Bhāṣya
? । । ; । । —
In plain words
An objection is raised: How can a single ātman preside over many acts of cognition at the very same time? Surely a single horseman is never seen managing multiple running horses simultaneously; control must happen sequentially. Yet here in experience that sequential control does not happen, because all mental functions are observed operating at once, and unguided mental states could not function at all. Therefore, the ātman cannot be a single finite entity like that. In light of this difficulty, the text says:
Close to the Sanskrit
Now then, how does one single Self preside over multiple intellects simultaneously? For a single horse-rider is not observed presiding over multiple horses simultaneously; sequential presiding is reasonable. And that is not here, because of the seeing of the activity of all intellects in their own activity simultaneously, and because of the impossibility of activity for unpresided things. Hence the Self is not one — in view of this, [the author] says: