Bhāṣya
तथा हि — आत्मनश्चैतन्यं भिन्नम् , अभिन्नं वा, भिन्नाभिन्नं वा ।तत्र न तावद्भिन्नम् ; भिन्नं चेत् , घटवदात्मधर्मत्वानुपपत्तेः ।ननु घटः असम्बन्धात् आत्मधर्मो न भवति, चैतन्यं तु आत्मसम्बन्धीति युक्तमात्मधर्मत्वम् इत्यपि न सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः ।सम्बन्धो हि तावत् संयोगो वा समवायो वा स्यात् , सम्बन्धान्तरस्य अत्र असम्भवात् ।न तावत्संयोगः, तस्य द्रव्यमात्रधर्मत्वात् , अद्रव्यत्वाच्चैतन्यस्य ।नापि समवायः, अनवस्थापातात् ।समवायो हि सम्बद्धः समवायिनौ सम्बध्नाति, असम्बद्धो वा ? न तावदसम्बद्धः, घटादिवदकिञ्चित्करत्वात् ।सम्बद्धश्चेत् , संयोगादेरभावेन समवायस्यापि समवायान्तरमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।एवं परम्परापेक्षायाम् अनवस्थापात इति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् ।तस्माद्भिन्नत्वपक्षे धर्मधर्मिभावः सर्वथा नोपपद्यते ।अभिन्नत्वपक्षे तु बोधस्य आत्मरूपत्वेन सुतरां धर्मधर्मिभावो नास्त्येव ।न हि तस्य तदेव धर्मो भवति ; न हि शुक्लं शुक्लस्य धर्मो भवतीति ।तस्मात् भिन्नाभिन्नत्वपक्ष एव अवशिष्यते ।स च विरोधान्न युज्यते — न ह्येकमेवैकस्मात् भिन्नमभिन्नं च भवितुमर्हति, विरोधात् ।
In plain words
Furthermore, let us examine consciousness in relation to the self: is it separate, identical, or both at once? First, it cannot be separate. If it were separate from the self, it could never function as an attribute of the self, any more than an ordinary clay pot can. An opponent might argue: a pot is not a property of the self because there is no direct connection, whereas consciousness is intimately linked to the self, making its status as a property entirely reasonable. But even this argument fails, because establishing any real relationship between them is impossible. Any relationship must be either physical contact or inseparable inherence, since no other category of connection exists. It cannot be physical contact, because contact applies exclusively to physical substances, and consciousness is not a substance. Nor can it be inherence, because that leads straight to an endless regress. Does the relation of inherence connect two entities while it is already connected to them, or while it is unconnected? It cannot be unconnected, for then it would be utterly useless, like a pot. And if it is already connected, then lacking any prior contact, you would have to postulate yet another relation of inherence to connect the first one, leading to an endless chain of dependencies. Thus, this line of reasoning completely collapses. Therefore, on the hypothesis that consciousness is separate from the self, the relationship between a property and its bearer is utterly indefensible. On the hypothesis that they are identical, since awareness is the very essence of the self, the relationship of property and bearer vanishes entirely. Nothing can ever be a property of itself; white does not become a property of white. Consequently, only the third alternative remains: that consciousness is simultaneously separate and identical. But this too fails due to logical contradiction, for one and the same entity cannot possibly be both distinct and non-distinct from something else.
Close to the Sanskrit
Furthermore, consciousness of the self is distinct, or non-distinct, or both-distinct-and-non-distinct. There, firstly, it is not distinct; if it were distinct, due to the non-establishment of being an attribute of the self, like a pot. Now, a pot is not an attribute of the self due to lack of connection, but consciousness is connected to the self, thus its status as an attribute of the self is appropriate—even this is not so, due to the impossibility of a relationship. A relationship indeed would be either conjunction or inherence, due to the impossibility of another relationship here. Not firstly conjunction, because of its being an attribute solely of substances, and because consciousness is not a substance. Nor inherence, due to falling into infinite regress. Inherence indeed connects two inhering entities while connected, or while unconnected? Not firstly unconnected, because it would be ineffective like a pot etc. If connected, in the absence of conjunction etc., another inherence of inherence also must be accepted. Thus upon requiring a series there is the fall of infinite regress—this is trivial. Therefore, in the view of distinctness, the relation of attribute and substrate in no way holds up. In the view of non-distinctness, however, since awareness is of the nature of the self, the relation of attribute and substrate does not exist at all. For something does not become an attribute of itself; just as white does not become an attribute of white. Therefore, only the view of both-distinct-and-non-distinct remains. And that is not tenable due to contradiction—for one and the same entity from one [source] cannot be both distinct and non-distinct, because of contradiction.