon from a single moon. Therefore, since perception is accounted for otherwise, the refutation of the contradiction of difference and non-difference by that perception is not proper.